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The relational turn in psychoanalysis can be identified by the replacement of Freudian drives for intersubjectivity as main regulative principle. "Intersubjective systems theory" is the name of one strand within the relational turn that explicitly locates its philosophical foundations in a number of phenomenological insights. In this paper, I investigate some of the essential phenomenological assumptions underlying intersubjective systems theory. I identify 2 main problems: 1. intersubjective systems theory relies on the premise that meaning is intersubjectively constituted, yet fails to offer an account of this constitution; 2. intersubjective systems theory is based on an ambiguous conception of the unconscious. The aim of this paper is to show how Husserlian phenomenology offers a valuable theoretical foundation for intersubjective systems theory in the sense that it presents a convincing account of the intersubjective constitution of meaning that in its very constitution allows for a dynamic and situational relation between consciousness and unconsciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Human consciousness is characterized by constant transitions in time. On the other hand, what is consciously experienced always possesses the temporal feature of "now." In consciousness, "now" constantly holds different contents, yet it remains "now" no matter how far it goes. This duality is thematized in Husserlian phenomenology as "the standing-streaming now." Although this phrase appears contradictory in everyday language, it has a structure that can be clearly understood and formalized. In this paper, we show that this structure can be described as a monoid in category theory. Furthermore, monoids can be transformed into the coslice category, which corresponds to the way of perceiving present moments as juxtaposed in succession. The seemingly contradictory nature of the "now" as both flowing and standing can be precisely structured and comprehended through the monoid, while the perspective of the "now" as discrete points on a timeline can be effectively formalized using the coslice category. This framework helps us more precisely understand the differences between ordinary consciousness and meditative consciousness, specifically the experience of the "eternal now." We illustrate how the meditative states of consciousness presented in the early Buddhist scriptures (Pali Canon) and Dōgen's Shōbōgenzō remarkably reflect a monoid structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relational turn in psychoanalysis can be identified by the replacement of Freudian drives for intersubjectivity as main regulative principle. “Intersubjective systems theory” is the name of one strand within the relational turn that explicitly locates its philosophical foundations in a number of phenomenological insights. In this paper, I investigate some of the essential phenomenological assumptions underlying intersubjective systems theory. I identify 2 main problems: 1. intersubjective systems theory relies on the premise that meaning is intersubjectively constituted, yet fails to offer an account of this constitution; 2. intersubjective systems theory is based on an ambiguous conception of the unconscious. The aim of this paper is to show how Husserlian phenomenology offers a valuable theoretical foundation for intersubjective systems theory in the sense that it presents a convincing account of the intersubjective constitution of meaning that in its very constitution allows for a dynamic and situational relation between consciousness and unconsciousness.

This article contrasts the views of the philosophers Husserl and Hegel on quantification in science and compares their proposals for conducting rigorous qualitative research. Both deem quantification integral to science, but furthermore proposed methodologies to investigate qualitative necessities achieved by a shift in conscious activity and awareness. However, their methodologies differ significantly. While Husserl rejects idealization and instead proposes intuitive means to ideate qualitative essential relations, Hegel suggests idealizing less one-sidedly, namely, qualitatively over and above quantitatively. The article first examines how quantification is achieved and how it contrasts with measuring. This contrast reveals that measuring implies knowledge of qualities. These qualities, however, thus far remain oddly external to the mathematical relations linking the various established equations. The article then follows Husserl's reconstruction of the development of science to illustrate the dismissal of many experiential qualities and how philosophy further amplified skepticism about science on qualities. Husserl's notion of the life-world and the method of eidetic variation are then introduced as means to counterbalance mathematical proceedings in science. However, this method reveals both eidetic qualitative structures and psychical structures without being able to distinguish between them. It is thus susceptible to idiosyncratic, traditional, and cultural biases. Subsequently, Hegel's description of the shift in conscious experience that sets qualitative from quantitative thinking apart is introduced. This shift may overcome the biases, but it faces skepticism that calls for further investigation of the experience of different kinds of thinking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]