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Identity is among of the most common explanations for political outcomes. Despite this, studies of politics often fail to clearly conceptualize or define identity, leading to tremendous variation in the use and application of the concept, much of which is at odds with fundamental tenets of research on the topic. Decades of research in psychology, sociology, and political psychology inform a family of related theories referred to as "Social Identity Theory" (SIT) which demonstrates that identity requires three conditions in order to affect attitudes and behavior: cognitive classification, psychological attachment to the group, and a social context that causes a group identity to become salient. In this paper, we build on these conditions to develop a typology to help identify when and for whom identity should be politically consequential. Using national election data from 2012, 2016 and 2020 we show that failing to differentiate between these concepts, particularly what we call Descriptive and Substantive identity, can lead to mistaken inferences about the behavior of identity groups in politics. Applying insights from SIT also promises to help advance an improved understanding of questions of race, representation, and intersectionality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is argued that far‐right (FR) populism in the West is fuelled by inequality. In this paper, we argue that three social psychological processes are central to explaining these phenomena. We suggest that these processes are recursive although we do not specify their temporal order. Drawing on the social identity tradition, we first examine how inequality is linked to reduced social trust and cohesion, which has consequences for both low‐ and high‐income groups. We examine the known effects of perceived threat in amplifying tensions between groups and consolidating identity positions. Second, we argue that national identity consolidation is a particularly likely response to inequality, which, in turn, reduces tolerance of cultural diversity as an associated consequence. Finally, we consider the value of these strengthened national identities to those who harness them effectively to gain political ground. In this way, those who offer FR populist rhetoric aligned with nationalism can blame immigrants, "foreign" powers, and mainstream politics for both the lack of social cohesion and reduced economic circumstances of many. We conclude that FR populist leaders not only tap into the negative social consequences of inequality, their policy positions also fail to address and may even compound the situation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]