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This study examined discourses and positions produced by educators (n = 31) on the topics of teamwork and professional expertise in extended hours early childhood education and care (ECEC). Theoretically, we follow the ideas of relational expertise and common knowledge. Previous research provides that relational expertise and creating common knowledge are useful in ECEC contexts, especially in teamwork. The data were collected by interviewing educators, and discursive psychology was applied in the analysis of the data. As results, we found two discursive tensions. In relation to teamwork the tension was working alone versus working in a team. In the topic of professional expertise, the tension was independent work orientation versus following instructions. The special features of extended hours ECEC, in particular time, frame the possibilities of building expertise relationally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Stalnaker (Context, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014) defends two ideas about common ground. The first is that the common ground of a conversation is definable in terms of an iterated propositional attitude of acceptance, so that p is common ground iff p is commonly accepted. The second is the idea that the "default setting" of conversational acceptance is belief, so that as a default, what is accepted in conversation coincides with what is (commonly) believed. In this paper, I argue that we should favor a pair of contrasting theses instead. First, I argue that we should identify the common ground with what is common knowledge about what is accepted, so that p is common ground iff it is common knowledge that p is accepted. Thus the attitude that is iterated in the definition of common ground is not acceptance but knowledge. Second, I argue that the "default setting" for conversational acceptance is not belief, but knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Joint attention occurs when two (or more) individuals attend together to some object. It has been identified by psychologists as an early form of our joint engagement, and is thought to provide us with an understanding of other minds that is basic in that sophisticated conceptual resources are not involved. Accordingly, it has also attracted the interest of philosophers. Moreover, a very recent trend in the psychological and philosophical literature on joint attention consists of developing the suggestion that it holds partially in virtue of communication: it is because we share our thoughts or feelings about an object that our individual attention becomes joint. This paper unpacks the communicative suggestion in a way that accounts for joint attention's basicness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we explore the linear logic of multi-agent knowledge using multivalued models. The logic of the language contains the unary operators $K_{j}$ --- $j$ --- the agent knows, $ULK_{G}$ --- unstable local knowledge, $E_{G}$ --- stable local knowledge in the group, and the binary logical operator $AP_{G}$ - the majority opinion. We will show some examples that demonstrate the diversity of this language and its capabilities. Technically we prove decidability of satisfiability problem in the resulting models for our multi-agent logic, develop verification technique and provide some examples.

Domain adaptation aims to alleviate the impact of distribution differences when migrating knowledge from the source domain to the target domain. However, two issues remain to be addressed. One is the difficulty of learning both marginal and specific knowledge at the same time. The other is the low quality of pseudo labels in target domain can constrain the performance improvement during model iteration. To solve the above problems, we propose a domain adaptation method called Joint Marginal and Central Sample Learning (JMCSL). This method consists of three parts which are marginal sample learning (MSL), central sample learning (CSL) and unified strategy for multi-classifier (USMC). MSL and CSL aim to better learning of common and specific knowledge. USMC improves the accuracy and stability of pseudo labels in the target domain. Specifically, MSL learns specific knowledge from a novel triple distance, which is defined by sample pair and their class center. CSL uses the closest class center and the second closest class center of samples to retain the common knowledge. USMC selects label consistent samples by applying K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN) and Structural Risk Minimization (SRM), while it utilizes the class centers of both two domains for classification. Finally, extensive experiments on four visual datasets demonstrate that JMCSL is superior to other competing methods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Axel Seemann's book, "The Shared World: Perceptual Common Knowledge, Demonstrative Communication, and Social Space," explores the concept of joint attention and its relationship to perceptual common knowledge, demonstrative communication, and social space. The book combines philosophical analysis with empirical research in developmental psychology and social neuroscience. Seemann argues that joint perceptual capacities, including joint perception, joint attention, and perceptual common knowledge, play a central role in our ability to perceive a shared world. The book offers a unified account of joint perceptual capacities and their significance in understanding the relation between mind and world. The text discusses the concept of joint perception and its role in successful demonstrative communication, proposing a social disjunctivism approach that emphasizes the importance of joint perception and common knowledge of reference. The text also explores the idea of a social spatial framework and its role in joint attention, highlighting the connection between perception, attention, and communication. The author supports their arguments with empirical evidence and acknowledges the challenges of reconciling philosophical debates. Overall, this text offers valuable insights into the relationship between perception, communication, and the shared world. [Extracted from the article]

The industrial manufacturing model is undergoing a transformation from a product-centric model to a customer-centric one. Driven by customized requirements, the complexity of products and the requirements for quality have increased, which pose a challenge to the applicability of traditional machine vision technology. Extensive research demonstrates the effectiveness of AI-based learning and image processing on specific objects or tasks, but few publications focus on the composite task of the integrated product, the traceability and improvability of methods, as well as the extraction and communication of knowledge between different scenarios or tasks. To address this problem, this paper proposes a common, knowledge-driven, generic vision inspection framework, targeted for standardizing product inspection into a process of information decoupling and adaptive metrics. Task-related object perception is planned into a multi-granularity and multi-pattern progressive alignment based on industry knowledge and structured tasks. Inspection is abstracted as a reconfigurable process of multi-sub-pattern space combination mapping and difference metric under appropriate high-level strategies and experiences. Finally, strategies for knowledge improvement and accumulation based on historical data are presented. The experiment demonstrates the process of generating a detection pipeline for complex products and continuously improving it through failure tracing and knowledge improvement. Compared to the ( 1.767 ° , 69.802 mm) and 0.883 obtained by state-of-the-art deep learning methods, the generated pipeline achieves a pose estimation ranging from ( 2.771 ° , 153.584 mm) to ( 1.034 ° , 52.308 mm) and a detection rate ranging from 0.462 to 0.927. Through verification of other imaging methods and industrial tasks, we prove that the key to adaptability lies in the mining of inherent commonalities of knowledge, multi-dimensional accumulation, and reapplication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We show that knowledge satisfies interpersonal independence, meaning that a non-trivial sentence describing one agent’s knowledge cannot be equivalent to a sentence describing another agent’s knowledge. The same property of interpersonal independence holds, mutatis mutandis, for belief. In the case of knowledge, interpersonal independence is implied by the fact that there are no non-trivial sentences that are common knowledge in every model of knowledge. In the case of belief, interpersonal independence follows from a strong interpersonal independence that knowledge does not have. Specifically, there is no sentence describing the beliefs of one person that implies a sentence describing the beliefs of another person. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In disseminating information, policymakers face a choice between broadcasting to everyone and informing a small number of "seeds" who then spread the message. While broadcasting maximises the initial reach of messages, we offer theoretical and experimental evidence that it need not be the best strategy. In a field experiment during the 2016 Indian demonetisation, we delivered policy information, varying three dimensions of the delivery method at the village level: initial reach (broadcasting versus seeding); whether or not we induced common knowledge of who was initially informed; and number of facts delivered. We measured three outcomes: the volume of conversations about demonetisation, knowledge of demonetisation rules, and choice quality in a strongly incentivised policy-dependent decision. On all three outcomes, under common knowledge, seeding dominates broadcasting; moreover, adding common knowledge makes seeding more effective but broadcasting less so. We interpret our results via a model of image concerns deterring engagement in social learning, and we support this interpretation with evidence on differential behaviour across ability categories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

David Lewis is widely regarded as the philosopher who introduced the concept of common knowledge. His account of common knowledge differs greatly from most later accounts in philosophy and economy, with the central notion of his theory being 'having reason to believe' rather than 'knowledge'. Unfortunately, Lewis's account is rather informal, and the argument has a few gaps. This paper assesses two major attempts to formalise Lewis's account and argues that these formalisations are missing a crucial aspect of this account. Therefore, a new reconstruction is proposed, which explicitly discusses 'reasons' and uses a logic inspired by justification logic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay characterizes one way people are organized by their ideas about the ideas of others, namely, "ideational structure." I clarify its role in social explanation, compare it to some standard social ontologies, and propose that it is an important element in an ideology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that joint attention solves the "base problem" as it arises for Schiffer's and Lewis's theories of common knowledge. The problem is that an account is needed of the perceptual base of some forms of common knowledge that gets by without itself invoking common knowledge. The paper solves the problem by developing a theory of joint attention as consisting in the exercise of joint know-how involving particular and sometimes distal targets and arguing that certain joint perceivers can always have a minimal form of propositional common knowledge about the location of these targets. On such a view, perceptual common knowledge is based on the experience of a process that is maintained by way of perceivers' exercise of an object-involving form of joint know-how. Some reductive theories of collective intentionality require that agents' intentions and subplans are common knowledge (or "out in the open") between them. For these theories the base problem arises again. The enacted theory of joint attention can solve the problem. The argument is exactly parallel to the common knowledge case. The openness of joint agents' intentions and meshing subplans is explained by appeal to their practical knowledge of how to maintain the process by way of which they pursue the collective intention. They can then make this knowledge explicit by linguistic communication. When they succeed in communicating knowledge of their meshing subplans as pursued in a joint action context, they necessarily have this knowledge in common. For theories of collective intentionality that include a common knowledge condition, the experience of participating in a perceptually constituted joint action provides the base that renders harmless the regress that otherwise threatens reductive analyses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some arguments against the assumption that ordinary people may share common knowledge are sound. The apparent cost of such arguments is the rejection of scientific theories that appeal to common knowledge. My proposal is to accept the arguments without rejecting the theories. On my proposal, common knowledge is shared by ideally rational people, who are not just mathematically simple versions of ordinary people. They are qualitatively different from us, and theorizing about them does not lead to predictions about our behavior. Nevertheless, models of action that assume common knowledge have a role to play in our understanding of collective rationality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The widespread adoption of the rational expectations hypothesis in macroeconomics since the 1970s often overlooked the issue of coordinating individual decisions, particularly regarding expectations. How is common knowledge, essential for rational expectations equilibrium, established? When common knowledge supports multiple equilibria, how do expectations converge to a specific one? These questions have been central to sunspot literature, which emerged in the early 1980s. Initially regarded as essential coordination devices by David Cass and Karl Shell, the epistemological status of sunspots evolved with the introduction of competing models and the transition from overlapping generations to infinitely lived agent frameworks. Recently, advancements in sunspot theory, especially in financial crises and experimental economics, have begun to rehabilitate the original interpretation of sunspots as coordination devices. This evolution reflects the ongoing debate about expectation formation and coordination in macroeconomic theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Studia Socjologiczne is the property of Studia Socjologiczne and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Everybody belongs to different groups. These groups have common knowledge that is acquired by language that determines the identity of the group. However, this language varies depending on the social background of the members of the group and it has a social meaning. If a language form stands out and can be considered characteristic of a group, this leads to stereotyping. Another form of stereotyping, also called ‘framing’, is not based on language characteristics of a group but is the result of mostly (negative) judgements of opinion makers (e.g. about Muslims). Stereotyping is also described on the basis of the self-image of a group (the Dutch people) and on the basis of the image that foreigners have about this group (including Queen Maxima). Finally, the question is answered whether THE identity exists.

Common knowledge is ubiquitous in our lives and yet there remains considerable uncertainty about how to model or understand it. Standard analyses of common knowledge end up being challenged by either regress or circularity which then give rise to well-known paradoxes of practical reasoning, such as the Two Generals' Paradox. This paper argues that the nature and utility of common knowledge can be illuminated by appeal to Wittgenstein's Hinge Epistemology. It is argued that those things that we standardly think of as being common knowledge in our lives are the same as those that Wittgenstein identified as hinge certainties. This identification of common knowledge with hinge certainties allows us to resolve the regress problem for common knowledge and explain how the Two Generals' Paradox arises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For the modal logic |$\textsf {S4}^{C}_{I}$|⁠ , we identify the class of completable |$\textsf {S4}^{C}_{I}$| -algebras and prove for them a Stone-type representation theorem. As a consequence, we obtain strong algebraic and topological completeness of the logic |$\textsf {S4}^{C}_{I}$| in the case of local semantic consequence relations. In addition, we consider an extension of the logic |$\textsf {S4}^{C}_{I}$| with certain infinitary derivations and establish the corresponding strong completeness results for the enriched system in the case of global semantic consequence relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The contribution of sustainable public administration to the promotion of sustainable development is increasingly emphasized in the literature, including through an emerging and facilitating concept: collaborative administration. The sustainability of public organizations and of the public interventions carried out by these organizations is a central pillar of a modern administrative model, the desideratum of any government agenda. For this reason, the aim of this paper is to contribute to a more nuanced view on the relationship of sustainable development–institutional sustainability–collaborative dimension, covering some gaps that prevail in the literature by contextualizing the theoretical hypotheses in a case study. The novelty and added value of the research lies in establishing links between these three concepts by referring to a fourth concept: organizational intelligence. The study uses theoretical instruments, such as a questionnaire based on the design model proposed by Lefter et al., for the indirect assessment of the collaborative dimension. The outcomes demonstrate that the collaborative dimension of a public organization can be quantified using the proposed model. Moreover, organizational plans that promote the sustainability of public administration and sustainable development are identified. However, additional complementary studies are required to further investigate the cause-and-effect relationship between sustainable development, institutional sustainability, and collaborative dimensions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explores enablers that help researchers to undertake collaborative transdisciplinary work with non-academic actors to co-produce knowledge on complex climate risks in African cities. Enablers were explored using a qualitative case study approach and expansive learning theory, which emphasises the embeddedness of practices in cultural and historical contexts. Concepts associated with expansive learning helped to consider relational enablers, namely: (i) capabilities required by researchers to understand the perspectives, values and motives of non-academic actors and make their own explicit; (ii) characteristics of spaces that allowed diverse participants to engage with perspectives, values and motives of others; and (iii) knowledge of the motivation behind different practices of non-academic actors, as embedded in different contexts. Findings highlight the importance of researchers' intentional efforts to engage non-academic actors in their city contexts and respond to local priorities. Design elements that enabled relational work included explicit co-production framings, sharing experiences and opportunities for understanding various actor groups through structured activities and informal dialogues. The study highlights the situated and dialectical relationship between growing relational capabilities of researchers and their engagement in transdisciplinarity, provided spaces were created for reflection on activities. Relational enablers helped researchers to understand the heterogeneous experiences of actors working in African cities and tensions that influence their practices including traditional knowledge paradigms and siloed ways of working. The "champions" identified by researchers were those non-academic actors who took agency to engage with these tensions and begin transforming their practices towards multi-actor transdisciplinary knowledge co-production. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractCommon sense is a dynamic concept and it is natural that our (statistical) common sense lags behind the development of statistical science. What is not so easy to understand is why common sense lags behind as much as it does. We conduct a survey among Japanese students and provide examples and tentative explanations of a number of statistical questions where common sense and statistical science diverge. Supplementary materials for this article are available online.

Simple Summary: The modern lifestyle, including indoor-centric living, urbanization and limited exposure to nature, contributes to the estrangement of humans from nature and a rapid decline in people's natural history knowledge. Meanwhile, several wild species are adapting and thriving in urban environments alongside humans. How should we see the rising human disconnect with nature, even while urban wildlife increases and environmental education programmes are deployed? How does this lack of connection affect perception and attitude towards wildlife? What is the role of the sociodemographic context? To address these questions, we used a keystone species as a study model—the European hedgehog. We collected data via online questionnaires that comprised four main sections: (i) socio-demographic features; (ii) feelings, attitude and perception; (iii) natural history knowledge about species; and (iv) self-evaluation about the extent of knowledge and past experience. The data indicate generally positive feelings and attitudes towards hedgehogs. We found that academic qualifications and past experience with the species shaped people's attitudes and natural history knowledge; however, the extent of knowledge, overall, was low and the study population was self-aware of this. We discuss the relevance of citizen profiling and possible avenues to enhance nature experience, improve knowledge, and increase public support for conservation measures. The modern lifestyle of humans is leading to a limited exposure to nature. While several wild species are adapting and thriving in anthropic environments, natural history knowledge is declining, and positive attitudes and behaviours towards nature are facing challenges. Because anticipating attitudes and engendering broad-based support for nature-related measures requires a good grasp of social contexts, we set out to evaluate the sociodemographic factors driving the perception, attitudes towards, and natural history knowledge of a keystone species—the European hedgehog. In 2022, we conducted a questionnaire answered by 324 Portuguese adults. We found generally positive feelings and attitudes towards this species. A higher degree of academic qualifications and previous personal experience with the species seem to play a role in (i) people's perception about human impacts on hedgehogs and (ii) positive attitudes, especially during encounters where the animals were in difficulty. Despite this, the extent of natural history knowledge was low overall, and the study population was self-aware of this. Our insights underline the need to tailor educational programmes if we are to encourage people to re-establish meaningful connections with nature, to foster social support for biodiversity stewardship, and to implement the One Health approach in a way that resonates with distinct social groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Environnement, Risques & Santé is the property of John Libbey Eurotext Ltd. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Common sense is a dynamic concept and it is natural that our (statistical) common sense lags behind the development of statistical science. What is not so easy to understand is why common sense lags behind as much as it does. We conduct a survey among Japanese students and provide examples and tentative explanations of a number of statistical questions where common sense and statistical science diverge. for this article are available online. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We explore the relationship between evidence and knowledge when knowledge is described by a standard partition over a finite state space, and evidence is represented by a state-dependent collection of finite sets of messages. When the collection is measurable with respect to the partition, there is evidence for an event only if the event is self-evident—i.e., known at every one of its states. Thus, an event is commonly known in and only if there is mutual evidence that implies that the event has occurred, and all knowledge can be proved only when the agent is informed about the state or knows nothing. The existence of partial provability outside these two extremes hinges on the non monotonic nature of provability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Finansal piyasaların sağlıklı bir şekilde işlemesi için iyi yönetilen bir ekonomi oldukça önemlidir. Ekonomiyi yöneten liderler ve bürokratlar bir kriz riski durumunda ne yapılması gerektiğini bilseler bile eksik bilgi altında koordinasyon problemi yüzünden ekonomik krizlerden kaçınmak mümkün olmayabilir. Bu çalışmada bölümsel bilgi yapısına sahip ekonomik aktörlerin eksik bilgi altında koordinasyon problemi ele alınmaktadır. Basit bir kuramsal model ile aslında herkesin bildiği bir finansal riskin, ekonomiyi yöneten lider ve bürokratların kriz durumunda ne yapılması gerektiğini bildikleri ideal bir durumda bile ortak bilgi olmadan engellenemeyebileceği gösterilmektedir. Herkesin bildiği finansal risklerin ilgili otoriteler tarafından açıkça kamuya ilanının gerekli olup olmadığı tartışılmaktadır. Sonuçlarımız, herkesin bildiği bir bilgiyi paylaşsa bile bir ekonomik koordinasyon merkezinin karşılıklı bilgiyi ortak bilgiye çevirerek ekonomik aktörlerin bir finansal kriz riski durumunda yapılması gerekeni yapmasını sağlayabileceğini göstermektedir. Çalışmamız ortak bilgi ile karşılıklı bilgi arasındaki keskin farkı vurgulayarak eksik bilgi altındaki koordinasyon problemlerinde yüksek dereceli bilgilerin önemli olduğunu bir kez daha ortaya koymaktadır.

We build and study dynamic versions of epistemic logic. We study languages parameterized by an action signature that allows one to express epistemic actions such as (truthful) public announcements, completely private announcements to groups of agents, and more. The language L (Σ) is modeled on dynamic logic. Its sentence-building operations include modalities for the execution of programs, and for knowledge and common knowledge. Its program-building operations include action execution, composition, repetition, and choice. We consider two fragments of L (Σ) . In L 1 (Σ) , we drop action repetition; in L 0 (Σ) , we also drop common knowledge. We present the syntax and semantics of these languages and sound proof systems for the validities in them. We prove the strong completeness of a logical system for L 0 (Σ) and the weak completeness of one for L 1 (Σ) . We show the finite model property and, hence, decidability of L 1 (Σ) . We translate L 1 (Σ) into PDL, obtaining a second proof of decidability. We prove results on expressive power, comparing L 1 (Σ) with modal logic together with transitive closure operators. We prove that a logical language with operators for private announcements is more expressive than one for public announcements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent work suggests that common knowledge is an important cognitive mechanism for coordinating prosocial behavior, in part because it reduces uncertainty about others' cooperative behavior. However, it remains unclear whether children also rely on common knowledge to solve coordination problems. Here we examined whether 6- to 9-year-old children (N = 133) from the United States were more likely to attempt to coordinate when they had common knowledge about a joint payoff. Participants saw 3 vignettes that modeled the structure of a 2-player coordination problem and were provided with common knowledge, secondary knowledge, or private knowledge about the mutually beneficial, but risky, joint payoff. By 6 years of age, participants were more likely to attempt to coordinate when they had common knowledge than secondary knowledge, and secondary knowledge than private knowledge. Participants were also most likely to expect the other player to coordinate, and were most certain in their predictions, when there was common knowledge. Results indicate that, by middle childhood, children are able to solve coordination problems by relying on common knowledge, in part because it likely increases their certainty in others' cooperative behavior. Overall, findings suggest that common knowledge is an important cognitive mechanism for coordinating behavior and that it does so by reducing uncertainty about others' cooperative behavior. Public Significance Statement: This study highlights the important role common knowledge plays in children's emerging prosocial behavior during early-middle childhood. Findings suggest that increasing confidence that all parties know they share the same information is an effective means of promoting cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his “Common knowledge” (2016) and The Transmission of Knowledge (2021), John Greco proposes a novel account of hinge propositions. Central to it is the idea that they are items of common knowledge – that is, of knowledge that is already present in the system, freely available to anyone, without having to figure it out by oneself or having to be taught it by others. As such, they are not subject to any quality control at all. Furthermore, they figure in a subject’s cognitive economy as items of procedural, mostly tacit knowledge, which is operative in the execution of actions and various cognitive tasks. After introducing the basics of Greco’s account, I consider it from a systematic and historical perspective and argue that, while instructive, it is wanting in several respects. Whereas some, among the myriad hinges Wittgenstein considers in On Certainty (1969), may be known, there is no need to make them the content of a different kind of knowledge. Furthermore, we cannot have (evidential) justification and, a fortiori, knowledge of at least some other propositions that Wittgenstein considered as hinges. In passing, I also show that Greco’s account aligns much more with G. E. Moore’s ideas about the epistemic status of his truisms in “A defence of common sense” (1925) and the premises of his celebrated “Proof of an external world” (1939), than with Wittgenstein’s account of hinges and their epistemic significance in On Certainty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we propose a dynamic epistemic framework to capture the knowledge evolution in multi-agent systems where agents are not able to observe. We formalize multi-agent conformant planning with group knowledge, and reduce planning problems to model checking problems. We prove that multi-agent conformant planning with group knowledge is Pspace-complete on the size of dynamic epistemic models. We also consider the alternative Kripke semantics, and show that for each Kripke model with perfect recall and no miracles, there is an equivalent dynamic epistemic model and vice versa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The contribution of sustainable public administration to the promotion of sustainable development is increasingly emphasized in the literature, including through an emerging and facilitating concept: collaborative administration. The sustainability of public organizations and of the public interventions carried out by these organizations is a central pillar of a modern administrative model, the desideratum of any government agenda. For this reason, the aim of this paper is to contribute to a more nuanced view on the relationship of sustainable development–institutional sustainability–collaborative dimension, covering some gaps that prevail in the literature by contextualizing the theoretical hypotheses in a case study. The novelty and added value of the research lies in establishing links between these three concepts by referring to a fourth concept: organizational intelligence. The study uses theoretical instruments, such as a questionnaire based on the design model proposed by Lefter et al., for the indirect assessment of the collaborative dimension. The outcomes demonstrate that the collaborative dimension of a public organization can be quantified using the proposed model. Moreover, organizational plans that promote the sustainability of public administration and sustainable development are identified. However, additional complementary studies are required to further investigate the cause-and-effect relationship between sustainable development, institutional sustainability, and collaborative dimensions.

Joint attention is an everyday phenomenon in which two or more individuals attend to an object, event process or property in the presence of each other, such that their attention to that object is to some degree intertwined with the other's attention to it. This paper argues that joint attention has the normative role of enabling subjects to coordinate their actions in a way that would contribute to the rational execution of a joint action in accordance with a prior shared plan or shared intention. This understanding of the normative function of joint attention underpins a particular understanding of the nature of joint attention: what I shall call Rich Relationalism. Rich Relationalism argues for the view that joint attention acts as an epistemically significant interface between the world, other people, and their background plans and concepts. It understands joint attention as an object-dependent, conceptually structured, token experiential state that is shared by two (or more) people. It can be contrasted with non-relational (i.e., Representational or Enactivist) accounts of joint attention on the one hand, and Lean Relationalist accounts on the other (such as John Campbell's influential account). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Everybody belongs to different groups. These groups have common knowledge that is acquired by language that determines the identity of the group. However, this language varies depending on the social background of the members of the group and it has a social meaning. If a language form stands out and can be considered characteristic of a group, this leads to stereotyping. Another form of stereotyping, also called 'framing', is not based on language characteristics of a group but is the result of mostly (negative) judgements of opinion makers (e.g. about Muslims). Stereotyping is also described on the basis of the self-image of a group (the Dutch people) and on the basis of the image that foreigners have about this group (including Queen Maxima). Finally, the question is answered whether THE identity exists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]