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This paper presents a thorough examination of methane capture from Polish coal mines, contextualized within the framework of the European Union's (EU) climate policy objectives. Through a strategic analysis encompassing the interior of coal mines, the surrounding environment, and the macro environment, this study elucidates the complex dynamics involved in methane emissions and capture initiatives. The key findings include a declining trend in absolute methane emissions since 2008, despite fluctuations in coal extraction volumes, and a relatively stable level of methane capture exceeding 300 million m3/year since 2014. The analysis underscores the critical role of government support, both in terms of financial incentives and streamlined regulatory processes, to facilitate the integration of methane capture technologies into coal mining operations. Collaboration through partnerships and stakeholder engagement emerges as essential for overcoming resource competition and ensuring the long-term success of methane capture projects. This paper also highlights the economic and environmental opportunities presented by methane reserves, emphasizing the importance of investment in efficient extraction technologies. Despite these advancements, challenges persist, particularly regarding the low efficiency of current de-methanation technologies. Recommendations for modernization and technological innovation are proposed to enhance methane capture efficiency and utilization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The research aim of the paper is to analyze the objectives of the European Union (EU) climate policy and the instruments for their implementation, as well as to present the challenges on the way to achieving climate neutrality by the EU. In 2015, during the 21st UN Climate Change Conference in Paris, an agreement was agreed, the purpose of which is to limit global warming, aiming, among other things, for limiting the increase in global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and preferably to no more than 1.5°C. All EU Member States have ratified the above agreement, while agreeing to take action to make the EU the world’s first climate-neutral economy and society by 2050. To achieve this, the “European Green Deal” strategy was adopted, followed by the European Climate Law and the “Fit for 55” package of legislative proposals. In addition, a more ambitious EU climate target for 2030 has been agreed, namely a reduction of net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% compared to 1990 levels. Based on this, the following research hypothesis should be put forward, assuming that if all initiated projects, climate programs and mechanisms are fully implemented, the EU will become the first climate neutral continent by 2050. The first part of the article focuses on the goals of the European Green Deal and their implementation. The second part discusses the assumptions of European Climate Law and the elements of the “Fit for 55” package, as well as presents the most important financial instruments of the EU climate policy. The third part contains an analysis of the challenges standing in the way of the EU achieving climate neutrality by 2050, including the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian aggression against Ukraine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of the paper is to present Germany’s position during the government of Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU/CSU/SPD coalition: 2018-2021) and Chancellor Olaf Scholz (SPD/Alliance 90/Greens/FDP coalition: from 2021) towards changes in climate policy (understood as reform) introduced by the European Green Deal and the Fit for 55 package of legislative proposals, with particular emphasis on the issue of CO2 emission standards for new passenger cars and new light commercial vehicles. Germany’s support for increasing the level of ambition in the field of climate protection in the EU was largely the result of the belief that the success of the German transformation of the energy sector and achieving climate neutrality by 2045 also depends on the progress of the energy transformation process and the climate neutrality policy in the European Union. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union's climate policy aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 55% by 2030 and to achieve climate neutrality by 2050. One of the instruments for achieving these climate goals is the development of offshore wind energy. Unfortunately, Poland, as one of the few European Union countries with access to the sea, does not have offshore wind farms yet. The purpose of this article is to determine the importance of offshore wind energy for the development of Poland based on the example of two sea regions: the West Pomeranian and Pomeranian Voivodeships. This article uses the input–output method to determine the economic effects of offshore wind power. The region's share in the supply chain was determined based on the location of the offshore wind energy sector. A comparative analysis with the Saint-Brieuc offshore wind farm in France made it possible to show the differences between the studied locations. The supply chain share of the regions surveyed was 2.28% and 6.00% in the CAPEX phase and 5.98% and 8.23% in the OPEX phase. The annual average global value in the CAPEX phase at the country level was EUR 2793 million, and at the regional level, EUR 243 million and EUR 663 million. In the OPEX phase, the corresponding values are EUR 2106 million, EUR 223 million and EUR 663 million. The average annual employment in the CAPEX phase at the national level amounted to 26,323 jobs and at the regional level, 1953 and 5804. In the OPEX phase, employment amounted to 4790, 558 and 751 jobs, respectively. On the other hand, the average annual value added in the CAPEX phase at the national level was EUR 1221 million, and at the regional level, it was EUR 106 million and EUR 290 million. In the OPEX phase, it was EUR 920 million, EUR 97 million and EUR 239 million, respectively. While not all of the findings are conclusive, in general, the domestic offshore wind industry has weaker economic linkages and lower wage levels than the location adopted for comparison. It uses more labour-intensive economic sectors with lower OPEX value added. The results of the analyses presented in this paper are of crucial importance not only for Poland, as their advantage is the possibility to present, from an economic point of view, the profitability of this type of investment in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: The publication presents the challenges facing the European Union but also Polish regions in implementing the Green Deal. Design/methodology/approach: The method of statistical data analysis and source materials was used in the work. Findings: The paper presents the most important issues of change posed by the European Union for the implementation of climate policy. Originality/value: The paper is aimed at those interested in EU policy and climate policy in particular. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The lack of equal globally binding GHG's emission reduction targets is currently leading to a set of diverging GHG's emission prices across the world (or even no price for GHG's emission in some regions). This may result in distortions with direct implications on competitiveness of the industries in regions with strict climate policies (as the European Union) and can cause the issue of carbon leakage. Carbon leakage is defined as 'the increase in emission outside a region as a direct result of the policy to cap emission in this region'. This paper is the first part of the set of two analysis aiming at the carbon leakage assessment. In the following paper (aimed to be published this year), we will assess the impact of free allowances for emission intensive trade exposed industries (EITE) and the NDCs in the rest of the world countries - for the sake of brevity, we decided to remove these results from the current paper, but they will be presented later this year. The purpose of this paper is to assess the possible scale of the carbon leakage using different assumptions and policy scenarios and identify channels to efficiently prevent the carbon leakage phenomenon. The analysis has been carried out using the computable general equilibrium d-PLACE model developed within the Centre for Climate and Policy Analysis (CAKE).2 Our model is a recursive dynamic multi-regional and multi-commodity tool in which emissions are modelled in great detail, for example, the process and each fossil fuel combustion related emission are modelled separately. Furthermore, the big advantage of the applied model is a very detailed modelling of EU ETS as well as non-ETS emission targets. In the paper, the simulations using two versions of model was presented - with and without endogenous technical change to elaborate on how the assumptions on technical change affect the modelling results and consequent scale of the carbon leakage. Moreover, this paper aims mainly at the assessment of different channels of carbon leakage; therefore, we do not take into account either NDCs in the rest of the world or free allowances for emission intensive trade exposed sectors. These problems will be handled in the next paper, aimed to be published later this year. Using the above mentioned CGE (computable general equilibrium model, we captured the main factors, that determine the carbon leakage rates. We assessed the contribution of three channels - demand channel, competitiveness channel and carbon intensity channel to the risk of carbon leakage. It turned out that carbon intensity channel and competitiveness channel are the most important, while demand channel contributes to changes in GHG's emission only in the most restrictive scenario. Moreover, energy channel was further decomposed to the impact of sectoral structure and influence in emission intensity within each sector - the impact of these two channels is also similar, but dependent on the analysed scenario. Such a decomposition allowed us to determine the main channels through which the carbon leakage occur and pursue relevant policy recommendations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The transformation of societies and economies towards climate neutrality is a highly complex multi-sectoral and multi-level challenge. This paper examines the multi-level dimension of climate policy with particular reference to the European legal framework and the example of Germany. It analyses how regional and local governments are engaged and whether, in this regard, the existing arrangements of multi-level climate governance can be considered adequate and effective. In the light of the basic principles of federalism theory and in view of the - failed - German multi-level approaches to energy transition it is concluded, in particular, that federal climate governance must build not only on European and national objectives but also on regional and local climate targets and policy planning schemes as a means of both ensuring sufficient transformation efforts and preserving as much autonomy as possible for regional and local communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tackling climate change has provided a key focus for the creation of what the editors of this special issue have termed 'environmental intangibles.' This paper focuses on the European Union Emissions Trading System (EUETS), a climate policy that revolves around the issuance and trading of environmental intangibles called emissions allowances. Set up in the mid-2000s, the cap and trade system has experienced many complications. We propose here to explore a particularly contentious issue: the allocation of free allowances. We will see that deciding on allocation rules leads to vivid debates about whether energy-intensive industries in Europe, such as the manufacturing of cement, can remain competitive in the global economy if climate policy is unilaterally enforced. These debates are focused on a phenomenon referred to as the risk of carbon leakage due to loss of competitiveness. Drawing on an empirical enquiry into the workings of policy-making, the paper examines the ways, in which this risk is framed and questioned through lobbying and evidential work. We suggest that the threat to competitiveness posed by the EUETS can neither be established, nor dismissed; a form of under-determination is maintained and carbon leakage as a never-quite-tangible possibility becomes a battleground for protecting European industry over the environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Emissions from aviation are expected to grow. With evidence that the International Civil Aviation Organization's Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation is an inadequate mitigation mechanism, there is interest in upscaling the sector's climate-related policies. This paper reviews potential aviation emissions mitigation policies against the background of emerging complexities, such as the large share of radiative forcing not covered under any policy agreement, as well as highly skewed demand distributions. In total, 30 voluntary, market-based and regulatory "transition policies" are identified and evaluated with regard to their potential to reduce emissions from air passenger transport and to initiate the transition to new fuels and propulsion technologies. The paper also discusses the potential public acceptance of differing policies. It concludes that the removal of fossil fuel and related subsidies represents a priority, supported by policy mixes comprising levies (CO2, frequent fliers, premium classes) and a feed-in quota for definitively established sustainable aviation fuels. To reduce flight emissions is feasible in principle, but will require policy initiatives at the national level or at the level of regional jurisdictions such as the European Union. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The EU has long pursued relatively ambitious climate and energy policies, often against the backdrop of what has been termed the EU 'polycrisis'. This paper introduces a special issue which seeks to develop a better understanding of why, how and with which consequences the polycrisis and EU climate and energy governance have influenced each other. It draws on a novel framework of five broad crisis trends underlying the polycrisis. Most of the contributions suggest that EU climate and energy governance have advanced significantly despite, and sometimes even because of, the crisis trends. The countervailing effects of the trends and the effectiveness of actors' strategies to advance EU policy against opponents go a long way to explaining this puzzling finding. As the EU seeks to fully decarbonise itself by 2050, interactions with the crisis trends are likely to intensify in ways which future research could fruitfully investigate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Space & Society / Tér és Társadalom is the property of Centre for Economic & Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The European Union (EU) Green Deal and its Farm to Fork Strategy are intended to promote sustainable food systems to achieve EU climate-neutrality by 2050. The Farm to Fork action plan also foresees the introduction of a harmonized mandatory front-of-pack nutrition labelling scheme in 2023. The EU countries have yet to reach agreement on the nutrition labelling scheme, which will also have environmental impacts. This article raises the question of whether at the European level, countries should seek agreements on both climate mitigation and nutrition policies (full agreement as in the case of the Green Deal) or should negotiate separate climate and nutrition policy agreements (as for the nutritional labelling). To address this question, this paper develops a game-theoretic model with multiple countries where each country implements a climate policy and a nutrition policy. We compare the consequences in terms of total emissions, the level of the nutrition policy and the welfare under different institutional arrangements of a non-cooperative equilibrium, full agreement, and three alternative agreements. Our results show in particular that full agreement always leads to the lowest total emissions at the expense of the level of nutrition policy in some cases. In an extension of our analysis, we show that agreements that include cooperation over nutrition policies do not necessarily imply formation of a larger coalition of signatory countries, even if a nutrition policy has positive or negative impacts on emissions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Industrialized countries and emerging economies must cooperate in order to decarbonize the emissions-intensive industrial sector and to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius. While Germany and the other G7 countries have committed to supporting emerging economies in their efforts to combat climate change via international climate finance, it remains to be seen how this support can be implemented successfully. A wide variety of cooperation initiatives that could form a foundation for climate financing--such as climate clubs, partnerships, and alliances--are currently being discussed. However, the incentives to cooperate are not the same for industrialized and emerging countries. As of 2022, the climate club discourse centers on carbon prices, a carbon border adjustment mechanism, incentives for club membership, and sanctions for non-compliance. Financial-technical support for emerging countries has not been discussed sufficiently. Building on interviews with steel sector representatives, international organizations, the financial sector, and think tanks from both the European Union and emerging and developing countries, this paper analyzes existing gaps in cooperation. Moreover, it discusses how international carbon contracts for difference (CCfDs) can support the decarbonization of the steel industry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The issue of globalisation-induced greenhouse gas emissions is an ongoing topic and a major challenge to the EU climate goals of achieving non-zero emissions by 2050. In the light of this ongoing debate on the globalisation–environment nexus, the paper examines the impact of economic globalisation on climate in EU countries over the period 2000–2019 and provide some new empirical evidence. After applying the panel cointegration analysis and the Granger causality test, the dynamic panel analysis is performed for 26 EU countries using the Arellano–Bond estimator. For the policy perspective, the analysed sample of countries is grouped into two subpanels according to their level of development—EU countries with above-average and below-average GDP per capita. After testing the effects of different dimensions of economic globalisation and environmental taxes on GHG emissions, the results revealed the following: (1) Trade globalisation is detrimental to the climate, as trade openness significantly increases emissions in both country groups. Financial globalisation has a weaker impact and increases emissions only in below-average countries, suggesting that FDI inflows could be important for the transfer of green technologies when a country reaches higher development level. (2) Passenger transport reduces GHG emissions in both groups of countries, while FDI are beneficiary for the climate in above-average countries. (3) Environmental taxes as a proxy for environmental policy show statistically significant results, but with different outcomes in the two groups; they have a negative impact on emissions in countries that are below the GDP p/c average, indicating the shortcomings of the tax system in addressing climate change. (4) The total energy consumption increases emissions in both country groups and, thus, harms the climate. Therefore, despite the current unfavourable circumstances, EU countries should continue to expand the green economy, increase energy consumption from renewables, and develop low-carbon technologies that do not depend on imported fossil fuels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The cost of transport decarbonisation matters, yet little information is available. Policies need to reflect the costs to society. The European Union relies on the PRIMES model, a private model with limited transparency. Our research revealed its methodological deficiencies. Based on a revised PRIMES model, modelling was carried out and compared with an official impact assessment prepared for a key EU policy. Our modelling results indicate that crop-based bioethanol has negative abatement costs, biodiesel and biomethane have costs below 100 EUR/tCO2eq, electromobility falls in the range of 100–150 EUR/tCO2eq, cellulosic ethanol has costs above 200 EUR/tCO2eq, while advanced biodiesel has costs above 300 EUR/tCO2eq. Our results on carbon abatement costs suggest that policy-making has often been based on outdated modelling in the EU. With regard to transport decarbonisation policies, a large number of recent energy and climate proposals by the European Commission seem to have been misguided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Starting from 2026, imports of certain goods to the EU will be subject to a special fee that is based on the carbon content of the imported products. Consequently, the EU’s trade partners have tried to predict the possible risks of such a change in the European trade policies. Given this, the article focuses on the analysis of the impact of the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) on different countries. In particular, the current research aims to assess CBAM payments for imports of products from Eurasian countries to the EU. Despite current trends in the EU’s trade policy, the largest CBAM payment is estimated to be for Russia. Analysis shows that the highest share of CBAM payments in exports to the EU is estimated to be for Uzbekistan, Georgia, Tajikistan and Belarus. The biggest share of CBAM payments falls on imports of metals, fertilisers, electricity and oil. However, these results should be treated with caution since some Eurasian countries are missing high quality data on the carbon intensity of the produced goods. In this light Eurasian countries should adopt a transparent system for collecting and publishing detailed information on the embedded emissions of different products. Adoption of CBAM by the EU may lead to the implementation of the analogous mechanisms by trade partners of the Eurasian region. Therefore, the decrease of carbon intensity of products and “green” transition should be among the top priorities of the industrial and economic policies of these countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Zeszyty Naukowe SGGW: Ekonomika i Organizacja Logistyki is the property of Warsaw University of Life Sciences (SGGW), Faculty of Economic Sciences and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Prakseologia is the property of Wydawnictwo Instytutu Filozofii i Socjologii Polskiej Akademii Nauk and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper analyzes the possibility to reduce the carbon footprint of exported products by implementing forest climate offset projects amid the introduction of the carbon tax on imports of high-carbon products, including those exported from Russia, by the European Union. The role of forests as absorbers of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions differs significantly in Russia and in the EU. It is suggested that the EU's climate neutrality policy aimed primarily at the reduction of direct CO2 emissions by sectors such as power, industry, and agriculture is a consequence of the insignificant role of European forests in greenhouse gas absorption. By contrast, Russia can achieve climate neutrality not only by reducing greenhouse gas emissions, but also by increasing their absorption by forests and implementing forest climate projects (FCPs). Taking into consideration the UNFCCC baseline and additionality requirements, three FCP types can be proposed for implementation in the Russian Federation. The possibility to monetize the carbon sequestration function of Russian forests in the framework of carbon offset projects is assessed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of GAIA: Ecological Perspectives for Science & Society is the property of Oekom Verlag GmbH and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This study is one of the first to empirically investigate firm trading behaviour and the importance of permit trading transaction costs, such as information costs and search costs, in the first phase of the European Union's Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). The signs and significance of our constructed transaction costs proxy variables indicate for a presence of these costs in the initial years of the EU ETS. In particular, this paper shows that ETS firms with the smaller number of installations and with less trading experience were less likely to participate in the European emissions trading market and traded the lower quantities of permits. Furthermore, these firms chose to trade permits indirectly via third parties. This study also supports the concerns that transaction costs could be excessive for smaller participants and firms operating in the new EU member states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The EU has established the world's first cross-border emission-trading systems (ETS) for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, currently covering aviation, emission-intensive sectors, and electricity (EITE). The EU Commission has offered to apply emissions trading in new sectors where emissions from maritime transport will be incorporated into the current EU ETS, while a separated emissions trading system will cover emissions from road transport and the building sector. This paper employs a multi-regional multi-sectoral computable general equilibrium (CGE) model with two simultaneous international emission permit markets. After examining the abatement costs for the EU regions, various policy scenarios are implemented to study the welfare effects of forming an ETS covering the sectors other than EITE (NEIT) and its linking with the EITE sectors under two different baselines and four emission reduction targets. The results provide several important insights: (i) Marginal abatement costs in Germany and the Eastern European Union region (EEU) are significantly lower than in the rest of the EU regions. (ii) The carbon price in the emission permit market covering NEIT is significantly higher than the carbon price in the emission permit market covering EITE. (iii) Germany and EEU appear as notable suppliers of emission permits in both markets. (iv) There is a significant aggregate welfare gain under the scenario in which the ETS covering NEIT co-exists parallel with the ETS covering EITE. (v) The aggregate welfare in the EU under the full integration of EITE and NEIT may fall below its value under the scenario with two parallel emission permit markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Matériaux et Techniques is the property of EDP Sciences and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper is dealing with mechanisms that can accelerate the global diffusion of climate-friendly technologies. The accelerated diffusion of low-carbon technology innovation can possibly be achieved by interactive processes such as: (1) mutually reinforcing cycles of policy-induced domestic market growth, innovation, and policy feedback; (2) lead markets and political lesson-drawing, the reinforced international adoption of innovations from pioneer countries; and (3) interaction between the vertical and horizontal dynamics in multi-level systems of governance. The three mechanisms are not exclusive. They can overlap and reinforce each other. After a theoretical introduction they will be described. The empirical focus is on the European system of multi-level climate governance. The paper draws some final conclusions for policy makers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

European dieselization, i.e. the sustained increase in the diesel share in the passenger car fleet, is associated with the first EU strategy to reduce CO2 emissions from passenger cars. This paper aims to contribute to the literature on dieselization by looking at EU international trade flows in passenger cars, a perspective seldom found in the literature. Trade data confirm that the bulk of EU diesel trade flows occurs between EU partners, although diesel imports from other, non-EU countries are also significant. Besides, the external competitiveness of the EU car industry is clearly based on petrol cars. The analysis of trade data also reflects previous findings on the increase in car size. On the policy side, the divergence between CO2 from new car registrations and total CO2 emissions from passenger cars during the dieselization era proves that strategies for decarbonization should not rely exclusively on efficiency gains, demand policies are also needed. The dieselization phenomenon warns of the major inertia that road transport policies can have. The analysis of EU car trade also underlines the need to coordinate environmental policy with other relevant countries in the international car market. • EU dieselization can be tracked by looking at car trade flows. • EU dieselization has been related more to imported than to exported vehicles. • Despite dieselization, EU car industry competitiveness is based on petrol cars. • Clean vehicles and lower demand for motoring will be required to make decarbonization happen. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The intensive development of sewerage networks and municipal wastewater treatment plants observed in Poland in recent years has led to the generation of large quantities of municipal sewage sludge. At present, only nearly 140 out of about 2,500 wastewater treatment plants have full sludge digestion facilities. This means that only 6% of wastewater treatment plants operating in Poland produce biogas that can be used for energy purposes. The total volume of digesters at all wastewater treatment plants is estimated at 800,000-900,000 m3 . The aim of this paper is to analyse the energy potential of biogas generated in the processes of methane fermentation of sewage sludge in the context of the EU energy and climate policy while strengthening national energy security. Thus the following research questions have been formulated: To what extent can biogas support the implementation of the EU energy and climate policy in Poland? What are the barriers to biogas development from sewage sludge digestion in Poland? The research hypothesis was defined that the production of biogas from sewage fermentation will contribute to increasing the energy security of the country by diversifying the natural gas production structure and increasing the stability of the energy system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Shifting from fossil to renewable energy sources is a major global challenge, and in this context, the European Union has promoted sustainable and environmentally friendly growth as early as the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. To date, European institutions have promulgated a series of environmental regulations and directives aimed at promoting and imposing adoption by member states of internal regulations. This paper is focused on Western Europe, and it explores, for each state under analysis, energy policies adopted, the results achieved and recommendations for the future growth of renewable energy. The results show that in countries where energy policy is not fragmented, the yield in renewable energies has been higher, and also in the states where more and various forms of subsidies are foreseen, growth seems to be greater. Finally, the paper provides useful recommendations and future policy implications for states that have not met the 2020 targets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explains the relatively successful performance of the European Union (EU) in climate and energy governance by two factors: (1) multi-level reinforcement and (2) the mobilization of economic interests at different levels of governance through low-carbon industrial policy. The article adds to the literature by further developing existing arguments on multi-level reinforcement in climate and energy policy. We stress the point that economic co-benefits of climate protection have been successfully mobilized at all levels of governance, including the sub-national level, in recent times. This is illustrated by examples from pioneer countries as well as laggards and waverers in terms of national climate and energy policy. While it is far from certain whether the EU will indeed deliver the needed CO2 reductions to reach its internationally agreed targets, this paper, nevertheless, highlights why the EU system of climate governance remains relatively robust in light of the various challenges it currently faces. © 2017 The Authors. Environmental Policy and Governance published by ERP Environment and John Wiley & Sons Ltd [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Transport is a significant and growing contributor to climate change. To stay within ‘safe’ global warming guardrails requires substantial cuts in greenhouse gas emissions. This represents a global political consensus, but there is evidence that current legislation in the transport sector is not significant enough to achieve medium- and longer-term reduction goals. In focusing on the European Union, this paper investigates the perspectives of twelve policy officers in three Directorates-General (MOVE, CLIMA, ENV) of the European Commission with regard to their understanding of mitigation goals and timelines, responsibilities for policy development and implementation, and perceived efficiencies of these policies to achieve climate objectives in the transport sector. Results indicate diverging and common views on climate policy goals and political responsibilities, as well as barriers to policy-making, including lack of political leadership on climate change mitigation, resistance from member states, the favoring of economic growth over cuts in greenhouse gas emissions, pressure from industry and lobby groups, preferential treatment of aero- and automobility over more sustainable transport modes, policy implementation delays, insufficient forecasting and monitoring tools, and an overreliance on technologies to contribute to emission reductions. In offering a view inside the ‘black box’ of transport policy-making, the paper reveals fundamental institutional (structural) and individual (agency-based) barriers that will have to be overcome if significant emission cuts in the transport sector are to be achieved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This article analyzes the relationship between the social and climate policies of the European Union member states and examines the concept of the eco–social state. In the climate crisis era, the need for a close link between social and climate policies is particularly acute. The European Green Deal and other EU strategies reflect a political agenda with a specific interest in social and ecological goals. We aim to answer whether more significant state efforts in the social field are related to a similarly more substantial commitment in climate policy or whether a greater focus on one means less attention on another. On a theoretical level, we discuss the challenges of climate change for social policy and present the concept of climate justice. The similarities and differences between the ecological and the welfare state are also examined. We argue that the concept of climate justice highlights the phenomenon of a double and even triple injustice on a global level, which requires joint efforts in spheres of social and climate policy. Eco-social state combines social and environmental institutions intending to ensure welfare and sustainability and thus complements the traditional concept of the welfare state. The Koch-Fritz (2014) classification, which distinguishes between the established, deadlocked, emerging, and failing eco-social states, is presented in the paper and used for the empirical analysis. The empirical part of the paper employs non-parametrical correlation and hierarchical cluster analysis. The former allows for exploring the links between the ecological and social indicators. The latter enables countries to be grouped according to social and climate indicators and compared to the traditional classification of welfare states and Koch-Fritz models of eco-social states. The analysis is based on social and climate indicators of the Europe 2020 strategy. The study found that countries that provide relatively more significant funding for traditional social problems also perform better in climate change adaptation and mitigation policies by reducing greenhouse gas emissions in an effort–sharing sectors and final energy consumption. We show that clusters of the EU member states in terms of social and climate indicators (eco–social state models) are very similar to their membership in the traditional welfare states’ classification. Moreover, social democratic welfare states are better prepared to address climate change than countries representing other types of welfare states. Thus the analysis confirms the social democratic welfare states as established eco–social states, while the conservative-corporate and liberal welfare states can indeed be called deadlocked eco–social states with average results. We show, however, that Lithuania, together with other Eastern European and Southern European countries, fluctuates on both the best and the worst social and climate change mitigation outcomes. Hence those should be attributed to a group with the mixed results and can be named as failed-emerging eco-social states.

The paper offers sector-based qualitative evidence concerning the climate and energy policy effects on eco innovations in the EU. Through interviews with industry associations of Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) sectors, it analyses the extent to which past innovation adoption dynamics were influenced by policy and regulatory levers, by looking at the single and interaction effects of policies. As could be expected from the neo-Schumpeterian theory on innovation, differences emerge across sectors. Policies appear to be relevant in some sectors, namely energy, coke and refinery, and paper, but energy costs considerations dominate over the potential effects of CO 2 targeted policies. Overall, technological and organisational levels are both relevant: organisational innovations emerged as important in most sectors, often operating as a leading force in technological development. We expect this ‘complementarity’ to play a crucial role in the future path towards 2030 and 2050 aims, whose achievement is possible only by integrating technological, organisational and behavioural innovations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From 2021 onwards, forests and forestry will for the first time contribute to the European Union's climate action targets. The new Land Use, Land Use Change & Forestry (LULUCF) Regulation commits Member States to achieve carbon neutrality on the basis of an EU-wide system. The system accounts for carbon sequestered and emitted from forests and other land uses like crop- and wetland. What looks like a significant step in the Union's climate policy framework, however, leaves the large potential of Europe's forest sector for climate mitigation untapped. The present article draws this conclusion from a comprehensive analysis of 67 documents related to decision-making on the LULUCF Regulation. It reveals coalitional politics and the salience of the Commission's behavior as key to explain the Regulation's limited scope and concludes with assessing the future role of forests in the Union's climate policy framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change is pictured like the most threatening environmental outcome of the recent industry driven economic and social development. Fighting against climate change has a great legitimacy and the public at large seldom question the necessity of governmental intervention in this respect. The global financial crisis and the globalized markets are external factors that tailored some unexpected results of climate policy implementation in the European Union. Thus, along with expected progress in emission abatement, some companies improved their economic and financial indicators on the carbon market. The paper reveals the mechanism of this process, outlines some quantitative milestones and concludes that the public at large might loss some of the commitment to climate change mitigation by finding itself in the role of main financial supporter of the climate policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Switzerland, transportation represents 41% of CO2 emissions from energy combustion (2016), a much higher share than in the European Union (EU) (28%) or even the USA (34%). While total Swiss CO2 emissions decreased by 10% between 1990 and 2016, CO2 emissions from transport increased by 4.5% over the same period (all data from UNFCCC database). Our projections (Vielle and Thalmann, Updated emissions scenarios without measures, 1990-2025, Tech. rep., 2017) show that the contribution of the transport sector would remain constant in a scenario taking into account climate and energy policy measures already implemented or adopted in 2016. In the EU, several initiatives have already been introduced to limit the use of petroleum products in transportation. This paper presents deep decarbonization pathways for Switzerland that demand a strong contribution from the transport sector. We find that a preferential treatment of transportation fuels raises the welfare cost of decarbonization by about 18% relative to a uniform tax on all fossil fuels. This is of similar magnitude as the preferential treatment of large CO2 emitters through an emissions trading system. We also find that the preferential treatment leads to a share of fossil fuels in total energy for road transportation in 2050 which is approximately twice as high as in the uniform treatment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The integration of climate policy concerns in other policy areas where decisions are taken that determine greenhouse gas emissions is a prerequisite for effectively mitigating climate change. There are particularly strong interlinkages between energy and climate policy as the major part of greenhouse gas emissions is related to energy supply and use. We compile a set of five output‐focused indicators for assessing climate policy integration (political commitment, functional overlap, policy instruments, weighting, and time perspective). We then apply the criteria for an appraisal of climate policy integration in European Union (EU) energy policy during the last decade; that is, we focus on climate policy integration from a horizontal perspective. The focus of our research lies on the comparison of the Renewable Energy and the Energy Efficiency Directives of the Energy Union Package with their predecessors. Our results show that climate change mitigation is a key objective in these documents. The energy policy objectives are generally synergetic with climate policy. The Energy Union Package makes progress in some areas like the more stringent EU targets for renewable energy and energy efficiency or the more stringent sustainability criteria for biofuels. However, some conflicting issues arise. The shift from national to an overall EU renewables target and the change towards more market‐oriented support schemes might together with the elimination of preferential grid access for renewable electricity entail negative impacts on renewable investment and on achieving emission reductions. It remains to be seen whether the adaptations in EU energy policy will lead to the required acceleration of the energy transition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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As a major importer of fossil fuels, the EU will likely see its position in the geopolitics of energy change following its commitment to carbon neutrality by 2050. This article analyses the implications of the energy transition for the EU's role in energy geopolitics, looking at declining and emerging energy dependences by investigating the EU's exposure to the material foundations of interdependence (sensitivity) and its ability to manage them (vulnerability). The EU is generally in a more advantageous geopolitical position in a clean energy order than in the current fossil fuel-based energy system. This is mostly a result of the geological distribution and specific material features of clean energy materials and the EU's ability to manage such interdependence, as decarbonisation involves a set of policy areas where the EU shows important external strengths. Weaknesses may persist, however, as growing contestation could render sectoral state-like industrial policies more central to geo-economic competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Carbon taxation is a highly debated environmental policy tool and can contribute to tackling climate change. Before the advent of the emission trading system in the European Union, forms of carbon taxation were present in some EU member states; furthermore, after the approval of the well-known EU Green Deal, carbon taxes can gain momentum in addressing emissions from sectors not involved in the EU Emissions Trading System. Due to this historical evolution of environmental policies over the last decades and in the presence of a system that assigns to EU member states, the governance of energy and fiscal issues, heterogeneous carbon/energy policy settings may determine the impact on growth and trade. This article provides food for thought for a policy through an empirical evaluation of the impact on the gross domestic product of trade spillovers related to carbon taxation in the European Union. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is dealing with mechanisms that can accelerate the global diffusion of climate-friendly technologies. The accelerated diffusion of low-carbon technology innovation can possibly be achieved by interactive processes such as: (1) mutually reinforcing cycles of policy-induced domestic market growth, innovation, and policy feedback; (2) lead markets and political lesson-drawing, the reinforced international adoption of innovations from pioneer countries; and (3) interaction between the vertical and horizontal dynamics in multi-level systems of governance. The three mechanisms are not exclusive. They can overlap and reinforce each other. After a theoretical introduction they will be described. The empirical focus is on the European system of multi-level climate governance. The paper draws some final conclusions for policy makers.

This paper investigates the impact of the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) on carbon emissions and economic performance based on a matching methodology exploiting installation-level inclusion criteria combined with difference-in-differences. Installation-level data from national Polluting Emissions Registries in France, Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom point to a reduction in carbon emissions in the order of −10% between 2005 and 2012, in line with existing micro and macro evidence. Meanwhile, firm-level data on the 31 ETS-regulated countries shows that the EU ETS had no significant impact on profits and employment, and led to an increase in regulated firms' revenues and fixed assets. We explore various explanations for these findings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]