Search

This paper examines the state of the art of the Brexit negotiations in the area of financial services. It uses a two‐level game model to first explain the positions of UK and EU negotiators on the basis of the domestic constraints they face, and second, to consider the scope for final agreement based on the 'win‐set' of both sides. The paper analyses the preferences and power of three main groups of players within the UK and EU: the political authorities, financial regulators, and the financial industry. We argue that the scope for agreement on financial services has been severely hampered by political and regulatory constraints which forced UK and EU negotiators to adopt early hawkish negotiating positions, and by the absence of a unified position from the financial industry. After the 2017 general election, the position of the UK government and UK financial industry briefly converged, thereby narrowing the domestic win‐set, but also increasing the scope for agreement. However, the July 2018 'Chequers' deal represents a hardening of the UK government's position on financial services. We argue that this reflects the fact that the twin pressures facing UK negotiators—acute political constraints at home and bargaining weakness in Brussels—has become more, not less, acute over time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides a critical theoretical review of the political factors, which significantly influenced the June 2016 Brexit decision to leave the European Union (EU). This paper also provides a critical investigation of the likely impact of Brexit on certain social, political and economic aspects of the UK landscape. To this end the paper also analyses the effect EU policies on the economy, migration, sovereignty and democracy had on Brexit views. During the 2014 European Parliament elections, the UK Conservative Party haemorrhaged electoral support to the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). During the 2016 Brexit Referendum campaign, the ruling elite had an unfounded expectation that UK citizens would vote to remain in the EU. Under the policy vacuum of no change, the political mantra of UKIP became appealing to an increasing majority in the UK. The failure to ensure that UK citizens were informed of the finalised EU-UK Brexit deal before the referendum took place (as indicated in David Cameron's 2013 Bloomberg speech) will prove to be telling. By August 2018, the rationale that a second referendum should be held was overwhelming. The UK population will experience many of the significant elements of the political threats, which were made during 'project fear'. The reality of post Brexit for many UK people will be quite different to the panacea they envisaged. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Should we agree with Tom Peck that David Cameron was the "Worst Prime Minister in a Hundred Years?" (2016). Joseph Butler once stated that "Every thing is what it is, and not another thing" and that "Things and actions are what they are, and the consequences of them will be what they will be: why, then, should we desire to be deceived?" (Butler, 1841: Preface; 76). The United Kingdom (UK) is now faced with the claim that "Brexit means Brexit" - a vacuous phrase which palpably begs the question at issue. For the issue is: what is Brexit? and what type of Brexit was voted for? To say that "Brexit means Brexit" is whistling in the dark as a means to ward off unwelcome spirits and to conjure up an appearance of resolve. This paper argues that the referendum on whether the UK should stay in the European Union was held by the then Prime Minister, David Cameron, to satisfy internal party critics and the campaign conducted in a manner inspired by his previous success in holding and winning referendums. Further, it argues that it has unleashed a new doctrine: that of the referendum result as an expression of the undiluted 'will of the people'. The holding of the referendum, its conduct and its result were direct results of complacency and hubris; what precisely a vote for Brexit means is unclear and ambiguous, and the populist belief that the result has to be upheld because it expresses the 'will of the people' is both cause and consequence of the referendum campaign and result. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most striking questions raised by Brexit is undoubtedly related to security and defence. What should we expect from the United Kingdom (UK) in the collective and multilateral efforts within the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) after Brexit? This article aims to contribute to an answer by arguing that, in the security and defence field, Brexit hardly represents a threat to NATO or the EU. Instead, it offers an opportunity to readjust priorities and investments towards an effective multilateralism, both European and transatlantic. The paper argues that, faced with an apparent overlap of the threats and challenges shaped by the strategic environment and the priority concerns of both organisations, it is expected that the UK will continue to be engaged in the EU common security and defence policy's (CSDP) civilian missions and military operations as a third country, as well as enhance NATO's commitments in the aftermath of the implementation of the 2016 Warsaw Declaration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The process of leaving the European Union (EU) will have profound consequences for health and the National Health Service (NHS) in the UK. In this paper, we use the WHO health system building blocks framework to assess the likely effects of three scenarios we term soft Brexit, hard Brexit, and failed Brexit. We conclude that each scenario poses substantial threats. The workforce of the NHS is heavily reliant on EU staff. Financing of health care for UK citizens in the EU and vice versa is threatened, as is access to some capital funds, while Brexit threatens overall economic performance. Access to pharmaceuticals, technology, blood, and organs for transplant is jeopardised. Information used for international comparisons is threatened, as is service delivery, especially in Northern Ireland. Governance concerns relate to public health, competition and trade law, and research. However, we identified a few potential opportunities for improvement in areas such as competition law and flexibility of training, should the UK Government take them. Overall, a soft version of Brexit would minimise health threats whereas failed Brexit would be the riskiest outcome. Effective parliamentary scrutiny of policy and legal changes will be essential, but the scale of the task risks overwhelming parliament and the civil service. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The issue of the United Kingdom's exit from the European Union (the so-called Brexit) means a turning point both in the history of the European integration and also of the United Kingdom. The 51% of the British electorate voted in favour of leaving the EU, which raised up uncountable legal, political and economic questions to be answered. The legal questions raised by the Brexit could be categorized into some groups. According to Takis Tridimas, there are open procedural, institutional and administrative issues of the withdrawal, which organize the 'know how' of the process; but we could talk about the future relationship forms between the United Kingdom and European Union; and the future of the European integration paradigm; or about the development and changes of the European Union's and United Kingdom's legal system due to the Brexit. In this paper - after presenting the historical background of a member state's withdrawal-I focus on the summary of the main public law questions opened to be answered by the Brexit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]