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What is the best way to restore or uphold deterrence when an existing deterrent is perceived to have decayed? One common answer is that deterrers should simply add more of the ingredients that generally make for strong deterrents: more certainty that threats will be carried out, more capabilities to inflict severe punishments upon an adversary, and greater capacity to carry out threats with celerity (speed). This answer draws upon an intuitive quantitative logic that more is always better when it comes to dissuading an adversary from taking unwanted actions. In this article, however, we explain how following this quantitative logic can have the unintended consequence of worsening security relations and provoking war, especially under conditions of shifting power. Using proposals for the United States to provide 'strategic clarity' regarding its intentions to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression as a case-study, we show how efforts to maximize the certainty, severity and celerity of threats can backfire in practice. In general terms, our conclusion is that scholars and policy practitioners must assess the viability of deterrents from a qualitative perspective. With specific reference to Taiwan, we find that strategic clarity would be unlikely to strengthen deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines Zhang Wojun (1902–1955) and the memory of his 'collaboration' with Japan during the Second World War. A Taiwanese-born writer and educator who lived in Beijing for 25 years, his drifting identity was full of ambiguities. Although he was one of the key intellectuals behind Taiwan's New-Old Literatures Debate and responsible for introducing many May Fourth ideas to Taiwan, he also played an important role in bringing Japanese literature and thought into Chinese discourse during the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s. During the war, he continued to teach in Beijing and travelled to Japan to attend the Greater East Asia Writers' conferences. Some of his works from this period call for the Chinese people to support the empire and eradicate Western culture and literature from Asia, but many of his writings also indicate a strong sense of Chinese nationalism. This article considers the memories of Zhang, his various intellectual contributions, and his oeuvre, arguing that his collaboration must be understood and contextualized within his intellectual landscape through a research methodology that examines continuities and change across decades of his life and work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 2016, China has been conducting military flybys around Taiwan, while the US has approved arms sales to Taiwan on several occasions and sent warplanes and battleships through the Taiwan Strait. How does Taiwanese public opinion respond to the Chinese and US military presence in the Strait? Is the public likely to become less supportive of de jure independence for Taiwan on account of China's military deterrence or more supportive owing to a perceived likelihood of US military assistance? In this report, we provide answers to these questions based on evidence from a survey experiment conducted in Taiwan in October–November 2020. We find that Taiwanese are less sensitive to the Chinese military presence in the Taiwan Strait but have become more supportive of de jure independence after seeing the US aircraft in the area. Our findings contribute to studies of cross-Strait relations and US foreign policy on the Taiwan Strait. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do changes in US Taiwan policy play out? What is the logic behind these changes? To address these questions, existing studies have formulated four schools of explanation, providing valuable theoretical insights. However, these studies have obvious problems with unidirectional dichotomy and thus fail to identify a causal mechanism explaining the long-term trajectory of US Taiwan policy. This article conducts a re-typology of US Taiwan policy to break the traditional strategic ambiguity–clarity dichotomy by establishing three key indicators and argues that the orientation of US China policy and Taiwan's US policy are the two major factors triggering changes. By conceptualizing and operationalizing the two independent variables as engagement-oriented, coopetition-oriented, containment-oriented, and hedging/bandwagoning/binding, this article develops a systemic theoretical framework to demonstrate how the US Taiwan policy transits between strategic clarity, maximum pressure, partial strategic clarity, between partial strategic clarity and strategic ambiguity, strategic ambiguity, and controlling the pro-independent forces. This article conducts empirical studies by reviewing the transition of US Taiwan policy under different presidencies in post–Cold War era to demonstrate how the theoretical framework works in realpolitik. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This lead article surveys the history and evolving policy legacies of the "one China" framework 50 years after US President Richard Nixon's historic 1972 visit to China. It begins by introducing key concepts and highlighting the crucial difference between Beijing's self-defined "one-China principle" and the US's, Japan's and key other countries' variable "one China" policies as it relates to Taiwan. It argues that three seminal 1970s developments consolidated the "one China" framework as an informal institution of international politics. The ambiguity baked in by Cold War-era geopolitical necessity provided flexibility sufficient to enable diplomatic breakthroughs between erstwhile adversaries, but also planted seeds for deepening contestation and frictions today. Recent developments – especially Taiwan's democratization and Beijing's increasingly bold and proactive assertion of its claim to sovereignty over Taiwan – have transformed incentive structures in Taipei and for its major international partners. The net effect is that the myth of "consensus" and the ambiguities enabling the framework's half-century of success face unprecedented challenges today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on uncertainty management theory (Lind & Van den Bos, 2002; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002), we explored whether uncertainty in the workplace (role ambiguity) as well as off the workplace (economic hardship) moderates the relationship between abusive supervision and subordinates' job burnout. Using survey method, we obtained 458 valid responses from employees in a transportation company in Taiwan. The results of moderated hierarchical regression showed that both role ambiguity and economic hardship induce the positive relationship between abusive supervision and subordinates' job burnout. Abusive supervision related more strongly to job burnout when subordinates perceived higher role ambiguity (higher uncertainty) or higher economic hardship (higher uncertainty). As predicted, high uncertainty increases subordinates' attentions to the injustice from abusive supervision and thus strengthens the negative psychological consequences of abusive supervision, regardless of whether the source of uncertainty corresponds to the source of (in)justice perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The PRC's increasingly assertive foreign policy behaviors have triggered heightened anxiety among its regional neighbors. Washington has abided by a long-standing strategic ambiguity policy to manage the Taiwan Strait impasse. However, as the KMT's "1992 consensus" policy places Taiwan in close union with Beijing, Taipei's security positions sometimes go against the interests of the US and its allies in the Asia-Pacific. Pulling Taiwan away from China's orbit is congruent with US interest in continuing that enduring policy framework and ensuring a healthy balance across the Strait. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study explored the relationships among ambiguity tolerance, language learning strategies, and L2 proficiency in the context of learning Chinese as a second language (CSL) in Taiwan. The three dimensions are inextricably linked to one another. Although a statistical relationship between ambiguity tolerance and overall strategy use could not be established, high ambiguity tolerance was identified to be a significant predictor of L2 competence and the use of L2-oriented learning strategies with less reliance on L1. It can be also argued that such L2-oriented learning strategies constitute the foundation for success in L2 learning. Successful CSL learners tended to employ strategies that focus on the understanding of overall meaning in communication, use Chinese in a natural and authentic context, and excel at monitoring their study and progress. Findings showed that language teachers should assist students with low ambiguity tolerance to cope with L2 ambiguity and further encourage them to take advantage of opportunities to use L2-oriented strategies, especially in a second language setting. An awareness of ambiguity tolerance and language learning strategies should be developed and taken into account by language instructors when designing course materials and classroom activities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]