Search

Evidence suggests that as public opinion towards immigration becomes more negative, so the descriptive representation of ethnic minority groups is increasingly restricted. Recently, some initial research into the causal mechanism hinted that this effect is driven by patterns of candidacy. This suggests that political parties are creating an 'ethnic penalty' of their own in the selection stage. This paper investigates the relationship between patterns of candidacy, party strategy, and public opinion in Great Britain from 1997 to 2019, and proposes that 'punitive parties' are strongly responsible for shaping the representational outcomes of minority groups. I find support for earlier suggestions that parties are increasingly likely to place ethnic minority candidates away from 'winnable' contests as anti-immigrant hostility rises. These findings are important for our conceptions of ethnic penalties, of party behaviour in selection processes, and for the study and cause of improving political representation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2019 general election gave prominence to tactical voting advice websites, particularly those projecting constituency‐level results using national polling data and sophisticated multi‐level regression and poststratification (MRP) polling models. We see tactical voting as an example of a coordination game and argue that polling‐model driven advice websites are disruptive to the existing focal points for strategic voting. Although such websites may well help identify the strongest candidate based on constituency demographics, the article argues they are unlikely to coalesce support behind that single candidate, a prerequisite for successful tactical voting. In practice, there are multiple competing models and websites as well as other key sources of information to voters. Furthermore, the heuristic of relying on tactical voting websites is vulnerable to strategic action by partisans. In short, it is argued that the emergence of these websites risks muddying the waters further for electors seeking to vote tactically, potentially splitting the tactical vote rather than unifying it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Were women agents of their own political emancipation or did politicians preemptively grant rights to them in a bid for electoral success? This article claims that both electoral politics and the ordinary strategies of women’s movements explain the timing of female suffrage. Drawing on archival evidence from the United Kingdom, I show how in an electoral environment where the incumbent Liberals saw disadvantage to reform, an enterprising group of Liberal suffragists formed a pact with the Labour party, trading economic resources for the party’s promise to push for suffrage reform. The Election Fighting Fund, as the pact was called, was key to securing women’s place in the 1918 Representation of the People Act. In raising the possibility that ordinary instead of revolutionary tactics proved key to voting rights reform, women emerge as an interesting new case for the study of democratization. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]