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Escalation of commitment-the tendency to remain committed to a course of action, often despite negative prospects-is common. Why does it persist? Across three preregistered experiments (N = 3,888), we tested the hypothesis that escalating commitment signals trustworthiness. Experiments 1-2, respectively, revealed that decision makers who escalated commitment were perceived as more trustworthy and entrusted with 29% more money by third-party observers. Experiment 3 revealed that decision makers who escalated commitment subsequently made more trustworthy choices, returning 15% more money than those who de-escalated. Decision makers were equally likely to escalate commitment in public versus in private, possibly because they previously internalized how others would evaluate them. Complementing research examining cognitive factors driving escalation of commitment, the present work reveals that accounting for the reputational causes and consequences of decisions to escalate enhances understanding of why escalation is so common and suggests how organizations might reduce it. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Objective: Appetitive risk behaviors (ARB), including tobacco use, alcohol consumption, consumption of calorie dense/nutrient-poor foods, and sexual risk behavior contribute substantially to morbidity and mortality. Affective states that arise from a wide array of unrelated circumstances (i.e., incidental affect) may carry over to influence ARB. A meta-analysis is needed to systematically examine causal evidence for the role of incidental affect (including specific emotions) in influencing ARB. Method: Integrating effect sizes from 91 published and unpublished experimental studies that include both an incidental-affect induction and neutral-control condition (k = 271 effect sizes: k = 183 negative affect, k = 78 positive affect), this meta-analysis examines how negative and positive affective states influenced ARB and related health cognitions (e.g., intentions, evaluations, craving, perceived control). Results: Negative affective states reliably increased ARB, in analyses where all negative affective states were analyzed (d = .29) and in stratified analyses of just negative mood (d = .30) and stress (d = .48). These effects were stronger among study populations coded as clinically at risk. Positive affective states generally did not influence ARB or related health cognitions, except in the presence of a craving cue. Design issues of extant literature largely precluded conclusions about the effects of specific positive and negative affective states. Conclusion: Taken together, findings suggest the importance of strategies to attenuate negative affect incidental to ARB to facilitate healthier behavioral patterns, especially among clinically at-risk individuals. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Correction to: Nature Human Behaviour https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-021-01173-x, published online 2 August 2021.In the version of this article initially published, the following authors were omitted from the author list and the Author contributionssection for “investigation” and “writing and editing”: Nandor Hajdu (Institute of Psychology, ELTE Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest,Hungary), Jordane Boudesseul (Facultad de Psicología, Instituto de Investigación Científica, Universidad de Lima, Lima, Perú), RafałMuda (Faculty of Economics, Maria Curie-Sklodowska University, Lublin, Poland) and Sandersan Onie (Black Dog Institute, UNSWSydney, Sydney, Australia & Emotional Health for All Foundation, Jakarta, Indonesia). In addition, Saeideh FatahModares’ name wasoriginally misspelled as Saiedeh FatahModarres in the author list. Further, affiliations have been corrected for Maria Terskova (NationalResearch University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia), Susana Ruiz Fernandez (FOM University of Applied Sciences,Essen; Leibniz-Institut fur Wissensmedien, Tubingen, and LEAD Research Network, Eberhard Karls University, Tubingen, Germany),Hendrik Godbersen (FOM University of Applied Sciences, Essen, Germany), Gulnaz Anjum (Department of Psychology, Simon FraserUniversity, Burnaby, Canada, and Department of Economics & Social Sciences, Institute of Business Administration, Karachi, Pakistan).

Research over the past decades has demonstrated the explanatory power of emotions, feelings, motivations, moods, and other affective processes when trying to understand and predict how we think and behave. In this consensus article, we ask: has the increasingly recognized impact of affective phenomena ushered in a new era, the era of affectivism? ispartof: Nature Human Behaviour vol:5 issue:7 pages:816-820 ispartof: location:England status: published

Context Being diagnosed with cancer often forces patients and families to make difficult medical decisions. How patients think they and others will feel in the future, termed affective predictions, may influence these decisions. These affective predictions are often biased, which may contribute to suboptimal care outcomes by influencing decisions related to palliative care and advance care planning. Objectives This study aimed to translate perspectives from the decision sciences to inform future research about when and how affective predictions may influence decisions about palliative care and advance care planning. Methods A systematic search of two databases to evaluate the extent to which affective predictions have been examined in the palliative care and advance care planning context yielded 35 relevant articles. Over half utilized qualitative methodologies (n = 21). Most studies were conducted in the U.S. (n = 12), Canada (n = 7), or European countries (n = 10). Study contexts included end of life (n = 10), early treatment decisions (n = 10), pain and symptom management (n = 7), and patient-provider communication (n = 6). The affective processes of patients (n = 20), caregivers (n = 16), and/or providers (n = 12) were examined. Results Three features of the palliative care and advance care planning context may contribute to biased affective predictions: 1) early treatment decisions are made under heightened emotional states and with insufficient information; 2) palliative care decisions influence life domains beyond physical health; and 3) palliative care decisions involve multiple people. Conclusion Biases in affective predictions may serve as a barrier to optimal palliative care delivery. Predictions are complicated by intense emotions, inadequate prognostic information, involvement of many individuals, and cancer's effect on non–health life domains. Applying decision science frameworks may generate insights about affective predictions that can be harnessed to solve challenges associated with optimal delivery of palliative care.

Do negative feelings in general trigger addictive behavior, or do specific emotions play a stronger role? Testing these alternative accounts of emotion and decision making, we drew on the Appraisal Tendency Framework to predict that sadness, specifically, rather than negative mood, generally, would 1) increase craving, impatience, and actual addictive substance use and 2) do so through mechanisms selectively heightened by sadness. Using a nationally representative, longitudinal survey, study 1 (n = 10,685) revealed that sadness, but not other negative emotions (i.e., fear, anger, shame), reliably predicted current smoking as well as relapsing 20 years later. Study 2 (n = 425) used an experimental design, and found further support for emotion specificity: Sadness, but not disgust, increased self-reported craving relative to a neutral state. Studies 3 and 4 (n = 918) introduced choice behavior as outcome variables, revealing that sadness causally increased impatience for cigarette puffs. Moreover, study 4 revealed that the effect of sadness on impatience was more fully explained by concomitant appraisals of self-focus, which are specific to sadness, than by concomitant appraisals of negative valence, which are general to all negative emotions. Importantly, study 4 also examined the topography of actual smoking behavior, finding that experimentally induced sadness (as compared to neutral emotion) causally increased the volume and duration of cigarette puffs inhaled. Together, the present studies provide support for a more nuanced model regarding the effects of emotion on tobacco use, in particular, as well as on addictive behavior, in general.

National security is one of many fields where experts make vague probability assessments when evaluating high-stakes decisions. This practice has always been controversial, and it is often justified on the grounds that making probability assessments too precise could bias analysts or decision makers. Yet these claims have rarely been submitted to rigorous testing. In this paper, we specify behavioral concerns about probabilistic precision into falsifiable hypotheses which we evaluate through survey experiments involving national security professionals. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that decision makers responding to quantitative probability assessments are less willing to support risky actions and more receptive to gathering additional information. Yet we also find that when respondents estimate probabilities themselves, quantification magnifies overconfidence, particularly among low-performing assessors. These results hone wide-ranging concerns about probabilistic precision into a specific and previously undocumented bias that training may be able to correct.

How does trait negative affect shape somatic memory of stressful events? We hypothesized that negative affect would impair accurate recall of one's own heart rate during stressful situations. Two bio-behavioral studies used a new paradigm to test retrospective visceral perception and assessed whether negative affective states experienced during aversive events (i.e., the Trier Stress Task—Time 1) would retrospectively shape recall of past heart rate (Time 2), even when accounting for actual heart rate at the time of each stressful event (Time 1). Results across both studies showed that individual differences in negative affect in response to a stressful task predicted visceral recollections, and those who experienced more negative affect were more inaccurate. Negative affect was associated with a tendency to remember visceral reactions as worse than they actually were.

Cultivating successful personal and professional relationships requires the ability to accurately infer the feelings of others — i.e., to be empathically accurate. Some are better than others at this, which may be explained by mode of thought, among other factors. Specifically, it may be that empathically-accurate people tend to rely more on intuitive rather than systematic thought when perceiving others. Alternatively, it may be the reverse — that systematic thought increases accuracy. In order to determine which view receives empirical support, we conducted four studies examining relations between mode of thought (intuitive versus systematic) and empathic accuracy. Study 1 revealed a lay belief that empathic accuracy arises from intuitive modes of thought. Studies 2-4, each using executive-level professionals as participants, demonstrated that (contrary to lay beliefs) people who tend to rely on intuitive thinking also tend to exhibit lower empathic accuracy. This pattern held when participants inferred others’ emotional states based on (a) in-person face-to-face interactions with partners (Study 2) as well as on (b) pictures with limited facial cues (Study 3). Study 4 confirmed that the relationship is causal: experimentally inducing systematic (as opposed to intuitive) thought led to improved empathic accuracy. In sum, evidence regarding personal and social processes in these four samples of working professionals converges on the conclusion that — contrary to lay beliefs — empathic accuracy arises more from systematic thought than from gut intuition.

That anger elicited in one situation can carry over to drive risky behavior in another situation has been described since the days of Aristotle. The present studies examine the mechanisms through which and the conditions under which such behavior occurs. Across three experiments, as well as a meta-analytic synthesis of the data, results reveal that incidental anger is significantly more likely to drive risky decision making among males than among females. Moreover, the experiments document that, under certain circumstances, such risk-taking pays off financially. Indeed, the present experiments demonstrate that, because the expected-value-maximizing strategy in these studies rewarded risk-taking, angry-male individuals earned more money than did both neutral-emotion males and angry females. In sum, these studies found evidence for robust disparities between males and females for anger-driven risk-taking. Importantly, although men did not experience more anger than women, they did show a heightened tendency to respond to anger with risk-taking. Published 2016. This article has been contributed to by US Government employees and their work is in the public domain in the USA.

Since the passage of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) in 2002, American policymakers have relied primarily on outcome-based accountability in the form of high-stakes testing to improve public school performance. With NCLB supplanted in 2015 by the Every Student Succeeds Act—which gives states far greater discretion in the design of accountability systems—the time is ripe for policymakers to consider extensive behavioral science literature that shows outcome-based accountability is only one of multiple forms of accountability, each invoking distinct motivational mechanisms. We review rule-based, market-based, and professional accountability alongside outcome-based accountability, using evidence from the laboratory and the field to describe how each can produce favorable or unfavorable effects. We conclude that policymakers should (a) make greater use of professional accountability, which has historically been underutilized in education; (b) use transparency to promote professional accountability; and (c) use multiple, complementary forms of accountability, creating a complete system that encourages and supports the continuous improvement of educational practice.

Recent research has explored the relationship between social hierarchy and empathic accuracy—the ability to accurately infer other people’s mental states. In the current research, we tested the hypothesis that, regardless of one’s personal level of status and power, simply believing that social inequality is natural and morally acceptable (e.g., endorsing social dominance orientation, or SDO) would be negatively associated with empathic accuracy. In a sample of managers, a group for whom empathic accuracy is a valuable skill, empathic accuracy was lower for managers who possessed structural power and also for managers who endorsed social dominance, regardless of their structural power. Moreover, men were less empathically accurate than women, a relationship that may be explained by men’s higher SDO and greater structural power. These findings suggest that for empathic abilities, it matters just as much what you think about social hierarchies as it does where you stand within them.

National security is one of many fields where public officials offer imprecise probability assessments when evaluating high-stakes decisions. This practice is often justified with arguments about how quantifying subjective judgments would bias analysts and decision makers toward overconfident action. We translate these arguments into testable hypotheses, and evaluate their validity through survey experiments involving national security professionals. Results reveal that when decision makers receive numerals (as opposed to words) for probability assessments, they are less likely to support risky actions and more receptive to gathering additional information, disconfirming the idea of a bias toward action. Yet when respondents generate probabilities themselves, using numbers (as opposed to words) magnifies overconfidence, especially among low-performing assessors. These results hone directions for research among both proponents and skeptics of quantifying probability estimates in national security and other fields. Given that uncertainty surrounds virtually all intelligence reports, military plans, and national security decisions, understanding how national security officials form and interpret probability assessments has wide-ranging implications for theory and practice.

Are hormone levels associated with the attainment of social status? Although endogenous testosterone predicts status-seeking social behaviors, research suggests that the stress hormone cortisol may inhibit testosterone's effects. Thus, individuals with both high testosterone and low cortisol may be especially likely to occupy high-status positions in social hierarchies while individuals with high testosterone and high cortisol may not. We tested this hypothesis by recruiting a sample of real executives and examining testosterone, cortisol, and a concrete indicator of attained status: the number of subordinates over which the executive has authority. Despite the myriad nonhormonal factors that determine organizational promotion, the executives' endogenous testosterone and cortisol interacted to significantly predict hierarchical position: Testosterone positively predicted executives' number of subordinates, but only among low-cortisol executives. The results imply that reducing cortisol levels via stress reduction may be a critical goal not only because doing so will improve health but also because doing so may enhance leadership potential. (PsycINFO Database Record

9 Background: Oncologist-patient end-of-life (EOL) discussions are associated with less aggressive care at EOL. Prior research on EOL discussions has not explored the role of oncologists’ dispositional affect, trait patterns of emotional responses. Affect could possibly facilitate or hinder broaching difficult EOL topics. We examined associations between oncologists’ disposition for experiencing positive and negative affect and likelihood of EOL discussions reported by their patients with advanced cancers. Methods: 350 patients with incurable lung and GI cancers were enrolled in a randomized trial of early palliative care within 8 weeks of diagnosis. Oncologists providing care for participants completed a measure of dispositional affect, Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS). Positive and negative affect scales were analyzed dichotomously (above/below sample median). At 24 weeks in the trial, patients reported if they had ever discussed with their oncologist the care they would want to receive if they were dying (yes/no). Associations between oncologists’ affect and patient-reported EOL discussions were tested with multilevel models clustered by oncologist, adjusting for patient age, cancer type, and randomization. Results: At 24 weeks, 57/242 (23.6%) patients reported having had EOL discussions. The PANAS was completed by 17/19 (89%) oncologists with patients in the trial. Patients treated by oncologists with higher negative affect reported more EOL conversations, but this did not reach statistical significance: OR = 1.76 [.81, 3.83], p = .15. Patients treated by oncologists with higher positive affect also reported more EOL conversations, but this did not reach statistical significance: OR = 1.66 [.83, 3.35], p = .15. However, patients treated by oncologists with both higher positive and higher negative affect were over 3 times as likely to report having had EOL discussions: OR = 3.22 [1.02, 10.23], p = .046. Conclusions: Patients treated by oncologists with greater propensity to experience both positive and negative affect were more likely to report EOL discussions compared to those treated by oncologists who experience lower levels of affect. More research is needed to better understand these relationships.