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In resourced-constrained countries like India, ambitions for environmental protection are often limited by the paucity of funds, and limited capacity within governments to implement transformational programs. But an excessive focus on funding and government action fails to account for several ways in which motivated individuals and communities voluntarily come together to solve environmental problems. Such initiatives might be small and dispersed but can be scaled-up by understanding the underlying structure of incentives and motivations that drive people towards contributing labour and finding collective solutions. My dissertation is motivated by the desire to develop practical insights for fostering greater citizen participation and collective action. In particular, my research is focused on understanding how low-cost and non-monetary incentives motivate individuals towards pro-social and pro-environmental behaviours.The first project examines the factors that contribute to better performance on tasks that managers cannot easily observe. Here, I study frontline employees of an NGO in India who are responsible for improving social development outcomes for rural women. These employees perform two broad categories of tasks – some are observable by their managers and others are more difficult to observe or unobservable. Unobservable tasks like cajoling, convincing, dispute resolution, and emotional labour are critical for frontline work and meeting the NGO’s organizational mission. However they remain unrewarded because they are not observed. Why do frontline employees perform these tasks then? Through a survey of 15,000 rural women and 150 frontline employees, I find that pro-social motivation is associated with improved performance on all types of tasks. On the other hand, I find that monitoring is not associated with improved performance. I also find that understanding the broad principles for action are more important than knowing which specific tasks the manageme

In resourced-constrained countries like India, ambitions for environmental protection are often limited by the paucity of funds, and limited capacity within governments to implement transformational programs. But an excessive focus on funding and government action fails to account for several ways in which motivated individuals and communities voluntarily come together to solve environmental problems. Such initiatives might be small and dispersed but can be scaled-up by understanding the underlying structure of incentives and motivations that drive people towards contributing labour and finding collective solutions. My dissertation is motivated by the desire to develop practical insights for fostering greater citizen participation and collective action. In particular, my research is focused on understanding how low-cost and non-monetary incentives motivate individuals towards pro-social and pro-environmental behaviours.The first project examines the factors that contribute to better performance on tasks that managers cannot easily observe. Here, I study frontline employees of an NGO in India who are responsible for improving social development outcomes for rural women. These employees perform two broad categories of tasks – some are observable by their managers and others are more difficult to observe or unobservable. Unobservable tasks like cajoling, convincing, dispute resolution, and emotional labour are critical for frontline work and meeting the NGO’s organizational mission. However they remain unrewarded because they are not observed. Why do frontline employees perform these tasks then? Through a survey of 15,000 rural women and 150 frontline employees, I find that pro-social motivation is associated with improved performance on all types of tasks. On the other hand, I find that monitoring is not associated with improved performance. I also find that understanding the broad principles for action are more important than knowing which specific tasks the manageme