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Intergenerational political socialization is alive and well in the polarized American polity. But, by what mechanism do parental views transmit to children? We develop a theory (dyadic social learning theory) which posits the importance of dyadic familial communication in facilitating attitudinal concordance between parents and children. Using original survey data of 1,048 dyadic pairs of American parents and middle school-aged children, we develop a novel measure of political perception that combines the perceptive accuracy of parents with the perceptive accuracy of their children. This measure of parent-child alignment, which we argue signals quality communication in families, is a powerful determinant of parent-child congruence on political views and emotions, particularly polarization. When a dyadic pair accurately perceives each other politically, the likelihood of congruent views and shared polarization increases. This research has implications for how we understand political transference of polarized views, and for broader theories of how children are socialized into the political world. It also suggests that solutions to polarization will have to address the role of parents in initiating polarization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the speed of rulemaking in American state governments. Drawing on a unique data set of over 250,000 individual rules issued by states from 1993 through 2009, we introduce new measures of the speed and breadth of rulemaking in American state bureaucracies, providing a new way of evaluating the incidence of rulemaking delay within and across governments. We focus specifically on how professionalism and oversight powers of state legislative and executive branches affect rulemaking speed and find that states with more professionalized legislatures and governments with extensive legislative/executive oversight powers experience greater delays in rule adoption. These findings provide important new insights into the politics of regulatory delay and suggest disparate ways in which sub-national governments approach regulatory policymaking in a federal system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars of American politics debate the consequences of polarized and divided government on lawmaking but have largely neglected the impact of institutional conflict on the policy outputs of the bureaucracy. We argue that lawmaking gridlock creates opportunities and demands for governors and civil servants to pursue policy goals through rulemaking. To explore these dynamics, we draw upon a comprehensive dataset of over 150,000 proposed and adopted rules issued by US state agencies from 1994 through 2009 and compare differences in rulemaking output within states across periods of divided and unified party control. We find that policy conflict (measured by the presence of a party divided legislature) leads to a 3%–7% increase in the number of proposed and adopted rules. We then explore how variation in state powers of legislative oversight affect rulemaking, and find that these effects are concentrated in governments with weaker powers of legislative review. Our research speaks to debates in the literature regarding the nature of bureaucratic policymaking and highlights practical consequences of legislative gridlock and partisan polarization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theory suggests that Congress should delegate more policymaking authority to the bureaucracy under unified government, where lawmakers are less worried about the president orchestrating "bureaucratic drift." Yet, all unified governments come to an end, making broad delegations potentially advantageous to future lawmaking coalitions ("coalitional drift"). We seek to assess how lawmakers simultaneously limit the risk of each of these pitfalls of delegation. Our answer is rooted in Congress's ability to spur agency rulemaking activity under unified government. Specifically, we expect statutes passed under unified government to require agencies to issue regulations quickly and for enacting coalitions to use oversight tools to influence agency policy choices. Such "proximate oversight" allows coalitions to cement policy decisions before a new election changes the configuration of preferences within Congress and the executive branch. We assess our argument using unique data on both congressional rulemaking deadlines (1995–2014) and the speed with which agencies issue regulations (1997–2014). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most sex offenders appear to desist from sexual and other violent offending; however, research on this population has historically focused more on the characteristics of individuals who persist offending versus those who desist from offending. The present study examined change patterns of 563 child sexual abusers’ scores on the Sex Offender Treatment Intervention and Progress Scale, a dynamic risk measure, at three points of time over 2 years. Individuals who did versus did not commit a new serious offense, defined as a new sexual or other violent offense, at 5-year follow-up were contrasted. Desisters demonstrated most changes during their first year in treatment, whereas change among persisters more often occurred during their second year in treatment. All classes of offenders made gains in addressing dynamic risk related to sexually specific needs, whereas desisters made significantly greater gains in social stability needs. Findings are discussed in light of treatment dose allocation and community reentry needs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

State medical boards are increasingly responsible for regulating medical and osteopathic licensure and professional conduct in the United States. Yet, there is great variation in the extent to which such boards take disciplinary action against physicians, indicating that some boards are more zealous regulators than others. We look to the political roots of such variation and seek to answer a simple, yet important, question: are nominally apolitical state medical boards responsive to political preferences? To address this question, we use panel data on disciplinary actions across sixty-four state medical boards from 1993 through 2006 and control for over-time changes in board characteristics (e.g., composition, independence, budgetary status), regulatory structure, and resources. We show that as state legislatures become more liberal [conservative], state boards increasingly [decreasingly] discipline physicians, especially during unified government and in the presence of highly professional legislatures. Our conclusions join others in emphasizing the importance of state medical boards and the contingent nature of political control of state regulation. In addition, we emphasize the roles that oversight capacity and strategy play in offsetting concerns regarding self-regulation of a powerful organized interest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Information from ratings sites are increasingly informing patient decisions related to health care and the selection of physicians. Objective: The current study sought to determine the validity of online patient ratings of physicians through comparison with physician peer review. Methods: We extracted 223,715 reviews of 41,104 physicians from 10 of the largest cities in the United States, including 1142 physicians listed as "America's Top Doctors" through physician peer review. Differences in mean online patient ratings were tested for physicians who were listed and those who were not. Results: Overall, no differences were found between the online patient ratings based upon physician peer review status. However, statistical differences were found for four specialties (family medicine, allergists, internal medicine, and pediatrics), with online patient ratings significantly higher for those physicians listed as a peer-reviewed "Top Doctor" versus those who were not. Conclusions: The results of this large-scale study indicate that while online patient ratings are consistent with physician peer review for four nonsurgical, primarily in-office specializations, patient ratings were not consistent with physician peer review for specializations like anesthesiology. This result indicates that the validity of patient ratings varies by medical specialization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]