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Navigating our social environment requires the ability to distinguish ourselves from others. Previous research suggests that training interventions have the potential to enhance the capacity for self-other distinction (SOD), which then may impact various sociocognitive domains, including imitation-inhibition, visual perspective taking, and empathy. Importantly, empirical research on the role of SOD in emotion regulation remains scarce. In this study, we aim to investigate the impact of training SOD on emotion regulation and also replicate findings on empathy and the attribution of mental states to others. Using a pre-post design, participants ( N = 104) were assigned to either the imitation-inhibition or general inhibitory control training. Compared to general inhibitory control training, participants trained to inhibit imitation displayed a significant increase in posttest emotion regulation levels compared to pretest levels, indicating that imitation-inhibition training increased self-reported emotion regulation. Notably, emotional interference remained unaffected by either form of training. Both training interventions resulted in diminished self-reported empathic concern, while only general inhibitory control training led to a reduction in personal distress. Moreover, neither type of training had an impact on self-reported perspective taking or theory of mind performance. This study provides novel empirical evidence of the positive impact of imitation-inhibition training on emotion regulation. Furthermore, our findings make significant contributions to the advancement of research in this area and offer further support for the advantages of behavioral training as a methodological approach to studying sociocognitive abilities. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Being able to empathise with others is a crucial ability in everyday life. However, this does not usually entail feeling the pain of others in our own bodies. For individuals with mirror-sensory synaesthesia (MSS), however, this form of empathic embodiment is a common feature. Our study investigates the empathic ability of adults who experience MSS using a video-based empathy task. We found that MSS participants did not differ from controls on emotion identification and affective empathy; however, they showed higher affect sharing (degree to which their affect matches what they attribute to others) than controls. This finding indicates difficulties with self-other distinction, which our data shows results in fewer signs of prosocial behaviour. Our findings are in line with the self-other control theory of MSS and highlight how the use of appropriate empathy measures can contribute to our understanding of this important socio-affective ability, both in typical and atypical populations.

Past research has yielded conflicting findings concerning socio-cognitive deficits in individuals with autistic traits. This raises the fundamental question whether autistic traits and socio-cognitive abilities are related. The present study investigated whether three key socio-cognitive abilities-imitation-inhibition, empathy, and emotion regulation-can serve as predictive factors for autistic traits within a neurotypical population. Participants (N = 166, M age  = 24.83 years, SD age  = 5.20 years, range age  = 18 to 39 years) were asked to perform an online imitation-inhibition task and complete self-report measures assessing empathy, emotion regulation, and autistic traits. Empathy was measured using the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI), emotion regulation was assessed using the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS), and autistic traits were measured using the ten-item short form of the Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ-10). Multiple regression analyses revealed that both imitation-inhibition and emotion regulation were significantly associated with autistic traits. However, empathy was not found to be a significant predictor. Our study aimed to clarify inconsistent results regarding the relationship between socio-cognitive abilities and autistic traits., Competing Interests: Declaration of competing interest The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest., (Copyright © 2023 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

A new task ('CARER') was used to test claims of reduced empathy in autistic adults. CARER measures emotion identification (ability to identify another's affective state), affective empathy (degree to which another's affective state causes a matching state in the Empathiser) and affect sharing (degree to which the Empathiser's state matches the state they attribute to another). After controlling for alexithymia, autistic individuals showed intact affect sharing, emotion identification and affective empathy. Results suggested reduced retrospective socio-emotional processing, likely due to a failure to infer neurotypical mental states. Thus, autism may be associated with difficulties inferring another's affective state retrospectively, but not with sharing that state. Therefore, when appropriate measures are used, autistic individuals do not show a lack of empathy.

Vicarious perception refers to the ability to co-represent the experiences of others. Prior research has shown considerable inter-individual variability in vicarious perception of pain, with some experiencing conscious sensations of pain on their own body when viewing another person in pain (conscious vicarious perception/mirror-pain synaesthesia). Self-Other Theory proposes that this conscious vicarious perception may result from impairments in self-other distinction and maintaining a coherent sense of bodily self. In support of this, individuals who experience conscious vicarious perception are more susceptible to illusions of body ownership and agency. However, little work has assessed whether trait differences in bodily self-awareness are associated with conscious vicarious pain. Here we addressed this gap by examining individual difference factors related to awareness of the body, in conscious vicarious pain responders. Increased self-reported depersonalization and interoceptive sensibility was found for conscious vicarious pain responders compared with non-responders, in addition to more internally oriented thinking (associated with lower alexithymia). There were no significant differences in trait anxiety. Results indicate that maintaining a stable sense of the bodily self may be important for vicarious perception of pain, and that vicarious perception might also be enhanced by attention towards internal bodily states. This article is part of a discussion meeting issue 'Bridging senses: novel insights from synaesthesia'.

Mentalizing is a fundamental process underpinning human social interaction. Claims of the existence of 'implicit mentalizing' represent a fundamental shift in our understanding of this important skill, suggesting that preverbal infants and even animals may be capable of mentalizing. One of the most influential tasks supporting such claims in adults is the dot perspective-taking task, but demonstrations of similar performance on this task for mentalistic and non-mentalistic stimuli have led to the suggestion that this task in fact measures domain-general processes, rather than implicit mentalizing. A mentalizing explanation was supported by fMRI data claiming to show greater activation of brain areas involved in mentalizing, including right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ), when participants made self-perspective judgements in a mentalistic, but not in a non-mentalistic condition, an interpretation subsequently challenged. Here we provide the first causal test of the mentalizing claim using disruptive transcranial magnetic stimulation of rTPJ during self-perspective judgements. We found no evidence for a distinction between mentalistic and non-mentalistic stimuli: stimulation of rTPJ impaired performance on all self-perspective trials, regardless of the mentalistic/non-mentalistic nature of the stimulus. Our data support a domain-general attentional interpretation of performance on the dot perspective-taking task, a role which is subserved by the rTPJ., (Crown Copyright © 2017. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

In this Commentary article we critically assess the claims made by Schurz, Kronbichler, Weissengrubler, Surtees, Samson and Perner (2015) relating to the neural processes underlying theory of mind and visual perspective taking. They attempt to integrate research findings in these two areas of social neuroscience using a perspective taking task contrasting mentalistic agents ('avatars'), with non-mentalistic control stimuli ('arrows'), during functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging. We support this endeavour whole-heartedly, agreeing that the integration of findings in these areas has been neglected in research on the social brain. However, we cannot find among the behavioural or neuroimaging data presented by Schurz et al. evidence supporting their claim of 'implicit mentalizing'-the automatic ascription of mental states to another representing what they can see. Indeed, we suggest that neuroimaging methods may be ill-suited to address the existence of implicit mentalizing, and suggest that approaches utilizing neurostimulation methods are likely to be more successful., (Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Although neuroimaging studies have consistently identified the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) as a key brain region involved in social cognition, the literature is far from consistent with respect to lateralization of function. For example, during theory-of-mind tasks bilateral TPJ activation is found in some studies but only right hemisphere activation in others. Visual perspective-taking and imitation inhibition, which have been argued to recruit the same socio-cognitive processes as theory of mind, are associated with unilateral activation of either left TPJ (perspective taking) or right TPJ (imitation inhibition). The present study investigated the functional lateralization of TPJ involvement in the above three socio-cognitive abilities using transcranial direct current stimulation. Three groups of healthy adults received anodal stimulation over right TPJ, left TPJ or the occipital cortex prior to performing three tasks (imitation inhibition, visual perspective-taking and theory of mind). In contrast to the extant neuroimaging literature, our results suggest bilateral TPJ involvement in imitation inhibition and visual perspective-taking, while no effect of anodal stimulation was observed on theory of mind. The discrepancy between these findings and those obtained using neuroimaging highlight the efficacy of neurostimulation as a complementary methodological tool in cognitive neuroscience., (© 2015 Federation of European Neuroscience Societies and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

Individuals with mirror touch synaesthesia (MTS) experience touch on their own body when observing others being touched. A recent account proposes that such rare experiences could be linked to impairment in self-other representations. Here we tested participants with MTS on a battery of social cognition tests and found that compared to non-synaesthete controls, the MTS group showed impairment in imitation-inhibition but not in visual perspective taking or theory of mind. Although all of these socio-cognitive abilities rely on the control of self-other representations, they differ as to whether the self, or the other, should be preferentially represented. For imitation-inhibition, representations of the other should be inhibited and self-representations should be enhanced, whereas the opposite is true for visual perspective taking and theory of mind. These findings suggest that MTS is associated with a specific deficit in inhibiting representation of other individuals and shed light on the fractionability of processes underlying typical social cognition., (Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

The control of neurological networks supporting social cognition is crucially important for social interaction. In particular, the control of imitation is directly linked to interaction quality, with impairments associated with disorders characterized by social difficulties. Previous work suggests inferior frontal cortex (IFC) and the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) are involved in controlling imitation, but the functional roles of these areas remain unclear. Here, transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) was used to enhance cortical excitability at IFC and the TPJ prior to the completion of three tasks: (i) a naturalistic social interaction during which increased imitation is known to improve rapport, (ii) a choice reaction time task in which imitation needs to be inhibited for successful performance and (iii) a non-imitative control task. Relative to sham stimulation, stimulating IFC improved the context-dependent control of imitation-participants imitated more during the social interaction and less during the imitation inhibition task. In contrast, stimulating the TPJ reduced imitation in the inhibition task without affecting imitation during social interaction. Neither stimulation site affected the non-imitative control task. These data support a model in which IFC modulates imitation directly according to task demands, whereas TPJ controls task-appropriate shifts in attention toward representation of the self or the other, indirectly impacting upon imitation., (© The Author (2014). Published by Oxford University Press.)

In the director task (DT), participants are instructed to move objects within a grid of shelves while ignoring those objects that cannot be seen by a human figure, the "director," located beyond the shelves. It is widely assumed that, since they are explicitly instructed to do, participants use mentalizing in this communicative task; they represent what the director can see, and therefore the DT provides important information about how and when mentalizing is used in adult life. We tested this view against a "submentalizing" hypothesis suggesting that DT performance depends on object-centered spatial coding, without mentalizing. As predicted by the submentalizing account, we found that DT performance was unchanged when the director was replaced by an inanimate object, a camera, and that participants with autism spectrum disorders were unimpaired, relative to matched control participants, in both the director and camera conditions. In combination with recent critical analyses of "implicit mentalizing," these findings support the view that adults use mentalizing sparingly in psychological experiments and in everyday life.