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In this paper I discuss how Law and Economics can benefit from incorporating some insights from Public Choice into their analyses. Within this argument, I examine the evolution of experimental methods by looking at laboratory, field, and natural experiments; and conducting a very simple scientometrics analysis on the relative frequency of experimental studies in journals such as Public Choice, European Journal of Political Economy, Constitutional Political Economy, Journal of Law and Economics, and Journal of Law, Economics and Organization compared with top economics journals such as American Economic Review, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Journal of Political Economy, Econometrica, or Review of Economic Studies. I also refer to the connectivity of Behavioral Law and Economics and Behavioral Public Choice. The paper then finishes with a discussion of a selected number of topics covering areas such as corruption, tax compliance, shitstorms/firestorms, constitutional choices, globalization, and international organizations; all of which present scientific challenges when applying pure Law and Economics approaches without also implementing a Public Choice analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: Habits are a common strategy for successfully countering medication non‐adherence, yet existing interventions do not support participants during the long habit formation period, resulting in high attrition. We test a novel intervention combining text messages and incentives with anchoring to support antiretroviral therapy (ART) pill‐taking habits. Methods: In a randomized, parallel controlled trial, a sample of 155 participants 18 years and older who initiated ART within 3 months were recruited at Mildmay Uganda between October 2021 and April 2022. All participants were educated on the anchoring strategy and chose an anchor, that is existing routines, to pair with pill‐taking. Participants were randomized to either usual care (C = 49), daily text message reminders to follow their anchoring plan (Messages group; T1 = 49) or messages and incentives conditional on pill‐taking in line with their anchor (Incentives group; T2 = 57). Assessments occurred at baseline, month 3 (end of intervention) and month 9 (end of observation period). The primary outcomes are electronically measured mean adherence and pill‐taking consistent with participants' anchor time. Results: The primary outcome of pill‐taking in line with the anchoring plan was higher in the Incentives group during the 3‐month intervention (12.2 p.p. [95% CI: 2.2 22.2; p =.02]), and remained significantly higher after the incentives were withdrawn (months 4−6 (14.2 p.p. [95% CI 1.1 27.2; p =.03]); months 7−9 (14.1 p.p. [95% CI −0.2 28.5; p =.05])). Mean adherence was higher in both treatment groups relative to the control group during the intervention (T1 vs. C, p =.06; T2 vs. C, p =.06) but not post‐intervention. Conclusions: The promising approach of using incentives to support habit formation among ART treatment initiators needs to be evaluated in a fully powered study to further our understanding of the habit formation process and to evaluate its cost‐effectiveness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Community‐based conservation is a widely adopted wildlife governance approach, but questions remain about the conditions under which this form of wildlife governance achieves success. Particularly, participating communities are often marked by considerable wealth and risk heterogeneities that are driven by differences in livestock or agricultural holdings and varying exposure to wildlife depredation of those holdings.The effect of these types of heterogeneity on successful conservation collective action is understudied, particularly in the case of risk heterogeneity. This lacuna limits policymakers' ability to effectively match the design of community‐based programs to their particular settings.Using established behavioural experimental techniques, we model the incentive structures underlying community‐based wildlife conservation where actors differ in wealth and exposure to human–wildlife conflict. We conduct a modified binary linear voluntary contribution mechanism game, in which we vary subject endowments and risk of incurring a loss when participating in collective action and we find that the type of heterogeneity matters to collective action success.On their own, the presence of either economic or risk heterogeneities (but not both) dampen cooperation compared with homogeneous groups, as do 'balanced' distributions of both heterogeneities (where individuals facing high risk levels receive high endowments and vice versa). However, groups with 'unbalanced' heterogeneities (where those facing high risk levels receive low endowments and vice versa) demonstrate cooperation at similar levels to that of homogeneous groups.At the individual level, risk drives cooperative behaviour, although its impact is influenced by relative wealth levels when both forms of heterogeneity are present.These findings suggest the need for a more in‐depth look at the role and interaction of risk and wealth heterogeneities in conservation management. Read the free Plain Language Summary for this article on the Journal blog. Read the free Plain Language Summary for this article on the Journal blog. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Financial crises often seem to be associated with populism, although the populist banking policies introduced to address such crises are far from homogenous. This apparent paradox—a sort of "sight‐unseen consensus"—suggests that specific economic drivers coupled with general psychological components can explain populist consensus. We propose a model of populist consensus, which we term "democratic rioting," in which individuals' decisions to support or resist a specific populist bailout policy after a financial crisis are heavily influenced by psychological group dynamics. Those dynamics, in turn, are driven by general, non‐banking‐related motivations, such as anti‐elite sentiments. In a multiple equilibria setting, the more individuals are unhappy for general economic and/or psychological reasons, the more likely they are to support myopic and redistributive populist banking policies rather than long‐sighted public interventions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Global South contains low‐information environments that impose information search costs on organisations. We compare explanations for how employers make decisions in these environments. To do so, we analyse salaries collected from employers in Haiti, including local and international non‐profits and domestic and foreign businesses. Although preliminary findings suggest that international non‐governmental organisations pay above‐market salaries, accounting for alternative explanations from behavioural economics causes the organisational form's importance to dissipate. We find that anchoring and framing mechanisms separately influence decision‐making. These findings direct us to focus more on the actions and tools managers use to make decisions in low‐information environments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Governments around the world have increasingly used experimental findings from behavioural trials to fine‐tune their service delivery policy models and their communication with citizens. In some areas of policy review, government teams have drawn on 'behavioural' methods, developed through Behavioural Insights (BI) and Behavioural Economics (BE) approaches, with a view to enhancing cost‐efficiencies and regulatory compliance. We compare the practices of several teams in Australia and New Zealand, based on 40 practitioner interviews with staff in governmental BI–BE units. We outline staff perceptions about the challenges and opportunities for BI–BE units in their quest to make positive contributions to policy innovation in the informational, regulatory, and service domains. In most instances, their focus has been on selecting specific researchable topics where experimental methods can be deployed, and where measurable positive changes are anticipated. Although benefits have been produced in many such areas, complex issues have not yet been tackled. However, BI–BE approaches could potentially contribute to broader teams addressing more complex problems. We compare the practices of several teams in Australia and New Zealand, based on 40 practitioner interviews with staff in governmental BI–BE units. We outline staff perceptions about the challenges and opportunities for BI–BE units in their quest to make positive contributions to policy innovation in the informational, regulatory, and service domains. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]