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Climatic changes can cause unpredictability in flood regimes that traditional flood risk management (FRM) approaches may struggle with. Therefore, flood resilience is seen as a supplementation to these approaches, putting a larger emphasis on flood acceptance and minimising consequences. An (emergent) group contributing towards flood resilience is civil society. This paper examines how civil society contributions can be furthered and guided in the Netherlands as well as exploring potential limitations in doing so. To achieve this, England is used as a good practice example due to a more developed and defined role for civil society being present here. Data were collected on both actual (England and the Netherlands) and potential (The Netherlands) civil society contributions. These were compared to identify potential avenues for Dutch civil society contributions to flood resilience that can be further investigated. The research shows that the most promising avenues are improving advocacy from citizens, improving local flood awareness and developing relationships between FRM authorities and existing citizen groups that can be harnessed and mobilised to support flood resilience. Additionally, the research also provides insights into potential limitations for transferring resilience approaches from one context to another beyond the cases discussed in this publication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The global increase in extreme weather events in recent years has spurred political scientists to examine the potential political effects of such phenomena. This paper explores effect of flooding on electoral outcomes and offers evidence that the impact of adverse events varies with changes in political context. Using a difference‐in‐differences identification strategy to analyse three consecutive general elections in the United Kingdom (2015, 2017 and 2019), the paper finds variability in partisan electoral benefit from one election to the next that calls into question the blind retrospection and rally‐round‐the‐leader explanations which are often advanced to account for electoral reactions to natural disasters. Instead, changing party positions on environmental issues appear to account more convincingly for shifts in electoral support in response to flooding. This suggests that parties can derive benefit from, or be punished for, the positions they take on environmental issues when extreme weather events affect citizens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the challenging – and frightening – times in which we now live, education is seen as playing a key role in making change for the better. However, the Department for Education's (2022) strategy on education for sustainability and climate change, applicable to schools in England, is lacking in many areas and fails to address students', teachers', and teacher educators' priorities. Crucially, the environment and climate emergency greatly concerns many children and young people and these issues should be addressed across the whole curriculum, not just in geography and science. Further, there needs to be more focus on emotions rather than facts, wellbeing rather than the economy. So, the question is: How can we 'green' art, craft and design education to ensure it is both effective and affective? Art can change the world because it is 'homeless, endless, and edgeless' – this sounds exciting but does not aid teachers in curriculum design. In this paper I will share an emergent manifesto for an environmentally responsible art, craft and design (ACD) curriculum... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drought and water scarcity pose a risk to the economy, particularly sectors where water is a crucial input to the production process. This paper describes integrated simulations of water shortages from a dynamic national water resource systems model with a static economic input‐output (I‐O) model to assess total drought risk to the economy. To quantify the economic risks of drought and water scarcity, the analysis: (a) integrates a large ensemble of simulated meteorological droughts, propagated through a national hydrological model and water resource systems model to simulate water availability from reservoirs and groundwater; (b) assesses implications of restrictions on water availability for multiple water user categories, representing natural and human contributions to water scarcity; (c) investigates how water shortages propagate into economy‐wide direct and indirect impacts. The study focuses on England and Wales where the water supply system is considered under strain, with growing recognition of the economic risk of prolonged and widespread shortages. The direct Expected Annual Loss (EAL) to water users, averaged over an ensemble equivalent to 2800 years of synthetic daily weather, is estimated to be £11.7 million in the 2011 base‐year. Accounting for indirect economic losses results in a total EAL of £30.2 million in 2011. The most severe event simulated results in a total loss of £1.4 billion in 2011, equivalent to 0.11% of GVA. The analysis provides a framework to assess what the economically efficient level of system reliability should be, and for deciding upon appropriate water management regulations and strategic investments. Key Points: Simulated water availability from a national water resource system model are integrated with a macroeconomic model to assess drought riskThe use of a large ensemble of synthetic drought simulations supports the risk‐based analysis of direct and indirect economic lossesThe method supports national economic assessment of the implications of climate change and different water management strategies [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The biodiversity and climate crises demand ambitious policies lowering the environmental impacts of farming. Most current interventions incentivise so‐called land‐sharing approaches to address the widespread trade‐off between farm yields and on‐farm environmental outcomes by compensating farmers who adopt yield‐reducing interventions that encourage wildlife or reduce net emissions within farmed land.Here, we present the first quantification of the likely costs to taxpayers of land sharing compared with land sparing, in which large areas are removed from production altogether because of high‐yielding practices elsewhere in the landscape. Focusing on arable production in the United Kingdom, we used a choice experiment to explore farmer preferences and estimated the overall costs of contrasting agri‐environment schemes that delivered increased populations of three well‐studied farmland birds and reduced net carbon emissions in England. We included capital, administration and monitoring costs, and lost food production.Sparing delivered our target biodiversity and carbon emission outcomes at 79% of the food production cost and 48% of the taxpayer cost of sharing. The difference in subsidy payments required by farmers roughly tracked lost food production but other costs favoured sparing even more strongly.The cost‐related merits of sparing would probably increase further in studies incorporating (1) the many species and ecosystem services not deliverable on farmland, (2) the costs of food imports to compensate domestic lost production and (3) countries without as long and extensive a history of agriculture as the United Kingdom.Our results suggest that, for at least some conservation outcomes, continuing a land‐sharing approach in countries such as the United Kingdom is not only an inefficient use of government funds but also undermines conservation and food security in food‐exporting countries which bear the burden of compensating domestic production forgone in the name of conservation. Read the free Plain Language Summary for this article on the Journal blog. Read the free Plain Language Summary for this article on the Journal blog. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Habitat loss and climate change are key drivers of global biodiversity declines but their relative importance has rarely been examined. We attempted to attribute spatially divergent population trends of two Afro‐Palaearctic migrant warbler species, Willow Warbler Phylloscopus trochilus and Common Chiffchaff Phylloscopus collybita, to changes in breeding grounds climate or habitat. We used bird counts from over 4000 sites across the UK between 1994 and 2017, monitored as part of the BTO/JNCC/RSPB Breeding Bird Survey. We modelled Willow Warbler and Common Chiffchaff population size and growth in relation to habitat, climate and weather. We then used the abundance model coefficients and observed environmental changes to determine the extent to which spatially varying population trends in England and Scotland were consistent with attribution to climate and habitat changes. Both species' population size and growth correlated with habitat, climate and weather on their breeding grounds. Changes in habitat, in particular woodland expansion, could be linked to small population increases for both species in England and Scotland. Both species' populations correlated more strongly with climate than weather, and both had an optimum breeding season temperature: 11°C for Willow Warbler and around 13.5°C for Common Chiffchaff (with marginally different predictions from population size and growth models). Breeding ground temperature increases, therefore, had the potential to have caused some of the observed Willow Warbler declines in England (where the mean breeding season temperature was 12.7°C) and increases in Scotland (mean breeding season temperature was 10.2°C), and some of the differential rates of increase for Common Chiffchaff. However, much of the variation in species' population abundance and trends were not well predicted by our models and could be due to other factors, such as species interactions, habitat and climate change in their wintering grounds and on migration. This study provides evidence that the effect of climate change on a species may vary spatially and may switch from being beneficial to being detrimental if a temperature threshold is exceeded. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aims: Pressurised metered‐dose inhalers (MDIs) have a much higher carbon footprint than dry powder inhalers (DPIs). We aimed to describe variations of inhaler options in local adult asthma prescribing guidance. Methods: We reviewed local clinical commissioning group (CCG) adult asthma prescribing guidance for primary care in England in 2019 and recorded DPI and MDI inclusion. The relationship to prescribing data from OpenPrescribing.net was examined. Results: In total, 58 unique guidance documents were analysed covering 144 out of 191 CCGs in England. Only 3% of CCG guidelines expressed an overall preference for DPIs, while 12% explicitly preferred MDIs. The inclusion of DPIs first‐line was 77% for short‐acting β‐agonists, 78% for low‐dose inhaled corticosteroid (ICS) inhalers and 90–96% for combination long‐acting β‐agonist/ICS inhalers. MDIs were included first‐line in 98–100% of these classes. In 26% of CCGs, there was no first‐line DPI option for at least 1 asthma management step. Ten percent of CCGs had no DPI included first‐line for any of the 5 classes examined. Many CCGs recommended higher carbon footprint options; Ventolin MDI (25.6%), inhalers containing HFA227ea (57.9%) and ICS regimes recommending 2 puffs of a lower dose over 1 puff of higher dose (94.2%). MDIs were prescribed more in CCGs that recommended them. Conclusion: Before the COVID pandemic, there was substantial variation between CCGs in adult asthma prescribing guidance regarding higher and lower carbon footprint options. There may still be scope to amend local guidance to improve clinical and environmental outcomes. This study provides a method and baseline for further investigation of this. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article draws on original empirical research to explore the rise and fall of innocence projects across England and Wales. Innocence projects are university‐based projects which seek to educate students, to assist the wrongly convicted and to contribute to research and reform within criminal justice. Thirty‐six projects were established between 2004 and 2014 under Innocence Network UK, but following the network's closure, projects appear to be gradually disappearing. Drawing on empirical evidence from key actors, this article argues that the decline of innocence projects resulted from both emerging tensions within the innocence project movement itself and through the external constraints of operating within a restrictive criminal appeal system. It will conclude by rethinking how surviving projects might play a valuable role in addressing miscarriages of justice in the current climate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]