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The position of human sciences in Gadamer's philosophy is one of the challenging issues in his thought. Human sciences or spiritual sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) is one of the things that has a serious presence in Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics; The central issue is what is the relationship between Gadamer's philosophy and humanities. In one reading because of Gadamer's hermeneutics failing to connect hermeneutics to the human sciences in an attempt to develop the Dilthey project, and in accordance with the developments of postmodernity, it has prepared a pluralistic method, multicultural and truth-free methods for human sciences, or there is not a direct connection between Gadamer's hermeneutics and the human sciences and philosophical hermeneutics is only about hermeneutic existence of Dasein. By criticizing both of the above readings, this article shows that the recovery of the fundamental meaning of truth and then knowledge in Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics puts a fundamental meaning of human sciences on the table and together with ancient practical philosophy in a way that It also can be used as a basis for discovering the meaning of other components of Gadamer's philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Alasdair MacIntyre's relationship to Karl Marx and Marxism has been and remains fundamental in his work. Drawing on a number of important MacIntyrean texts, this paper shows how it has animated his Marxist early years, how it has been a crucial element in the epistemological crisis he experienced and how it has left him an important legacy. At the heart of the history of this relationship are the question of truth, the problematics of the right telos of human action, of the achievement of the individual and common goods, of the desires, the role of the critique of both the capitalist system and the Marxist politics. Understanding how MacIntyre positioned himself in relation to all these issues helps us to understand the reasons that led him to switch from a Marxist to an Aristotelian narrative. Key concepts of Marx and the Marxist tradition find a new life today in the now Aristotelian-Thomist thought of Alasdair MacIntyre. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The polarization and charges of "post-truth" that mark contemporary politics may have its source, ultimately, in a crisis of epistemology, which is characterized by a tension between different forms of naïve realism—the view that reality appears to us directly, unmediated by interpretation. Perhaps too schematically, those on the right tend to be first-person naïve realists in treating economic and social realities as accessible to the ordinary political participant by simple common sense, while those on the left tend to be third-person naïve realists in treating credentialed experts as forming a consensus—a new common sense. In treating reality as transparent enough to be legible either to oneself or to a group of experts, both sides tend to treat disagreement as a motivational problem—a problem of bad faith, motivated reasoning, perversity, and refusal to see the truth—rather than as an epistemic problem caused by the possibility that each side may hold a different set of interpretive frameworks that determines how and what it sees of reality. In obviating the possibility of genuine disagreement, the epistemological crisis is quite naturally transformed into a political crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A prevalent political narrative is that we are facing an epistemological crisis, where many citizens no longer care about truth and facts. Yet the view that we are living in a post-truth era relies on some implicit questionable empirical and normative assumptions. The post-truth rhetoric converts epistemic issues into motivational issues, treating people with whom we disagree as if they no longer believe in or care about truth. This narrative is also dubious on epistemic, moral, and political grounds. It is epistemically dubious in being largely insensitive to the problem of complexity in politics; it is morally dubious because "post-truth" is often a derogatory label for individuals or groups that are deemed stupid, irrational, or morally compromised; and it is a politically toxic neologism because it purports to use the language of 'truth' as a weapon against power, yet these truth-claims are often themselves attempts to exert power over others by delegitimizing their perspectives. While it may seem as if truth and democracy are on especially bad terms lately, politics and truth have long had a vexed relationship, and moral panics about the value of truthfulness in politics are as old as politics itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Portuguesa de Pedagogia is the property of Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Our clinical practice is contextualized by a co-participant trauma constituted by a confluence of upheavals–pandemic, politics, an epistemological crisis, pervasive distrust of expertise and evidence. Psychoanalytic work, parallel to the external world, has become defamiliarized, if not, at sometimes unrecognizable. The affect on the frame and the boundaries of the therapeutic frame and of the psychoanalytic institution are explored with an awareness of the uncertainty of the future. The experience of the onset of the pandemic is discussed with awareness of an unknown future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The modern editions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), beginning with DSM-III in 1980, emerged in response to notable challenges to psychiatry's practices and ways of knowing in the early 1970s. Because these challenges threatened psychiatry's scientific self-understanding and moral authority, they exemplify what Alasdair MacIntyre has termed "epistemological crisis." As a response to crisis, the modern DSM has been a stunning political achievement, providing the central diagnostic constructs around which psychiatric research, practice, and reimbursement has been organized for four decades. Indeed, the DSM's authority survives in the face of ongoing trenchant scientific and philosophical critique. But if psychiatry is to be healthy, it must be epistemologically humble, reckoning honestly with the limits of the DSM before a future epistemological crisis destabilizes it entirely. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is now constituted by a set of characteristic symptoms, its roots lie in Post-Vietnam Syndrome, a label generated by a Vietnam-era advocacy movement that focused not on symptoms but on war's traumatic context. When Post-Vietnam Syndrome was subsumed into the abstract, individualistic, symptom-centered language of DSM-III and rendered as PTSD, it not only lost this focus on context but also neglected the experiences of veterans who suffer from things done or witnessed, not primarily from what was done to them, in war. This agent-related trauma has been rediscovered in contemporary work on moral injury, but moral injury too is increasingly subjected to the hegemony of the symptom. Focusing on symptoms, however, unhelpfully pathologizes and individualizes trauma, neglects traumatic context, and legitimates problematic therapeutic approaches. Trauma researchers and clinicians should decenter the language of symptoms and focus instead on context and on alternative accounts of trauma. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current civilizational crisis of the project of capitalist rationality-modernity was objectively evident in the collapse and rupture of Eurocentric epistemological paradigms that claimed to be universal and superior to other knowledge of human diversity. In Latin America, we are immersed in a process of struggle for new anti-capitalist social constructions and for our own knowledge expressed in the Mexican indigenous movement of the Zapatista National Liberation Army. Here, Mariátegui's philosophical-political reflections on the need to build and consolidate a Latin-American thought and social project have been proven at the EZLN to de facto exercise their autonomous forms of government, productive, educational and social justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Modern science has no basis of positivist epistemological and methodological foundations sufficient for building a comprehensive understanding of the world of man and society. A study of contrasts to the paradigms of science, technology and modern rationality expressed the thoughts of Jürgen Habermas, Herbert Marcuse, Martin Heidegger, Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and Boaventura Santos Souza was conducted. We used a dialectic approach to highlight the contradictions and limitations of this paradigm and highlight other paradigms of positivist epistemological basis not carry that enabled the overcoming of knowledge as regulation by knowledge empowerment. It was evident, based on the theories of these authors and arguments of researchers such as Albert Einstein, Ilya Prigogine, Michel Foucault, among others, that modern science has methodological limitations Cartesian basis and fragile epistemological basis when trying to conceive man, world and society while dynamically articulated.

Copyright of Revista Brasileira de Ciência e Movimento: RBCM is the property of Revista Brasileira de Ciencia e Movimento and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article explores the nature of the Elim movement by utilizing Alasdair MacIntyre's concept of tradition as 'an argument extended through time'. In doing so it seeks to identify the essential content of the Elim argument (read: tradition) and its method (read: rationality); and to narrate how the Elim argument has progressed during its 100 year history, with particular emphasis on its two major epistemological crises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]