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We examine the relationship between corporate tax avoidance and reliance on trade credit. Using a sample of US listed firms during the period 1987–2017, we show that tax-avoiding firms rely more on supplier-provided trade credit as a source of financing. We take advantage of the 'check-the-box' regulation introduced in 1997 as an exogenous shock to firms' tax strategies. The findings from the difference-in-differences design suggest a causal interpretation of our results. We also observe that the relationship between tax avoidance and trade credit is more salient for a sub-sample of firms with: (i) more information asymmetry; and (ii) more financing constraints. These findings remain robust to a battery of sensitivity analyses and endogeneity concerns. In an additional analysis, we find that corporate tax avoidance increases firms' reliance on trade credit by reducing access to bank loans. Overall, we provide evidence that tax avoidance has important implications for a valuable alternative source of financing: trade credit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research Question/Issue: This study investigates the impact of family governance, including founder directors and their ties to family members on the board, on the social performance of microfinance institutions (MFIs), a special kind of social enterprise with dual objectives. Research Findings/Insights: Using a dataset of 735 MFIs operating in Bangladesh from 2007 to 2017, we find that founder directors and board members with family ties to the founder have an adverse impact on MFIs' social performance. These findings hold when we perform several robustness tests and endogeneity tests. Theoretical/Academic Implications: We contribute to the corporate governance literature on MFIs and social enterprises in two ways. First, our findings suggest that, when MFIs are confronted with dual performance objectives, founder directors may "trade off" social outcomes in favor of economic outcomes and therefore adversely affect MFIs' social performance. Second, our findings extend the literature by showing that the presence of board members with family ties to founder directors also adversely affects MFIs' social performance. Practitioner/Policy Implications: This study suggests that MFIs' board composition influences their governance and ability to oversee their social and financial performance effectively. If MFIs' social performance is a major concern of national policy makers, then regulation should be put in place to limit board recruitment with family ties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]