Search

In recent years, legislators from both parties have drawn attention for their public support or opposition to leading figures within their party, such as Donald Trump and Nancy Pelosi. Yet we know relatively little about the extent to which voters care about members' professed loyalty to party leaders, especially when compared to competing considerations such as members' policy positions. In two national survey experiments, we independently manipulate hypothetical Democratic and Republican legislators' ideological reputations and levels of support for a leading party figure. Through our experiments and a supplemental observational analysis, we find that partisans in the electorate do use information about support for or opposition to leading party figures as a basis for evaluating members of Congress. At the same time, the results reaffirm the importance voters attach to policy and ideological factors and suggest these considerations are not overwhelmed by partisan loyalty considerations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study offers experimental tests of the “personal vote” in an era of heightened partisanship and polarization. Using three national surveys, we randomly present information about a hypothetical legislator's voting record, committee assignment, and district‐oriented work. After evaluating the legislator, respondents are presented with information about a challenger running on a nationalized message. Respondents, especially out‐partisans, report much greater satisfaction with the legislator when told about his district‐oriented activities, but increased willingness to vote for the legislator is more limited and mostly reserved for independents. In varying information about the legislator's voting record, we also find scant evidence that bipartisan legislators are better at securing a personal vote. In two experimental extensions, we show that our findings generalize to evaluations of real senators, and that nationalizing elections is one possible way that opponents can thwart incumbent efforts at winning the votes of independents and out‐partisans through traditional district‐oriented appeals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Judicial confirmation hearings offer a rare opportunity for senators to engage in a public exchange with current and future members of the federal judiciary. Below the Supreme Court level, however, we know relatively little about how members of the Judiciary Committee use these hearings. In this article, we examine senator mentions of Supreme Court cases at circuit court confirmation hearings between 1993 and 2012 to test whether these hearings serve as a venue for position-taking, as well as for interbranch dialogue. We find evidence that senators do reference decisions in ways that seem motivated by electoral considerations. However, we also find that hearings are frequently used as a forum for interbranch dialogue over Supreme Court cases. When used in this fashion, the dialogue is often focused on cases that challenge congressional power. The results suggest that confirmation hearings are an underappreciated venue for interbranch conversations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Senate Judiciary Committee confirmation hearings offer senators a public opportunity to exercise their “advice and consent” privilege and scrutinize presidential nominees. In this article, we examine the purpose and functioning of confirmation hearings for federal district court nominees, which make up the majority of presidential selections to federal courts. Using transcripts from all hearings between 1993 and 2008, we find the characteristics of individual nominees have little effect on the types of questions senators pose. Instead, larger institutional and political factors—such as Senate composition, party of the president, and proximity to a presidential election—are much better predictors of how senators use their opportunity to scrutinize nominees. The results indicate senators use hearings to engage in partisan and ideological position taking rather than to ascertain the qualifications of district court nominees. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]