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La pandemie de COVID-19 a mis les systemes fiscal et de securite sociale a rude epreuve. Des fissures qui existaient depuis un certain temps deja se sont creusees davantage et il est peu probable qu'elles se referment sans travaux a la structure. De nouvelles connaissances sur la nature changeante du travail, combinees au developpement de technologies capables de fournir des solutions modernes et pratiques a de vieux problemes, offrent la possibilite de repenser la maniere dont nous imposons les travailleurs a la demande et autres fournisseurs de travail atypiques. Cet article soutient qu'au moment d'examiner la conception des dispositions fiscales et de securite sociale, nous devons nous affranchir des classifications de statuts d'emploi elaborees dans d'autres domaines du droit, a d'autres fins. Afin d'accroItre l'equite et de supprimer les distorsions, nous devrions chercher, dans la mesure ou c'est possible concretement, a harmoniser le traitement fiscal et de securite sociale de tous ceux qui fournissent un travail. Quand ce n'est pas possible, malgre les avantages que procurent les nouvelles technologies, ce sont les objectifs de la politique fiscale et des avantages sociaux qui devraient dicter les lignes de demarcation plutot que les liens avec la jurisprudence qui a evolue dans d'autres domaines.Alternate abstract:The COVID-19 pandemic has strained tax and social security systems. Cracks that have existed for some time have been opened up further and are unlikely to close without structural repair. New insights into the shifting nature of work, combined with the development of technologies that can provide modern, practical solutions to old problems, offer the opportunity to rethink the way we tax gig workers and other non-standard providers of labour. This article argues that we need to free ourselves from the employment status classifications developed in other areas of law, for other purposes, when we consider the design of tax and social security provisions. We should aim to harmonize the tax and social security treatment of all those who provide labour as far as is practically possible in order to increase equity and remove distortions. Where that cannot be achieved, despite the benefits of new technologies, dividing lines should be dictated by tax and benefits policy objectives rather than linkages to case law that has evolved in other areas.

This chapter examines the relationship between trust and transparency in the context of corporate taxation. It draws on the work of philosopher Professor Onora O’Neil to show that transparency will not always increase trust and might even undermine it. Sometimes this loss of trust will be deserved and might help to bring about change that is needed, but at other times transparency can lead to misunderstanding and inability to absorb or utilize the information that is being made available, with a consequential unjustified and unfortunate loss of trust. In such cases, increased transparency can actually lower tax morale and the willingness of taxpayers to pay their taxes voluntarily, with little or no corresponding benefit. The pressure for increased transparency to the public in the tax world arises largely from lack of trust not only in large multinational companies (MNCs) but also in governments, institutions generally and tax authorities in particular. It has become clear in recent years that bilateral tax treaties are inadequate to ensure that tax is collected in a way that the public (and many experts) perceive to be ‘fair’ and this has further undermined trust in the taxation of MNCs. This chapter argues that this widespread lack of trust in our tax system needs to be addressed through improved institutions and fundamental reform. There may be many views of what a ‘fair’ corporate tax would look like, and there should be public debate on this, but ultimately it is essential for trust to be restored in governments and tax authorities to design, impose and administer taxes on businesses in a way that the public perceive to be procedurally and administratively fair, whatever system is ultimately chosen for this purpose. It is institutional reform rather than increasingly detailed information in the public domain that is needed to achieve this. This is not antidemocratic – there should be debate and input – but democracies also need wellfunctioning, trustworthy and trusted institutions to serve them.

The Coronavirus pandemic that is dominating all thought as this article is finalised has highlighted major flaws in our tax and benefits systems. These are not newly discovered problems. They have ...

It has been suggested that Brexit creates opportunities for the UK to become a tax haven with low rates of tax and new tax incentives. The opportunities created should not be exaggerated. On the one hand, some of the actions now being mooted, such as the further reduction of corporation tax, could have been taken regardless of the decision to leave the EU. On the other hand, the UK has played a leading role in formulating the OECD’s action points to combat base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS). Moving too far away from this programme would be contrary to stated government policy to counteract aggressive tax avoidance and would be seen as reneging on agreements with the global tax community. The UK’s extensive network of bi-lateral double taxation agreements could be placed in jeopardy by changes seen to be out of line with international norms, nor would such changes be conducive to the making of new international trade agreements. Most forms of Brexit would remove some constraints on the making of tax policy in the UK, enabling the government to introduce new exemptions and reliefs without the restrictions currently imposed by VAT directives, the requirement to satisfy the four freedoms, or the state aid regime. But this removal of restrictions on the freedom to make tax policy could lead to a temptation to respond to pressure groups and make rapid changes to the tax system that might well turn out to be ill-advised. Brexit offers some opportunities but also dangers. Any tax changes made need to be part of long-term and principled planning for the tax system as a whole, and tax incentives and reliefs should not be seen as quick fixes.

Both tax law and employment law incentivize engagers of labour to structure their workforce as a crowd of self-employed micro-entrepreneurs. Recent technological change and the rise of the gig economy have made it easier for agents to respond to these incentives, contributing to an increase in self-employment. In this article, we review the evidence on the rise of the gig economy in the UK and lay out a set of key principles to guide the reform of tax and employment law to better enable policy to meet its underlying objectives.

In this chapter, we explore themes that emerge in psychoanalytic work with couples, particularly in those couples presenting with sexual problems, from the "ordinary" difficulties of anxiety about being intimate to the more pathological manifestations in perversion. We examine how unresolved conflict in the internal world, especially in relation to the internal couple, can lead to difficulties in the capacity for intimate relating. We suggest that intrusive projective identification and the use of "defensive sameness" and "defensive difference" serve as defenses against intimacy. These defenses function to obliterate the reality of the other, and it is in this sense we use the term perversion. Finally, we comment on the difficulties for the therapist who may feel drawn into a perverse arena when working with couples with sexual problems. We use the film Sex, Lies and Videotape (Soderbergh, 1988) to illustrate these themes. In this extraordinary film we can observe a set of characters demonstrating the range of these difficulties, with the advantage that we do not encounter any problems about confidentiality.

In the USA there have been calls for greater conformity between the rules producing tax accounts and those used for financial reporting purposes. A number of benefits are claimed for this so-called ‘book-tax conformity’, including reduced compliance costs and better opportunities for monitoring. In Europe, the debate around use of the financial accounts for tax purposes has arisen from a different conceptual starting point as well as differences in surrounding circumstances. Linkage between tax and financial accounts is common in Europe, although it takes varying forms. This does not result in complete book-tax conformity, however, and recent developments in accounting may be increasing divergence rather than reducing it. Despite the strong arguments in favour of conformity, there are also good reasons for some divergences, meaning that the most likely outcome in any system, whatever the starting point, is partial convergence. The problem with a hybrid outcome of this kind is that, at the point of divergence, there can be conceptual confusion and difficulties in integrating and managing two conceptually very different rule systems. Clarity of the relationship between the rules and improved accounting disclosure requirements might be more important than convergence, and might be achieved with less distortion to either tax or financial accounting. The current UK position is used to illustrate these points.

To operate efficiently and effectively revenue authorities require discretion, but processes must be in place to keep discretion in check. This delicate balancing act takes place against the background of a more general constitutional framework. This working paper starts by outlining the unique features of the UK constitution that form the background to the way in which the discretion of the UK revenue authorities (HMRC) is assessed and controlled. It then discusses a limited, yet crucial, set of discretions vested in HMRC. The paper focuses particularly on the use of non-statutory guidance. It discusses the operation of judicial review, and in particular, the doctrine of legitimate expectations, in the context of such guidance. It then presents two case studies, which reveal a distinct uncertainty over the limits of non- statutory guidance. This is currently of considerable concern to the UK tax community. As the role of guidance appears to be increasing in the UK system, the case for addressing some of these causes of uncertainty strengthens. The paper concludes by offering some preliminary suggestions on how the problems may be addressed.

The European Commission is working on a proposal for a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB). A draft Directive is expected to be published during the course of 2008. The proposal aims to tackle some fundamental problems encountered as a result of lack of corporate tax harmonisation, especially in the areas of cross border losses and transfer pricing. There are several difficulties that must be tackled to make the proposal workable, not least the question of formulary apportionment of the consolidated profits of the corporate group as between Member States. This paper does not attempt to discuss the entire range of issues to which the CCCTB gives rise, important though they are, but focuses on the question of the tax base itself. The CCCTB project presents an opportunity to rethink the tax base. For the purposes of this paper it is assumed that there will be no radical re-appraisal of the way in which we tax corporations for the time being, but that the tax base will continue to be based on a concept of ‘profit’. This paper supports the use of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) as a starting point in ascertaining profit. It acknowledges that some deviations will be necessary from IFRS for tax purposes and suggests that these deviations should be explicit and based on autonomous tax principles. Partial convergence gives rise to issues about the relationship between accounting and tax principles. Conceptual clarity is needed to manage the questions that will arise and appropriate institutional mechanisms need to be developed to deal with the task of interpretation and regulation of the evolving relationship between accounting developments and tax law. If the CCCTB is to be successful it must provide a comprehensive and autonomous set of rules. In fact it must be a Comprehensive Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCCTB or C4TB) In view of the complexity of the issues arising in creating and applying the rules for a tax base, it is impossible to produce a Directive that will cover every necessary detail. Instead it needs to refer to IFRS as at the date of the Directive and to contain a set of tax principles as well as setting out institutional arrangements capable of managing the relationship. National tax law and national accounting standards are an inappropriate default for a C4TB. Thus the Directive should provide both a reference point for determining the scope of the tax base and a constitutionally valid framework for interpretation and application of the Directive and its implementing legislation in Member States.

This book chapter discusses the background to the UK General Anti-Avoidance Rule, analyses the wording of the legislation and looks at its relationship with double taxation treaties and EU and OECD developments.

There is a widespread view that tax systems are too complex and that simplification would be a desirable outcome. Complexity leads to cost, uncertainty, avoidance opportunities and the inability to engage in tax issues. There is a point at which complexity becomes so great and unmanageable that it begins to undermine the rule of law, because it does not enable individuals to regulate their affairs properly. This paper does not take issue with the view that complexity is undesirable, but accepts that it is, to some extent, inevitable. The thesis here is that complexity should be reduced wherever possible, but that simplification cannot be the only, or even the main, driver of reform. Where simplicity cannot be achieved consistently with other objectives, there should be mechanisms to help taxpayers and revenue authorities to navigate through the remaining intricacies. Improved institutions could assist in providing ways of managing uncertainty and increasing understanding, as well as leading to improvements in the tax system. In the UK, however, lack of clear thought about the operation of our relevant institutions means that they do not play the part they should do in improving tax law. In the UK there is a proliferation of institutional approaches and, in particular, the Office of Tax Simplification (OTS) was created specifically to tackle the issue of complexity, but new institutions need to tackle the problems at root and it is not clear that the OTS or any of the other new institutions created over recent years have been able to do that. The paper concludes that there remains a need for institutional reform in the UK and suggests the transformation of the Office of Tax Simplification into a well resourced Office of Tax Policy, with wider scope than simplification and answerable to a Joint Committee of Parliament on Taxation Policy.