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This paper represents one of the most recent and pertinent studies conducted in Afghanistan, aiming to address the societal imperative of comprehending the factors behind the fall of the Republic government and the subsequent rise of the Taliban to power. Furthermore, the paper seeks to analyse public attitudes towards the current situation. Employing a quantitative approach, the research utilizes a descriptive-analytical method through questionnaires and the participants include social media activist, students and universities professors, the data collected by online survey according WhatsApp, Facebook messengers, telegram, email and other social media groups from different ethnic groups. The findings of this research have identified several pivotal factors contributing to the ascent of the Taliban to power, including the US-Taliban agreement in Doha, Qatar; political disparities; administrative and financial corruption within the Republic's administration; Pakistan's support for the Taliban; the previous government's accord with the Taliban; ethnic dominance; robust military morale of the Taliban; and proficient war management by the Taliban. Afghanistan, as a multi-ethnic society, witnesses political dynamics predominantly rooted in ethnic affiliations. The majority of respondents express dissatisfaction with the current Afghan situation, displaying significant concerns for the populace. Foremost concerns, in terms of prioritization, encompass poverty; closure of girls' schools; restrictions on women's education and employment; escalation of civil unrest; mono-ethnic rule; ethnic conflicts; emergence of ISIS; ethnic marginalization; violations of citizenship rights; political participation and legitimacy crises; and authoritarianism. Consequently, to address the political crisis and establish a viable system, the research concludes that while Pashtuns lean toward a centralized system, Hazaras, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Turkmens evince greater interest in a decentralized structure.

Background: Through a nationally representative household survey in Afghanistan, we conducted an operational study in two relatively secure provinces comparing effectiveness of computer-aided personal interviewing (CAPI) with paper-and-pencil interviewing (PAPI). Methods: In Panjshir and Parwan provinces, household survey data were collected using paper questionnaires in 15 clusters, and OpenDataKit (ODK) software on electronic tablets in 15 other clusters. Added value was evaluated from three perspectives: efficient implementation, data quality, and acceptability. Efficiency was measured through financial expenditures and time stamped data. Data quality was measured by examining completeness. Acceptability was studied through focus group discussions with survey staff. Results: Survey costs were 68% more expensive in CAPI clusters compared to PAPI clusters, due primarily to the upfront one-time investment for survey programming. Enumerators spent significantly less time administering surveys in CAPI cluster households (248 min survey time) compared to PAPI (289 min), for an average savings of 41 min per household (95% CI 25–55). CAPI offered a savings of 87 days for data management over PAPI. Among 49 tracer variables (meaning responses were required from all respondents), small differences were observed between PAPI and CAPI. 2.2% of the cleaned dataset's tracer data points were missing in CAPI surveys (1216/ 56,073 data points), compared to 3.2% in PAPI surveys (1953/ 60,675 data points). In pre-cleaned datasets, 3.9% of tracer data points were missing in CAPI surveys (2151/ 55,092 data points) compared to 3.2% in PAPI surveys (1924/ 60,113 data points). Enumerators from Panjsher and Parwan preferred CAPI over PAPI due to time savings, user-friendliness, improved data security, and less conspicuity when traveling; however approximately half of enumerators trained from all 34 provinces reported feeling unsafe due to Taliban presence. Community and household respondent skepticism could be resolved by enumerator reassurance. Enumerators shared that in the future, they prefer collecting data using CAPI when possible. Conclusions: CAPI offers clear gains in efficiency over PAPI for data collection and management time, although costs are relatively comparable even without the programming investment. However, serious field staff concerns around Taliban threats and general insecurity mean that CAPI should only be conducted in relatively secure areas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the way education and conflict have become entangled during the post-9/11 "war on terror" response to "radical Islam" at home and abroad. The paper charts the complex ways that education has been deployed to serve Western military and security objectives in multiple locations in the global south and how these strategies have now returned to the "West" in the form of "countering violent extremism" interventions. Drawing on Foucault's concept of the "boomerang effect" I will explore whether and how education techniques and strategies deployed abroad in pursuit of imperial interests return to the West and are deployed to monitor, control and suppress marginalised communities in a form of "internal colonialism". Finally, the paper brings the two sections together in the Findings to explore commonalities and divergences.

The future and prosperity of Pakistan largely relies upon the nature of its relations with neighbouring Afghanistan. The strategic quandaries between Pakistan and Afghanistan like border issues and persistent cross-border terrorism directly affect Pakistan's domestic situation and are producing reverberating influence throughout South Asia. This paper sought to examine the strategic limitations influencing their relations significantly in the wake of American withdrawal from Afghan soil. Furthermore, elucidating the profound impacts stemming from the circumstances after the American exit, it explores the political dimensions and ramifications of their relations. To that end, this research builds multi-dimensional causal relationships and employs qualitative approaches. The study's findings depict that these strategic constraints are deep-rooted and multifaceted with implications for regional stabilization, manifesting through traditional security conundrums, disruption of trade routes, and obstacles to economic integration. The implications of this study accentuate the pressing need for coordinated measures to promote peace and stability in the region. It concludes by presenting some policy recommendations intended to lessen the existing challenges as well as encouraging a conducive environment to ameliorate relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The post-2019 period is a crucial timeframe in the context of the reappearance of Tehrik -e- Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) and other militant groups and the consequent rise of terrorist incidents in Pakistan. This paper aims to investigate the significant growth of terrorism in Pakistan as a threat to the country's internal security in the aforementioned era. This paper presents the concepts of internal security from the broader perspective of human and state security. The authors employ the situational method of qualitative approach encompassing various events and situations causing the intensity of terrorism in Pakistan in this phase covering two and half years (from January 2020 to June 2022). The concept of internal security is the perception of an act of keeping peace and maintaining law and order within the borders of a sovereign state by upholding the national law and defending against internal security threats. Besides the increasing number of terror attacks and casualties as compared with the previous years, this period is additionally important due to the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the return of Afghan Taliban to the power corridors of the war-ravaged country, ostensibly with high hopes of controlling terrorism in the region, affecting security situation in Pakistan as well. It has been identified that terrorism in the country during 2020 had increased compared to the year 2019, and there was a sharp rise in 2021 and 2022, reinforcing a threat to the country's internal security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Establishing a liberal government in post-Taliban Afghanistan allowed India to fulfil its foreign policy goal, i.e., investment in Afghanistan to acquire leverage for its anti-Pakistan agenda. However, the twenty-year war ended with the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, resulting in the Taliban's rise to power, diminishing Indian influence and reversion of its interests. India halted its investment and diplomatic engagement with the Taliban government due to its previous position, which led India to compromise on its strategic interests outlined in the presence of US forces. To safeguard its strategic interests, India has resumed its diplomatic and economic engagement with the Taliban government at a critical time when other regional states are analysing the US' future course of action towards the war-torn country. Therefore, this paper examines how India evaluates the newly structured regional environment while finding a new role in Afghanistan. It also analyses the implications of India-Afghanistan re-engagement for Pakistan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Politics & Religion Journal is the property of University of Belgrade, Faculty of Political Sciences and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Purpose: This paper aims to examine the current situation in Afghanistan after the rapid withdrawal of US troops and the Taliban takeover of the country, and how this has shed new light on the financing of terrorism. Design/methodology/approach: Informal interviews were conducted with alleged perpetrators as well as formal interviews with compliance experts to further investigate the subject of terrorist financing in the wake of the latest changes in Afghanistan and terrorist financing through hawala banking. The interviewees were analysed through a qualitative analysis. Findings: Based on the interviews, it was concluded that both illegal and legal sources of income could be used by terrorist financiers. This study also shows why hawala represents a significant challenge for counter-terrorist financing policies. Originality/value: While existing literature sufficiently links parallel banking systems, such as hawala, to terrorist financing, this study shows the implications for Switzerland's perceived commitment against financial crime in light of current changes in Afghanistan, and in addition, certain dogmatic weaknesses of Article 260quinquies of the Swiss Penal Code are critically analysed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper studies the gendered impact of the pandemic in a war ravaged Afghanistan. For majority of Afghan women, the onslaught of Covid has exacerbated their already dire condition and adversely impacted their social, economical, physical and cultural aspects of life. The research also underlines that the imposition of lockdown has caused the reversal of war gains. The paper also highlights the notable works of various Afghan women carried out during the corona pandemic that has contributed to their emancipation and upliftment of the society at large. It brings forth strong and courageous women who are combatting terrorism, everyday conflicts, frequent bombings, societal restrictions and now the deadly coronavirus and yet contributing majorly in re-building the Afghan society. This paper is an attempt to dispel the dominant narrative of their state of helplessness and despondency around Afghan women before the withdrawal of American troops and Taliban takeover. Both primary and secondary sources have complemented this research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) commenced in October 2001, the U.S. Special Forces (SF) were the first U.S. military unit on the ground in Afghanistan, utilising their Unconventional Warfare (UW) capabilities. Despite their significant role at the initial stage of the military campaign, SF began to encounter numerous challenges from as early as 2002 and throughout OEF. Based on an analysis of forty-five master's theses authored by SF officers, this paper discusses the structural-organisational and cultural-conceptual challenges. These obstacles led to the marginalisation of SF's UW efforts. Scholarship on special operations forces (SOF) often regards the period of the so-called global war on terrorism (GWOT) as U.S. SOF's golden age focusing predominantly on the activities of SOF units linked to the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command rather than on SF. By examining the challenges faced by SF, this article aims to contribute to a more nuanced discussion of SOF efforts during GWOT. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Building on a global research sweep of terrorist organizations' (as well as other non-state actors such as separatist and insurgent groups) use of fresh water as a target, weapon, or source of control, this paper analyzes attacks on major water projects (specifically dams and other related infrastructure) in South Asia—the region identified to have had the largest number of recorded water-related violent incidents. Focusing on India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, and the post 9/11 period through 2019, the paper explores how large water infrastructures (and their environs) have become hot spots for violence between states that use water development projects to consolidate power, garner local loyalty, and create a national narrative and non-state actors who attempt to target these same projects to assert indigenous self-determination, subvert state power, or challenge state authority through terrorist means. Since fresh water is shared across borders, dam projects can become entangled in regional political disputes further exacerbating violent conflict between state and non-state actors. Given its impacts on water resources, climate change may act as a "threat multiplier" by enhancing local grievances, providing both government and terrorist groups additional incentives for exploitation, and further contributing to instability. The analysis provided here borrows from and contributes to the fields of development, environment and security, and terrorism studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Foreign policy tends to undergo review with the changes in foreign policy objectives. Terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001 not only altered the course of history for America but also impacted dynamics of world politics in general and South Asian politics in particular. During the last seventeen years, despite having different strategies by the three US administrations, the United States' main foreign policy goals in Afghanistan--to eliminate terrorists, bring peace in the country and transform Afghan state and society into a modern state have not been accomplished. Instability and bloodshed continue, making the country the center of attention for the international community. It is important to evaluate strategies of different US administrations toward Afghanistan since 2001. This paper, written from a Neorealist perspective, attempts to explore different dimensions of the US strategies, i.e., their strengths and shortcomings, achievements and the role of regional stakeholders. The paper argues that US policies have not worked mainly because of complexities of the internal dynamics of Afghanistan. These complexities are caused by the conflicting goals of neighboring and regional states that the US policies need to take into account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates, by means of computer-assisted qualitative and quantitative discourse analysis, how and when ideology was securitized in US presidential speech. It reveals how securitizing speech justifies methods and targets in the resistance of "dangerous ideologies" that are problematic for democracies. The analysis reveals that the entanglement of oppositional ideologies with security was articulated in the context of the War on Terror. While the original need to see ideologies as an existential threat was necessary to justify the exclusion of the ideologies of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein from the elections in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2004 and 2005 respectively, the securitization of ideologies then spread to issue areas beyond terror and to geographic contexts outside of these two countries, all the way to US domestic political competition. The need to avoid embarrassment in Iraq and Afghanistan may have thus affected US democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to analyse India's foreign policy towards Afghanistan in the post-9/11 era. While the 9/11 attacks marked the beginning of a new epoch in world politics, the ensuing US-led military intervention in Afghanistan offered India a much needed opportunity to re-establish diplomatic ties with Kabul. Since then, India has remained cautious in its approach toward Afghanistan by relying more on assistance-driven foreign policy measures rather than on engaging militarily in the war-torn country. However, the question remains as to what extent India has been able to create strategic space for itself in Afghanistan, given the fact that India had to shut down its embassy and consulates in Afghanistan in August 2021 when the Taliban regained control of the country? Or, has India's policy been too reliant on soft power that India failed to capitalise on the opportunity created by the overthrow of the Taliban regime in late 2001? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For more than 19 years, Pakistan has been in a state of war against terrorism. It has launched many military operations in different areas based on different strategic and tactical considerations. The geographic limits, priority, and timing of these operations were carefully planned and executed. Credible intelligence revealed that after operation Rah-e-Nejat (2009), some of the militant groups shifted to Afghanistan while the remaining took refuge in the North Waziristan Agency. There was a requirement to eliminate these hideouts, thus, Pakistan decided to launch a military operation Zarb-e- Azb. As a result, the overall security situation in Pakistan has improved. The US appreciated the successes of operation Zarb-e-Azb but despite these military actions and other practical steps, Pakistan-US relations could not improve as such. There is a consistent divergence of interests between Pakistan and the US in the war against terror that impact seriously on bilateral relations. This paper, therefore, professes that unless this divergence of interest is understood, no ground action irrespective of the dimension and outcome can restore peace and stability within Pakistan and the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Global War on Terrorism, launched as a direct result of the heinous 9/11 attacks, has been wagging on for almost two decades with no clear signs of victory for the US. The US on a strategic level has lost the war as the primary opponent, Taliban, holds more territory than ever. The US and NATO coalition not only planned to eradicate terrorism in the country but also had great ambitions to modernize and rebuild the country; however, little has been archived so far. Amidst these harsh realities, Pakistan being a major non-NATO ally is often blamed to sabotage the war efforts by playing a so-called double-game while supporting the Global War on Terrorism on one hand and helping the Taliban on the other. Therefore, this paper investigates the reasons for the US failure in Afghanistan on a macro-level and what role Pakistan has played. Other than the notion that Pakistan is to blame, factors, such as, the US has no real longterm objectives for the war, employing conventional methods of warfare, underestimating the opponent and the terrain, lack of coordination among the NATO member states and the sudden attention shift from Afghanistan to Iraq, played a significant role in the current outcome. After evaluating all the evidence from the last two decades, it is clear that half-baked US planning led to the eventual failure of the war effort. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan came under the international spotlight following the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.Mainly due to being a semi-autonomous region where British-colonial-era laws were practised until May 2018, FATA remains one of the most marginalised and insecure areas of Pakistan. Based on Galtung's structural violence theory, this paper examines the nexus between the region's socio-economic and political realities and terrorism. Through primary and secondary data, this paper argues that economic marginalisation and the lack of political and individual freedom of the tribal people are root causes of the instability in FATA. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores an under-researched area of India's security relations with nations in West Asia. Counter Terrorism (CT) Cooperation between India and the Gulf nations has strengthened remarkably over the past five years after a prolonged period of limited cooperation on this critical issue. This paper explores why this has occurred. It argues that geopolitical factors associated with India's rise, associated shifts in economic interests, and the changing security landscape in the Middle East and Afghanistan account for this new cooperation. It also discusses the impact of the Modi administration in altering the dynamics of India's relationship with the two Gulf nations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent past, Sino-Afghan relations have taken a new phase of collaboration and inter-dependency to work jointly to advance their common geo-strategic and geo-economic goals. Being an international power on the global chessboard, China does have a great role in the regional geopolitical setting to ensure peace and tranquility in the region on the one hand and prioritize its own interests on the other. Afghanistan, being an epicenter of the region, draws a special attention of neighboring countries especially China to address threat perception emanating from cross-border terrorism, drug trafficking and promoting insurgency in its region of Xinjiang. This paper attempts to analyze the scope of bilateral collaboration between China and Afghanistan. The paper also intends to ascertain whether Afghan leadership will be wise enough to use Chinese assistance as a trap card to utilize their geographic setting in such a manner in which both Chinese and Afghans can benefit and also to ensure their cooperation for longer period of time for peaceful and prosperous Afghanistan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The war-torn Afghanistan has long suffered from the dynastical contests and fraught economic strategies of foreigners, which instigated constant internal strife and regional instability. The foreign interventions have made this land a sphere of influence and initiated the great game politics sporadically. This paper attempts to examine the historical geostrategic tussles in Afghanistan between international players on the one hand and regional actors on the other hand over control and manipulation of Afghanistan and its surrounding regions through the lens of conceptual framework of unintended consequences approach, which deals with irrational aspect of foreign policy of the states. This study makes interesting contribution to the existing literature of the [old] Great Game of the late 19th century between Czarist Russia and Great Britain or New Great Game by re-conceptualizing this idea into a new concept of the Grand Great Game or the 3G in place of explaining the unintended consequences of the historical events i.e. the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan of 1979, the post-Cold War era when the regional players Pakistan and India got involved in Afghanistan; and the US invasion of Afghanistan of 9/11 incident. The findings of the paper suggest that the unintended consequences of these historical events are bitter than the reality. The foreign interventions have paralyzed the Afghan society and made it more insecure by promoting clandestine terrorist activities and proxies. The interview technique helps to verify the 3G concept and present its unintended consequences. The critical content analysis of the primary and secondary data is of assistance to understand that the current 3G to be not only multidimensional competition, embodying multiple stakeholders but also incorporating complex self-defined rational as well as irrational foreign policy objectives and national interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper adopts a socio-historical perspective to explore when, how and why the eradication of poliomyelitis has become politicised to the extent that health workers and security personnel are targeted in drive-by shootings. Discussions of the polio crisis in Afghanistan and Pakistan have tended to focus on Taliban suspicions of a US-led public health intervention and the denunciation of ‘modernity’ by Islamic ‘extremists’. In contrast, this paper considers a broader history of indigenous hostility and resistance to colonial immunisation on the subcontinent, suggesting how interconnected public health and political crises today have reactivated the past and created a continuity between events. The paper explores how the biomedical threat posed by polio has become intertwined with military and governmental discourses premised on the ‘preemptive strike’. Here, the paper tracks the connections between biological immunity and a postcolonial politics that posits an immunological rationale for politico-military interventions. The paper concludes by reflecting on the consequences for global public health of this entanglement of infectious disease with terror. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Copyright of Studia Islamika is the property of Center for the Study of Islam & Society of UIN Jakarta and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Afghanistan is located at the convergence of Central, Middle and South Asian regions, one of the most world prime geographical locations. Its strategic location and abundant mineral resources have always attracted international community including India. Hence Indian objectives to develop relations with Afghanistan are manifold and decades old. Indian foreign policy is devised by many factors like its bitter relations with Pakistan and its desire of access route to Central Asian Republics by limiting Pakistan's reach that has serious implications for Pakistan. In view of its past experience, Pakistan perceives Indian extended desire to engage in Afghanistan as a deliberate strategy of using the later as a battleground to show its power and use influence against Pakistan. Terrorist incidents in Balochistan provide evidence and links with Indian RAW activities organized in Afghan areas. So, Indian intention to invest in Afghanistan for infrastructure rebuilding is not as simple as it is often claimed. India has covert objectives of troubling Pakistan. In hostile lunacy, India increased, dramatically, its involvement in Afghanistan when the Taliban era came to an end. India's interference in Afghanistan is a clear reflection of its desire to execute Afghan land against Pakistan. India sees Afghan war an opportunity to encounter Pakistan's influence in the region. This research paper will analyze Indian involvement in Afghanistan and its implications for Pakistan. The study is designed to unveil the hidden objectives of fast growing Indo-Afghan relations and evaluates Indian strategies in regional context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper presents aspects of the author's work, which for 5 years had to cope with major security challenges in Afghanistan. The author shares from his experience in the true understanding of terrorism, the risks, the ways of operation, the bloodshed, the material damage, and the dramas of the people who lost their lives or their close ones: sons and daughters, parents, brothers, sisters, military and civilians. Are also presenting relations within Afghan society. It briefly presents the Taliban's tactics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study employs hierarchical Bayesian analysis of terrorist attacks to provide a retrospective analysis of the war in Afghanistan between 2002 and 2018. We examine the relationship between U.S. troop levels, target type, and the severity of attacks in terms of the number killed or wounded. We find that although some targets might have become better fortified after enduring attacks (such as police departments), terrorists would subsequently succeed in either attacking other targets (such as educational institutions) or even those same targets in subsequent years. Our analysis also finds that increases in U.S. troop levels throughout much of the conflict did not seem to quell violence, although explanations of this phenomenon are considerably more nuanced after taking expert opinion into account. We hope our analysis provides a useful retrospective analysis of the U.S. War in Afghanistan for policymakers to assess how or if security measures in the country could have been improved over the course of the conflict. Our modeling framework, however, is easily generalizable to other conflicts worldwide and thus provides a useful statistical tool for analyzing terrorism in many other settings as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After spending trillions of dollars, making Afghan war the U.S longest combat, and jeopardizing the future of Afghan generations; ‘Not War But Peace’ became the reality on February 29, 2020 when Tehreek-e-Taliban Afghanistan (TTA) deputy leader Mullah Abdul-Ghani Bradar and American peace envoy Zalmay Khalilzad signed the Peace Agreement in Doha, Qatar. The foundation of peace that Pakistan once wanted to build in Kabul by recognizing the Taliban regime became truth after 18 years of U.S. combat in Afghanistan that witnessed continuous chaos, instability, civil war, and turmoil beyond borders. Presence of Pakistan at the time of Doha ceremony is adamant to 1996 decision of Islamabad when the then Taliban Regime was recognized to avoid instability and install regional peace. This article makes the point that the farsightedness of Pakistan rightly realized the strength and resilience of Taliban and therefore took the right decision to bring them into mainstream diplomatic exposure in 1996. This fact was also recognized by Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and United Arab Emirates (U.A.E) who stood by with the reality of Afghanistan and too accepted Taliban as the legitimate political authority in 1996. A notion which was true in 1996 became reality of the day that “peace in Afghanistan is peace in Pakistan”. By incorporating deductive approach, this paper is descriptive in analysis and uses historical method of inquiry to establish facts and infer conclusions. Regional Complex Security Theory has been contextualized to refer to intelligence havoc that allowed regional states to sustain the chaos, instability, and turmoil in Afghanistan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In April 2023, the Taliban banned poppy cultivation and the trade of all narcotics. This caused a 95% reduction in opium production. Usually, that would be good news. But there is a substantial worry: synthetic opioids might fill the void left by heroin. This is concerning because these drugs have led to health emergencies in areas where they are prevalent. This paper highlights the limitations of the current drug surveillance system in Europe and proposes improvements. It argues that reliance on secondary data is insufficient. Instead, we need to interview a sentinel group of people who inject drugs and adjust city-level sentinel systems, such as wastewater analysis, to specifically track the spread of synthetic opioids. Without these proactive steps, we risk only noticing a transition from heroin to synthetic opioids after it has occurred, with its harmful impacts already in place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of bilig: Journal of Social Sciences of the Turkish World is the property of bilig: Journal of Social Sciences of the Turkish World and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In the backdrop of War on Terror in Afghanistan, Pakistan abandoned its two decade long Afghan policy of supporting Taliban, Islamic Jihad, Islamic fundamentalists, and became an ally with US in conducting operations against Al-Qaida and Taliban network in Afghanistan. This change in Pakistan's Afghan policy had deep impacts on country's peace and security, particularly on Pakistan's bordering region with Afghanistan, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Consequently, Pakistan's military conducted several operations from 2002 onwards in FATA. During this period, several peace agreements were conducted between the military and militants in FATA. But such operations and the subsequent agreements failed to prevail peace in border region. Instead, spreading conflicts to other areas of Pakistan. This paper attempts to examine Pakistan's Afghan policy since 2001, and analyze its impact on FATA's peace, security and social fabric. It also critically analyzes the strategies adopted by Pakistan's military in dealing with Pakistan based militant groups and foreign insurgents in FATA. The issue of peace and conflict in FATA needs to be carefully addressed because this is a porous and fragile area that exists between Afghanistan and Pakistan. FATA's volatile geography makes it more violent and resistant to international aid, Counterinsurgency (COIN) tactics, and development, which has direct impact over peace and development of Pakistan. The methodology employed is qualitative and analytical. First half lays out the independent variable by describing US, Pakistani and militant action post 9/11. Second half lays out the dependent variables by describing sociopolitical and economic changes in FATA. This study concludes with recommendations regarding prevailing peace in FATA. The finding of this study shall help in framing future Pakistan's Afghan policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is deemed as the most lethal terrorist organization throughout Central Asian region. Although it emerged in 1998, its roots can be traced back to the era right after the demise of former Soviet Union. This Movement was created to launch an armed struggle against Islam Karimov's regime in Uzbekistan. IMU, however, could not make solid bases in Uzbekistan and remained engaged in Tajik civil war between 1992 and 1997. After the General Peace Accord of 1997 singed between the rival groups which ended the Tajik Civil War, Uzbek militants had no choice but to move to Taliban ruled Afghanistan. The US led attack in Afghanistan after 9/11 forced the remnants of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan to take refuge in the FATA region of Pakistan. IMU's focus was primarily targeting Western forces in Afghanistan. However, when Pakistani government initiated a military action in FATA against the terrorists in 2004, IMU joined its hands with Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). After this union IMU started its operations in mainland Pakistan and Afghanistan. It also supported Islamists to siege Swat in 2007. From attacks on armed forces bases in Karachi and Peshawar to jail break in Bannu and from attacks on Karachi, Peshawar and Quetta airports to kidnapping for ransom, IMU had played central role in terrorist activities in Pakistan. Similar kinds of activities have been carried out by IMU in Afghanistan as well. The IMU has least focus on Central Asia for the time being and is more engaged in Afghanistan and Syria. It has joined its hands with global Islamic militant organizations. It has close relationship with Islamic State (IS) and majority of its top leadership has joined the later. The death of Mullah Omar has led to the fragmentation of IMU in different groups. One group is pro-Taliban and al-Qaeda while other supports Islamic State. IMU has helped IS to group in northern Afghanistan especially in Faryab and Zabul provinces, which are the strongest hold of later in the entire Central-South Asian region. This paper will discuss the history, objectives and operational capabilities of the IMU. It will also explain the current nexus of IMU with the IS and its impacts on the broader regions of Central and South Asia besides possible future of the group especially after the death of Islam Karimov. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After 14 years of war on terror, the coalition forces are leaving Afghanistan. There are claims of victory, but stipulated goals have not been achieved and international community is increasingly looking towards the impact of NATO drawdown 2014, which will directly impact the wider region. Not only there is a risk of instability spilling over to the South Asian region, but the drawdown will also accelerate the ongoing competition among the regional powers, particularly between India and Pakistan. Both have a real clash of interests and want to serve their relative geo-strategic, geopolitical and economic interests. These interests are varied and sometimes conflicting. Besides these interests they have strategic stakes in Afghanistan. Pakistan is pre-occupied with its 'strategic depth policy' and India with its security related to Kashmir. Other apprehensions include radical Islamism, extremism and drug trafficking. Emphasis is also on issues pertaining to internal security and the political settlement in Afghanistan as the weakness of the state and political fragmentation of the country will also influence the South Asian region. It is a well known fact that power in Afghanistan is extremely decentralized and real control is exercised by a handful of field commanders and warlords without having any real political affiliation. Their relations with neighbouring powers are to secure their respective interests only. There is a clear indication that the clash and competition in Afghanistan may create a conflicting situation transforming into a war after the drawdown. There is a need to manage the interests and neutralize their concerns regarding the post-2014 scenario in Afghanistan. In this regard, an enhanced regional cooperation is required to keep the region away from instability and insecurity. On the other hand south Asian powers' involvement will be viewed as a threat to the regional stability. This allegation is based on the past experience when the superpowers made Afghan territory a playground for their proxy war making alliance with regional powers. There is a need of co-operation among the regional powers in the post withdrawal scenario in the same manner as they did in counterterrorism operations. The paper will evaluate all these aspects and impact of drawdown 2014 on the security of South Asia keeping in view competition of regional power in the endgame politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay reflects on the broad contours of the war in Afghanistan from Southeast Asia's perspective. While the United States' withdrawal from Kabul was calamitous, the pessimism about America's role in Southeast Asia has been overstated. The United States' withdrawal from Afghanistan was largely inconsequential for the region. Southeast Asian states deftly mixed their support for America's campaign in Afghanistan and the broader war on terror without being seen as too sympathetic, including, in some instances, condemnation of America's attacks on Islam. Regional governments balanced their domestic political interests with their foreign policy objectives. The abrupt Afghan withdrawal may instead have positive outcomes, as the United States boosted its courtship with countries of Southeast Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific region through new security arrangements such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and the Australian, U.K., and U.S. trilateral pact (AUKUS). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on the efficacy of leadership decapitation has focused primarily on targeting the topmost leaders of groups. Yet, most organizations rely on multiple leaders with specific functional or geographical responsibilities, rather than a single symbolic leader. In this context, we pose the following question: how are the effects of leadership decapitation on a group's short-term operational capacity conditioned by the type or rank of targeted leaders? We argue that due to the risks faced by militant organizations, upper-tier leaders will delegate operational duties to lower-tier leadership for security purposes. Because of the shift of the principal-agent dynamic to lower-tier leaders, targeting of lower ranked leaders versus topmost leaders is more likely to result in a loss of control over foot soldiers, and trigger negative effects such as a rise in indiscriminate violence. We conduct our study using the case of Islamic State Khorasan in Afghanistan, with weekly data on the group's attacks, and multi-tier leadership losses between 2015–2019 across 72 districts. 1 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Terrorism perpetrated in any country by either internal or external actors jeopardizes the country's security, economic growth, societal peace, and harmony. Hence, accurate modelling of terrorism has become a necessary component of the national security mission of most nations. This research extracted and analyzed high impact attacks (HIAs) perpetrated by terrorists in India and its neighboring countries since 1970 using the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). We evaluated the extraction efficacy of the Global Terrorism Index Impact Score (GTI-IS) against the GTD measure "nkill" using the iterative outlier analysis (IOA) heuristic. The heuristic identified 6117 common HIAs using nkill or GTI-IS attributes. GTI-IS extracted 1718 exclusive HIAs that nkill missed, while nkill extracted 2233 exclusive HIAs. We further classified the extracted HIAs into lethal and non-lethal attacks. Next, we conducted a rigorous spatiotemporal exploratory analysis of countries that reported the most HIAs. Though Afghanistan, India, and Sri Lanka exhibited global spatial autocorrelation, Pakistan did not. Ripley's G function suggested the recurrence of lethal attacks near other similar events. This analysis showed that lethal and non-lethal attacks in those countries follow different statistical distributions, which can aid in focused counterterrorism tactics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When confronted with a perceived military mission failure like that in Afghanistan, service members may reflect upon the personal and family sacrifices committed in support of the mission and may no longer be willing to make the same sacrifices for future missions. This dynamic can be referred to as mission injury. This article applies a feminist analytical framework to the lived experiences of military personnel during the Global War on Terrorism and worldwide operations against terrorism that continued after 2013 to engage the structural dynamics of military life that shape mission injury. Mission injury may lead to retention and recruitment issues that weaken the nation's military force against future threats. To mitigate this risk, the US military should implement institutional changes to the structure of military life in order to alleviate the personal and family sacrifices required by US military service. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Radicalisation has been a problem for Pakistan from the earliest days of its existence. However, after the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan by the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and Pakistan's joining hands with the West and the Arab World in backing the Jihad against the former USSR, the society was in the throes of radicalisation and militancy. The youth has been hurt the most in terms of both actors and victims. The study aims to identify the key factors that can be attributed to inducing radicalisation and infusing militancy amongst the Pakistani youth and examine their role in violent extremism to devise the means for its control in Pakistan. Qualitative case study-based interviews have been conducted with de-radicalised former militants. The study exudes three main findings: first, the state remains ignorant of the movement of the radicalised youth; second, the state has launched various phases of anti-terrorist operations. Third, the state is unable to discourage militant organisations from recruiting the youth for militant training. The conclusion is that the confluence of societal dogma and extremist (religious) ideologies offered significant resistance against preventing violent extremism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Global Security & Intelligence Studies is the property of Policy Studies Organization and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

After 9/11 Pakistan became one of the leading recipients of the US foreign assistance to counter the extremist and militant forces in Afghanistan and borderland area. The US financial support was consisting of military, non-military and humanitarian development. The fundamental aim of the financial support to Pakistan was to enhance the ability and capability of the security forces of Pakistan against new kind of war. It was expected that the financial aid will strengthen the Pak-US strategic Partnership but all futuristic silver hopes go in vain when it became a bone of contention between the partners and trust deficit emerged on the issue of mismanagement of financial aid. US leveled a number of corruption charges not only on the civil government of Pakistan but also on the military. The controversy over financial assistance between Washington and Islamabad not only undermined partnership but also damaged security forces' efforts against terrorists in Pakistan as well as in Afghanistan. Thus, the paper thoroughly examines and discusses the controversial issue of US financial aid with critical analysis of different documentary record which provides clear picture of the hardened attitude from both the sides. Moreover, timely study about the issue of aid is essential for strengthening the strategic partnership against the terrorist outfits operating in the region which is in the best interests of both the states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A cacophony of protest greeted President Biden's withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan following a 20-year deployment, implemented and overseen by four different administrations, both Republican and Democrat. For all the criticism of the final withdrawal's implementation, however, strategic ambivalence was always present in U.S. operations in Afghanistan. The bi-partisan decisions that defined the Afghan mission can best be seen in the National Security Strategy documents produced by successive administrations as they sought to address the evolving situation on the ground and the perceived level of threat to the United States. The utilization of discourse analysis to examine these official policy documents allows for an understanding of the comparable attention that was paid to Afghanistan by successive administrations, as well as for an appreciation of the tone and language used regarding the nation. Doing so reveals that despite the duration of the mission and the associated costs, a deep-seated strategic ambiguity existed towards Afghanistan, as it languished as a sideshow for U.S. grand strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, service-providing insurgent groups have responded differently, with some initiating more attacks amid ongoing destabilisation while others have immediately veered towards precautionary measures such as initiating public awareness campaigns and setting up quarantine centres. What drives these divergent responses? Relying on publicly available and semi-private sources, this article examines how the Taliban in Afghanistan, Ha'ayt Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Syria, and Al-Shabaab in Somalia have operationalised their responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. The findings reveal that the divergent responses are rooted in the framing of the pandemic discourse. The Taliban and HTS both interpreted it as a calamity that needs responding to and repurposed their activities accordingly by stepping up their attacks against combatants while concomitantly exploiting the humanitarian vacuum created by the pandemic by delivering health services. However, as the pandemic surged, the two groups gradually scaled down their combatant targeting and prioritised delivering health services to bolster their legitimacy and build popular support for their proto-states. By contrast, Al-Shabaab labelled the pandemic as a Western and Chinese 'problem', and made no visible changes to their operations in response to the crisis, only belatedly beginning to offer health services as the pandemic worsened. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Afghanistan is considered the entry point for interventions and an important basis for the strategic objectives of sovereign actors. Due to the lack of national sovereignty, the inefficient political system and its fragile legal system regarding ethnic-tribal crises have created strategic depths for global and regional actors, which they can pursue and implement their objectives. While Afghanistan is a focal point in expanding political, military, and economic exchanges and transactions in its peripheral areas, it has suffered from deep ethnic divisions to the same extent. This major weakness is the basis for interventions by regional actors. This article does not deal with Afghanistan's internal weaknesses and problems but focuses on the strategic goals of sovereign actors in Afghanistan. War on terror, invasion, and creation of military bases in Afghanistan by the US and NATO to control and monitor China, Russia, Iran, and Central Asian countries, have been pursued during the past 20 years. It shows the importance of Afghanistan's geo-strategic position in western policies, especially for the United States of America. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Afghanistan has not been a success story for the United States till now; nor has it been an unmitigated disaster. Some national interests have been achieved with hard struggle, but the cost in doing so has been high, and it has taken a very long time. Withdrawal of International Security Assistance Forces from Afghanistan in 2014 does not proclaim the stability in Afghanistan. After the withdrawal of International Security Assistance Forces, Afghanistan again emerged as an arena of instability and chaos. Though United States and other members of Resolute Support Mission are active in Afghanistan but the burden of security finally relies upon Afghan government. In this backdrop, the present paper aims to highlight major achievements in Afghanistan since 2001 and the emerging problems in Afghanistan after 2014. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Millennium (03058298) is the property of Sage Publications, Ltd. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Why do some rebels form persistent battlefield coalitions with terrorist groups? I argue three factors are likely to condition whether the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs: 1) potential rivalry among coalition members' political agendas, 2) the military, organizational, and political value terrorists can bring to the collective, and 3) the degree to which local partnerships are institutionalized or reinforced through threats of intra-coalitional violence. Analyzing previously classified and captured primary source documents, I examine the Taliban's persistence in forming battlefield coalitions with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan (1979 – present) and find significant empirical support for the argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The war in Afghanistan ended as it had started, with total ambiguity of its objectives as well as what it achieved. The official Western narrative in 2001 was that "everything changed" on the day four airliners were hijacked and nearly 5,000 people murdered. The US intervention in Afghanistan, by this account, was hastily improvised in less than a month. However, the decisions shaping the US military campaign in Afghanistan in 2001 show a remarkable continuity based on an ongoing pre-September 11 evolution in the US foreign policy. As a matter of fact, the US operations in Afghanistan did not begin 20 years ago. But in 1979, during the presidency of Jimmy Carter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]