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We evaluate the dynamics of a small and open economy under simple rules for alternative monetary-policy instruments, in a model with imperfectly anchored expectations. The inflation-targeting consensus indicates that interest-rate rules are preferred, instead of using either a monetary aggregate or the exchange rate as the main instrument; with arguments usually presented under rational expectations and full credibility. In contrast, we assume agents use econometric models to form inflation expectations, capturing limited credibility. In particular, we emphasize the exchange rate's role in shaping medium- and long-term inflation forecasts. We compare the dynamics after a shock to external-borrowing costs (arguably one of the most important sources of fluctuations in emerging countries) under three policy rules: a Taylor-type rule for the interest rate, a constant-growth-rate rule for monetary aggregates, and a fixed exchange rate. The analysis identifies relevant trade-offs in choosing among alternative instruments, showing that the relative merits of each of them is indeed influenced by how agents form inflation-related expectations.

We build an equilibrium model of a small open economy with labor market frictions and imperfectly enforced regulations. Heterogeneous firms sort into the formal or informal sector. We estimate the model using data from Brazil, and use counterfactual simulations to understand how trade affects economic outcomes in the presence of informality. We show the following: 1) Trade openness unambiguously decreases informality in the tradable sector but has ambiguous effects on aggregate informality. 2) The productivity gains from trade are understated when the informal sector is omitted. 3) Trade openness results in large welfare gains even when informality is repressed. 4) Repressing informality increases productivity but at the expense of employment and welfare. 5) The effects of trade on wage inequality are reversed when the informal sector is incorporated in the analysis. 6) The informal sector works as an "unemployment buffer" but not a "welfare buffer" in the event of negative economic shocks.

A DSGE (Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium) model is used to report the empirical behavior of the Argentine economy during the administration of the Cambiemos government coalition. Two main aspects have been taken into account: on the one hand, the debate on the economic policy of the 2016-2019 period, and on the other hand the requirement of microeconomic foundations that support the debate and the empirical results. Two alternative macro models are estimated obtaining statistically significant parameters to illuminate confusing aspects of the policy debate, and to help future research on modeling Argentina macro dynamics. The empirical results obtained for Argentina indicate that the small open economy models used in the state-space specification can also be useful for modeling other small open economies that suffer from Fiscal Dominance.

In a number of countries a substantial proportion of mortgage loans is denominated in foreign currency. In this paper we demonstrate how their presence affects economic policy and agents' welfare. To this end we construct a small open economy model with housing loans denominated in domestic or foreign currency. The model is calibrated for Poland - a typical small open economy with a large share of foreign currency loans (FCL). We show that FCLs negatively affect the transmission of monetary policy. In contrast, their impact on the effectiveness of macroprudential policy is much weaker but positive. We also demonstrate that FCLs increase welfare when domestic interest rate shocks prevail and decrease it when risk premium (exchange rate) shocks dominate. Under a realistic calibration of the stochastic environment FCLs are welfare reducing. Finally, we show that regulatory policies that correct the share of FCLs may cause a short term slowdown.

The recent debt crises in Europe and the U.S. states feature similar sharp increases in spreads on government debt but also show important differences. In Europe, the crisis occurred at high government indebtedness levels and had spillovers to the private sector. In the United States, state government indebtedness was low, and the crisis had no spillovers to the private sector. We show theoretically and empirically that these different debt experiences result from the interplay between differences in the ability of governments to interfere in private external debt contracts and differences in the flexibility of state fiscal institutions.