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One of the main obstacles to implementing the Conversion of Cropland to Forest and Grassland Program (CCFGP) is the risk of returning forest and grassland to cropland when their livelihoods are challenged after subsidies expire. The implementation of the new old-age insurance system for rural residents has weakened the economic security function of cropland and may motivate farmers to engage in the CCFGP spontaneously and permanently. Based on the utility theory, this paper first developed a theoretical analysis framework for the behaviors of farmers who participated in the CCFGP and were affected by the new old-age insurance system. Then, based on the data of 18 789 fixed rural observation stations set by the Rural Economy Research Center of China's Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, the Probit model was used to empirically analyze the impact of the new old-age insurance system on farmers' behaviors in the CCFGP. Finally, the robustness of the results was tested using a logistic regression model based on clustering robust standard errors. The results showed that: ① The new old-age insurance system increased expected income, while the CCFGP reduced expected income, but the extra spare time after the action increased farmers' utility. The theoretical analysis framework showed that: the behaviors of farmers participating in the new old-age insurance system affected the amount of arable land, thus affecting the behaviors of farmers' participation in the conversion of cropland to forest and grassland. ② After farmers' participation in the new agricultural insurance, they were more likely to adopt the behaviors associated with the conversion of cropland to forest and grassland. The new oldage insurance system increased the income channels for elderly farmers, thereby weakening the economic security function of cultivated land and, to a certain extent, promoting farmers to take part in the CCFGP. ③ In the robustness test, the logistic regression model with clustering robust standard errors still confirmed the conclusion that 'participating in the new old-age insurance system is beneficial for farmers joining the CCFGP.' ④ The poorer the health conditions of farmers, the lower the possibility of joining the CCFGP. Poor health conditions generally meant large medical expenses, greater uncertainty in future income, and strong dependence on cultivated land, which resulted in farmers' reluctance to be involved in the CCFGP. Farmers with higher original values of productive fixed assets were more likely to join the CCFGP. The policy implications of the conclusions are that it may be more effective to integrate the new old-age insurance system for rural residents with the CCFGP. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]