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The precautionary nature of risk regulation in the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) is an ongoing debate. Theoretical contentions over 'who is more precautionary' confirm that the degree of relative precaution may lead to different levels of protection, but also suggest that precaution needs to be evaluated against different parts of the regulatory process. This paper addresses a new case of transatlantic split which has occurred with the adoption of the EU regulation on alien invasive species. This regulation aims to drive important changes at the trade–environment nexus and reflects Europe's integrated policy approach to environmental, health, and safety risks. We have carried out a comparative analysis by examining parts of the regulatory process. We argue that differences in legal and policy frameworks, risk assessment, and risk management structures have left the EU and the US wide apart as to their risk governance ambitions. The EU exhibits more precautionary approach with regard to these parts, as compared to the US. Our finding suggests that policy divergence, as reflected in this case, is true for both stringency and regulatory process, expanding literature discussions on precaution in these systems. Yet, with the EU's regulation being relatively new, there are still implementation issues up for debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many critics of bioenhancement go to considerable lengths to establish the existence of reasons against pursuing bioenhancements but do little to establish the absence of reasons in favor. This suggests that they accept what Allen Buchanan has called the conclusive reasons view (CRV). According to this view, our reasons against bioenhancement are obviously decisive, so there is no need to balance them against countervailing reasons. Buchanan criticizes the CRV by showing that the reasons most commonly adduced against bioenhancement are not decisive, or, at least, not obviously so.In this article, I suggest that both Buchanan and the authors to whom he is responding underestimate the strength of the case for the CRV. There are, I argue, harm-based reasons against bioenhancement that provide stronger support to the CRV than the reasons that have most often been adduced by critics of enhancement. However, I then argue that even these harm-based reasons are not obviously decisive. Thus, I ultimately agree with Buchanan about the falsity of the CRV, though I disagree with him about the reasons for its falsity. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]