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Nuclear-powered Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs) remain the mainstay of credible nuclear deterrence. Owing to the limited information emerging from China, even the number of SSBNs in service with the PLA Navy at present remains an estimate. Projections or forecasts of Chinese SSBN force levels in the next 10–20 years are therefore speculative and widely deviating. Based on the analysis of China's professed nuclear policy, possible SSBN deployment patterns, and developing shipyard infrastructure, this paper assesses the capacity as well as perceived requirement of Chinese SSBNs. Accordingly, the author offers forecasts for SSBN force levels by 2030 and by 2040. Likely technological developments and characteristics of the next-generation Type 096 SSBN are also predicted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the impact of the establishment of circuit courts on corporate fraud. Using a quasi-natural experiment in China and the difference-in-differences approach, we find that corporate fraud is significantly lower following the establishment of circuit courts. The reduction in fraud is more pronounced for companies with poor internal and external governance and weak information disclosures. The mechanism analysis shows that circuit courts increase litigation risks faced by companies and deter corporate fraud. Overall, the findings suggest that circuit courts are an effective legal institution to constrain corporate fraud. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores how and why Chinese courts became involved in regulating pollution by aiding administrative agencies in executing sanction decisions and collecting pollution levies. It also studies the effects of their regulatory involvement, both in terms of deterrence inferred from available information, as well as the compliance behavior of regulated actors defined as payment of regulatory penalties. It finds that judicial involvement in regulatory enforcement proved to be short-lived and depended on a particular context at a particular period of time when a regulatory need coincided with administrative and financial judicial needs and particular judges. The paper also finds that court involvement enhanced deterrence in terms of certainty of punishment and to some extent the severity of punishment; however that deterrent effect was undermined by the close relationship between the courts and the regulated entities as fines and levies were almost always negotiated. In effect, deterrence increased the number of compliers paying levies without increasing the depth of compliance in terms of their full payment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The war in Ukraine and reactions to it have affected, and mostly worsened, already-formidable and growing challenges for US policy toward China-Taiwan conflict situations. These challenges include deterring a more powerful and assertive China in a more complex set of scenarios (including gray zone conflicts), assuring China that behavior that conforms to US preferences will mean more cooperative US behavior, and managing the abandonment / entrapment dynamic in US relations with Taiwan. The implication of the Ukraine war for the US and cross-Strait issues is mixed, complicated, and stillevolving. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For the past several decades, US policy toward China has fundamentally limited the policy options toward Taiwan. For several historical and practical reasons, mistrust of the United States remains relatively strong among the Taiwanese public. Skepticism about US intentions oscillates between fears of being abandoned and being entrapped. As Washington policymakers continue to debate Taiwan policy through the lens of US-China relations, most of the discussion focuses on how to deter China from attacking Taiwan; few are articulating the importance of reassuring Taiwan. This article sheds light on the Taiwanese sentiment toward the United States, specifically the source of mistrust of the United States, which would significantly affect the efficacy of any US policy. The intricate history of the United States and Taiwan suggests that a new and effective US policy toward Taiwan should include both credible military deterrence of China and a clear reassurance for Taiwan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's nuclear expansion has fueled debates about its nuclear strategy. In this article, I argue that there is still little evidence to suggest that China's strategy has changed. The expansion can best be explained as an effort to bolster China's second-strike capability, and it is primarily driven by increasing concerns about US missile defense as well as nuclear and conventional counterforce weapons. This is in line with assumptions of the nuclear revolution theory, which stresses the importance of secure second-strike forces. So far, China's nuclear modernization does not align with the "delicate nuclear balance" school, which sees strong incentives for states to adopt competitive nuclear policies and attempt to obtain strategic superiority. The findings further highlight how US policy choices will have a significant influence on China's future nuclear posture. A strong US response to China's expansion will feed arms race dynamics and increase the risks of China fielding destabilizing weapons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most debates on U.S. military strategy in the Western Pacific revolve around the question of how to deter China. Advocates of deterrence by punishment believe that the Chinese threat is serious but not critical, because the United States can leverage its global military-technological advantages to preserve a position of regional military primacy. Those in favor of deterrence by denial point to China's potential and "home advantages," and argue that the United States should settle for more modest objectives such as preventing Chinese regional military dominance. I argue that the high level of uncertainty around Chinese capabilities and the evolving Sino-American regional military balance have led the United States to adopt a flexible strategy, and embrace distinct–even contradictory–operational concepts to deter Beijing: The United States itself mostly focuses primarily on deterrence by punishment, while actively encouraging and enabling its regional allies to develop deterrence by denial. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although deterrence was one of the cornerstones of the international relations field for much of the 20th century, today surveys demonstrate that most students lack even a basic understanding of this concept. Yet, in the light of recent events on the Korean Peninsula, in China, and the post-Soviet space, our civilian and military leaders continue to emphasize the need to develop and foster critical and strategic thinking on deterrence. In this essay, we ask how we can nurture the next generation of strategic thinkers and leaders without deliberately leaving teaching "defense" concepts to the military. We propose updating our reading lists to include the emerging and innovative literature on deterring 21st-century threats, and teaching with current policy documents, problem-based learning, and simulations. More specifically, we suggest strengthening students' critical thinking and writing skills through collaborative research projects and encouraging experiential learning opportunities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose--The purpose of this article is to anticipate the policy options of great and middle powers in East Asia, and to pressure China to support Korean reunification and stop economically supporting the Kim regime. Design/methodology/approach--I review historical and contemporary scholarship, journalist reports, and unclassified government documents to argue for an alternative interpretation of current affairs. Findings--On the basis of my analysis, I found convincing evidence that China's overt and covert atavistic Cold War foreign policy includes a surrogate client-proxy relationship with North Korea that extends its reach into the Middle East as well as indirectly threatening the United States and its allies. Practical implications--My analysis of rational security adjustments by Japan, South Korea, and the United States to the North Korean nuclear missile program suggests a growing security threat may convince China to change policy. Originality/value--This research challenges the consensus view that China has distanced itself from North Korea because of its nuclear missile program. We may glean intentions from scripted narratives and symbolic gestures, but if one looks at China's behavior, a different view comes into perspective. From this more inductive view of the geopolitical situation, China's in-kind aid to North Korea helps underwrite Pyongyang's nuclear missile progress. It is time the international community observes behavior and recognizes rhetoric. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]