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West Nile virus (WNV) is continuously spreading across Europe, and other continents, i.e. North and South America and many other regions of the world. Despite the overall sporadic nature of outbreaks with cases of West Nile neuroinvasive disease (WNND) in Europe, the spillover events have increased and the virus has been introduced into new areas. The high genetic diversity of the virus, with remarkable phenotypic variation, and its endemic circulation in several countries, require an intensification of the integrated and multidisciplinary research efforts built under the 7th Framework Programme of the European Union (FP7). It is important to better clarify several aspects of WNV circulation in Europe, including its ecology, genomic diversity, pathogenicity, transmissibility, diagnosis and control options, under different environmental and socio-economic scenarios. Identifying WNV endemic as well as infection-free areas is becoming a need for the development of human vaccines and therapeutics and the application of blood and organs safety regulations. This review, produced as a joint initiative among European experts and based on analysis of 118 scientific papers published between 2004 and 2014, provides the state of knowledge on WNV and highlights the existing knowledge and research gaps that need to be addressed with high priority in Europe and neighbouring countries.

More and more regions are cooperating with their Chinese counterparts in many different areas: economy, environment, culture, academic exchange. Although the subnational dimension has started to be a visibly important element of EU-China relations, this trend is not reflected in the academic literature on EU-China relations. Until now, we have not known what the network of contacts with China at the regional level looks like and what the determinants and institutional forms of inter-regional partnerships there are. The present book maps Sino-European relations at the regional level and presents a detailed analysis of subnational contacts in the six analysed EU member states, illustrated by case studies of interesting regions from each country. It shows the rising role of non-state actors in international relations, the growing importance of paradiplomacy, as well as the necessity to look at the EU-China relations as a multi-layer phenomenon, engaging different types of actors on different levels. Publication financed by the National Science Centre, Poland. (Project number: 2015/19/B/HS5/02534 entitled “Rola regionów w polityce Unii Europejskiej wobec Chin/ The Role of Regions in the European Union Policy towards China”)

The European response to COVID-19 has revealed an inconvenient truth. Despite having integrated public health concerns across all its policies – be it agriculture, consumer protection, or security –, the Union cannot directly act to save people’s lives. Only member states can do so. Yet when they adopted unilateral measures to counter the spread of the virus, those proved not only ineffective but also disruptive on vital supply chains, by ultimately preventing the flow of essential goods and people across the Union. These fragmented efforts in tackling cross-border health threats have almost immediately prompted political calls for the urgent creation of a European Health Union. Yet this call raises more questions than answers. With the aim to offer a rigorous and timely blueprint to decision-makers and the public at large, this Special Issue of the European Journal of Risk Regulation contextualizes such a new political project within the broader constitutional and institutional framework of EU public health law and policy. By introducing the Special, this paper argues that unless the envisaged Health Union will tackle the root causes of what prevented the Union from effectively responding to COVID-19 – the divergent health capacity across the Union –, it might fall short of its declared objective of strengthening the EU’resilience for cross-border health threats.

Ten years after the introduction of participatory democracy as one of the democratic foundations of the European Union, this introductory chapter to "Citizen Participation in Democratic Europe" provides some theoretical background on the role citizens play, and should play, within the EU democratic system. As such, it offers a contribution about the place of citizen participation in the wider, ongoing debate about how to develop the EU’s democratic system in a post-pandemic Europe. It sets the scene for the subsequent chapters written, again, not only by academic scholars but also civil society advocates and practitioners from across Europe who experience on a daily basis the realities of EU citizen participation. Ultimately, this edited volume argues how Europe’s long-standing democracy challenge can be addressed through the emergence of a new model of EU citizen participation, and a set of democratic innovations emerging bottom-up across the continent. To do so, it offers a re-evaluation and systematisation of EU level citizen participation and its future development, which remains largely underexplored.

Europe has largely been absent from the US-dominated debate surrounding the introduction of nudge-type interventions in policy-making. Yet the European Union and some of its Member States are exploring the possibility of informing their policy action with behavioural insights. While a great deal of academic attention is currently been paid to the philosophical, ethical and other abstract implications of behavioural-informed regulation, such as those concerning autonomy, dignity and moral development, this chapter charts and systematizes the incipient European Nudge discourse. Besides a few isolated initiatives displaying some behavioural considerations (e.g. consumer rights, revised tobacco products directive, sporadic behavioural remedies in competition law), the EU – similarly to its own Member States – has not yet shown a general commitment to systematically integrate behavioural insights into policy-making. Given the potential of this innovative regulatory approach to attain effective, low-cost and choice-preserving policies, such a stance seems surprising, especially when measured against growing citizen mistrust towards EU policy action. At a time in which some EU countries are calling for a repatriation of powers and the European Commission promises to redefine - in the framework of its Better Regulation agenda - the relationships between the Union and its citizens, nudging might provide a promising way forward. In the aftermath of the Brexit vote, this promise has not only been shared by the 27 remaining Member State but also represents one of their major priorities . Yet with promises come challenges too. The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets the scene by discussing the growing appeal of nudging among policymakers within and across Europe. Section 3 introduces the notion of behavioural policymaking and contrasts it with that of nudging. Section 4 describes the early and rather timid attempts at integrating behavioural insights into EU policymaking and identifies some domestic experiences. Section 5 discusses the institutional and methodological efforts undertaken by the EU and some of its member states to embrace behavioural policymaking. In turn, section 6 discusses the major difficulties of integrating behavioural insights into EU policymaking and offers some concluding remarks.

COVID-19 is a matter of common European interest since its very first detection on the continent. Yet this pandemic outbreak has largely been handled as an essentially national matter.This article makes a first attempt at unpacking how such fragmented, uncoordinated national responses to COVID19 came into being under the EU legal order. To do so, it systematizes the European response into separate stages. Phase 1 – the emergency – has been characterized by the adoption of national emergency risk management measures that, albeit country specific, were inspired by a common objective of pandemic suppression, i.e. to reduce disease transmission and thereby diminishing pressure on health services, under the by now well-known ‘flatten the curve’ imperative. Phase 2 – the lifting – is about the attempt at relaxing some of the national risk responses in a coordinated fashion to avoid creating negative spillovers or distortions – be they sanitary and/or financial – across the Union.The article argues that contrary to conventional wisdom the resulting uncoordinated EU response to Covid-19 shouldn’t be seen as the inevitable consequence of the EU’s limited competence in public health. Against this backdrop, it strives to define the regulatory policy framework that might be governing the next phases of the European risk management response to this pandemic as they will emerge from a widely undefined yet unescapable dialectic between the Union and its member states. Ultimately, it predicts that by testing the outer limits of the EU public health competence COVID-19 is set to go down in history as a major catalyst in the advancement of EU health emergency action.

A dozen of green and sustainable labels have emerged on the financial markets of the Member States of the European Union since the creation of a first label in 1997 in France, allocated to nearly 1,360 financial products, demonstrating a quantitative success, especially in France. This article analyzes the development of such green and socially responsible labels in Europe over the past decades , their construction dynamics, and questions the real benefits of a proliferation of labels in this industry. Does the multiplicity of factors contributing to the development of labels achieve the desired end or does it encumber the market with loud but uncertain signals? While household savings are at their highest and there is a demand for financing the ecological transition, does the proliferation of labels not complicate the readability of the market ? We show that, instead of simplifying the choice of agents, the multiplication of labels tends to increase the noise provided by each of the quality signals and deteriorate confidence. Economic agents have less interest in benefiting from a generic label but are looking for less demanding labeling at a lower cost. The whole system can therefore play in a counterproductive way, each actor minimizing the intrinsic effort provided. As the number of labels grows, the information asymmetry grows and end investors may therefore turn away from labeled products. Only regulator can counter this trend.; Une dizaine de labels verts et durables ont vu le jour sur les marchés financiers des États membres de l'Union européenne depuis la création d'un premier label en 1997 en France, attribués à près de 1360 produits financiers, démontrant un succès quantitatif, notamment en France. Cet article analyse l'évolution de ces labels verts et durables en Europe au cours des dernières décennies, leur dynamique de construction, et s'interroge sur les réels bénéfices d'une prolifération de labels dans ce secteur. La multiplicité des facteurs contribuant au développement des labels atteint-elle le but recherché ou encombre-t-elle le marché de signaux forts mais incertains? Alors que l'épargne des ménages est au plus haut et qu'il existe une demande de financement de la transition écologique, la multiplication des labels ne complique-t-elle pas la lisibilité du marché? Nous montrons que, au lieu de simplifier le choix des agents, la mutliplication des labels tend à accroître le bruit fourni par chacun des signaux de qualité et détériorer la confiance. Les agents économiques ont moins intérêt à bénéficier d’un label générique mais recherchent à moindre coût une labelisation moins exigeante. L’ensemble du système peut donc jouer de façon contreproductive, chaque acteur minimisant l’effort intrinsèque fourni. L’asymmétrie d’information s’accroît à mesure que le nombre de labels grandit et les investisseurs finaux risquent donc de se détourner in fine des produits labelisés. Seul le regulateur peut contrer cet effet.

Stunning animals before slaughter and avoiding unnecessary suffering is mandatory throughout the EU. Although the EU Animal Slaughter Regulation allows for a ‘religious exception’ departing from such a practice, it also expressly enables Member States to adopt “national rules aimed at ensuring more extensive protection of animals at the time of killing”. That’s how Denmark, Sweden and Slovenia were able to, ban slaughter without stunning tout court. The Flemish region falls short of banning un-stunned slaughter, by prescribing instead reversible stunning. This method, by rendering the animal unconscious only for the time it takes to cut its throat, seems to respect the religious requirement of it remaining alive so the blood is pumped out by its still beating heart. According to well-established scientific evidence, this method is not only less traumatizing for the animal, and makes its handling easier for the butcher, but it is also accepted by a growing number of representatives of these religious communities. However, reversible stunning - as prescribed by the Flemish region - now faces a major legal challenge across Europe, having been challenged before the Belgian Constitutional Court, which has in turn referred the matter to the Court of Justice of the EU. This amicus curiae brief argues that a legislation – like the Flemish decree in question – prescribing an alternative stunning procedure for the slaughter carried out in the context of a religious rite is permissible under Union law, not least having regard to the guarantees of religious liberty and freedom contained in the Charter. It presents reversible stunning as a method that successfully balances the apparently competing values of religious freedom expressed in ritual slaughtering on the one hand and the concern for animal welfare on the other under current EU law.

This article examines what difference – if any – the renewed EU Better Regulation Agenda has made for the EU Commission in terms of its own accountability and policy outcomes. Emboldened by the Spitzenkandidaten process – which established for the first time a link between the outcome of the EU elections and the presidency of the EU Commission –, the Juncker Commission emerged as the most political yet. To shrug off the label of technocratic institution – historically insulated from citizens’ preferences –, the new Commission asked EU citizens to judge its operation by its ability ‘to deliver solutions to the big issues that cannot be addressed by the Member States alone’. By embracing such a panem et circenses approach to EU democracy – as such not too dissimilar from the Santer’s and Barroso’s previous administrations – the Juncker Commission raised new expectations. This is true not only in terms of output legitimacy – which was meant to become the privileged benchmark against which to measure the Commission’s success –, but also in terms of its own democratic and political accountability vis-à-vis EU citizens. Indeed, although unintelligible to the many, the Spitzenkandidaten logic entails that EU citizens contributed for the first time with their vote to shape the political orientation of this Commission and – as a result – could hold it accountable. While the very notion of political accountability is foreign to the EU constitutional setting – as citizens don’t have the possibility to replace the Commission if this does not meet their hopes –, the Juncker Commission has strived to frame its mandate as if such an oversight existed. This article concludes that at the very same time the Juncker Commission has been striving to develop its own, autonomous democratic credentials, its choice to embrace a set of well-defined institutional mechanisms that reward expert judgment over political adjudication appears at odds with its newly-acquired political nature.

The EU’s approach to fake news, as epitomised by the European External Action (EEAS) Service East Stratcom Disinformation Review, violates the rights to freedom of expression and due process of those accused of distributing disinformation. The EU Disinformation Review is a publication of the European External Action Service (the European Union’s diplomatic service) to target fake news and online disinformation. Following our request for access to documents, EEAS conceded that the EU Disinformation Review uses an “ad hoc” methodology for conducting its fact-checks, which makes it an outlier in the international fact-checking community led by the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN). Despite being a well-intentioned initiative to respond to the challenges posed by pro-Kremlin disinformation, the EU should ensure the respect of fundamental rights when engaging in fact-checking. The EU Disinformation Review seeks to control the right to freedom of expression by labelling publishers as “disinforming outlets” and their content as “disinformation,” creating a chilling effect on the work of journalists that is central to democracy. The right to freedom of expression is expressed in Article 11.1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000/C 364/01) and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The labelling of publishers as “disinformation outlets” is contrary to principle of the freedom of press established by the European Court of Human Rights: “[a] general requirement for journalists systematically and formally to distance themselves from the content of a quotation that might insult or provoke others or damage their reputation is not reconcilable with the press’ role of providing information on current events, opinion and ideas.” In addition, the methodology used by EEAS in the EU Disinformation Review is “ad hoc,” which constitutes a violation of the fundamental right to good administration in Article 41 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. Specifically, the ad hoc design and operation of the EU Disinformation Review fails to ensure the review acts “impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time.” First, publications are not provided with the right to be heard or proper notice. The EU Disinformation Review’s homepage offers an opportunity to contact the Task Force report a suspected mistake in a fact-check but the page is only available in English, in violation of the principle of multilingualism, and no notice if given to outlets accused of being “disinforming outlets” before or after fact-checks of their content are published. Second, the EEAS does not fulfil its duty to motivate. EEAS is given a broad margin of discretion to identify disinformation, but fails to do so according to a consistent methodology. Therefore, EEAS cannot justify, on the basis of objective criteria, its choice of which content to review and how to determine its truth or falsehood. To comply with EU law and ensure the respect of fundamental rights, the EEAS should develop and make public (1) a methodology for selecting partnerships and reviewing fact-checks in line with international standards and (2) a notice and response mechanism for journalists, publishers and citizens whose content is being reviewed. If EEAS is unable to comply with the above, the EU Disinformation Review should be shut down.

This paper provides a critical assessment of the realities of EU participatory democracy and offers a set of innovative democratic innovations capable of making the Union more responsive to public input. It argues that today’s limited effectiveness of citizen participation to EU decision-making is due to the design, nature and practice of those instruments more than to the inherent inability of citizens to participate. As such, it concludes, the democratizing potential of the EU participatory tool-box remains not only fundamentally misaligned with societal participatory expectations, but also largely untapped.The paper suggests that the time has come for the EU to create an enabling and collaborative political environment fostering citizen participation beyond elections. Such a space may give birth to alternative, unconventional forms of participation capable of channeling citizens’ pluralistic and increasingly chaotic input into the political conversation to bring citizens closer to our representatives and, moreover, doing so in-between elections and across countries. Thus, for instance, by centralising all public input in a one-stop-shop entailing the participation of all EU institutions, a European Question Time might crystallise and eventually connect the daily realities of Europeans with the day-to-day operation of their institutions. A European Democratic Jury of randomly selected citizens from all over the Union could further contribute to such an objective by ‘humanising’ the EU decision-making.While this participatory framework would not magically fix the European accountability deficit, it may compensate for that by making the system responsive to citizen-driven agenda-setting and monitoring and eventually making it more intelligible and accessible to the many.

To resolve conflicts among norms, various nonmonotonic formalisms can be used to perform prioritized normative reasoning. Meanwhile, formal argumentation provides a way to represent nonmonotonic logics. In this paper, we propose a representation of prioritized normative reasoning by argumentation. Using hierarchical abstract normative systems, we define three kinds of prioritized normative reasoning approaches, called Greedy, Reduction, and Optimization. Then, after formulating an argumentation theory for a hierarchical abstract normative system, we show that for a totally ordered hierarchical abstract normative system, Greedy and Reduction can be represented in argumentation by applying the weakest link and the last link principles respectively, and Optimization can be represented by introducing additional defeats capturing the idea that for each argument that contains a norm not belonging to the maximal obeyable set then this argument should be rejected., Accepted by the Journal of Logic and Computation on November 2nd, 2017

The purpose of this legal memorandum is to provide advice to organisations and individuals interested in submitting a request for public access to documents under Regulation (EC) No 1049/01 (“Regulation 1049/01”) to the European Parliament for documents related to the spending of political groups covered by Budget Item 400 appropriations under Chapter 7. Requests for those documents may face rejection on grounds related to exceptions provided for in Regulation 1049/01, specifically those found in Articles 4(1)b, 4(2), and 4(3) pertaining to privacy and integrity of the individual, commercial interests, and institution’s decision-making process respectively. This legal memorandum addresses the applicability of those exceptions to the documents requested for potential use in a confirmatory request to be submitted to the European Parliament subsequent to the initial rejection in line with Article 7 of Regulation 1049/01. The memo also provides arguments for overcoming these exceptions in light of: 1) recent developments in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) relating to the privacy exception; and 2) the strict legal requirements for triggering the commercial interests and institutional decision-making exceptions. The last section of the memo is structured to provide draft responses to the denial of requests for documents and should be tailored to the specific situation in question.

This Memorandum to the European Commission presents our professional opinion on the legal and ethical issues arising from the appointment of the former President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso as non-executive chairman and director of Goldman Sachs. We identify a number of flaws of the Opinion of the Ad Hoc Ethical Committee which considered the issue and offer our own analysis of applicable law and the action the Commission is required to take. In our view, the Opinion represents a case of maladministration, on the ground of which it should have been set aside by the Commission in unequivocal terms. On our own analysis, Mr. Barroso’s acceptance of his new appointment was ethically inappropriate and, therefore, a violation of TFEU. Further we argue that the Commission has powers to take remedial action and is legally obliged to act to enforce the EU law and to protect the interests of the EU and its reputation. We show that, contrary to most comments in the media, the expiry of the eighteen months ‘cooling-off’ period does not put Mr. Barroso on the right side of the law, and does not preclude the obligation of the Commission to take remedial action.

This paper aims to contribute to the longstanding technology-push vs. demand-pull debate and to the literature on renewable energy policy assessment. We argue that in addition to the traditional push–pull dichotomy, the drivers of technological change must be differentiated by whether they are exogenous or endogenous to the economic system and must be assessed with respect to their contribution to both the creation and the diffusion of innovation. We apply this perspective to study innovation in the renewable energy (RE) industry in 15 European Union countries from 1990 to 2012. Using different panel data estimators, we find that public R&D investments, policies supporting RE and per capita income all have a positive effect on either innovation creation or diffusion, whereas the variability of policy support has a negative impact on diffusion. However, impacts are heterogeneous and differ depending on the innovation dimension considered. Most importantly, we find that economic growth is a stronger driver of RE diffusion than technology-push or exogenous demand-pull mechanisms, whereas it is relatively ineffective at stimulating innovation creation. The effect of economic growth on RE diffusion exhibits a nonlinear, U-shaped pattern that resonates with the Environmental Kuznets Curve hypothesis. RE penetration remains negligible at low levels of growth whereas it increases sharply only after income per capita has reached a given threshold. This effect has both a direct cause (with increased affluence demand for environmental quality rises) and an indirect cause (with increased affluence expensive RE policies become more affordable and get implemented more extensively). Our findings have implications for policy making. They suggest that for RE diffusion to increase, innovation policies should be carefully balanced. Government action should be directed not only at shielding renewables from competition with fossil fuel technologies, but also at stimulating aggregated demand and economic growth.

This paper advocates for the adoption of freedom of panorama in the European Union. The term “freedom of panorama” (FoP) refers to an unconditional copyright exception vis-a-vis works of architecture and sculpture placed permanently in public places. The current lack of uniformity with respect to copyright exceptions at the EU level has proven problematic to end-users, service providers and other intermediaries. It has also frustrated the ultimate goal of promoting a single internal market throughout Europe, and safeguarding freedom of expression and free movement of services throughout the EU.The current system does not harmonize copyright exceptions throughout the EU. Rather, each Member State is free to adopt copyright exceptions as it sees fit. The result is a heavily fragmented system that leaves businesses and users with the necessity to individually deal with each Member State and rights holder concerned. A mandatory exception for FoP would play a key role in guaranteeing freedom of expression, access to education and the free movement of digital services in the internal single market.FoP is critical for ensuring freedom of expression and access to education. Additionally, the growth of net companies that rely on user generated conduct (UGC), such as through YouTube, Wikipedia and blogs, has led to the constant fear among most EU citizens of violating copyright law. This reiterates the need for a FoP exception that covers both commercial and non-commercial uses. Furthermore, many new cross-border educational initiatives in Europe do not fall within the “non-commercial educational and scientific research purposes” exempted under the current InfoSoc Directive. Some national systems that broadly extend the education exception to uses that fall outside the “non-commercial” definition do not extend the exception to online uses.The EU Copyright Directive should be re-written to include a mandatory FoP provision, as is already the case in the national law of EU Member States such as the United Kingdom and Germany, as well as third countries like Brazil. This solution would also comply with copyright-protective countries’ call – among them Italy, Spain and France – for such an exhaustive list. This solution would provide clear direction to Member States without becoming an overly lengthy and unwieldy document.Several problems remain with this approach. First, there has been reticence on the part of the European Court of Human Rights to protect FoP from a freedom of expression standpoint when the images’ use was commercial. Second, there is the possibility for Member States to use trademark law, cultural heritage law, or other national laws to get around a mandatory FoP exception. The uses of trademark and cultural heritage law do not pose a significant barrier to a mandatory FoP exception at present. However, the reforms ultimately decided upon must take into account the possibility of the use of this law to frustrate the Directive’s objectives.The HEC-NYU EU Public Interest Clinic (the “Clinic”) presents its justifications for a mandatory FoP exception below. We also include an annex and model legislation that addresses many of the deficiencies of current EU law.