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Conventionalism about mathematics has much in common with two other views: fictionalism and the multiverse view (aka plenitudinous platonism). The three views may differ over the existence of mathematical objects, but they agree in rejecting a certain kind of objectivity claim about mathematics, advocating instead an extreme pluralism. The early parts of the paper will try to elucidate this anti‐objectivist position, and question whether conventionalism really offers a third form of it distinct from fictionalism and the multiverse view. The paper then turns to anti‐objectivism about logic, and suggests that here too conventionalism offers no distinct alternative, and that there are limits on the extent of pluralism/anti‐objectivism. It also argues that these limits can't be used to argue for more extensive objectivity within mathematics, and also that they do allow for more limited pluralism within logic, e.g. as regards resolution of semantic and property‐theoretic paradoxes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the views of leading Czech physicists regarding a physics curriculum for upper secondary schools. This paper presents the first part of an effort to define starting points for a new physics curriculum in Czechia (subsequent phases would analyze the opinions of other scientists, education experts, and physics teachers regarding the physicists' ideas) and create a new physics textbook for upper secondary schools. The methodology was inspired especially by the objectivist grounded theory. We conducted in‐depth interviews about the upper secondary physics curriculum with 29 leading Czech physicists and identified 56 ideas (categories) that they agreed on (according to the interview analysis). Subsequently, a questionnaire was created based on these 56 ideas. Two years later, the same group of physicists were asked to express their opinions on the ideas on a 7‐point Likert scale. The new survey sought to clarify the relevance and permanence of the ideas, and the physicists' willingness to collaborate on constructing a physics curriculum for upper secondary schools. Four core categories—students, physics, context, and math—were identified through a comparison of the relevance of the ideas. Additionally, we compared the questionnaire answers of a physicist with their opinions during the interview and identified 43 ideas as permanent (in the 2‐year interval). Surprisingly, 26 of the 29 researchers in the initial study completed the subsequent questionnaire survey and 13 among these expressed their willingness to contribute to the development of a physics textbook for upper secondary schools. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the received view, philosophy of action took a justified turn towards causalism because anti‐causalists failed the causalist challenge about efficacious reasons. This paper contests that view by examining the ways in which Georg Henrik von Wright responded to causalism in his later philosophy. First, von Wright attacked the subjectivism of causalism by arguing for an objectivist view that construes reasons not as subjective mental states but as external facts of the agent's situation. Second, von Wright fundamentally disagreed with the view of philosophical inquiry that underpinned causalism. For von Wright, the task of philosophy was conceptual: to explicate what one is looking for when one is looking for the real reasons for action. In contrast, for causalists the task was ontological: to determine what kind of item in the world the real reason for action is. Examining von Wright's account contributes to contemporary assessments of the metaphilosophical dimension of the reasons/causes debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the Chicago sociologist William F. Ogburn's (1886–1959) views about technological unemployment, which were intimately connected to his analysis of the social impacts of technological developments and resulting social problems due to cultural lag. We trace the development of his views as seen through his well‐known 1922 book, Social Change with Respect to Culture and Original Nature, his important contributions to the President's Research Committee on Social Trends (1933), and his lesser‐known pamphlets designed for a broader audience—Living with Machines (1933), You and Machines (1934), and Machines and Tomorrow's World (1938). He used these pamphlets to educate the public about the dangers of new machines and technological unemployment. In doing so, he drew upon sociological analysis in his professional scholarly writings and his long‐standing personal interests in social betterment and social reform. Our analysis also calls into question the adequacy of existing scholarship on Ogburn that has emphasized his commitment to a statistical, dispassionate, and "objectivist" approach to social science research. We call for a revised, richer, and more complex view of Ogburn's work and legacy as one of the nation's leading social scientists during the first half of the 20th century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue below for the view that non‐moral truths entail moral ones. I first argue that moral claims do have truth values which are objectively true or false. I then argue that this objectivism does not entail non‐relativism. I produce a simple possible worlds argument for the entailment view. I then give some examples where p entails q but many intelligent people have thought it does not, and where it does not, but many intelligent people have thought that it does. I also try to evaluate a somewhat neglected argument by Hume. In the final section, I further consider some moral and meta‐moral opinions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]