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The People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) (Taiwan) have taken divergent paths in the area of human rights. Since the two leaders Xi Jinping and Tsai Ing-wen came to power, the differences in the area of human rights have further increased. The paper analyses and compares their external human rights strategies based on realist assumptions and the soft and hard power resources of the PRC and the ROC. The PRC's objectives are to deflect international criticism of its human rights situation and to weaken the global human rights system and its underlying human rights norms. Taiwan's objective is to use its record as a human rights leader in Asia to expand its limited international space and to strengthen its ties with other consolidated democracies and the global civil society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a growing risk of a military attack on Taiwan by mainland China (otherwise known as the People's Republic of China, or PRC) to achieve what the latter terms "reunification." Taiwan, the US, and Japan must urgently and interactively prepare for this contingency—which is also the best way of deterring it. Taiwan must increase military spending (as it has begun to do), with an emphasis on a "porcupine strategy" of lots of distributed, mobile, survivable, affordable, and lethal weapons. The US must increase its military deployments and joint exercises in the region, again emphasizing the types of weapons that can survive a preemptive PRC attack and counter a Chinese blockade or amphibious invading force. Japan will double defense spending over the next five years in a welcome and transformative move, but effective deterrence requires that it also signal that the collective defense of Taiwan against a military attack is existential for its own security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan's opposition to PRC demands such as acceptance of the '92 Consensus' and 'One Country, Two Systems' formula since 2016 has invited a series of retaliatory measures from Beijing, designed to coerce Taiwan into compliance. Given the stark asymmetry in economic size, military capability, and diplomatic status, Taiwan provides a case for studying coercive diplomacy that takes the form of threats to punish. Material differences suggest that Taiwan should capitulate, and 'cheap talk' theses expect PRC threats to have no discernible effect, while balance of threat arguments expect resolve. In this article, we use the survey data collected in the 2016, 2019, and 2020 rounds of the Taiwan National Security Study to examine how Taiwanese respond to China's intensifying and expanding threats. Our paper identifies four strategies that the public sees as responses to PRC coercion: isolation, bandwagon with China, balance against China by allying with the USA and Japan, and hedge by deepening economic ties with China while aligning with the USA and Japan against China. We show that the popular support for balancing against China rises as PRC coercion grows and Taiwanese citizens increasingly perceive China to be a threat. Our findings imply that citizens in a liberal democracy can develop the will to pushback against pressure from an authoritarian regime despite sharp asymmetries in capabilities and material limitations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper describes the growing human rights gap between China on one side and the US and Taiwan on the other side and analyses its impact on cross-strait relations. Since Xi Jinping's ascent to power in the People's Republic of China in 2012/2013 and the elections of Donald Trump in the US and Tsai Ing-wen in Taiwan in 2016, the relationship between China and the other two countries has worsened. The US and Taiwan have a similar view on human rights in the PRC. The increasing repression and authoritarianism of the PRC leads to a human rights gap in the Taiwan Strait that increases the divide and the tensions between both sides. The failure of the PRC to address in its proposal for a peaceful unification the concerns of the Taiwanese for their democracy and human rights pushes Taiwan further away. The similar assessment of the PRC's authoritarian threat by the US and Taiwan strengthens the bond between both, based on the shared values of democracy and human rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An analysis of PRC leaders' public communication with respect to Taiwan from 2003 to 2013 shows the presence of three conflict frames: aspiration, process and image. Chinese leaders most often use the process frame to convey the preferred process through which both sides could find a common ground. These messages are reinforced by rhetoric about China's capacity, resolve and sincerity to reach out to Taiwan for peaceful solutions. Communication of China's own aspirations of national unification is usually less visible. However, it becomes more prominent when the Taiwanese are not the intended audience, indicating its utility in rallying internal support. Using these frames as broad parameters, the paper discusses how they may have influenced policy actions toward Taiwan in the early days of the Xi administration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of China Quarterly is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of China Quarterly is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Tensions between Beijing and Taipei in 2022 reached their heights since the 1995- 1996 Third Strait Crisis. The decision by the outgoing Speaker of the US House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi to visit Taiwan in August, few months prior to the momentous 20th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, was immediately followed by an unprecedented display of military capabilities by the People’s Liberation Army in the waters and airspace surrounding Taiwan. Forceful assertions of sovereignty over the island by Beijing, and explicit declarations of support in case of a Chinese attempt at a military takeover by President Biden preceded and followed the events that occurred in August, only to partially wane by the end of the year following the XiBiden G20 meeting in Bali. With no open route to improve cross-Strait relations, the Tsai administration further deepened relations with the US and expanded unofficial engagement with Washington’s East Asian allies and the European Union and its member states. Shared support for Ukraine against Russia’s aggression and growing synergies in industrial policy related to the semiconductor sector drove this engagement, without however producing meaningful results in trade policy. In November, the Kuomintang obtained a sweeping victory in the local «nine-in-one» elections. The result showed the party’s continuing competitiveness in local elections, but the slowdown of the Taiwanese economy, rising inflationary trends, and declining popular support for the Tsai administration complicated the ruling Democratic Progressive Party’s prospects for the 2024 general elections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The widely believed notion that Taiwan will inevitably submit to rule by Beijing is not politically, economically, or strategically well grounded. Despite its economic influence and growing military might, China's ability to compel involuntary unification is far from certain if Taiwan's people are determined to maintain their autonomy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]