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In this paper, we explore the possibility of connecting decentralized biogas plants via a pipeline network to terminals that upgrade biogas into biomethane. We present a mixed-integer linear program that forms subnetworks of such plants, decides on suitable terminal locations, and establishes pipeline connections to maximize profit. We apply this model to a real-world scenario in Northern Germany. The results show a much higher total profit for the optimized network compared to the benchmark solutions where each plant upgrades biogas into biomethane on its own. Therefore, plants can increase their profitability by collaborating with other (neighboring) plants. However, the collaboration requires a fair profit-sharing model as network participation is not individually profitable for all plants, especially small ones. • We explore network designs for a profitable upgrading of biogas into biomethane. • We introduce a Mixed Integer Programming model to determine optimal plant networks. • A real-world application for biogas plants in Northern Germany is presented. • Results reveal higher profits for the networks compared to stand-alone upgrading. • Fair profit-sharing mechanisms are important for plant collaborations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the determinants of the use of profit sharing schemes (PSS) by private companies, exploiting a firm-level dataset for Germany. First, our results from static regression models replicate studies for the U.S. which report a positive correlation between R&D activity and PSS use. Similar to those studies, we find that a firm's turnover is strongly associated with PSS use, whereas this does not hold for the age of a firm. Firms with an unionised or more qualified workforce are also associated with PSS use. By exploiting the panel structure of our data, we also provide a novel set of tests by means of dynamic models estimation. The analysis sheds light on the relation between R&D activity, past innovation and PSS use. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examinations on the determinants of profit sharing usually focus on objective firm characteristics. Using data from manufacturing firms in Germany, this study shows that managers' subjective attitudes towards profit sharing also play an important role in the adoption and termination of this payment scheme. Positive management attitudes are associated with an increased likelihood of adopting profit sharing. While to some extent this entails failed experimentation, positive managerial attitudes also substantially contribute to a sustained use of profit sharing. The pattern of results holds even when controlling for a variety of objective firm characteristics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using a sample of over 5000 establishments in Germany, we analyze the antecedents and effects of profit sharing (PS) and employee share ownership (ESO) with respect to the ability of firms to meet their recruitment and retention objectives and to achieve employment growth. We draw on both economic and behavioral perspectives to argue that firms that adopt PS and ESO plans do so in order to attract and retain employees. Using logistic regression and a propensity score matching technique, we find that firms that face higher recruitment problems, and those that have greater employment growth objectives, are more likely to use ESO and PS. Unlike ESO, PS enhances firm-level employment growth. However, neither ESO nor PS help firms to fully resolve recruitment and retention problems. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Politicians and scholars alike praise the significant benefits associated with employee share ownership (ESO). However, little is known about the concrete motives of firms to provide ESO to their employees. In particular, it is unknown how these motives correlate with firms' contexts. Drawing on an institutional theoretical framework, this article examines what aims firms pursue through the provision of ESO. The data originate from a survey of firms in Germany. The cluster analytic findings indicate distinctive patterns of relationships between aims and firm characteristics. Aims related to employee performance are most important to foreign-owned firms, financial aims are most important to non-public small and medium-sized firms and aims related to corporate image are most important to big firms and to firms that do not provide profit sharing. Aims related to employee attraction and retention are almost equally important to all kinds of firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Profit sharing wages are of growing importance in Germany. They are indicating a nascent trend of financialisation of wages. However, little is known about the regulation of profit sharing wages especially on plant level and the way they affect the policies of works councils. Plant level wage policy is a subject of codetermination according to the German Works Constitutions Act, and wage policy has always been one of the most crucial topics of works councils' activities. What is the role works councils play regarding the negotiation and regulation of profit sharing wages? What is the collective interest they define and pursue in this respect? And what are the effects of wage financialisation on the legitimacy of works councils? These questions are analysed with respect to the development of profit sharing wages in the German metalworking industry. Based on a variety of research methods, our analysis shows that profit sharing wages are a source of legitimacy for the works councils. In many cases the works councils, usually regarded as victims of financialisation, are actively striving for the financialisation of wages in their companies. However, they have to cope with the problem that profit sharing nowadays is based on a redistribution of income between capital and labour, between firms and between different categories of employees. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Profit sharing is an increasingly important component of pay in Germany and is the main reason for the intensification of wage drift that has been observed in recent years. However, little is known about how widespread it is, how it is collectively regulated, the regulatory practices that accompany it and the effects those practices have on works councils and unions. These questions are analysed with respect to the development of profit sharing in the German metalworking industry, where it is relatively widespread. Our analysis shows that profit sharing is characterized by ambiguities and contradictions. On the one hand, it is contributing to the ongoing process of wage modernization; on the other hand, however, profit sharing is fuelling trends towards the fragmentation and financialization of pay. Moreover, although driving up actual wages, profit sharing is also a manifestation of an increasing redistribution of income between capital and labour, between firms and between different categories of employee. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]