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The beautiful picture of brothers in arms vanquishing a tyrant. The power of a well-orchestrated army and navy winning historic battles. Overwhelming military might and ability through teamwork. This is how the US military services portray themselves to the public and to their own service members through official doctrine. However, under the veneer of jointness, deeply fraught processes are at play. Frequently, the services think more about protecting organizational turf than about national security and maintaining an advantage against the United States'external adversaries. Uniting US military services is a difficult endeavor that becomes even more so the farther from a battlefield and the higher up the command structure the unifying needs to happen.In The Collaborative Fight, Paul R. Birch and Lina M. Svedin examine cases of institutional jointness among US military services from the late nineteenth century into the twenty-first century. They draw actionable conclusions for practitioners in the defense establishment while giving examples of successful joint cooperation that overcame the difficulties inherent in pursuing it. Even the successful cases that Birch and Svedin discuss show that the US military services face bureaucratic incentives and organizational leadership issues that make battlefield cooperation less than ideal.Birch and Svedin adeptly translate theory and history into approaches useful to practitioners in the field while examining the theoretical framework outlining the drivers in joint military cooperation.

Fifteen years into the era of?cyber warfare,? are we any closer to understanding the role a major cyberattack would play in international relations - or to preventing one? Uniquely spanning disciplines and enriched by the insights of a leading practitioner, Rethinking Cyber Warfare provides a fresh understanding of the role that digital disruption plays in contemporary international security. Focusing on the critical phenomenon of major cyberattacks against wired societies, the book reconsiders central tenets that shaped global powers'policies and explains what forces in the international system might durably restrain their use. Arming the reader with the key technological and historical context to make sense of cyberattacks, it explores how deterrence, international law, and normative taboos operate today to shape whether and how states think about causing this kind of disruption - and how soon those forces might combine to rethink those decisions entirely. The result is a comprehensive look at one of the most pressing issues in international security that also illuminates a new pathway for managing one of its greatest sources of instability.

This book addresses issues of legal and moral governance arising in the development, deployment, and eventual uses of emerging technologies in military operations. Proverbial wisdom has it that law and morality always lag behind technological innovation. Hence, the book aims to identify, enumerate, and constructively address the problems of adequate governance for the development, deployment, and eventual uses of military technologies that have been newly introduced into military operations or which will be available in the near future. Proposals for modifications in governance, the book argues, closely track the anxieties of many critics of these technologies to the extent that they will proliferate, prove destructive in unanticipated ways, and partially or wholly escape regulation under current treaties and regulatory regimes. In addition to such concerns in domestic and especially in international law, the book addresses ethical norms in the professions involved in the design and eventual use of specific technologies, principally involving the professional norms of practice in engineering and the military (as well as biomedical and health care practice), which impose moral obligations on their members to avoid reckless endangerment or criminal negligence in the course of their activities. Thus, in addition to exploring the application of existing legal regimes and moral norms, the book examines how these professions might develop or improve the voluntary constraints on forms of malfeasance that are enshrined in their histories and codes of best practices. This book should prove of great interest to students of ethics, military studies, philosophy of war and peace, law, and international relations.

“This profusely illustrated and thoroughly researched book conveys a wealth of information” about the USAF's B-1 bomber (Aviation History Magazine). When the B-52 Stratofortress entered operational service with the US Air Force in 1955, work was already underway on defining its successor. The B-70 Valkyrie, a Mach 3 jet bomber, was one option. Although two XB-70A prototypes flew, the B-70 never went into production. Out of the subsequent Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft program came the B-1A bomber, which flew at high speed and low altitude to evade enemy air defenses. But the B-1A was cancelled in favor of fitting the B-52 with cruise missiles. The B-1, known as the BONE, was revived in 1981 as the improved B-1B to boost American military power and serve as a symbol of American strength at the peak of Cold War tensions. The B-1B entered service in 1986 with several deficiencies. The resolution of most of these issues coincided with the end of the Cold War. After the Cold War, the B-1B lost its primary nuclear mission but remained relevant by transforming into a high-speed, long-range, high-payload delivery platform for conventional precision-guided munitions. The first combat use of the B-1B was in 1998 in Iraq. The BONE has proved a highly effective combat aircraft in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and the former Yugoslavia. This extensively illustrated book traces the BONE's long development and operational history in detail. “A must-read book... a great reference for historians, pilots, engineers, and even policy makers. Both the writing and photos are excellent.” —Air & Space Power History

This study explains how the armies of North and South Vietnam, newly equipped with the most modern Soviet and US tanks and weaponry, fought the decisive armored battles of the Easter Offensive.Wearied by years of fighting against Viet Cong guerillas and North Vietnamese regulars, the United States had almost completely withdrawn its forces from Vietnam by early 1972. Determined to halt the expansion and improvement of South Vietnamese forces under the U.S. “Vietnamization” program, North Vietnam launched a major fourteen-division attack in March 1972 against the South that became known as the “Easter Offensive.” Hanoi's assault was spearheaded by 1,200 tanks and was counteracted on the opposite side by Saigon's newly equipped armored force using U.S. medium tanks. The result was ferocious fighting between major Cold War-era U.S. and Soviet tanks and mechanized equipment, pitting M-48 medium and M-41 light tanks against their T- 54 and PT-76 rivals in a variety of combat environments ranging from dense jungle to urban terrain. Both sides employed cutting-edge weaponry for the first time, including the U.S. TOW and Soviet 9M14 Malyutk wire-guided anti-tank missiles.This volume examines the tanks, armored forces and weapons that clashed in this little-known campaign in detail, using after-action reports from the battlefield and other primary sources to analyze the technical and organizational factors that shaped the outcome. Despite the ARVN's defensive success in October 1972, North Vietnam massively expanded its armor forces over the next two years while U.S. support waned. This imbalance with key strategic misjudgments by the South Vietnamese President led to the stunning defeat of the South in 1975 when T54 tanks crashed through the fence surrounding the Presidential palace and took Saigon on 30 April 1975.

Nachrichtendienstforschung ist, vor allem in Deutschland, häufig stark geschichts- oder praxisorientiert ausgerichtet. Gesellschaftstheoretische Arbeiten zu Nachrichtendiensten sind Mangelware. Das Buch adressiert diese Lücke unter Rückgriff auf systemtheoretische Herangehensweisen. Diese erlauben eine theoretisch fundierte Betrachtung grundlegender Inhalte von Nachrichtenwesen wie Geheimnissen, den Umgang mit Unsicherheit oder bestimmten nachrichtendienstlichen Funktionen für die Politik. Dadurch werden einerseits neue theoretische Perspektiven für die „Intelligence Studies“ eröffnet und andererseits der Anschluss an aktuelle Diskussionen der Internationalen Beziehungen und der Internationalen Politischen Soziologie ermöglicht.

During the first half of the 1970s, two new fighter aircraft entered operational service in the United States: The Navy's Grumman F-14 Tomcat and the Air Force's McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle. These two aircraft were part of the backbone of the tactical air power of the United States; their introduction was accompanied by comprehensive reforms in pilot training as well as new technologies and weapon systems. In addition to the tactical significance of the two aircraft as innovative fighting platforms, however, their development and deployment should be viewed within a broad geopolitical and geostrategic context. Tovy explains how the F-14 Tomcat and the F-15 Eagle were an integral part of the aerial component of the conventional arms race within the Cold War. He argues that the trend of Soviet advanced weapon systems development created a perception of threat to the United States, challenging its conventional military power. Tomcats and Eagles explores how the Vietnam War accelerated the need for advanced fighter-interceptors, and that the lessons learned from aerial combat in Vietnam had a significant impact on the design and operational characteristics of the F-15. The author reveals that after F-14s were sold to Iran and F-15s to Israel in the second half of the 1970s, these jets were integrated into their armed forces, leading to Israel's use of the F-15 during the First Lebanese War. Finally, the author provides an in-depth look at the operation of the F-14 and F-15 in U.S. actions in Southeast Asia, beginning with the Tanker Wars in the mid-1980s, through Operation Desert Storm and Operation Enduring Freedom, and ending with Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Cyberwarfare: Information Operations in a Connected World puts students on the real-world battlefield of cyberspace! It reviews the role that cyberwarfare plays in modern military operations–operations in which it has become almost impossible to separate cyberwarfare from traditional warfare.

This updated and expanded edition of Cyberspace in Peace and War by Martin C. Libicki presents a comprehensive understanding of cybersecurity, cyberwar, and cyber-terrorism. From basic concepts to advanced principles, Libicki examines the sources and consequences of system compromises, addresses strategic aspects of cyberwar, and defines cybersecurity in the context of military operations while highlighting unique aspects of the digital battleground and strategic uses of cyberwar. This new edition provides updated analysis on cyberespionage, including the enigmatic behavior of Russian actors, making this volume a timely and necessary addition to the cyber-practitioner's library. Cyberspace in Peace and War guides readers through the complexities of cybersecurity and cyberwar and challenges them to understand the topics in new ways. Libicki provides the technical and geopolitical foundations of cyberwar necessary to understand the policies, operations, and strategies required for safeguarding an increasingly online infrastructure.

Maritime Unmanned recounts the promising beginning, demoralizing setbacks, and ultimate success of the visionaries who championed unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) technology for the U.S. Navy. Ernest Snowden and Robert F. Wood Jr. dive deep inside the machinations of aerospace and defense industry leadership, strategy development, and execution to describe the process by which the Air Force's Global Hawk was adapted to become the Navy's Triton. This was the first time in the history of naval aviation that an unmanned aerial vehicle was adopted into frontline squadron inventories to become an enabling component of the maritime patrol and reconnaissance mission, a process that took more than twenty years as industry representatives and Navy counterparts developed and socialized an unfamiliar and unconventional concept of operations and senior government acquisition officials either advocated or purposely road-blocked its advancement. —Military Writers Society of America Award: Bronze Medal

In Visions of Beirut Hatim El-Hibri explores how the creation and circulation of images have shaped the urban spaces and cultural imaginaries of Beirut. Drawing on fieldwork and texts ranging from maps, urban plans, and aerial photographs to live television and drone-camera footage, El-Hibri traces how the technologies and media infrastructure that visualize the city are used to consolidate or destabilize regimes of power. Throughout the twentieth century, colonial, economic, and military mapping projects helped produce and govern Beirut's spaces. In the 1990s, the imagery of its post-civil war downtown reconstruction cast Beirut as a site of financial investment in ways that obscured its ongoing crises. During and following the 2006 Israel/Hizbullah war, Hizbullah's use of live television broadcasts of fighting and protests along with its construction of a war memorial museum at a former secret military bunker demonstrate the tension between visualizing space and the practices of concealment. Outlining how Beirut's urban space and public life intertwine with images and infrastructure, El-Hibri interrogates how media embody and exacerbate the region's political fault lines.

With the withdrawal of French forces from South Vietnam in 1955, the U.S. took an ever-widening role in defending the country against invasion by North Vietnam. By 1965, the U.S. had'Americanized'the war, relegating the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) to a supporting role. While the U.S. won many tactical victories, it had difficulty controlling the territory it fought for. As the war grew increasingly unpopular with the American public, the North Vietnamese launched two large-scale invasions in 1968 and 1972--both tactical defeats but strategic victories for the North that precipitated the U.S. policy of'Vietnamization,'the drawdown of American forces that left the ARVN to fight alone. This book examines the maturation of the ARVN, and the major battles it fought from 1963 to its demise in 1975. Despite its flaws, the ARVN was a well-organized and disciplined force with an independent spirit and contributed enormously to the war effort. Had the U.S.'Vietnamized'the war earlier, it might have been won in 1967-1968.

Globalization and Maritime Power focuses on the direct impact of globalization on naval forces and the maritime aspects of commerce and international relations. It seeks to translate what we have learned about the phenomenon of globalization into the language of strategy and defense policy. This book uses a general knowledge of globalization to deduce its impact on the maritime world, and applies inductive reasoning to the maritime impacts of defense planning. Its intent is to provide national security leaders with analyses applicable to the future security environment.—Print ed.

From the defeat of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam at Ap Bac to the battles of the Ia Drang Valley, Khe Sanh, and more, Storms over the Mekong offers a reassessment of key turning points in the Vietnam War. Award-winning historian William P. Head not only reexamines these pivotal battles but also provides a new interpretation on the course of the war in Southeast Asia. In considering Operation Rolling Thunder, for example—which Head dubs as “too much rolling and not enough thunder”—readers will grasp the full scope of the campaign, from specifically targeted bridges in North Vietnam to the challenges of measuring success or failure, the domestic political situation, and how over time, Head argues, “slowly, but surely, Rolling Thunder dug itself into a hole.” Likewise, Head shows how the battles for Saigon and Hue during the Tet Offensive of 1968 were tactical defeats for the Communist forces with as many as 40,000 killed and no real gains. At the same time, however, Tet made it clear to many in Washington that victory in Vietnam would require a still greater commitment of men and resources, far more than the American people were willing to invest.Storms over the Mekong is a blow-by-blow account of the key military events, to be sure. But beyond that, it is also a measured reconsideration of the battles and moments that Americans thought they already knew, adding up to a new history of the Vietnam War.

A history of the military campaign that set the stage for the end of the Vietnam War. By the end of 1971, in what Hanoi called the American War and at the height of the Cold War, the fighting had dragged on for eight years with neither side gaining a decisive advantage on the battlefield and talks in Paris to the end the war were going nowhere. While the United States was steadily drawing down its ground forces in South Vietnam, Washington was also engaging in a grand effort to build up and strengthen Saigon's armed forces to the point of self-sufficiency. Not only had the ranks of Saigon's forces swelled in recent years, but they were now being equipped and trained to use the latest American military equipment. Perhaps now was the time for Hanoi to take one last gamble before it was too late. With the rumble of men and mechanized equipment breaking the early morning silence, some 40,000 North Vietnamese troops advanced across the demilitarized zone into South Vietnam on March 30, 1972, in what would become the largest conventional attack of the war. Ill-prepared and poorly led, South Vietnamese troops in the far north were quickly routed in the face of the ensuing onslaught. Likewise, coordinated attacks across the Cambodian border northwest of Saigon and into the central highlands in the coming weeks gained steam and in due course as many as 200,000 men along with T-54/55 main battle tanks, 130mm towed artillery, ZSU-57 self-propelled ant-aircraft guns, and hundreds of trucks and armored personnel carriers were engaged across three battlefronts. Soon Saigon's beleaguered forces were being pushed to the brink of defeat in what appeared to be the end for the Thieu government. Ultimately, however, the timely and massive intervention by U.S. and South Vietnamese air power, along with the bravery of some South Vietnamese commanders and their American advisers saved the day. Hanoi's gamble had failed and, in its wake, lay up to 100,000 dead and South Vietnamese roads littered with the smoldering wrecks of North Vietnamese military equipment. Moreover, it would be another three years before the North had recovered enough to try again. “Informatively presents an episode of the Vietnam War that has otherwise lapsed into obscurity, crowed out of the history books by North Vietnam's ultimate victory against the U.S. and South Vietnamese military.” —Midwest Book Review “The lessons from Hanoi's military victory, which are discussed in this book, still echo in today's U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan, so this book's account is especially pertinent in understanding the current predicaments facing the U.S. in that troubled country.” —Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

An account of the last American bombardments that took place over North Vietnam while peace talks struggled in Paris. Includes maps and photos. On March 30, 1972, some thirty thousand North Vietnamese troops, along with tanks and heavy artillery, surged across the demilitarized zone into South Vietnam in the opening round of Hanoi's Easter Offensive. By early May, South Vietnamese forces were on the ropes and faltering. Without the support of U.S. combat troops—who were in their final stage of withdrawing from the country—the Saigon government was in danger of total collapse and with it any American hope of a negotiated settlement to the war. In response, President Richard Nixon called for an aggressive, sustained bombardment of North Vietnam. Code-named Operation Linebacker I, the interdiction effort sought to stem the flow of men and materiel southward, as well as sever all outside supply lines in the first new bombing of the North Vietnamese heartland in nearly four years. To meet the American air armada, North Vietnamese MiG fighters took to the skies and surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft fire filled the air from May to October over Hanoi and Haiphong. With the failure of its Easter Offensive to achieve military victory, Hanoi reluctantly returned to the negotiating table in Paris. However, as the peace talks teetered on the edge of collapse in December 1972, Nixon played his trump card: Operation Linebacker II. The resulting twelve-day Christmas bombing campaign unleashed the full wrath of American air power. This book tells the story of these decisive campaigns and how they led, finally, to a ceasefire agreement.

This book analyzes the development and evolution of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, a multinational aircraft endeavor involving the U.S. and many of its allies. The author provides a historical overview of jet fighter aircraft, discussing the different generations of these planes and their technical characteristics, as well as an outline of emerging international geopolitical and security trends the F-35 may see combat in. By examining the role of defense industries, domestic politics, and governmental oversight of the Joint Strike Fighter in various countries, the author concludes that this aircraft will be deployed in most of these countries to replace their aging jet fighter fleets and combat potential military aggression from China, Russia, and other revisionist international powers.

This book offers one of the first comprehensive academic views on Just Cause, the December 1989 U.S. military intervention in Panama. It presents excellent positions for the reader to consider and give a comprehensive view of all of the factors and events that prompted the operation.

What is intelligence – why is it so hard to define, and why is there no systematic theory of intelligence? Kjetil Anders Hatlebrekke creates a new, systematic model of intelligence analysis, arguing that good intelligence is based on understanding the threats that appear beyond our experience, and are therefore the most dangerous to society.

This book offers a comprehensive overview of the impact of ‘strategic culture'on Israeli military operations against Hamas between 1987 and 2014. It has often been argued that Israeli policies and military operations against Hamas have proven tactically effective, but strategically disastrous, allowing the Islamic Resistance Movement to grow from a small spin-off of the Muslim Brotherhood into a powerful military and political actor in the Palestinian arena. This book argues, contrary to this opinion, that Israel was effective in its struggle against the Islamic Resistance Movement between 1987 and 2014, as the Jewish state ultimately managed to deny the majority of Hamas'strategic aims and to preserve a position of relative strength. By relying on a synthesis of primary sources, interviews, memoirs, scholarly and professional military studies and information gathered from the media, the study delivers a careful and comprehensive analysis of the conflict. It provides an historical outline of the development of the Israeli ‘strategic culture'and analyzes its impact on the process of military adaptation during the First Intifada, the Oslo Peace Process, the al-Aqsa Intifada and the Gaza wars. Finally, the book illuminates how the Israeli strategic culture moulded a distinctive ‘way of war'that, though marked by successes and failures, ultimately proved effective against Hamas.This book will be of much interest to students of strategic studies, Middle Eastern politics, counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism and security studies in general.

This anthology constitutes an attempt to take stock of the debate on non-offensive defence after the Cold War, providing information on a research project that was initiated in 1985 at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Research in Copenhagen.

In Danger 79er, historian James H. Willbanks tells the remarkable story of Lt. Gen. James F. Hollingsworth, a three-time recipient of the Distinguished Service Cross along with four Silver Stars, six Purple Hearts, and a host of additional medals and commendations. His career spanned wars both cold and hot, and throughout, “Holly” was a hard-charging, hands-on soldier who could be irreverent and brash but always “led from the front.” Hollingsworth entered the US Army as a second lieutenant upon graduation from the Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas (now Texas A&M University). In World War II, while leading tanks in Gen. George S. Patton's Third Army, Hollingsworth encountered dug-in German defenders. He lined up his thirty-four tanks and issued a command rarely heard in modern warfare: Charge! Patton later recognized Hollingsworth as one of the two best armored battalion commanders in the war. Twenty years later, Hollingsworth served in Vietnam, where he became identified by the radio call-sign of “Danger 79er,” a designation that remained for the duration of his career. He later served in South Korea commanding I Corps (ROK/US) Group, the largest combined field army in the world. Even after retirement from active duty, Hollingsworth continued to serve as a military adviser during the Cold War.Danger 79er provides a compelling and inspiring read as it recounts the exciting story of one of the most decorated soldiers in the history of the US Army.

Der Politikwissenschaftler Thomas Rid ist sich sicher: Ein Cyberkrieg findet nicht statt. Den bisher dokumentierten Cyberattacken fehlen die zielgerichtete Gewalt gegen Menschen und die brutale Zerstörung, die untrennbar mit einem Krieg verbunden sind. Beruhigt zurücklehnen können wir uns dennoch nicht. Denn Thomas Rid macht auch klar, dass aus dem Cyberspace durchaus reale Gefahren wie Spionage, Sabotage und Subversion drohen. Kenntnisreich und spannend erzählt er von Spionageangriffen, von Sabotageakten und von Versuchen, mithilfe der Informationstechnologie Regierungen zu destabilisieren und Umstürze einzuleiten. Wir müssen begreifen, wer vom Mythos Cyberwar profitiert. Und wir müssen definieren, welchen Gefahren wir wirklich ausgesetzt sind, um den Sicherheitsanforderungen gut vorbereitet begegnen zu können.

This volume's contributors offer a new critical language through which to explore and assess the historical, juridical, geopolitical, and cultural dimensions of drone technology and warfare. They show how drones generate particular ways of visualizing the spaces and targets of war while acting as tools to exercise state power. Essays include discussions of the legal justifications of extrajudicial killings and how US drone strikes in the Horn of Africa impact life on the ground, as well as a personal narrative of a former drone operator. The contributors also explore drone warfare in relation to sovereignty, governance, and social difference; provide accounts of the relationships between drone technologies and modes of perception and mediation; and theorize drones'relation to biopolitics, robotics, automation, and art. Interdisciplinary and timely, Life in the Age of Drone Warfare extends the critical study of drones while expanding the public discussion of one of our era's most ubiquitous instruments of war.Contributors. Peter Asaro, Brandon Wayne Bryant, Katherine Chandler, Jordan Crandall, Ricardo Dominguez, Derek Gregory, Inderpal Grewal, Lisa Hajjar, Caren Kaplan, Andrea Miller, Anjali Nath, Jeremy Packer, Lisa Parks, Joshua Reeves, Thomas Stubblefield, Madiha Tahir

Fresh out of West Point, John Howard arrived for his first tour in Vietnam in 1965, the first full year of escalation when U.S. troop levels increased to 184,000 from 23,000 the year before. When he returned for a second tour in 1972, troop strength stood at 24,000 and would dwindle to a mere 50 the following year. He thus participated in the very early and very late stages of American military involvement in the Vietnam War. His two tours—one as a platoon commander and member of an elite counterguerrilla force, the second as a senior advisor to the South Vietnamese—provide a fascinating lens through which to view not only one soldier's experience in Vietnam, but also the country's.

Em janeiro de 2010, inspetores da Agência Internacional de Energia Atômica perceberam que centrífugas nas usinas iranianas de enriquecimento de urânio estavam falhando a taxas sem precedentes. A causa era um mistério. 5 meses depois, um evento aparentemente não relacionado ocorre: uma empresa de segurança na Bielorrúsia é acionada para resolver problemas em computadores no Irã que estavam travando e reiniciando repetidamente. Os programadores da empresa acreditavam que o código malicioso identificado nas máquinas era um simples e rotineiro malware. No entanto, à medida que eles e outros especialistas ao redor do mundo investigavam, era descoberto um vírus misterioso e de incomparável complexidade. Descobriram que tinham tropeçado no 1º exemplo mundial de arma digital. O Stuxnet era diferente de qualquer vírus ou worm anteriormente construído: causava destruição física real. A jornalista da Wired Kim Zetter se baseia em suas inúmeras fontes e extensa expertise para contar a história por trás do Stuxnet – narrando uma espetacular e improvável história de geeks de segurança que desvendaram uma campanha de sabotagem com anos de duração. O eBook abrange muito mais que o Stuxnet. Zetter nos mostra como a guerra digital se desenvolveu nos Estados Unidos. Ela nos leva para dentro do próspero'mercado cinza'de exploits zero-day, onde agências de inteligência e militares pagam enormes quantias em troca dos códigos maliciosos de que precisam para conduzir infiltrações e ataques. Ela revela o quão vulneráveis podem ser muitos dos nossos sistemas críticos face a ações semelhantes à do Stuxnet, partindo de atacantes anônimos ou nações-estado – e nos mostra o que pode acontecer caso nossa infraestrutura seja atingida por um ataque assim. Impulsionado pelo conhecimento e acesso únicos de Zetter,'Contagem Regressiva até Zero Day'é um retrato abrangente e visionário de um mundo à beira de um novo tipo de guerra.

Airpower Applied reviews the evolution of airpower and its impact on the history of warfare. Through a critical examination of twenty-nine case studies in which various U.S. coalitions and Israel played significant roles, this book offers perspectives on the political purpose, strategic meaning, and military importance of airpower. By comparing and contrasting more than seventy-five years of airpower experience in very different circumstances, readers can gain insight into present-day thinking on the use of airpower and on warfare. The authors, all experts in their fields, demystify some of airpower‘s strategic history by extracting the most useful teachings to help military professionals and political leaders understand what airpower has to offer as a “continuation of politics by other means.” The case studies emphasize the importance of connecting policy and airpower: operational effectiveness cannot substitute for poor statecraft. As the United States, its allies, and Israel have seen in their most recent applications of airpower, even the most robust and capable air weapon can never be more effective than the strategy and policy it is intended to support.

In 1967, the North Vietnamese launched a series of offensives in the Central Highlands along the border with South Vietnam--a strategic move intended to draw U.S. and South Vietnamese forces away from major cities before the Tet Offensive. A series of bloody engagements known as'the border battles'followed, with the principle action taking place at Dak To. Drawing on the writings of key figures, veterans'memoirs and the author's records from two tours in Vietnam, this book merges official history with the recollections of those who were there, revealing previously unpublished details of these decisive battles.

NATIONAL BESTSELLER • Based on the celebrated PBS television series, the complete text of an engrossing history of America's least-understood conflict, “a significant milestone [that] will no doubt do much to determine how the war is understood for years to come.” —The Washington Post More than forty years have passed since the end of the Vietnam War, but its memory continues to loom large in the national psyche. In this intimate history, Geoffrey C. Ward and Ken Burns have crafted a fresh and insightful account of the long and brutal conflict that reunited Vietnam while dividing the United States as nothing else had since the Civil War. From the Gulf of Tonkin and the Tet Offensive to Hamburger Hill and the fall of Saigon, Ward and Burns trace the conflict that dogged three American presidents and their advisers. But most of the voices that echo from these pages belong to less exalted men and women—those who fought in the war as well as those who fought against it, both victims and victors—willing for the first time to share their memories of Vietnam as it really was. A magisterial tour de force, The Vietnam War is an engrossing history of America's least-understood conflict.

This detailed two-volume set considers the Vietnam War, one of America's longest and bloodiest wars, from a topical perspective, addressing the main characters and key events of the war and supplying many relevant primary source documents.The Vietnam War not only claimed the lives of nearly 60,000 Americans and more than a million Vietnamese, but the prolonged conflict also resulted in a firestorm of protest at home that shook the foundations of the country and made U.S. citizens question the moral principles and motivations behind our foreign policy and military actions.Written in a very accessible style by recognized authorities on the war, Vietnam War: A Topical Exploration and Primary Source Collection provides students and general readers with a complete overview of the conflict in Vietnam—a broad topic that remains an important part of the American history and world history curriculum. Using a topical approach to cover all aspects of the war, the set enables students to see the complete picture of the conflict through its presentation of reference entries and documents arranged in cohesive, compelling chapters. Examples of the primary documents in the set include'Communist Party: Evaluation of the Tet Offensive'(1968) and President Richard Nixon's Speech on Vietnamization (1969). These primary sources are augmented by oral histories of soldiers who fought in the Tet Offensive. Additionally, maps and images in each section enhance the aesthetic appeal of the book and heighten students'understanding of the material. Readers will come away with both a strong comprehension of the Vietnam War as well as an appreciation for how significant this proxy conflict was as a lead-up event to the global Cold War.

President Obama was elected on an anti-war platform, yet targeted killings have increased under his command of the'War on Terror'. The US thinks of itself as upholding the rule of international law and spreading democracy, yet such targeted killings have been widely decried as extra-judicial violations of human rights. This book examines these paradoxes, arguing that they are partially explained by the application of existing legal standards to transnational wars. Critics argue that the kind of war the US claims to be waging - transnational armed conflict - doesn't actually exist. McDonald analyses the concept of transnational war and the legal interpretations that underpin it, and argues that the Obama administration's adherence to the rule of law produces a status quo of violence that is in some ways more disturbing than the excesses of the Bush administration. America's interpretations of sovereignty and international law shape and constitute war itself, with lethal consequences for the named and anonymous persons that it unilaterally defines as participants. McDonald's analysis helps us understand the social and legal construction of legitimate violence in warfare, and the relationship between legal opinions formed in US government departments and acts of violence half a world away.

How did American fighter pilots respond to the challenges posed by increasing automation?Spurred by their commanders during the Korean War to be “tigers,” aggressive and tenacious American fighter pilots charged headlong into packs of fireball-spewing enemy MiGs, relying on their keen eyesight, piloting finesse, and steady trigger fingers to achieve victory. But by the 1980s, American fighter pilots vanquished their foes by focusing on a four-inch-square cockpit display, manipulating electromagnetic waves, and launching rocket-propelled guided missiles from miles away. In this new era of automated, long-range air combat, can fighter pilots still be considered tigers? Aimed at scholars of technology and airpower aficionados alike, Steven A. Fino's Tiger Check offers a detailed study of air-to-air combat focusing on three of the US Air Force's most famed aircraft: the F-86E Sabre, the F-4C Phantom II, and the F-15A Eagle. Fino argues that increasing fire control automation altered what fighter pilots actually did during air-to-air combat. Drawing on an array of sources, as well as his own decade of experience as an F-15C fighter pilot, Fino unpacks not just the technological black box of fighter fire control equipment, but also fighter pilots'attitudes toward their profession and their evolving aircraft. He describes how pilots grappled with the new technologies, acutely aware that the very systems that promised to simplify their jobs while increasing their lethality in the air also threatened to rob them of the quintessential—albeit mythic—fighter pilot experience. Finally, Fino explains that these new systems often required new, unique skills that took time for the pilots to identify and then develop. Eschewing the typical “great machine” or “great pilot” perspectives that dominate aviation historiography, Tiger Check provides a richer perspective on humans and machines working and evolving together in the air. The book illuminates the complex interactions between human and machine that accompany advancing automation in the workplace.

This book is written to be a comprehensive guide to cybersecurity and cyberwar policy and strategy, developed for a one- or two-semester class for students of public policy (including political science, law, business, etc.). Although written from a U.S. perspective, most of its contents are globally relevant.It is written essentially in four sections. The first (chapters 1 - 5) describes how compromises of computers and networks permit unauthorized parties to extract information from such systems (cyber-espionage), and/or to force these systems to misbehave in ways that disrupt their operations or corrupt their workings. The section examines notable hacks of systems, fundamental challenges to cybersecurity (e.g., the lack of forced entry, the measure-countermeasure relationship) including the role of malware, and various broad approaches to cybersecurity.The second (chapters 6 - 9) describes what government policies can, and, as importantly, cannot be expected to do to improve a nation's cybersecurity thereby leaving leave countries less susceptible to cyberattack by others. Among its focus areas are approaches to countering nation-scale attacks, the cost to victims of broad-scale cyberespionage, and how to balance intelligence and cybersecurity needs.The third (chapters 10 - 15) looks at cyberwar in the context of military operations. Describing cyberspace as the 5th domain of warfare feeds the notion that lessons learned from other domains (e.g., land, sea) apply to cyberspace. In reality, cyberwar (a campaign of disrupting/corrupting computers/networks) is quite different: it rarely breaks things, can only be useful against a sophisticated adversary, competes against cyber-espionage, and has many first-strike characteristics.The fourth (chapters 16 – 35) examines strategic cyberwar within the context of state-on-state relations. It examines what strategic cyberwar (and threats thereof) can do against whom – and how countries can respond. It then considers the possibility and limitations of a deterrence strategy to modulate such threats, covering credibility, attribution, thresholds, and punishment (as well as whether denial can deter). It continues by examining sub rosa attacks (where neither the effects nor the attacker are obvious to the public); the role of proxy cyberwar; the scope for brandishing cyberattack capabilities (including in a nuclear context); the role of narrative and signals in a conflict in cyberspace; questions of strategic stability; and norms for conduct in cyberspace (particularly in the context of Sino-U.S. relations) and the role played by international law.The last chapter considers the future of cyberwar.

Philosophical and ethical discussions of warfare are often tied to emerging technologies and techniques. Today we are presented with what many believe is a radical shift in the nature of war-the realization of conflict in the cyber-realm, the so-called'fifth domain'of warfare. Does an aggressive act in the cyber-realm constitute an act of war? If so, what rules should govern such warfare? Are the standard theories of just war capable of analyzing and assessing this mode of conflict? These changing circumstances present us with a series of questions demanding serious attention. Is there such a thing as cyberwarfare? How do the existing rules of engagement and theories from the just war tradition apply to cyberwarfare? How should we assess a cyber-attack conducted by a state agency against private enterprise and vice versa? Furthermore, how should actors behave in the cyber-realm? Are there ethical norms that can be applied to the cyber-realm? Are the classic just war constraints of non-combatant immunity and proportionality possible in this realm? Especially given the idea that events that are constrained within the cyber-realm do not directly physically harm anyone, what do traditional ethics of war conventions say about this new space? These questions strike at the very center of contemporary intellectual discussion over the ethics of war. In twelve original essays, plus a foreword from John Arquilla and an introduction, Binary Bullets: The Ethics of Cyberwarfare, engages these questions head on with contributions from the top scholars working in this field today.

Looking beyond the events of the second intifada and 9/11, this book reveals how targeted killing is intimately embedded in both Israeli and US statecraft, and in the problematic relationship between sovereign authority and lawful violence underpinning the modern state system. It details the legal and political issues raised in targeted killing as it has emerged in practice, including questions of domestic constitutional authority, the use of force in international law, the law of belligerent occupation, the law of targeting and human rights law. The distinctive nature of Israeli and US targeted killing is analysed in terms of the compulsion of legality characteristic of the liberal constitutional state, a compulsion that demands the ability to distinguish between legal'targeted killing'and extra-legal'political assassination'. The effect is a highly legalized framework for the extraterritorial killing of designated terrorists that may significantly affect the international law of force.

Cine ne urmărește din umbră? Din zorii omenirii, dorința de a controla gândurile, comportamentele și acțiunile altora a fost foarte răspândită. De la folosirea persuasiunii coercitive de către egiptenii din Antichitate și cavalerii templieri până la afirmațiile actuale privind hărțuirea electronică și „bombardamentul“ cu microunde, am fost mereu la mila celor dornici să ne reprogrameze gândirea și să ne remodeleze convingerile. În Războaiele PSI găsim relatări fascinante despre: încercările străvechi de control al minții folosind vrăji, poțiuni și ritualuri; sectele și folosirea reprogramării mentale; tehnici de control mental moderne, de la hipnoză, droguri și electroșocuri la radiație și control mediumnic; povestea secretă a căutării adevăratului Candidat Manciurian – MKUltra și conexiunea CIA; „minunata lume nouă“ a metodelor ingenioase de hărțuire electronică și de supraveghere agresivă.

The exploitation of superior US systems for the collection, analysis and distribution of information currently undermines US leadership in the context of transatlantic crisis management. The USA's clear lead in information technology creates political liabilities with respect to both allies and adversaries, while political-technical tradeoffs warrant a more open approach to information systems, information production, and information sharing among allies. Clearly distinguishing the role of information in winning wars versus managing crises, this book extends existing models for how breakdowns occur in international bargaining. Allies, who share preferences but not the resolve of a coalition leader, are brought into the explanation for war as a rational outcome of incomplete information. Case studies ranging from Cold War Berlin to the War in Iraq illustrate how national classified systems that underwrite large margins of victory in conventional combat fail to inspire trust among allies during the crucial, preceding stage of crisis bargaining. The volume offers powerful arguments for a new direction in defence transformation.

This book provides a comprehensive narrative history of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, from 1942 to 1975--with a concluding section that traces U.S.-Vietnam relations from the end of the war in 1975 to the present. Unlike most general histories of U.S. involvement in Vietnam--which are either conventional diplomatic or military histories--this volume synthesizes the perspectives to explore both dimensions of the struggle in greater depth, elucidating more of the complexities of the U.S.-Vietnam entanglement. It explains why Americans tried so hard for so long to stop the spread of Communism into Indochina, and why they failed. Key topics: The Fall of Saigon: The End as Prelude. Vietnam: A Place and A People. The Elephant and the Tiger. An Experiment in Nation Building. Raising the Stakes. Going to War. The Chain of Thunders. The Year of the Monkey. A War to End a War. The End of the Tunnel. Market: For anyone curious to know about the long American involvement in Southeast Asia, 1942-1975.

'Cyber security'is a recent addition to the global security agenda, concerned with protecting states and citizens from the misuse of computer networks for war, terrorism, economic espionage and criminal gain. Many argue that the ubiquity of computer networks calls for robust and pervasive countermeasures, not least governments concerned about their potential effects on national and economic security. Drawing on critical literature in international relations, security studies, political theory and social theory, this is the first book that describes how these visions of future cyber security are sustained in the communities that articulate them. Specifically, it shows that conceptions of time and temporality are foundational to the politics of cyber security. It explores how cyber security communities understand the past, present and future, thereby shaping cyber security as a political practice. Integrating a wide range of conceptual and empirical resources, this innovative book provides insight for scholars, practitioners and policymakers.

Within the last fifty years the performance requirements for technical objects and systems were supplemented with: customer expectations (quality), abilities to prevent the loss of the object properties in operation time (reliability and maintainability), protection against the effects of undesirable events (safety and security) and the ability to

A historical case study concerning the Israeli Army's response to the Palestinian “Intifada” or uprising in the late 1980's and early 1990's provides instructive planning considerations for likely future application of U.S. military force in an asymmetrical threat environment. The monograph specifically analyzes the time period from the beginning of the uprising until the handshake of Rabin and Arafat on the White House lawn September 13th, 1993.Although the theoretical application of the case study is speculative of future environments, this paper attempts to link available historical data to anticipated trends in the international security environment and emerging concepts of operational art. The argument surrounding asymmetrical types of warfare leads into a discussion of the application of IDF lessons learned that may be applied to future U.S. military scenarios.

On September 11, 2001, the United States was without a plan for military operations in Afghanistan. One was quickly created by the Defense Department and operations began October 7. The Taliban was toppled in less than two months. This report describes preparations at CENTCOM and elsewhere, Army operations and support activities, building a coalition, and civil-military operations in Afghanistan from October 2001 through June 2002.

You don�t have to outrun the bear � you just have to outrun the other guy. Often in business we only have to run a bit faster than our competitors to be successful. The same is true in risk management. While we would always like to anticipate and prevent risk from happening, when risk events do occur being faster, flexible, and more responsive than

The burgeoning of global connectivity in recent decades is without historical parallel and the'wiring up'of the world continues apace, even in the poorest regions. Flux and ever-quickening change are the leitmotifs of the'information age'across a swathe of human enterprise from industry and commerce through to politics and social relations. This is no less the case for the patterns of war, where change has been disorientating for soldiers and statesmen whose confidence in the old, the traditional, and the known has been shaken. David Betz's book explains the huge and disruptive implications of connectivity for the practice of warfare. The tactical ingenuity of opponents to confound or drop below the threshold of sophisticated weapons systems means war remains the realm of chance and probability. Increasingly, though, the conflicts of our time are less contests of arms than wars of hearts and minds conducted on a mass scale through multimedia communications networks. The most pernicious challengers to the status quo are not states but ever more powerful non-state actors.

Research on The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is a valuable addition to understanding the political situation in the potentially volatile South China Sea region. This book covers topics such as baselines, historic title and rights, due regard and abuse of rights, peaceful use of the ocean, navigation regimes, marine scientific research, intelligence gathering, the UNCLOS dispute settlement system and regional common heritage. In search of varying viewpoints, the authors in this book come from multiple countries, including the Philippines, Australia, Ireland, Mainland China and Taiwan, the United States, and Indonesia, Singapore, UK and Germany. Ongoing events, such as the recent waves made by China in the East China Sea and increasing tensions between the South East Asian countries over the use of South China Sea, make this book especially pertinent.

From the dawn of humanity, the desire to control the thoughts, behaviors, and actions of others has been a pervasive one. From the use of coercive persuasion by ancient Egyptians and the Knights Templar to today's claims of electronic harassment and microwave “bombing,” we have always been at the mercy of those who wish to reprogram our thoughts and reshape our beliefs.Mind Wars includes fascinating stories of:Ancient attempts at mind control using spell casting, potions, and rituals.Cults and the use of mental reprogramming.More modern mind-control techniques, from hypnosis, drugs, and electroshock to radiation and psychic driving.The inside story of the quest for a real Manchurian Candidate—MKUltra and the CIA connection.The brave new world of electronic harassment, “voice to skull” technology, and gang-stalking.The inner frontier of the human mind is the last bastion of privacy. But are we really in control of our own minds? The answer may shock you!

Control of the air is the foundation for all conventional military operations against an adversary with an air defence capability. In future warfare, will it be possible for Unmanned Combat Air Systems to undertake the tasks and accept most of the risks that, until now, have been the lot of military aviators?

This study analyzes the feasibility of guerrilla warfare as the basis for a strategy of airpower employment for a weak air force confronting an opponent with a stronger air force. The analysis begins with a distillation of the theory of guerrilla warfare into five elements essential to its success: superior intelligence, security, mobility advantage, surprise, and sustainment. The author then compares the ground combat environment of the traditional guerrilla with the airpower environment of the potential air guerrilla and concludes that these five elements can be met in the airpower environment provided the weak force has sufficient ingenuity and the necessary resources. An investigation of recent trends in technology and the prevailing strategic environment indicates that it increasingly possible for a weak force to obtain these resources. The author assesses that air guerrilla warfare is a viable warfighting strategy, but points out that the likelihood of a weak force actually adopting air guerrilla warfare will depend on its regional security needs and its resolve to protract a conflict. The study concludes that air guerrilla warfare is a credible threat to a stronger opponent. To meet this threat, the author recommends that the United States re-examine its intervention strategy, reinforce its policy of strategic engagement, and research both airpower and non-airpower means to neutralize an elusive guerrilla air force.