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In this paper I explore and defend the idea that those who struggle intellectually in theistic religious practice can be given a good reason to persist in it by treating their continuing practice as a way of paying tribute to people and projects and personal relationships and indeed to the whole moral dimension of human life, expressing how important and profoundly significant these things are to them. This ‘tribute of faith’ is a gesture that one makes with one’s life—a moral gesture. The key thought is that the sayings and other doings of a religious life allow one to treat the world as one in which the things, such as projects and people, that are, for one, most deeply imbued with moral value will achieve fulfilment—a fulfillment that without the truth of religious claims they would often be denied.

Recently, we co-edited a volume of essays (Draper & Schellenberg 2017) dedicated to the proposition that our field, the philosophy of religion, is not all that it could be. The new set of essays we’re joining here shows that this sentiment is, at the least, not going away. That’s encouraging, but how can we get beyond sentiment? In this our own essay we hope to do so by focusing very precisely and persuasively on problems and solutions: on why our field needs renewal and how to achieve it. More specifically, we hope to get every reader to recognize and accept at least one problem from the range of problems in the field as it exists today that we propose to identify, and to select for special thought and supportive effort at least one solution from the range of solutions we’ll be promoting. Let’s adjust that slightly: one extra problem and one extra solution – for we’re going to start by setting the right mood with some thoughts about a very basic problem/solution pair that we should all be able to recognize/support.

This is a fragment of J. L. Schellenberg’s paper “Divine Hiddenness and Human Philosophy” originally published in Adam Green and Eleonore Stump (eds.), Hidden Divinity and Religious Belief (Cambridge: CUP 2015), 23–25, 28. Reprinted by permission of the author Jest to fragment artykułu J.L. Schellenberga „Divine Hiddenness and Human Philosophy” pierwotnie opublikowanego w: Adam Green i Eleonore Stump (eds.), Hidden Divinity and Religious Belief (Cambridge: CUP 2015), 23–25, 28. Przedruk za zgodą autora.

In this essay, I reply to the comments of Joanna Leidenhag and Nick Trakakis on my book Religion After Science: The Cultural Consequences of Religious Immaturity.

Here I show how thinking of inquiry as immature can illuminate problems about metaphysical and scientific realism. I begin with the question whether human beings at the very beginning of systematic inquiry who (counterfactually) held themselves to be thus situated, temporally speaking, and came to recognize their inability to prove or probabilify the truth of metaphysical realism would have been justified in believing or accepting metaphysical realism even so. Drawing on broadly Wittgensteinian ideas I defend an affirmative answer. Then I extrapolate from this result, arguing by analogy that acceptance of both metaphysical realism and scientific realism is justified for us today.

Here I explain the concept of evolutionary religion and consider its relations to what in previous work I have called sceptical religion. I also interact with five articles recently published in Religious Studies that respond to my work and address related themes – articles by William A. Rottschaefer, James Elliott, Travis Dumsday, and Carl-Johan Palmqvist.

This article describes a new type of religious commitment that is activated only if the associated religious propositions are true. The notion of a conditional intention provides the mechanism for understanding how it works, and the justification for forming such an intention in the religious case comes from an awareness of human immaturity combined with a more fundamental and unconditional commitment to truth, goodness, and beauty. The article's argument promises to contribute widely and to supersede certain older arguments, including Pascal's Wager.

This Element traces the effects of science's rise on the cultural status of monotheism. Starting in the past, it shows how monotheism contributed to science's rise, and how, returning the favour, science provided aid and support, until fairly recently, for the continuing success of monotheism in the west. Turning to the present, the Element explores reasons for supposing that explanatorily, and even on an existential level, science is taking over monotheism's traditional roles in western culture. These reasons are found to be less powerful than is commonly supposed, though the existential challenge can be made effective when framed in an unusual and indirect manner. Finally, the Element considers how the relationship between science's high standing and the status of monotheism might appear in the future. Could something like monotheism rise again, and might science help it do so? The Element concludes that an affirmative answer is possible.

Objective: To evaluate safety, dose response, and preliminary efficacy of reldesemtiv over 12 weeks in patients with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS). Methods: Patients (≤2 years since diagnosis) with slow upright vital capacity (SVC) of ≥60% were randomized 1:1:1:1 to reldesemtiv 150, 300, or 450 mg twice daily (bid) or placebo; active treatment was 12 weeks with 4-week follow-up. Primary endpoint was change in percent predicted SVC at 12 weeks; secondary measures included ALS Functional Rating Scale-Revised (ALSFRS-R) and muscle strength mega-score. Results: Patients (N = 458) were enrolled; 85% completed 12-week treatment. The primary analysis failed to reach statistical significance (p = 0.11); secondary endpoints showed no statistically significant effects (ALSFRS-R, p = 0.09; muscle strength megascore, p = 0.31). Post hoc analyses pooling all active reldesemtiv-treated patients compared against placebo showed trends toward benefit in all endpoints (progression rate for SVC, ALSFRS-R, and muscle strength mega-score (nominal p values of 0.10, 0.01 and 0.20 respectively)). Reldesemtiv was well tolerated, with nausea and fatigue being the most common side effects. A dose-dependent decrease in estimated glomerular filtration rate was noted, and transaminase elevations were seen in approximately 5% of patients. Both hepatic and renal abnormalities trended toward resolution after study drug discontinuation. Conclusions: Although the primary efficacy analysis did not demonstrate statistical significance, there were trends favoring reldesemtiv for all three endpoints, with effect sizes generally regarded as clinically important. Tolerability was good; modest hepatic and renal abnormalities were reversible. The impact of reldesemtiv on patients with ALS should be assessed in a pivotal Phase 3 trial. (ClinicalTrials.gov Identifier: NCT03160898)

Religious epistemology is widely regarded as being in a flourishing condition. It is true that some very sharp analytical work on religion has been produced by philosophers in the past few decades. But this work, for various cultural and historical reasons, has been kept within excessively narrow bounds, and the result is that the appearance of flourishing is to a considerable extent illusory. Here I discuss three important ways in which improvements to this situation might be made.

BACKGROUND: Intra-arterial administration of radiographic contrast media (CM) is discussed to impair renal perfusion. The pathogenesis of contrast-induced Nephropathy (CIN) is still not clarified. OBJECTIVE: This trial was performed to prove the effects of two CM with different molecular structure on renal perfusion. METHODS: A prospective, randomized study on 16 pigs was designed to compare the outcome after application of a low-osmolar iodinated CM (770 mOsm/kg H2O-Group1) and an iso-osmolar iodinated CM (290 mOsm/kg H(2)o-Group2). Color Coded Doppler Sonography (LOGIQ E9, GE, Milwaukee, USA) was applied for measuring the Renal Resistive Index (RRI) before and after the first, fifth, and tenth bolus of CM. Statistics was performed using analysis of variance for repeated measurements with the Factor "CM". RESULTS: All flow spectra were documented free of artifacts and Peak Systolic Velocity (PSV), Enddiastolic Velocity (EDV) and RRI respectively could be calculated. Mean PSV in Group 1 led to a decrease while in Group 2 PSV showed a significant increase after CM (p = 0,042). The course of the mean EDV in both groups deferred accordingly (p = 0,033). Mean RRI over time significantly deferred in both groups (p = 0,001). It showed a biphasic course in Group 2 and a decrease over time in Group 2. CONCLUSION: While iso-osmolar CM induced an increase of PSV and EDV together with a decrease of RRI, low-osmolar CM could not show this effect or rather led to the opposite.

In this paper I develop a new recipe for solving the problem of religious disagreement suggested by the injunction to cultivate intellectual humility conjoined with awareness of human immaturity in deep time. The ingredients brought to the table include such things as noticing the full breadth and texture of the religious propositional field, observing the previously hidden areas of agreement this exposes, making a differential judgment of importance in relation to religious propositions, applying the concept of a position, and finding a better home for an emphasis on detailed beliefs than contexts of inquiry can provide. Special attention is given to the modesty of the proposal, which asks relatively little of religious practitioners while reconceiving this area of discussion.

In this chapter John Schellenberg defends the proposal that the intellectual activity associated with Alvin Plantinga’s work on religion, a Reformed sort of Christian philosophy (RCP), isn’t properly regarded as being philosophy at all—not even philosophy of religion. Instead, Schellenberg argues that it is theology. He begins by clarifying how RCP should be understood. Then he presents and defends a condition he calls the Communal Condition, which says that to be doing philosophy one must aim not just to solve certain fundamental problems, or contribute thereto, but to do so together with like-minded others in a shared enterprise leading to informed consensus. Finally, Schellenberg defends the view that, although it satisfies very well a condition sufficient for something to count as theology, RCP cannot satisfy the Communal Condition.

Distinguishing between the old atheism, the new atheism, and modest atheism, and also between belief and acceptance, and belief and acceptance tokens and types, I defend the disjunctive view that either modest atheistic belief or modest atheistic acceptance, construed as type, is today epistemically justified in the context of philosophical inquiry. Central to my defence is a deductive version of the hiddenness argument and an emphasis on the early stage of philosophical inquiry that we presently occupy.