Search

Some scholars claim that epistemology of science and machine learning are actually overlapping disciplines studying induction, respectively affected by Hume's problem of induction and its formal machine‐learning counterpart, the "no‐free‐lunch" (NFL) theorems, to which even advanced AI systems such as LLMs are not immune. Extending Kevin Korb's view, this paper envisions a hierarchy of disciplines where the lowermost is a basic science, and, recursively, the metascience at each level inductively learns which methods work best at the immediately lower level. Due to Hume's dictum and NFL theorems, no exact metanorms for the good performance of each object science can be obtained after just a finite number of levels up the hierarchy, and the progressive abstractness of each metadiscipline and consequent ill‐definability of its methods and objects makes science—as defined by a minimal standard of scientificity—cease to exist above a certain metalevel, allowing for a still rational style of inquiry into science that can be called "philosophical." Philosophical levels, transitively reflecting on science, peculiarly manifest a non–empirically learned urge to self‐reflection constituting the properly normative aspect of philosophy of science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An educational innovation experience developed as part of the curriculum for the Early Childhood Education degree is presented within the framework of the scientific dissemination project entitled 'INFA-CIENCIA: From the girls of today to the scientists of tomorrow', which pursues two objectives: (1) To bolster future teachers' knowledge of women scientists and (2) To improve their didactic skills so that they can adapt the research carried out by women to children's capacities. The key findings are a high level of satisfaction amongst teachers with the interventions by university students; the need to continue implementing this innovation, due to the scant knowledge of women scientists amongst students; and the advisability of the students voluntarily choosing the woman scientist they want to work on, in order to boost their motivation and interest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this text is to assert the thesis that scientific work, manifested in the production of analyses, theories, and concepts, irrespective of their disciplinary, multidisciplinary, or interdisciplinary origins, only unfolds when rooted in the primacy of the real. The complexity of scientific objects cannot be fully addressed exclusively within disciplinary confines. Discussions centered solely on theoretical, conceptual, or explanatory models, while assisting in transcending disciplinary limitations, do not propel the advancement of scientific knowledge. Contradictions in theoretical-conceptual and analytical production, explicit within disciplinary fields, arise not only from the limitations of disciplines but from how reality is conceptualized as concrete thought. Regardless of the discipline, theory and concept divorced from reality amount to mere speculation.

Copyright of Horizonte de la Ciencia is the property of Horizonte de la Ciencia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Estimating whether the Earth’s biota is in the middle of a crisis relies heavily on comparisons between present and past data about biodiversity or biodiversity surrogates. Although the past is a crucial source of information to assess the severity of the current biodiversity crisis, substantive conceptual and methodological questions remain about how paleodiversity and biodiversity are to be properly compared. I argue that to justify claims of a current biodiversity crisis is harder than it appears. More precisely, I claim that paleodiversity measurements are incommensurable with contemporary measurements, given the different ways that biodiversity is conceptualized and operationalized. I conclude by proposing three possible ways of overcoming this incommensurability problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thought experiments, models, diagrams, computer simulations, and metaphors can all be understood as tools of the imagination. While these devices are usually treated separately in philosophy of science, this paper provides a unified account according to which tools of the imagination are epistemically good insofar as they improve scientific imaginings. Improving scientific imagining is characterized in terms of epistemological consequences: more improvement means better consequences. A distinction is then drawn between tools being good in retrospect, at the time, and in general. In retrospect, tools are evaluated straightforwardly in terms of the quality of their consequences. At the cutting edge, tools are evaluated positively insofar as there is reason to believe that using them will have good consequences. Lastly, tools can be generally good, insofar as their use encourages the development of epistemic virtues, which are good because they have good epistemic consequences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Computer simulations have conventionally been understood to be either extensions of formal methods such as mathematical models or as special cases of empirical practices such as experiments. Here, I argue that computer simulations are best understood as instruments. Understanding them as such can better elucidate their actual role as well as their potential epistemic standing in relation to science and other scientific methods, practices and devices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Góndola, Enseñanza y Aprendizaje de las Ciencias is the property of Gondola, Ensenanza y Aprendizaje de las Ciencias and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Sociologists, ethnologists, philosophers among others have tried to identify the norms or rules that govern scientific research; however, so far, they have not been widely accepted by scientists. This team followed a different path to identify the rules that govern scientific work by asking researchers if, in their opinion, there are rules in scientific research, and, if so, what they are. An opinion poll was conducted among 270 scientists who received academic training at universities in Mexico, Europe, and the United States, and who work at three universities in Mexico. The instrument is based on a social psychology theory that divides memories into spontaneous and assisted, and a dichotomous probability distribution was used to identify variations. Between eight and nine out of ten researchers from physical, biological, and social sciences recognized that there are four rules for research: to study reality as it is, have a critical attitude, have a methodological aptitude, and express willingness to openly publish results. Despite the heterogeneity of the disciplines researchers practice and the variety of their academic training, there is a consensus among scientists about the validity of such rules to conduct scientific research, although most of the time they do not mention them spontaneously.

Questions about what experts need to know to facilitate their collaboration in interdisciplinary situations are usually answered with proposals concerning the technical methods, epistemic ground rules, and explanatory theories that one applies "across" disciplines, just as such methods, rules, and theories are applied "within" a discipline. However, (post-Husserlian) phenomenology offers something better. Instead of following the traditional route of looking for general conditions that apply to collaborative practice, phenomenology turns to what actually happens in collaborative experience and shows that success is not just a function of applied procedures, even when they are in play. Instead, individual experts seem to rediscover their ability to keep their thoughts and concepts looser, more informal, and open-endedly responsive to the situation—just as they did when they first began to shape unfamiliar circumstances into a regionally shared practice—only now with potentially interdisciplinary circumstances as their experienced phenomenon. By cultivating an awareness of how it is with life prior to its being variously studied, exploited, or harnessed to explanatory theories and essentialist ideas, they remain open to becoming expert collaborators, just as they are already regional experts. An example of this process is given from the authors' recent field research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hasok Chang is developing a new form of pragmatic scientific realism that aims to reorient the debate away from truth and towards practice. Central to his project is replacing truth as correspondence with his new notion of 'operational coherence', which is introduced as: 1) A success term with probative value to judge and guide epistemic activities. 2) A more useful alternative than truth as correspondence in guiding scientific practice. I argue that, given its current construal as neither necessary nor sufficient for success, operational coherence is too weak and fails to satisfy both 1) and 2). I offer a stronger construal of operational coherence which aims to improve on Chang's account by tying it to systematic success. This makes operational coherence necessary and sufficient for (systematic) success. This new account, if successful, rescues 1) but not 2). I then take a step back and try to locate Chang's pragmatic realism within the broader pragmatist tradition by comparing his views to the founding fathers Peirce, James and Dewey. I also assess to what extent we should consider Chang's position 'realist', arguing that despite the many relativists threads running through it, Chang's pragmatic realism is deserving of the realist label because its aims to maximize our learning from reality, even if it falls short of what many traditional realist are happy to accept as realism. I finish with comments on the epistemology of science pointing out that there is nothing intrinsic about a practice-based philosophy of science that precludes having both operational coherence and correspondence and highlighting that given a proper understanding these two notions could, in fact, be understood as complementary. I suggest one way this could be done. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this essay was to critically discuss whether there are and what are the epistemological differences between scientists and designers. These two characters are worked out in the form of extreme stereotypes. The scientist is the ultimate representative of a traditional and positivist view of science, which seeks to explain in a value-free way how the world is. While the designer represents all those who act guided by proposals of value to transform the world, not just explain it. In these two different ways of acting and creating knowledge, Peirce's three types of logical inference would play a fundamental role, induction and deduction being the central tools for the scientist and abduction of the designer's own thinking. Throughout the work, we present a critique about this split, demonstrating that this is an artificial and inadequate division, since both characters work with the three types of inference. In this way, both would be, contrary to what the literature defends, epistemologically very similar. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Next Generation Science Standards (NGSS) emphasize engaging students in science practices through which students can develop content, procedural, and epistemic knowledge of science. To accomplish this goal, science teachers must embed science content in authentic science practice. Successfully integrating content and practice will require significant epistemological and pedagogical shifts on the part of teachers. However, teachers cannot meaningfully achieve this integration if they, themselves, do not understand the epistemic underpinnings of the science practices. Given the lack of literature specifically addressing teachers' epistemic understanding of science practices, we conducted a qualitative study to fill this gap in the literature. Data were collected using an open-ended online survey, and responses from 128 science teachers were analyzed using the constant comparative method. Our results indicate that relatively few teachers exhibited more nuanced epistemic understandings of scientific practice that extend beyond the rigid, linear scientific method presented in science textbooks. Teachers broadly believed that scientific inquiry must begin with a question, seldom cite methodological differences when comparing two experiments, frequently viewed models as teaching tools for representations and explanation, and hardly discussed computational thinking in terms beyond data analysis. More importantly, teachers viewed that scientific conclusions are heavily influenced by researchers' perceptions and biases. To enhance science teachers' sophisticated epistemic understanding of science, we highlight the need not only to engage teachers in authentic scientific inquiry experiences, but also to provide opportunities to learn how to effectively integrate science practices as a coherent system, especially computational thinking and models, into science lessons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Veritism, the position that truth is necessary for epistemic acceptability, seems to be in tension with the observation that much of our best science is not, strictly speaking, true when interpreted literally. This generates a paradox: (1) truth is necessary for epistemic acceptability; (2) the claims of science have to be taken literally; (3) much of what science produces is not literally true and yet it is acceptable. We frame Elgin's project in True Enough as being motivated by, and offering a particular resolution to, this paradox. We discuss the paradox with a focus on scientific models and argue that there is another resolution available which is compatible with retaining veritism: rejecting the idea that scientific models should be interpreted literally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The question of the metaphysical status of the laws of physics has received increased attention in recent years. Perhaps most well-known among this work are David Lewis’s Humean supervenience and Nancy Cartwright’s dispositionalism, both of which reject the classical conception of the laws of physics as necessary and real independent of the objects they govern, arguing instead that what we call laws are shorthand for the regularities of local states of affairs (on Lewis’s account) or the dispositions of objects (on Cartwright’s). The properties of necessity and reality are generally taken to go hand-in-hand when physical laws are concerned; however, this leaves aside the possibility that the laws of physics are independently real (i.e. not just a description of regularities of objects) yet contingent. This paper will explore this third option which is found in the work of Quentin Meillassoux. We will ask: if laws both exist independent of their objects and are contingent, what happens when laws change? Specifically, the possibility of metaphysical retro-causation becomes a live option. This raises both questions of the ontological status of the past as well as our epistemic access to the past after a change in physical laws. Meillassoux’s ontology of hyper-chaos weathers this challenge with its consistency intact; however, it is an open question of whether or not saving the reality of physical laws by sacrificing their necessity is worth the epistemic limits and metaphysical strangeness that it implies.

Representationalism—the view that scientific modeling is best understood in representational terms—is the received view in contemporary philosophy of science. Contributions to this literature have focused on a number of puzzles concerning the nature of representation and the epistemic role of misrepresentation, without considering whether these puzzles are the product of an inadequate analytical framework. The goal of this paper is to suggest that this possibility should be taken seriously. The argument has two parts, employing the "can't have" and "don't need" tactics drawn from philosophy of mind. On the one hand, I propose that representationalism doesn't work: different ways to flesh out representationalism create a tension between its ontological and epistemological components and thereby undermine the view. On the other hand, I propose that representationalism is not needed in the first place—a position I articulate based on a pragmatic stance on the success of scientific research and on the feasibility of alternative philosophical frameworks. I conclude that representationalism is untenable and unnecessary, a philosophical dead end. A new way of thinking is called for if we are to make progress in our understanding of scientific modeling. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The specific term "data science" has been widely cited, both in the academic context and in the industry, which is the result of its high applicability and also the buzzword effect created around the term. However, a "science of data" still lacks a distinct identity and a theory-driven approach, both for its benefit and so that it can be applied properly and in conjunction with Administration. This thematic section (dossier) reflects an initiative that provides the emerging area with an opportunity to express its applicability to the field of Administration. The five articles in the dossier present a set of theories and/or concepts able to address explanations and supporting the abilities of prediction/prescription in the field, especially when applied in conjunction with the social sciences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The education of scientific literate citizens requires an effective teaching on the complex scientific endeavor and its implication on society. Consequently, the improvement of the quality of scientific education from this perspective should be addressed from initial teacher education. This research article presents and discusses the changes observed in undergraduate Primary School teachers' views about key aspects of the Nature of Science (NOS), after the application of a didactic proposal based on the history of science, which integrates inquiry processes into different learning scenarios, using an explicit and reflective approach. Progress in the conceptions of the participants is shown through the effect size statistic. Results shows a positive evolution in aspects related to the epistemological and sociological dimensions of the NOS in the participants when compared to the control group, which provide evidence of the utility of the intervention to improve initial teacher education in this area. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I investigate how researchers evaluate their characterizations of scientific phenomena. Characterizing phenomena is an important – albeit often overlooked – aspect of scientific research, as phenomena are targets of explanation and theorization. As a result, there is a lacuna in the literature regarding how researchers determine whether their characterization of a target phenomenon is appropriate for their aims. This issue has become apparent for accounts of scientific explanation that take phenomena to be explananda. In particular, philosophers who endorse mechanistic explanation suggest that the discovery of the mechanisms that explain a phenomenon can lead to its recharacterization. However, they fail to make clear how these explanations provide warrant for recharacterizing their explananda phenomena. Drawing from cases of neurobiological research on potentiation phenomena, I argue that attempting to explain a phenomenon may provide reason to suspend judgment about its characterization, but this cannot provide warrant to recharacterize it if researchers cannot infer a phenomenon's characteristics from this explanation. To explicate this, I go beyond explanation – mechanistic or otherwise – to analyze why and how researchers change their epistemic commitments in light of new evidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Building on Carey and Smith’s work on epistemology of science, this study characterized elementary students’ scientific epistemology from the role-of-idea and theory-building perspective. The participants included 102 elementary students in Hong Kong. Open-ended questions and coding schemes were developed to examine and characterize their epistemic understanding of science. Four key dimensions were identified: role of idea, theory-fact understanding, theory revision and creation, and social process of scientific progress. The general pattern showed that students’ views of scientific inquiry ranged from seeing it as a mechanical process involving concrete materials and sets of scientific skills, to viewing it as an idea-driven process comprising collective theory-building and knowledge creation. The analysis showed that these students generally had a limited understanding of the role-of-idea and theory-building in science. Quantitative analysis indicated that this conceptualized epistemology of science was an important predictor of students’ academic performance in science. Implications for science education and future research are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We introduce a novel point of view on the 'models as mediators' framework in order to emphasize certain important epistemological questions about models in science which have so far been little investigated. To illustrate how this perspective can help answer these kinds of questions, we explore the use of simplified models in high energy physics research beyond the Standard Model. We show in detail how the construction of simplified models is grounded in the need to mitigate pressing epistemic problems concerning the uncertainty inherent in the present theoretical and experimental contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper discusses the extent to which the availability of unprecedentedly rich data-sets and the need for new approaches – both epistemological and computational – is an emerging issue for Macroeconomics. By adopting an evolutionary approach, we describe the paradigm shifts experienced in the macroeconomic research field and emphasize that the types of data the macroeconomist has to deal with play an important role in the evolutionary process of the development of the discipline. After introducing the current debate over Big Data in social sciences, the paper presents a detailed discussion of possible and existing interactions between Big Data and Computational Behavioral Macroeconomics. We argue that Big Data applied to economic questions can lead to new styles of thinking and research methods, namely to the development of a new research paradigm. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Next, it's a partial result of the research investigation "Conceptions of sciences, technology and CTS relations with training academic, secondary teachers and sciences textbooks." Then the question about teachers' conceptions of the nature of technology is that teachers of the University of Tolima expressed is discussed. Information was collected through interviews and focus information analysis was performed using content analysis. It's found that teachers have different conceptions about the nature of technology some more outdated than others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Methodological and theoretical foundations obtained from an investigative work are presented, whose purpose was to establish and explain the possible relationships between the implementation of experimental activities in the Science class and the social construction of scientific knowledge, through reflections about the measurement process around the phenomenon flotation within the bodies and its relation with the concept of density. To reach the stated purpose, the flotation phenomenon of the bodies is organized in relation to the concepts of specific weight and density, and the interlocution is formed, through a historical and critical analysis using authors like Galileo and Archimedes. The previous information constitutes an alternative to the traditional way of assuming the magnitude and measurement processes as external to the phenomenon and separate any sensible experience from the subject conducting the experiment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Studia Universitatis Babes-Bolyai, Philologia is the property of Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This study deals with the school instruction of the concept of weight. The historical review reveals the major steps in changing weight definition reflecting the epistemological changes in physics. The latest change drawing on the operation of weighing has been not widely copied into physics education. We compared the older instruction based on the gravitational definition of weight with the newer one based on the operational definition. The experimental teaching was applied in two versions, simpler and extended. The study examined the impact of this instruction on the middle school students in regular teaching environment. The experiment involved three groups ( N = 486) of 14-year-old students (ninth grade). The assessment drew on a written questionnaire and personal interviews. The elicited schemes of conceptual knowledge allowed to evaluate the impact on students' pertinent knowledge. The advantage of the new teaching manifested itself in the significant decrease of the well-known misconceptions such as 'space causes weightlessness,' 'weight is an unchanged property of the body considered,' and 'heavier objects fall faster'. The twofold advantage-epistemological and conceptual-of the operational definition of weight supports the correspondent curricular changes of its adoption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study applies a new quantitative methodological approach to diagnose epistemology conceptions in a large sample. The analyses use seven multiple-rating items on the epistemology of science drawn from the item pool Views on Science-Technology-Society (VOSTS). The bases of the new methodological diagnostic approach are the empirical psychometric scaling of the item sentences in accordance with experts' criteria, the implementation of a multiple-rating model of answering (the respondent appraises each item sentence), and a scoring procedure that computes standardized indices from the multiple-rating responses and the sentence's scaling. These standardized indices represent the extent to which the respondent's conceptions about the epistemology of science are informed (the higher the index, the more informed the conception). The approach is applied to evaluate the conceptions of a large and diverse national sample through its standardized indices, which provide statistical hypothesis-testing across individual sentences, items, groups, or studies, computation of reliability indices, the correlations between items, and an exploratory factor analysis that may complement qualitative analysis. Finally, the most relevant features of the new approach, its potential for applications to teacher training and curricular development in the science classroom and the method's power to make easy, quick, and economic evaluations of conceptions about the nature of science, are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can science properly serve as the exclusive or framing epistemology for conservation? It is argued here that, regardless of the ontological findings of science, its epistemology subtly reinforces anthropocentric bias by distancing the knower from the known in the name of value neutrality. If conservation is to escape the grip of anthropocentric bias, its underlying epistemology needs to be expanded to include very different ways of knowing, based on feeling and hence on caring, that may be found in certain Indigenous cultures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]