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Several northern European countries have announced ambitious plans to become carbon neutral already before the year 2050. Recent research has, however, highlighted how potential bottlenecks in raw material and resource availability could significantly delay or hinder wind and solar photovoltaic (PV) expansion and continued biomass usage in parts of Europe. To address this issue, this paper assesses how exposed the national energy and climate plans (NECPs) of Finland, Estonia, Germany, Sweden, and Denmark are to resource limitations and techno-economic risks by reviewing and analysing 2030 NECP targets compared to statistical energy use data in these countries. The results indicate that the NECPs of Denmark and Germany are particularly exposed to risks related to global raw material availability, as Denmark plans to rapidly grow the share of wind and solar PV in electricity generation to 81% and 13% by 2030, respectively, followed by Germany, which outlines a 39% and 16% share of wind and solar PV in its national climate strategy. The NECPs of Finland and Germany are also shown to be vulnerable to limitations in biomass availability, as there is a significant disparity between the projected biomass usage and legally binding European Union (EU) targets for land use, land use change, and forestry (LULUCF) sector emissions in 2030 in these countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The objective of this paper is to analyse role of forest industry in meeting energy and climate targets that aim to mitigating global change. Finland as an important forest industry country with the ambitious target of becoming carbon neutral by 2035 is selected to a target county. This study aims to present a plausible assessment of the future of the Finnish forest industry until 2035 based on literature and a scenario building approach. The focus is on energy use and fossil carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. The results suggest that electricity consumption will decrease, whereas electricity production will increase, which indicates that forest industry can provide more renewable electricity to the grid. Heat consumption may even increase as a result from building new biorefineries, but those mills can most probably meet their heat demand by combusting biofuels. Changes in forest industry's direct fossil CO2 emissions can reduce Finnish fossil CO2 emissions 2─4% in comparison to 2018. Biofuels production is likely to rise, but the extent remains to be seen. It is concluded that the Finnish forest industry can contribute significantly to meeting national climate policy targets, and forest industry in general can play a role in mitigating global change. Additionally, it was found that development of the Finnish forest industry will probably be limited by the requirement for sustainable wood harvesting, which may also be a problem for other forest industry countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Emissions from aviation are expected to grow. With evidence that the International Civil Aviation Organization's Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation is an inadequate mitigation mechanism, there is interest in upscaling the sector's climate-related policies. This paper reviews potential aviation emissions mitigation policies against the background of emerging complexities, such as the large share of radiative forcing not covered under any policy agreement, as well as highly skewed demand distributions. In total, 30 voluntary, market-based and regulatory "transition policies" are identified and evaluated with regard to their potential to reduce emissions from air passenger transport and to initiate the transition to new fuels and propulsion technologies. The paper also discusses the potential public acceptance of differing policies. It concludes that the removal of fossil fuel and related subsidies represents a priority, supported by policy mixes comprising levies (CO2, frequent fliers, premium classes) and a feed-in quota for definitively established sustainable aviation fuels. To reduce flight emissions is feasible in principle, but will require policy initiatives at the national level or at the level of regional jurisdictions such as the European Union. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This paper analyzes the possibility to reduce the carbon footprint of exported products by implementing forest climate offset projects amid the introduction of the carbon tax on imports of high-carbon products, including those exported from Russia, by the European Union. The role of forests as absorbers of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions differs significantly in Russia and in the EU. It is suggested that the EU's climate neutrality policy aimed primarily at the reduction of direct CO2 emissions by sectors such as power, industry, and agriculture is a consequence of the insignificant role of European forests in greenhouse gas absorption. By contrast, Russia can achieve climate neutrality not only by reducing greenhouse gas emissions, but also by increasing their absorption by forests and implementing forest climate projects (FCPs). Taking into consideration the UNFCCC baseline and additionality requirements, three FCP types can be proposed for implementation in the Russian Federation. The possibility to monetize the carbon sequestration function of Russian forests in the framework of carbon offset projects is assessed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The EU has established the world's first cross-border emission-trading systems (ETS) for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, currently covering aviation, emission-intensive sectors, and electricity (EITE). The EU Commission has offered to apply emissions trading in new sectors where emissions from maritime transport will be incorporated into the current EU ETS, while a separated emissions trading system will cover emissions from road transport and the building sector. This paper employs a multi-regional multi-sectoral computable general equilibrium (CGE) model with two simultaneous international emission permit markets. After examining the abatement costs for the EU regions, various policy scenarios are implemented to study the welfare effects of forming an ETS covering the sectors other than EITE (NEIT) and its linking with the EITE sectors under two different baselines and four emission reduction targets. The results provide several important insights: (i) Marginal abatement costs in Germany and the Eastern European Union region (EEU) are significantly lower than in the rest of the EU regions. (ii) The carbon price in the emission permit market covering NEIT is significantly higher than the carbon price in the emission permit market covering EITE. (iii) Germany and EEU appear as notable suppliers of emission permits in both markets. (iv) There is a significant aggregate welfare gain under the scenario in which the ETS covering NEIT co-exists parallel with the ETS covering EITE. (v) The aggregate welfare in the EU under the full integration of EITE and NEIT may fall below its value under the scenario with two parallel emission permit markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates how piloting programmes in China can promote local policy innovations. By using one of the piloting emission trading schemes (ETS) in Guangdong province as a case study, it is argued that the main features of the piloting experiments, particularly in the climate change domain, are largely different from previous local marketization experiments that dominate the reform period of China. Whereas previous experiments are often characterized as bottom-up or indigenous initiatives with strong patronage relations to the pro-reform politicians at central level, the current piloting programmes are often crafted in a top-down fashion that is often misaligned with local market or corporate interests. Hence, local policy innovations are designed, developed and brokered by the local state officers, in order to bridge this central–local interest gap. As a result, successful implementation of these policy innovations largely depends on local political traditions, bureaucratic culture and perceptions of distinctive development needs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the design of policy packages to enable carbon neutrality in the manufacturing sector by 2050, based on the case of the Netherlands. It first models potential pathways to net-zero emissions by 2050 in the Dutch manufacturing sector, and then evaluates the current policy framework's ability to catalyse the transition. The analysis shows that the Netherlands' credible commitment to raising carbon prices combined with ambitious technology support provides strong incentives for manufacturing to significantly decarbonise. However, even if the carbon levy sets an ambitious price trajectory to 2030, it is tempered by extensive preferential treatment to energy-intensive users, yielding a highly unequal carbon price across firms and sectors. Moreover, the country's technology support focuses on the cost-effective deployment of low-carbon options, which ensures least-cost decarbonisation in the short run but favours relatively mature technologies. The paper offers recommendations for policy adjustments to reach the country's carbon neutrality objective, including the gradual removal of exemptions, enhanced support for emerging technologies and greater visibility over future infrastructure plans. Other countries can learn from the Dutch experience when designing their own decarbonisation strategy for the manufacturing sector. • The Dutch policy package provides strong incentives for manufacturing to decarbonise. • Carbon pricing exemptions for energy-intensive users increase abatement costs. • Technology support favours short-term efficiency over long-term deep decarbonisation. • Dutch transition hinges on regulatory certainty and swift infrastructure deployment. • The Dutch case offers insights for other countries to design net-zero strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study answers four research questions by contextualising the background to Japan's "carbon neutrality and net-zero" (CNN) policy, which was announced in October 2020, and identifying important changes in Japanese climate policy between 1990 and 2020. What is the link between the problem of fairness under the Kyoto targets and the Japanese government's initial reluctance towards ambitious carbon emission reductions? Why did the Japanese business sector initially resist the possibility of ambitious carbon emission reductions? How has the term "climate crisis" contributed to the need for CNN policy? Why did the Japanese government change its reluctant stance and announce the CNN policy in October 2020? Four main findings were extracted from a narrative technique-based analysis of Japan's policy documents related to CNN. The following are the findings: [i] the framing of climate change as a "climate crisis" by influential Japanese climate stakeholders was a key motivation for Japan to formally announce its CNN policy in October 2020; [ii] pressure from the international community and the political leadership of the Yoshihide Suga administration are essential factors that led the Japanese government to change its stance and announced this policy; [iii] it is possible that the policy could have been announced sooner, but concern among Japanese climate stakeholders about the problem of fairness in the Kyoto Protocol's emission reduction targets likely impeded such an announcement; and [iv] this concern underpinned Keidanren's (or the business sector's) consistent opposition to the introduction of regulatory schemes. These results emerge for the first time in a study of Japan's carbon neutrality, particularly in terms of the broader context of climate politics. Finally, we offer a possible explanation for Suga's deliberate announcement of the CNN policy. This opens up space for future research to complement our study by providing important indicators on the trajectory of this important policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Global leaders agree on the need to substantially decarbonize the global economy by 2050. This paper compares potential costs associated with different policy pathways to achieve tourism sector emission reduction ambitions (−50% by 2035) and transform the sector to be part of the mid-century decarbonized economy (−70% by 2050). Investment in emissions abatement within the tourism sector, combined with strategic external carbon offsets, was found to be approximately 5% more cost effective over the period 2015–2050 than exclusive reliance on offsetting. The cost to achieve the −50% target through abatement and strategic offsetting, while significant, represents less than 0.1% of the estimated global tourism economy in 2020 and 3.6% in 2050. Distributed equally among all tourists (international and domestic), the cost of a low-carbon tourism sector is estimated at US$11 per trip, equivalent to many current travel fees or taxes. Exclusive reliance on offsetting would expose the sector to extensive and continued carbon liability costs beyond mid-century and could be perceived as climate inaction, increasing reputational risks and the potential for less efficient regulatory interventions that could hinder sustainable tourism development. Effective tourism sector leadership is needed to develop a strategic tourism policy framework and emission measurement and reporting system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Because China has emerged as the largest greenhouse gas (GHG) emitter in total annual emissions, to accelerate the pace of GHG emission reduction in China is important to the success of global efforts in addressing climate change. Carbon trading is a market mechanism and key instrument in the mitigation of climate change. This paper explores the policy process and development state to date of China׳s carbon-trade market to understand the emergence and development of that market and to understand what barriers are hampering China׳s carbon-trade market development. To achieve this goal, this paper introduces and analyzes China׳s status in the international market, examines the factors driving carbon-market launching by the Chinese government, and traces the development of mandatory carbon-emission trading and voluntary emission trading. It is argued that China׳s carbon-trading market is confronted with challenges such as the absence of a functional carbon-trading market, inaccuracy of the quota allocation, an imperfect trading mechanism, and lagging legislation. At the present stage, shortcomings such as having no real-time carbon price and dominated spot transactions differentiate China׳s trade market substantially from a functional system. A quick market integration of China׳s carbon market appears remote. It is suggested that specific measures be taken to promote the development of the Chinese carbon-trading market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From 2021 onwards, forests and forestry will for the first time contribute to the European Union's climate action targets. The new Land Use, Land Use Change & Forestry (LULUCF) Regulation commits Member States to achieve carbon neutrality on the basis of an EU-wide system. The system accounts for carbon sequestered and emitted from forests and other land uses like crop- and wetland. What looks like a significant step in the Union's climate policy framework, however, leaves the large potential of Europe's forest sector for climate mitigation untapped. The present article draws this conclusion from a comprehensive analysis of 67 documents related to decision-making on the LULUCF Regulation. It reveals coalitional politics and the salience of the Commission's behavior as key to explain the Regulation's limited scope and concludes with assessing the future role of forests in the Union's climate policy framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Almost two decades since the Kyoto Protocol was adopted, global greenhouse gas emissions are still rising rapidly. We argue that the global climate policy focus on carbon markets has played a significant role in the failure to reduce emissions. There are 16 compliance carbon markets in operation across the world. Many more are planned, although there have been numerous problems with carbon trading, including ineffectiveness, weak regulation and implementation, instances of fraud, little to no emissions reduction and major legitimacy issues for governments and the private sector. In this paper we take a “strong” position, arguing that carbon markets do not have a role to play in a policy scenario that requires radical emissions reductions in order to avoid dangerous greenhouse gas concentrations. We put forward 10 reasons why carbon markets should not be the preferred climate policy choice, which we have collated from positions taken by grassroots social movement organizations, think tanks, NGOs and other political advocacy groups as well as individual scientists and scholars. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Climate policy across the world is proceeding at a highly variable pace, with some places very committed to decarbonizing their economies and others just beginning. Emerging nations are generally just starting along this journey. However, among the few nation states that have pledged to achieve carbon neutrality, is Bhutan, a least developed country. Carbon neutrality is an ambitious climate policy that is increasingly being recognized as necessary in order to stabilize global temperature rise at 1.5°C. However, Bhutan is likely to face significant challenges in maintaining this status as the country balances its desire to grow in economic opportunities (GDP) and in human happiness (GNH). Little research has been conducted inside the policy processes to better understand how Bhutan will maintain carbon neutrality. Through open-ended, semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders, this study provides an inside view on the current situation and future challenges that Bhutan may face, along with the complexities associated with implementing and maintaining an ambitious carbon neutral policy. The paper highlights Bhutan's story and how it could be useful for policy learning and knowledge sharing, especially in the context of emerging nations' climate governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change is one of the most daunting challenges human kind has ever faced. In the paper, we provide a survey of the micro and macro economics of climate change from a complexity science perspective and we discuss the challenges ahead for this line of research. We identify four areas of the literature where complex system models have already produced valuable insights: (i) coalition formation and climate negotiations, (ii) macroeconomic impacts of climate-related events, (iii) energy markets and (iv) diffusion of climate-friendly technologies. On each of these issues, accounting for heterogeneity, interactions and disequilibrium dynamics provides a complementary and novel perspective to the one of standard equilibrium models. Furthermore, it highlights the potential economic benefits of mitigation and adaptation policies and the risk of under-estimating systemic climate change-related risks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the impact of the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) on carbon emissions and economic performance based on a matching methodology exploiting installation-level inclusion criteria combined with difference-in-differences. Installation-level data from national Polluting Emissions Registries in France, Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom point to a reduction in carbon emissions in the order of −10% between 2005 and 2012, in line with existing micro and macro evidence. Meanwhile, firm-level data on the 31 ETS-regulated countries shows that the EU ETS had no significant impact on profits and employment, and led to an increase in regulated firms' revenues and fixed assets. We explore various explanations for these findings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Carbon offsets are widely used by individuals, corporations, and governments to mitigate their greenhouse gas emissions on the assumption that offsets reflect equivalent climate benefits achieved elsewhere. These climate‐equivalence claims depend on offsets providing real and additional climate benefits beyond what would have happened, counterfactually, without the offsets project. Here, we evaluate the design of California's prominent forest carbon offsets program and demonstrate that its climate‐equivalence claims fall far short on the basis of directly observable evidence. By design, California's program awards large volumes of offset credits to forest projects with carbon stocks that exceed regional averages. This paradigm allows for adverse selection, which could occur if project developers preferentially select forests that are ecologically distinct from unrepresentative regional averages. By digitizing and analyzing comprehensive offset project records alongside detailed forest inventory data, we provide direct evidence that comparing projects against coarse regional carbon averages has led to systematic over‐crediting of 30.0 million tCO2e (90% CI: 20.5–38.6 million tCO2e) or 29.4% of the credits we analyzed (90% CI: 20.1%–37.8%). These excess credits are worth an estimated $410 million (90% CI: $280–$528 million) at recent market prices. Rather than improve forest management to store additional carbon, California's forest offsets program creates incentives to generate offset credits that do not reflect real climate benefits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although climate change and international trade are interdependent, policy-makers often address the two topics separately. This may inhibit progress at the intersection of climate change and trade and could present a serious constraint for global climate action. One key risk is carbon leakage through emission outsourcing, i.e. reductions in emissions in countries with rigorous climate policies being offset by increased emissions in countries with less stringent policies. We first analyze the Paris Agreement's nationally determined contributions (NDC) and investigate how carbon leakage is addressed. We find that the risk of carbon leakage is insufficiently accounted for in these documents. Then, we apply a novel quantitative approach (Jiborn et al., 2018; Baumert et al., 2019) to analyze trends in carbon outsourcing related to a previous international climate regime—the Kyoto Protocol—in order to assess whether reported emission reductions were offset by carbon outsourcing in the past. Our results for 2000–2014 show a more nuanced picture of carbon leakage during the Kyoto Protocol than previous studies have reported. Carbon outsourcing from developed to developing countries was dominated by the USA outsourcing to China, while the evidence for other developed countries was mixed. Against conventional wisdom, we find that, in general, countries that stayed committed to their Kyoto Protocol emission targets were either only minor carbon outsourcers or actually even insourcers—although the trend was slightly negative—indicating that binding emissions targets do not necessarily lead to carbon outsourcing. We argue that multiple carbon monitoring approaches are needed to reduce the risk of carbon leakage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How have 30 years of development in energy and climate policies influenced long-term trends in China and what does this imply for future climate policies? To answer the question, this article examines three decades of energy and climate policies in China. By providing an overarching review, it contributes new and updated research on drivers behind long-term climate policies and whether China's long-term emissions trend can be broken by placing greater emphasis on innovation, technology and low-carbon development. Importantly, it analyses the most recent policy developments in China, such as the likely effects of China's recent 2060 carbon neutrality goal. We conclude that after the Paris Agreement, the biggest policy change has been technological innovation in the power and transport sector. China has prioritized measures, laws and policies for developing renewable energy, especially solar and wind. China has also embraced the 'green growth' approach for responding to the challenges of climate change. These efforts have yielded results, and China has emerged as a world leader in renewable energy. However, there is still a long way to go. The upcoming 14th five-year plan will be critical for accelerating the energy transition, including setting a cap on coal in the national energy-transition strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers a framework for analyzing and extending the recent wave of national "keep it in the ground" (KIIG) bans on fossil fuel exploration and production. We situate this discussion in new theoretical work on decarbonization acceleration and then present an overview of KIIG movement and policy development. Next, drawing on the burgeoning supply side climate policy literature, we outline major barriers to constraining fossil fuel development, then focus on identifying conditions most conducive for KIIG policy. These include locally-rooted campaigns, the development of a pro-KIIG constituency that is horizontally dense and vertically integrated, resonant message framing, and support by well-placed norm entrepreneurs. We argue that early national efforts to keep fossil fuels in the ground demark a critical juncture in global climate policy. Understanding the trajectory of these bans is a first step in extending these initiatives as part of the pathway to carbon neutrality by 2050. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Air travel is predicted to grow over the coming decades contributing to carbon emissions. Airlines have offered voluntary carbon offsetting for over a decade, yet less than 10% of air travellers purchase them. Previous studies ignore the broader policy or social context of sustainable transport and aviation offsetting. In a natural experiment, a panel of the same Australian residents was tracked over a three-year period before and after the historic COP21. A novel hierarchical model was also tested using Partial Least Squares SEM. Although behaviour specific attitudes and social norms were more influential at encouraging aviation carbon offsetting, global policy knowledge and effectiveness of climate change policies play an important role. Although no changes in ratings were detected over a three-year period, the effect of social norms on encouraging aviation offsetting became stronger in later years. Implications and future research directions to better understand the political and social context of carbon offsetting and sustainable transport are provided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study presents estimates of the magnitude of carbon leakage as a consequence of emission reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol using gravity model-style regression analysis on data from the WIOD project. The carbon trade balance between 2002 and 2009 was reduced by 705 megatons of carbon dioxide due to Kyoto and carbon leakage amounts to slightly above 4% of traded carbon dioxide emissions. We highlight four previously neglected issues: First, we control for multilateral trade resistance in the estimation of a unilateral policy by using a two-stage procedure. Second, we control explicitly for the effect of Eastern European countries on leakage estimates. We show that this country group strongly affects the baseline estimates in the framework introduced by Aichele and Felbermayr (Rev Econ Stat 97(1):104–115, 2015). Third, we introduce an alternative specification of the Kyoto variable. Fourth, this is the first study to present econometric evidence for the magnitude of carbon leakage from services sectors. While service elasticities are estimated to be sizable, strong leakage is limited to transport sectors as well as renting of machinery. The manufacturing sectors of metals, machinery and transport equipment are responsible for three quarters of observed leakage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2013, Québec implemented a greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading system (QC ETS), despite opposition from industry, which feared loss of competitiveness and warned about job destruction. This article assesses the impact of that carbon regulation on industrial facilities in Québec. Conditional difference-in-differences ordinary least squares regressions show that regulated plants reduced their GHG emissions by about 9.8%, employment by about 6.8% and carbon intensity by about 3.7% more compared to non-regulated plants in the rest of Canada during the period 2013–2015. This suggests that facilities adapted to the new program by improving their technology, but first and foremost by scaling down their activity, which raises questions about the ability of the QC ETS to induce enough environmental investment and innovation in industrial facilities. The results, in terms of employment effects, contrast with the findings of similar studies on the early stages of the European ETS and the British Columbia carbon tax scheme, and this information challenges the initial allocation scheme for permits, in particular, with a view to a green fiscal reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Deep emission cuts rely on the use of low carbon technologies like renewable energy or carbon capture and storage. There is considerable uncertainty about their future costs. We carry out a sensitivity analysis based on Gauss Quadrature for cost parameters describing these technologies in order to evaluate the effect of the uncertainty on total and marginal mitigation costs as well as composition changes in the energy system. Globally, effects in total cost often average out, but different regions are affected quite differently from the underlying uncertainty in costs for key abatement technologies. Regions can be either affected because they are well suited to deploy a technology for geophysical reasons or because of repercussions through international energy markets. The absolute impact of uncertainty on consumption increases over the time horizon and with the ambition of emission reductions. Uncertainty in abatement costs relative to expected abatement costs are however larger under a moderate ambition climate policy scenario because in this case the marginal abatement occurs in the electricity sector where the cost uncertainty is implemented. Under more ambitious climate policy in line with the two degree target, the electricity sector is always decarbonized by 2050, hence uncertainty has less effect on the electricity mix. The findings illustrate the need for regional results as global averages can hide distributional consequences on technological uncertainty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China hosts over half of global coal-fired power generation capacity and has the world's largest coal reserves. Its 2060 carbon neutrality goal will require coal-fired electricity generation to shrink dramatically, with or without carbon capture and storage technology. Two macroeconomic areas in which the socioeconomic impact of this decline is felt are losses in jobs and tax revenues supported by thermal coal mining, transport and power generation. At the national level, under a 'baseline' (B) scenario consistent with China's carbon neutrality goal, labour productivity growth in coal mining implies that significant job losses will occur nationally in the medium term, even if all coal plants continue operating as planned. Jobs supported by the coal power industry would decline from an estimated 2.7 million in 2021, to 1.44 million in 2035 and 94,000 in 2050, with jobs losses from mining alone expected to exceed 1.1 million by 2035. Tax revenues from thermal coal would total approximately CNY 300 billion annually from 2021–2030, peaking in 2023 at CNY 340 billion. This is significantly less than estimated subsidies of at least CNY 480 billion, suggesting coal is likely a net fiscal drain on China's public finances, even without accounting for the costs of local pollution and the social cost of carbon. As coal plant retirements accelerate, from 2034 onwards, fiscal revenues begin to fall more rapidly, with rates of decline rising from 1% in the 2020s to over 10% a year by the 2040s. More aggressive climate policy and technology scenarios bring job and tax losses forward in time, while a No Transition policy, in which all currently planned coal plants are built, delays but does not ultimately prevent these losses. At the provincial level, China's major coal-producing provinces will likely face challenges in managing the localised effects of expected job losses and finding productive alternative uses for this labour. Governments of coal-producing provinces like Inner Mongolia, with an industry highly dependent on exports to other provinces, are more exposed than others to declining tax revenues from coal, and more insulated from job losses, given their high current degree of labour efficiency. Although their provincial revenues are likely to remain stable until the early 2030s under the B scenario, the possibility of increasing policy stringency underlines the need for revenue and skill base diversification. At the firm level, China's 'Big Five' state-owned power companies were responsible for over 40% of both jobs and tax revenues in 2021. The number of jobs supported by the activities of each of the largest ten firms, with one exception, will decline by 71–84% by the early 2040s, with the tax contribution of each declining by 43–69% in the same period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]