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Results reported in this article, on local implementation of mixed-ownership reforms and the corporatization of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOE) in the period 2008–2017, confirm that political and economic factors determine the possibility, objective, and pace of SOE corporate restructuring. With a starting point in a comprehensive review of the literature on Chinese SOE reforms in the late 1990s and early 2000s, hypotheses on the effects of 1) market supporting institutions, 2) fiscal and financial stability constraints, and 3) social stability constraints on state sector ownership reforms were identified. Industrial economy statistics found in province-level statistical yearbooks were used to test the continuing relevance of these hypotheses and to provide the basis for an updated analysis of the ownership structure of local state-owned enterprises in a new phase of SOE reforms. Most of the firm-level findings reported here are consistent with those of previous studies. However, in contrast to earlier stages of SOE reforms, we find that fiscal pressure on local governments no longer functions as a driver of local-state-sector ownership restructuring. The analysis implies that the Chinese government's current SOE reform strategy, which this time focus on mixed ownership, is mainly relevant for high-performing SOEs located in rich provinces with well-developed market-supporting institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are now working with humanitarian organizations to develop infrastructure abroad. This emerging phenomenon is puzzling: when, where, and why do Chinese SOEs, best known for constructing massive overseas infrastructure projects for commercial and political gain, execute smaller, lower-profile humanitarian projects? Similarly, why would humanitarian organizations––often with minimal experience in infrastructure contracting––select partners criticized for lack of emphasis on the international standards and best practices that they seek to promote? We address these questions through qualitative case studies of Chinese SOE-humanitarian organization collaboration in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, and the Republic of Congo. These cases suggest that such partnerships are more likely when a humanitarian organization has previous experience working in China or with Chinese actors, when Chinese SOEs aim to enter new markets, or when these firms operate in dangerous or politically unstable environments. This study contributes to scholarship on China's evolving role in international development by providing the first empirical analysis of Chinese SOE-humanitarian organization partnerships. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A great deal of prior literature on corporate governance in China has asserted that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are inefficiently run and badly governed—either worse than privately-owned enterprises (POEs) or just as bad. There is, however, no solid empirical evidence that underpins either claim. Using a unique, hand-coded dataset on corporate charter provisions with a random sample of nearly 300 publicly listed Chinese firms, this paper demonstrates that political hierarchy, state shareholding level, and political compliance are key factors in the governance and performance of Chinese SOEs. The corporate governance of SOEs that are firmly controlled by the Chinese central government favours minority shareholders, whereas that of SOEs firmly controlled by provincial governments appears to be less protective of them. Overall, SOEs, particularly those controlled by the central government, do not perform any worse than POEs, as measured by Tobin's Q. Nonetheless, more politically compliant firms do perform worse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]