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This paper analyzes the protection of victims of forced migration from the perspective of the philosophy of law and international human rights law. On the one hand, it focuses on the origin and philosophical-legal foundations of human dignity and its practical requirements as a legal principle. Understood in this sense, dignity is considered as the foundation of the most basic human rights; and implies universally enforceable legal prerogatives in favor of all persons, by the mere fact of their human nature; and without considering exogenous factors, such as origin or nationality. Within this context, fundamental notions such as ius communcationis, or the right of sociability of human beings and hospitality, which entail a common use of the universal land within the comunitas orbis or universal community, are recovered. It is concluded that, despite the efforts and the many legal instruments that exist in this regard, and which are based on the dignity of the individual, the protection afforded to them in practice is not sufficient. The reason for this lies in several factors, in particular, in the fact that although human dignity can be considered as the basis for the recognition of human rights on equal terms, its scope is limited to the most fundamental rights, such as life or the prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, but does not imply more specific rights such as freedom of movement or residence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, the problematic aspects of the thesis that bases human rights on the dignity of the person are presented. Following the metaphysics of the person of Thomas Aquinas, the ontological consistency referred to in this term is studied. Then the ideological inspiration of both modern «human rights» and Kantian ballast dignity is reviewed. The elements of natural rights that still exist in modern human rights theory are based on human nature, not directly and exclusively in the ontological dignity of the person. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The cross between aging and progressive dependence gives rise to one of the most vulnerable stages in the existence of every human being. In this paper I ask myself to what extent the perspective of human rights is being correctly applied to this group of elderly and highly dependent people. To answer this question, I begin by distinguishing between the concepts of existential vulnerability and constructed vulnerability. While the first must be assumed by individuals and cared for by society, the second must be fought. Next, I review the public policies that have been promoted at a global and regional level in relation to the recognition of the rights of older people who are becoming increasingly dependent. This review leads me to notice a certain disproportion between the insistence on guaranteeing the rights of the elderly who can act autonomously compared to those who, being highly dependent and close to dying, can barely lead an independent life. This emphasis on active and healthy ageing, if it does not integrate long-term and end-of-life care, may end up turning against older people when they are more fragile, because it is based on a lack of knowledge of existential vulnerability that generates constructed vulnerability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Both the concept of human rights in Jacques Maritain and his the role in the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 continue to generate significant interest among scholars and researchers. This interest is driven by a desire to understand the foundations of human rights in a multicultural context as well as the influence of the French philosopher on the composition of the UDHR. Charles Malik, a Lebanese philosopher and diplomat, was a nuclear drafter of the UDHR. An extensive archive of Malik’s papers is preserved at the Library of Congress, including large sections from his university years and his tenure as Lebanon’s ambassador to the United Nations. In order to provide original sources, this article presents Charles Malik’s references to the person and thought of Jacques Maritain, which will serve as a valuable resource for future researchers seeking to explain and clarify Maritain’s role and ideas in the drafting of the UDHR. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this article is to analyze the prevailing philosophical presuppositions in human rights interpretations and how they provide a reductionist and partial vision of the human person and of rationality. This paradigm excludes the experiences and moral concerns of a significant segment of the global population and avoids engaging with the underlying claims behind human rights debates. In response to such a situation, this paper will introduce a personalistic philosophical approach to human rights as an alternative capable of explaining how the concept of 'person', as a relational self, can enrich the prevailing rationality in International Human Rights Law. The research suggests that looking at inter-subjective relationships, meaning, and an enlarged concept of 'human experiences' can provide a deeper understanding of the human person and it can help to frame human rights discussions in more diversified and inclusive terms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]