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Subsidization of urban public transportation systems is often motivated by economies of scale and/or second-best considerations (underpriced road alternative). We model a public transportation system subject to frictions between users, users and vehicles, and vehicles. We derive the monopolistic and optimal provisions of supply. We show that if demand exceeds a first threshold, the system enters a congested regime and service frequency decreases. If demand exceeds a second threshold, the public transit system operates under diseconomies of scale, calling for a Pigovian tax instead of a subsidy. This finding, which goes against Mohring's classical rule (1972), holds with an untolled road alternative. We estimate the model for the London Piccadilly lane and find evidence of substantial diseconomies of scale during the morning peak, questioning current subsidy policies for the busiest transit lines.

Working Paper du LAET, n° 2021/01. ISSN : 2741-8103; This paper investigates the productive efficiency of French regional rail operators. Benefiting from unique databases (2012-2016), we use a panel stochastic frontier model to measure and explain the productive efficiency. We consider the regional monopoly nature of these operators by introducing specific contract-related variables into the model. The technical efficiency level of regional operators ranges from 59 to 98 per cent, revealing a high degree of heterogeneity in productive performance between regional operators. Factors related to the societal environment (density and delinquency rate), the characteristics of the rail system (network length and number of stations) and contractual design are significantly correlated with the technical efficiency. The policy implications of these results are substantial for both public authorities and rail operators.

Working Papers du LAET, 2020/02; We conduct a discrete choice experiment on 931 solo-driving commuters in Lyon, France to estimate the values of end-to-end travel time (VoTT) in the presence of an HOV lane for four modes: Solo Driver, Carpool Driver, Carpool Passenger and Public Transport. Mixed and latent class logit models are estimated. We find that Carpool Passenger, Carpool Driver and Public Transport median VoTTs are respectively around 20%, 40% and 60% higher than Solo Driver VoTT. The analysis of individual heterogeneity distinguishes three classes of behavior in our sample: open to carpool as a driver (41%), open to passenger modes (32%) and resistant to all alternatives to solo driving (28%). These three categories allow to identify solo drivers who could switch to carpool as drivers. We show that encouraging current solo drivers to switch to carpool as passengers will be more sensitive if public transport services are also improved.

Subsidization of urban public transportation systems is often motivated by economies of scale and/or second-best considerations (underpriced road alternative). We model a public transportation system subject to frictions between users, users and vehicles, and vehicles. We derive the monopolistic and optimal provisions of supply. We show that if demand exceeds a first threshold, the system enters a congested regime and service frequency decreases. If demand exceeds a second threshold, the public transit system operates under diseconomies of scale, calling for a Pigovian tax instead of a subsidy. This finding, which goes against Mohring's classical rule (1972), holds with an untolled road alternative. We estimate the model for the London Piccadilly lane and find evidence of substantial diseconomies of scale during the morning peak, questioning current subsidy policies for the busiest transit lines.

L’étude a pour objectif de donner quelques éléments d’appréciation sur les conséquences que pourrait avoir la mise en gratuité totale du réseau des Transports en Commun Lyonnais (TCL).

This paper studies the efficient pricing of medium distance passenger rail in Europe. Current fares and frequencies are compared with three alternatives: First-Best where road congestion is internalized, Second-Best where no road tolls are implemented and Third-Best where a maximum rail deficit is also imposed. We find that Second-Best fares depend strongly on the non-internalized road congestion and on the price elasticity of the passengers, complicating the derivation of a national or regional fare structure. Second-Best achieves a significant share of the First-Best benefits but adding a budget constraint makes Second-Best solutions difficult to implement for some corridors. ispartof: FEB Research Report Department of Economics status: published

International audience; We analyze trip-timing decisions of public transit users who trade off crowding costs and disutility from traveling early or late. Considering fixed and then endogenous demand, we derive the equilibrium distribution of users across trains for three fare regimes: no fare, an optimal uniform fare, and an optimal train-dependent fare that supports the social optimum. We also derive the optimal number of trains and train capacity, and compare them across fare regimes. Finally we calibrate the model to a segment of the Paris RER A mass transit system and estimate the potential welfare gains from train-dependent fares.

International audience; There is a large operations research literature on public transit system design. An extensive economic literature has also developed on public transit capacity investments, service frequency, and optimal pricing and subsidy policy. These two branches of literature have made significant advances in understanding public transit systems. However, in contrast to the literature on automobile traffic congestion, most of the studies have employed static models that cannot account for travelers' time-of-use decisions and the dynamics of transit congestion and crowding. The time profile of ridership is driven by the trade-off that users face between traveling at peak times and suffering crowding, and avoiding the peak by traveling earlier or later than they would like. A few studies have explored this trade-off using simple microeconomic models that combine trip-scheduling preferences as introduced by Vickrey (1969) with a crowding cost function that describes how utility from travel decreases with passenger loads. In this paper we use this modeling framework to analyze usage of a rail transit line, and assess the potential benefits from internalizing crowding externalities by setting differential train fares. We also present results on optimal train capacity and the number of trains put into service.

Presented at the 51st CTRF (57th TRF) Joint Conference, May 1-4, 2016, Toronto, Ontario

This dissertation addresses the foundations of user’s behavior with respect to the congestion in public transport. It is made of three distinct essays. The two first essays investigate how users get used to lack of punctuality and crowding. The third essay presents an empirical analysis of the crowding effect. In the first chapter, I consider the modeling of a bi-modal competitive network involving a public transport mode, which may be unreliable, and an alternative mode. The public transport reliability set by the public transport firm at the competitive equilibrium increases with the alternative mode fare, via a demand effect. This is reminiscent of the Mohring Effect. The study of the optimal service quality shows that often, public transport reliability and thereby patronage are lower at equilibrium compared to first-best social optimum. In the second chapter, to study the behavioral implications and costs of crowding, I develop a structural model in which public transport users face a choice between traveling in a crowded train and arriving when they want, and traveling earlier or later to avoid crowding but arriving at an inconvenient time. I derive the user equilibrium and socially optimal distribution of passengers across trains, show how the optimum can be decentralized using train-specific fares, and characterize the welfare gains from optimal pricing. Properties of the model are compared with those obtained from the bottleneck and flow congestion models of road traffic. In the third chapter, I investigate the influence of in-vehicle crowding on the comfort satisfaction experienced during a public transport journey. Moreover, I describe the anatomy of the crowding effect by testing various nuisance factors (Smell, Noise, Standing...) as channels through which crowding may decrease the comfort satisfaction. I find a clear crowding effect: on average, an extra-user per square meter decreases by one the expected 0 to 10 scale individual well-being. I do not find any empirical evidence of this effect being intensified by the travel time. However, the crowding effect increases with the income of users. I find three causes of crowding disutility: a higher probability to stand for all or part of the journey, a poorer use of the time during the journey, and noisier travel conditions. These features of discomfort matter more for women and wealthy individuals., Cette thèse s'intéresse aux fondements du comportement des usagers face à la congestion dans les transports publics. Elle se compose de trois essais distincts. Les deux premiers essais examinent l'adaptation des usagers au manque de ponctualité et à l'inconfort. Le troisième essai offre une analyse empirique de l'effet « foule ». Dans le premier chapitre, je présente un modèle de compétition bimodale entre une ligne de transport public sujette aux retards, et un mode alternatif. A l'équilibre du marché, le niveau de fiabilité choisi par la firme en charge des transports publics augmente avec le prix du mode alternatif via un effet « demande » évoquant l'effet Mohring. L'étude de la qualité de service optimale montre que souvent, la fiabilité des transports publics et donc leur fréquentation à l'équilibre sont inférieurs à ce qu'ils seraient à l'optimum social. Dans le second chapitre, afin d'étudier le coût de l'inconfort et ses implications quant au choix de l'heure de déplacement, je développe un modèle structurel dans lequel les usagers des transports public choisissent entre voyager dans un véhicule bondé et arriver à destination à l'heure désirée ou alors voyager plus tard ou plus tôt pour éviter la foule. J'établis la distribution des usagers parmi les véhicules à l'équilibre et à l'optimum social, et montre que l'optimum social peut être décentralisé par une tarification fine par véhicule. Les propriétés du modèle sont comparées avec celles du modèle du « bottleneck » et des modèles de congestion routière. Dans le troisième chapitre, j'analyse l'influence de la densité d'usagers sur la satisfaction liée au confort durant un déplacement en transport public. De plus, je décris l'anatomie de l'effet « foule » en testant différents aspects (odeur, bruit, position debout...) comme des causes d'inconfort lorsque la densité d'usagers augmente. J'identifie un net effet « foule » : en moyenne, un usager supplémentaire par mètre carré diminue de 1 la satisfaction liée au confort qui est mesurée sur une échelle de 0 à 10. Je ne trouve pas de corrélation entre temps de transport et l'effet « foule ». Cependant, cet effet augmente avec le revenu des usagers. Trois causes de désutilité liée à la foule sont identifiées : une plus grande probabilité de devoir voyager debout, un usage limité du temps, et des conditions de déplacement plus bruyantes. Ces désagréments sont plus importants chez les femmes et les usagers les plus aisés.

Most traffic congestion models assume that agents make trip-timing decisions independently and receive payoffs at the origin and destination that do not depend on whether other agents are present. We depart from this paradigm by considering a variant of Vickrey's bottleneck model of the morning commute in which individuals live as couples and value time at home more when together than when alone. We show that the costs of congestion can be higher than for a comparable population of individuals living alone. The costs can be even higher if spouses collaborate with each other when choosing their departure times. To calibrate the model we estimate trip-timing preferences for married and unmarried men and women in the Greater Paris region. Jel Classifications: D11, D70, R41.