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To study the long-term effects of school-starting-age rules in a setting with early ability tracking, we exploit the birth month threshold used in the Netherlands. We find that students born just after the threshold perform better at the end of primary school than students born just before it. This translates into increased placement in high ability tracks in secondary education. This difference diminishes gradually during subsequent stages, and we find no effect on the highest attained educational level. Those born just before the threshold enter the labor market somewhat younger and therefore have more labor market experience and higher earnings at any given age until 40. We conclude that early ability tracking does not harm long-term outcomes of children who were, for exogenous reasons, placed in a lower track.

This paper uses administrative data from 16 cohorts of the Dutch population to study the relationship between field of study and family outcomes. We first document considerable variation by field of study for a range of family outcomes. To get to causal effects, we use admission lotteries that were conducted in the Netherlands to allocate seats for four substantially oversubscribed studies. We find that field of study matters for partner choice, which for women also implies an effect on partners' earnings. Fertility of women is not affected and evidence for men is mixed, but we find evidence for intergenerational effects on children's education. This means that field of study does not only affect individual labor market outcomes but also causally influences other important dimensions of a person's life. JEL-codes: I26,J12,J13.

In this paper we focus on the role of caseworkers in the assignment and take-up of welfare-to-work programs. We conduct a field experiment that generates exogenous variation in the assignment to different policy regimes to caseworkers. The experiment allows us to provide evidence on the effectiveness of welfare-to-work programs and to study how caseworkers exploit their discretion in assigning these programs to welfare recipients. We find substantial heterogeneity in how caseworkers assign welfare-to-work programs. Participation in the experiment and learning about the effectiveness of the different programs does not induce caseworkers to focus more on the effective programs. This implies that obtaining knowledge about welfare-to-work programs is not enough to improve policy, also effort on implementation is required. JEL-codes: C93, I38, J64, J08

We investigate whether interventions by (a) medical doctors and (b) occupational specialists are effective in reducing sick leave durations among self‐employed workers. Therefore, we exploit unique administrative data comprising all sick leave claims by self‐employed workers insured with a major Dutch private insurer between January 2009 and March 2014. We estimate a multivariate duration model dealing with nonrandom selection into the two intervention types by controlling for observable and unobservable claimant characteristics. We find adverse treatment effects for both interventions, irrespective of whether they are started early or (middle) late in the sickness spell.

We exploit admission lotteries to estimate the payoffs to the dentistry study in the Netherlands. Using data from up to 22 years after the lottery, we find that in most years after graduation dentists earn around 50,000 Euros more than they would earn in their next-best profession. The payoff is larger for men than for women but does not vary with high school GPA. The large payoffs cannot be attributed to longer working hours, larger human capital investments or sacrifices in family outcomes. The natural explanation is that Dutch dentists extract a monopoly rent, which we attribute to the limited supply of dentists in the Netherlands. We discuss policies to curtail this rent. JEL: J44; I18; I23; C36

We test whether different empirical methods give different results when evaluating job-search assistance programs. Budgetary problems at the Dutch unemployment insurance (UI) administration in March 2010, caused a sharp drop in the availability of these programs. Using administrative data provided by the UI administration, we evaluate the effect of the program using (1) the policy discontinuity as a quasiexperiment, (2) conventional matching methods, and (3) the timing-of-events model. All three methods use the same data to consider the same program in the same setting, and also yield similar results. The program reduces job finding during the first six months after enrollment. At longer durations, the quasi-experimental estimates are not significantly different from zero, while the non-experimental methods show a small negative effect. JEL: J64, C14, C31