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The precautionary principle aims to influence decision‐making in contexts where some activity poses uncertain but potentially grave threats. This perfectly describes the controversy surrounding germline gene editing. This article considers whether the precautionary principle should influence how we weigh the risks and benefits of human germline interventions, focusing especially on the possible threats to the health of future generations. We distinguish between several existing forms of the precautionary principle, assess their plausibility and consider their implications for the ethics of germline modification. We also offer a novel form of the precautionary principle: the sufficientarian precautionary principle. Some plausible versions of the precautionary principle recommend placing somewhat greater weight on avoiding threats to future generations than on achieving short‐term benefits. However, no plausible versions of the precautionary principle entail that we should outright reject the use germline gene editing in human reproduction and some, such as the sufficientarian version, might endorse its use. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do policy‐makers call shots on major decisions—such as putting a country into lockdown to mitigate the risk of Covid‐19—when they don't have all the scientific facts about how the virus spreads? And to which moral values do they appeal when weighing the health and economic risks involved? David B. Resnik addresses such questions in his book Precautionary Reasoning in Environmental and Public Health Policy (Springer, 2021), which provides a fresh perspective on the precautionary principle. The precautionary principle captures the common intuition "better safe than sorry" but is also a contentious facet of precautionary reasoning. Resnik's novel approach to the precautionary principle and detailed discussion of moral values makes this book an excellent read for anyone interested in policy‐making, philosophy, or public health. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A common strategy in bioethics is to posit a prima facie case in favour of one policy, and to then claim that the burden of proof (that this policy should be rejected) falls on those with opposing views. If the burden of proof is not met, it is claimed, then the policy in question should be accepted. This article illustrates, and critically evaluates, examples of this strategy in debates about the sale of organs by living donors, human enhancement, and the precautionary principle. We highlight general problems with this style of argument, and particular problems with its use in specific cases. We conclude that the burden ultimately falls on decision-makers (i.e. policy-makers) to choose the policy supported by the best reasons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]