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In the increasingly volatile global political order, national economic structures and international relations, integrated as they are, are showing concerning signs of strain. Taiwan, whose world-leading semiconductor industry is indispensable in Global Supply Chains and whose economic prosperity and security are critical to a stable global economic system, has received much research interest since the late 1980s. Against the background of a slowing Taiwanese economy, starting in the 2000s, this paper seeks to investigate the causes of Taiwan's challenges and the linkages to the global economy vis-à-vis China. Based on previous research from different social science disciplines, this paper shows that Taiwan's economic performance has been undermined by the declining effectiveness of its industrial policy and the general state intervention in the country, which is in turn caused by deep socio-political divisions on issues of national identity and Taiwan-China relations. The paper reveals the dilemma, which results from this. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) (Taiwan) have taken divergent paths in the area of human rights. Since the two leaders Xi Jinping and Tsai Ing-wen came to power, the differences in the area of human rights have further increased. The paper analyses and compares their external human rights strategies based on realist assumptions and the soft and hard power resources of the PRC and the ROC. The PRC's objectives are to deflect international criticism of its human rights situation and to weaken the global human rights system and its underlying human rights norms. Taiwan's objective is to use its record as a human rights leader in Asia to expand its limited international space and to strengthen its ties with other consolidated democracies and the global civil society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a growing risk of a military attack on Taiwan by mainland China (otherwise known as the People's Republic of China, or PRC) to achieve what the latter terms "reunification." Taiwan, the US, and Japan must urgently and interactively prepare for this contingency—which is also the best way of deterring it. Taiwan must increase military spending (as it has begun to do), with an emphasis on a "porcupine strategy" of lots of distributed, mobile, survivable, affordable, and lethal weapons. The US must increase its military deployments and joint exercises in the region, again emphasizing the types of weapons that can survive a preemptive PRC attack and counter a Chinese blockade or amphibious invading force. Japan will double defense spending over the next five years in a welcome and transformative move, but effective deterrence requires that it also signal that the collective defense of Taiwan against a military attack is existential for its own security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan's opposition to PRC demands such as acceptance of the '92 Consensus' and 'One Country, Two Systems' formula since 2016 has invited a series of retaliatory measures from Beijing, designed to coerce Taiwan into compliance. Given the stark asymmetry in economic size, military capability, and diplomatic status, Taiwan provides a case for studying coercive diplomacy that takes the form of threats to punish. Material differences suggest that Taiwan should capitulate, and 'cheap talk' theses expect PRC threats to have no discernible effect, while balance of threat arguments expect resolve. In this article, we use the survey data collected in the 2016, 2019, and 2020 rounds of the Taiwan National Security Study to examine how Taiwanese respond to China's intensifying and expanding threats. Our paper identifies four strategies that the public sees as responses to PRC coercion: isolation, bandwagon with China, balance against China by allying with the USA and Japan, and hedge by deepening economic ties with China while aligning with the USA and Japan against China. We show that the popular support for balancing against China rises as PRC coercion grows and Taiwanese citizens increasingly perceive China to be a threat. Our findings imply that citizens in a liberal democracy can develop the will to pushback against pressure from an authoritarian regime despite sharp asymmetries in capabilities and material limitations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper describes the growing human rights gap between China on one side and the US and Taiwan on the other side and analyses its impact on cross-strait relations. Since Xi Jinping's ascent to power in the People's Republic of China in 2012/2013 and the elections of Donald Trump in the US and Tsai Ing-wen in Taiwan in 2016, the relationship between China and the other two countries has worsened. The US and Taiwan have a similar view on human rights in the PRC. The increasing repression and authoritarianism of the PRC leads to a human rights gap in the Taiwan Strait that increases the divide and the tensions between both sides. The failure of the PRC to address in its proposal for a peaceful unification the concerns of the Taiwanese for their democracy and human rights pushes Taiwan further away. The similar assessment of the PRC's authoritarian threat by the US and Taiwan strengthens the bond between both, based on the shared values of democracy and human rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explores the recent features of China's economic coercion against Taiwan by offering an up‐to‐date and in‐depth analysis of China's targeted sanctions on Taishang in Tsai Ing‐wen's first term. The paper elaborates on China's specific reasons and means for imposing informal targeted sanctions, as well as their newly observed features in comparison with the past. Heavy dependence on the Chinese economy by certain enterprises of the island has made them vulnerable to sanction targeting. Compared to the past, nationalist boycotts by Chinese consumers and online activities have had a greater influence as part of China's informal targeted sanctions. Beijing's demands for supporting the "one China" policy and the "1992 Consensus" have also become more obvious. These findings suggest that the impetus for developing the cross‐Strait economic exchanges has become more susceptible to the effects of non‐economic factors. Although Beijing's sanctions on Taishang have not yet changed Taipei's policy, they cannot be said to be ineffective. Through the tactics, Beijing definitely sends clear signals of what it wants as it advances their strategy on cross‐Strait relations to the outside world. The case studies on Taiwan provide important implications for other economies as a barometer of China's increasing economic sanction practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party won the 2016 election in Taiwan, Beijing's Taiwan policies have witnessed some strategic and tactical adjustments. This article attempts to clarify the underlying changes and continuity in Beijing's Taiwan policy by addressing three vital questions. First, for Beijing, what is the prominent concern for its Taiwan policy making? Second, what is the top priority for its 'great rejuvenation' ambition? And third, what is Beijing's guideline for dealing with Taipei's reluctance to accept reunification? This paper argues that, firstly, how to prevent Taiwan's de facto independence from perpetuating has become the primary challenge for Beijing, given Taiwan's inclination to indefinitely maintain de facto independence. Second, Beijing still prioritizes the achievement of comprehensive modernization before the fulfillment of reunification within its overarching 'national rejuvenation' timetable. Third, discouraged by Taiwan's anti-China dynamics, Beijing has switched its guideline for promoting unification from 'placing hope on the Taiwanese' to 'placing more hope on the mainland itself'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The war in Ukraine and reactions to it have affected, and mostly worsened, already-formidable and growing challenges for US policy toward China-Taiwan conflict situations. These challenges include deterring a more powerful and assertive China in a more complex set of scenarios (including gray zone conflicts), assuring China that behavior that conforms to US preferences will mean more cooperative US behavior, and managing the abandonment / entrapment dynamic in US relations with Taiwan. The implication of the Ukraine war for the US and cross-Strait issues is mixed, complicated, and stillevolving. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mobility across the Taiwan Strait has intensified since the border was opened in 1987. The cross-border social, cultural and economic exchanges, however, have remained closely embedded in the nationalistic logic specific to cross-Strait relations. Employing a state-centered approach and building on a comparative analysis of the interaction between Beijing and two groups of cross-Strait migrants (mainland spouses in Taiwan, and Taiwanese investors in China), this paper examines the various ways in which a state may still exert influence over migrant communities in a context of increased mobility and exchanges. This paper argues that the nation-state may still shape migrants’ experiences, particularly when sending and receiving governments have unresolved disputes. Under these conditions, state actors may use migrant communities to achieve their nationalistic goals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 2008, the Taiwanese business group Want Want, having made a fortune in China, has returned to Taiwan to buy a major media group and attempt to exert political influence on Taiwanese society. This paper analyses the rise and rationale of this new type of media investor in the light of the business-government relationship under China's model of state capitalism. According to the analysis developed in this paper, when China needed foreign investment in the early 1990s, Taiwanese investors were warmly welcomed by the Chinese government, which provided Taiwanese businesses with tax incentives at that time. After 2000, however, when not only domestic Chinese entrepreneurs emerged but also more non-Chinese investors entered the Chinese markets, Taiwanese businesses realised that the investment environment had become much more competitive, so they had to work hard on building ties with Chinese officials. Under these circumstances, Want Want bought into media in Taiwan as an asset to be used in order to build social ties with the Chinese government, but in doing so, Want Want has also triggered resistance from Taiwanese civil society. Future researchers and regulators can continue to watch and define this new type of investment, which has become increasingly significant in this region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies of public support for war among non-Western and non-major powers (NWNM) states are distinctive from United States foreign military operations. First, these wars often intrude on subjects' direct livelihood. Second, great powers' intervention can drastically alter the outcome of these wars. These factors have not been examined extensively in the war support literature. We fill this gap by spearheading several hypotheses of war support unique to NWNM countries. Through an original and representative survey experiment on a hypothetical military conflict between China and Taiwan, our analysis yields that the information about the United States coming to Taiwan's defense in an armed conflict with China drives up war support by around 7% among the citizenry, although such information does not make the Taiwanese population more tolerant of combat casualties. In addition, perception of military training increases public support for war significantly. The findings suggest that the study of NWNM states could contribute to the war support literature from different perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How international economic ties affect domestic politics is a research question that has interested many scholars. In this paper, I try to address this question by conducting a qualitative case study of the effect of China-Taiwan economic ties on the 2012 Taiwanese presidential election. Specifically, I examine how China-Taiwan economic ties (1) shaped the political debate in the aforementioned election; (2) influenced the Taiwanese people's opinions about the debate; and (3) affected the outcome of the election. By focusing on the political conflict in Taiwan over the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), an FTA-like economic agreement China and Taiwan signed in June 2010, I argue that (1) the 2012 Taiwanese presidential election involved a political competition between the pro-openness coalition (which was, politically, anti-Taiwan's independence and, economically, pro-ECFA) and the anti-openness coalition (which was pro-Taiwan's independence and had a cautious attitude toward the ECFA); (2) the Taiwanese general public was gradually convinced that the benefits of the ECFA outweighed the costs; and (3) the pro-openness coalition eventually won the election with the support from the majority of the Taiwanese people, which to a great extent was a result of China's, as well as the pro-openness coalition's, successful effort to persuade the Taiwanese people that the ECFA was incompatible with Taiwan's independence promoted by the antiopenness coalition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An analysis of PRC leaders' public communication with respect to Taiwan from 2003 to 2013 shows the presence of three conflict frames: aspiration, process and image. Chinese leaders most often use the process frame to convey the preferred process through which both sides could find a common ground. These messages are reinforced by rhetoric about China's capacity, resolve and sincerity to reach out to Taiwan for peaceful solutions. Communication of China's own aspirations of national unification is usually less visible. However, it becomes more prominent when the Taiwanese are not the intended audience, indicating its utility in rallying internal support. Using these frames as broad parameters, the paper discusses how they may have influenced policy actions toward Taiwan in the early days of the Xi administration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does the quality of international relations between countries affect regional economics? The question of how much economic change can be attributed to the trajectories of international politics is difficult to answer, because different factors over time can influence economic development. This research uses synthetic control and difference-in-differences methods to evaluate the impact of the normalisation of cross-strait relations in 2008 on regional economic growth in Jiangsu province. Based on data from the Regional and China Year Books from 1990 to 2015, Jiangsu province, a region with prominently close economic ties with Taiwan, witnessed a CNY 20,726.52 (around GBP 2328.35) increase in per capita GDP from 2008 to 2015, compared with the counterfactual in the absence of normalised cross-strait relations. There was an annual increase of approximately CNY 2961 Yuan (around GBP 333). This research has important implications for acknowledging the relationship between the quality of political relations and their economic impact on confrontational countries and regions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the late 1980s, Taiwan has been engulfed in waves of both democratisation and integration with mainland China. These two waves have pulled identity reconstruction in Taiwan in two different directions. In the process of democratisation, a shift to a majoritarian system encouraged a Taiwanese renaissance on the political platform and consequently led to the deconstruction of Chinese identity. On the other hand, in the 1990s, with the high mobility of capital and people across the Taiwan Strait, close economic ties could have put the brakes on Taiwan independence movements. Hence, this paper uses random coefficient models to explore how the democratic transition and increasing cross-strait relations brought about psychological and structural mechanisms that motivated people to opt for identity change in Taiwan. It also attempts to investigate how people dealt with the dissonance between rising Taiwanese nationalism and the economic interests that deterred a radical Taiwanese identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of China Quarterly is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of China Quarterly is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This study focuses on the characteristics and institutions of the Xi Jinping regime's policy-making on Taiwan affairs and compares them to those of the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao regimes. The study examines how factors such as changes in leadership, the domestic and international environment, and Cross-Strait relations have affected the policy-making processes and their mutual relations. The following three points are made. First, the operation of the People Republic of China's (PRC) policy-making on Taiwan affairs strongly reflects the leader's personality and domestic political situation at the time. Second, on the other hand, the process of the PRC's policy-making on Taiwan affairs is not only influenced by internal factors such as the personality of the leader and the internal political situation but also by the current status of the Cross-Strait relations and internal politics in Taiwan at the time. Third, since the Hu Jintao regime, the role of local governments in the PRC's policy toward Taiwan has increased, and the role of the local Taiwan affairs policy-making system has been polarized under Xi Jinping's rule. Considering these trends, the situation emerges that Xi Jinping's authority over the CCP's policy-making on Taiwan affairs is becoming more vital than ever. With the official channels of negotiation with Taiwan closed and the means available for "promoting reunification" limited, Xi Jinping is using the centralized policy-making system to develop policies that require a higher level of leadership than Hu Jintao's policies toward Taiwan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Biden administration is attempting to transform traditional US–Taiwan relations into a multilateralism‐based "US + alliance–Taiwan" interactional model, which can be conceptualized as alliance coordination. This article unpacks the logic of Biden's strategic thinking in the US Taiwan policy. Adopting an asymmetric alliance perspective, it argues that US allies' reactions to Biden's foreign policy and their ideological attitude toward China have interacted with the US placement of the Taiwan question on the agenda in the alliance system to produce different degrees of alliance coordination, which can be measured by the new typology constituted by seven approaches: all‐fields approach, pure high politics approach, high politics driven approach, half‐measures, low politics driven approach, pure low politics approach, and strategic inaction. Three cases, including the different reactions of Japan, European countries, and South Korea, are analyzed to demonstrate how the alliance coordination operates in realpolitik. Additionally, the assessment of this article reveals that Biden's alliance coordination would place growing strategic pressure on mainland China and introduces greater volatility into cross‐strait relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tensions between Beijing and Taipei in 2022 reached their heights since the 1995- 1996 Third Strait Crisis. The decision by the outgoing Speaker of the US House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi to visit Taiwan in August, few months prior to the momentous 20th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, was immediately followed by an unprecedented display of military capabilities by the People’s Liberation Army in the waters and airspace surrounding Taiwan. Forceful assertions of sovereignty over the island by Beijing, and explicit declarations of support in case of a Chinese attempt at a military takeover by President Biden preceded and followed the events that occurred in August, only to partially wane by the end of the year following the XiBiden G20 meeting in Bali. With no open route to improve cross-Strait relations, the Tsai administration further deepened relations with the US and expanded unofficial engagement with Washington’s East Asian allies and the European Union and its member states. Shared support for Ukraine against Russia’s aggression and growing synergies in industrial policy related to the semiconductor sector drove this engagement, without however producing meaningful results in trade policy. In November, the Kuomintang obtained a sweeping victory in the local «nine-in-one» elections. The result showed the party’s continuing competitiveness in local elections, but the slowdown of the Taiwanese economy, rising inflationary trends, and declining popular support for the Tsai administration complicated the ruling Democratic Progressive Party’s prospects for the 2024 general elections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is both academically and practically valuable to construct a multi-dimensional scale to assess the effectiveness of the Communist Party of China's (CPC) policy toward Taiwan. The author constructed a One China identity scale based on national identity theory and the CPC's political advocacy and actions toward Taiwan. Using panel data from 271 members of Taiwanese student delegations to Mainland China from 2016 to 2017, this study explored the changes in their sense of a One China identity. The results showed a significant increase (0.11, 5.19%) in the average ratings of the investigated students' One China identity. The regression equation constructed by the current study was able to explain 10.94% of the total variance of the One China identity scale, and all three hypotheses were supported. Following the exchange program, Taiwanese students appeared to have a greater sense of a One China identity. Their impression of Mainland China had improved, their acceptance of the CPC's regime had increased, and their preference for authoritarianism had increased. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2014 Sunflower Movement succeeded in blocking Taiwan's Congress from ratifying the Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA), a bill that proposed to liberalize trade with China. Since most of the participants in this movement were students and NGO members, they had limited economic and political resources to influence policy change, which makes their success in stopping a trade deal remarkable. Many attribute this important success to an elite alliance with politicians inside the government, fueled by a personal rivalry between political elites. However, I argue that changing public opinion is the more important force behind the creation of the alliance. With original data from interviews with political elites, their staff members, and activists in Taiwan, in addition to secondary information, I confirm public opinion to be the major reason for the political alliance. This case illustrates that in some circumstances, public opinion outweighs the importance of elite rivalry in influencing political elite decision-making, and it could represent a key mechanism of democratic policy-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are Taiwanese voters polarized? By presenting four novel visualizations based on a factor analysis of Taiwan National Security Surveys from 2002 to 2017, this article describes the contours of structural change in Taiwan politics. Overall, the cross-strait position among Taiwanese voters can be described by a stable inverted U shape over time. This arises from the fact that most nonpartisans—typically neglected in the literature on polarization—are moderate. Before 2008, increasing polarization among partisans can be attributed to pan-green voters moving toward independence. Between 2008 and 2014, decreasing polarization stems from moderates self-identifying as pan-blue supporters. Since 2014, a record-breaking number of nonpartisans have left the pan-blue camp, and more extreme pan-blue voters have contributed to a return of polarization among partisans. The results yield important implications for the study of polarization and populism, as well as for the future of Taiwanese politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Peloponnesian War, a conflict between the Greek city-states of Athens and Sparta and their respective allies, is held to be a classic example of war between a hegemon and a rising power. Graham Allison has recently coined the term "Thucydides' Trap" to emphasize how structural forces are leading to instability in U.S.-China relations. This interpretation of history is inaccurate and reflects the influence of misleading translations. Drawing on the original Greek text of Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War, I argue that the concept of Thucydides' Trap does not find support even in the case that has given it its name. Thucydides' famous attribution of the war to "the growth of the power of Athens" actually refers to the expansion of the Athenian Empire rather than a shift in the distribution of capabilities. Structural arguments do offer valuable insights about potential sources of conflict in U.S.-China relations, but the causal mechanism has little to do with the analogy of Athens and Sparta. As exemplified by the flashpoint in the Strait of Taiwan, structural change has aggravated long-standing differences between the United States and the PRC. Beijing's growing economic and military power has resulted in a growing threat to Taipei, which has led the United States to affirm its commitment to Taiwan's security in ways that are inconsistent with the One-China policy. If this trend continues, it will raise the potential for a military confrontation between the great powers in East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of China Quarterly is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The widely believed notion that Taiwan will inevitably submit to rule by Beijing is not politically, economically, or strategically well grounded. Despite its economic influence and growing military might, China's ability to compel involuntary unification is far from certain if Taiwan's people are determined to maintain their autonomy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2016 elections in Taiwan resulted in a landslide victory for the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). It not only won the presidency but also an outright majority in the Legislative Yuan. It is now in full control of the government. An intriguing question is how the DPP government under President Tsai Ing-wen will deal with China which has warned Taiwan time and again that it would attack Taiwan if the latter declares de jure independence. The current study investigates the possible move that may be considered by the Tsai Ing-wen government, that will not irritate its own constituents on the island, and at the same time will not escalate the tension across the Taiwan Strait. Whether Tsai's policy is tenable given the domestic and international constraints remains to be seen. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the termination of the US-ROC official relations, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act on April 10, 1979, which has helped to maintain commercial, cultural, and other relations through unofficial linkages between the United State and Taiwan. While the USROC relationship has remained stable, cross-strait relations have experienced dramatic changes. Thus, it is a good time to examine the implementation of the Act by reviewing cross-strait relations. This article summarizes six historical eras in cross-strait relations: 1) military confrontation, 2) political standoff, 3) people-to-people exchange, 4) institutional negotiation, 5) political confrontation, and 6) peaceful negotiation. Three challenges facing the ROC are then examined in detail: 1) the "one China" principle, 2) arms sales and Taiwan's security, and 3) the ROC's international participation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines KimDae Jung's 1998-2002 Sunshine Policy toward North Korea and the mutual reassurances between Taiwan and China from 2008 to 2013. Furthermore, it explores factors contributing to the failure of trust-building in the two cases, and the implications for reassurance theory as well as the prospects for inter-Korean and cross-Taiwan Strait relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]