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This paper complicates the classic security dilemma by considering the notions of ontological security and relational deterrence. It studies how the ontological security dilemma has emerged between the US, China, and Taiwan from the relational perspective and how these spiral chains will further develop in the future. The paper incurs the literature on relational analysis to expound on how different ontological security concerns allude to relational deterrence between the three actors. Taiwan's separatism is more of a threat to China's relational self than to physical security because the separatist does not belong to any already agreed relationship. A geometric model and a few simulations yield three unconventional findings. 1) The less advantaged the US military is over China, the less likely armed unification will occur. 2) The US anti-Chinese tendency is irrelevant in determining the probability of armed unification. 3) What may escalate the spiral are China's anti-Taiwan independence and Taiwan's anti-unification. Case sensitivity indicates the ontological sensibilities of a security dilemma. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the increasingly volatile global political order, national economic structures and international relations, integrated as they are, are showing concerning signs of strain. Taiwan, whose world-leading semiconductor industry is indispensable in Global Supply Chains and whose economic prosperity and security are critical to a stable global economic system, has received much research interest since the late 1980s. Against the background of a slowing Taiwanese economy, starting in the 2000s, this paper seeks to investigate the causes of Taiwan's challenges and the linkages to the global economy vis-à-vis China. Based on previous research from different social science disciplines, this paper shows that Taiwan's economic performance has been undermined by the declining effectiveness of its industrial policy and the general state intervention in the country, which is in turn caused by deep socio-political divisions on issues of national identity and Taiwan-China relations. The paper reveals the dilemma, which results from this. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: Though there are still political turbulences, the economic cooperation between mainland China and Taiwan is inseparable. Cooperation between enterprises on both sides has become more frequent. Studying the similarities and differences between employees in Cross-Strait enterprises can contribute to human resource management. This paper aims to study the cultural difference between employees of mainland China and in Taiwan when facing psychological contract violations. Design/methodology/approach: A total of 811 valid sample questionnaires were taken from Cross-Strait private enterprise employees. This research adopted partial least squares-structural equation model statistical analysis as an empirical research evaluation. Findings: This study finds that psychological contract violation has a significant positive impact on turnover intention and a significant negative impact on organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) in the Chinese context. There exist cultural differences between the employees of mainland China and Taiwan. When facing psychological contract violation, it is found that employees from Taiwan are more likely to have a strong turnover intention but still keep higher job performance. Employees from mainland China are found to be more likely to have higher OCB. Originality/value: The originality of this research lies in establishing a stronger theoretical model to understand employee behavior. This paper verifies the validity of this model under the Chinese context. Moreover, this paper verifies the cultural difference between Cross-Strait employees. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) (Taiwan) have taken divergent paths in the area of human rights. Since the two leaders Xi Jinping and Tsai Ing-wen came to power, the differences in the area of human rights have further increased. The paper analyses and compares their external human rights strategies based on realist assumptions and the soft and hard power resources of the PRC and the ROC. The PRC's objectives are to deflect international criticism of its human rights situation and to weaken the global human rights system and its underlying human rights norms. Taiwan's objective is to use its record as a human rights leader in Asia to expand its limited international space and to strengthen its ties with other consolidated democracies and the global civil society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While most ethnic Chinese in northern Thailand are Thai citizens now, their everyday lives are a site where we can witness the political power entanglement of China, Taiwan and Thailand. With this in mind, this paper aims to look into the relationship between global China and overseas Chinese from the perspective of the ethnic Chinese in the northern borderlands of Thailand. The purpose is not just to disclose the multiplicity of global China in people's everyday lives, but also to complicate the picture of overseas Chinese as portrayed in top-down grand narratives about global China. I argue that the ongoing re-Sinicization in South-East Asia and the territorial geopolitics among China, Taiwan and Thailand have opened a conceptual space for the ethnic Chinese in northern Thailand to flexibly articulate themselves within the changing geopolitical economy. I use tea production and related Chinese-language education programmes, two separate but intertwined cases, to address these issues. By looking beyond the competition, conflict and dilemmas between China and Taiwan, I argue that Taiwan's previous engagement with agricultural transfer to Thailand and the rooting of pro-Taiwan identity and discourse in language education have paradoxically paved a way for China to stretch its influence into the everyday lives of the Chinese communities in the northern Thai borderlands. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Up until the end of Cold War mainstream theories in the disciplines of International Relations and Peace Studies have overlooked the transformation in relations between actors but instead concentrated on either the constant state of conflict between units or radical changes from war to peace. Acknowledging major changes in their subject matters due to the changing conditions with the end of Cold War, both disciplines had to rethink their theoretical assumptions and renew their toolboxes. Accordingly, the constructivist turn in International Relations and the introduction of Transformational Approach to conflict in Peace Studies have brought the two disciplines closer. Similar to the Constructivist theory of International Relations that emphasizes changes rather than law-like regularities in international politics, the Conflict Transformation Approach in Peace Studies focuses on perennial transformation processes in conflicts. This paper through bringing together insights from the disciplines of International Relations and Peace Studies, analyses the cross-strait conflict between the People's Republic of China and Republic of China (Taiwan) within a constructivist framework, and from a transformational perspective by applying Hugh Miall's five-point model of conflict transformation (context transformation, structural transformation, actor transformation, issue transformation, and personal/elite transformation). Miall's five-point model is utilized in this paper to show that, despite serious crisis occurred in more than 70 years history of People's Republic of China-Republic of China conflict, the relationship of the parties has undergone a set of transformations on the way to reconciliation. Although the conflict, with serious disagreements on crucial issues, is far from being settled, the ongoing transformation creates room for negotiations and further reconciliation on issues that were previously regarded as non-negotiable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines US public opinion after the drastic changes in US–China relations during the Trump presidency. I argue that the perceived China threat influences Americans' evaluation of the China–Taiwan tension. Based on the US dataset of the 2018 Survey on Global Attitudes and Trends by the Pew Research Center, Americans tend to perceive the China–Taiwan tension as a serious problem for the USA when Americans identify China as a major threat and its military strength as a concern. As US public opinion shapes the US foreign policy on China, the findings shed light on the public support for the ongoing US–China conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan's opposition to PRC demands such as acceptance of the '92 Consensus' and 'One Country, Two Systems' formula since 2016 has invited a series of retaliatory measures from Beijing, designed to coerce Taiwan into compliance. Given the stark asymmetry in economic size, military capability, and diplomatic status, Taiwan provides a case for studying coercive diplomacy that takes the form of threats to punish. Material differences suggest that Taiwan should capitulate, and 'cheap talk' theses expect PRC threats to have no discernible effect, while balance of threat arguments expect resolve. In this article, we use the survey data collected in the 2016, 2019, and 2020 rounds of the Taiwan National Security Study to examine how Taiwanese respond to China's intensifying and expanding threats. Our paper identifies four strategies that the public sees as responses to PRC coercion: isolation, bandwagon with China, balance against China by allying with the USA and Japan, and hedge by deepening economic ties with China while aligning with the USA and Japan against China. We show that the popular support for balancing against China rises as PRC coercion grows and Taiwanese citizens increasingly perceive China to be a threat. Our findings imply that citizens in a liberal democracy can develop the will to pushback against pressure from an authoritarian regime despite sharp asymmetries in capabilities and material limitations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: The issue of concurrent jurisdiction over cross-border crimes has become common in a globalizing world, while the rigid compliance with territoriality and active personality jurisdiction has created a legal vacuum for cross-border crimes in many situations. The jurisdiction dispute between mainland China and Taiwan over cross-border telecom fraud crimes is a good example. In recent years, the Ministry of Public Security of the People's Republic of China cracked down a series of cross-border telecom fraud crimes against mainland residents and extradited suspects to mainland China. Given a certain proportion of Taiwan residents in criminal gangs, the Taiwan side raised jurisdiction objections, arguing that mainland China had no right to exercise jurisdiction over Taiwanese criminals. The essence of the jurisdiction dispute between two sides is the concurrence of Taiwan's right to exercise active personality jurisdiction and the mainland's right to exercise passive personality jurisdiction. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the connotation of different jurisdiction principles (namely, territorial, active personality, protective and passive personality jurisdiction) and reinterpret their prioritization of applicability from a jurisprudential perspective, and thus, enhance the theoretical basis for resolving the issue of concurrent jurisdiction over cross-border crimes. Design/methodology/approach: By reviewing the historical trajectory of major jurisdiction principles since the 1920s, and studying the specificities of the case in this context, this paper argues that territorial jurisdiction and active personality jurisdiction have presumed priority but not an absolute priority for resolving the issue of concurrent jurisdiction. The applicability of protective and passive personality jurisdiction could precede the former provided the jurisdictions of territoriality or active personality are inadequate, incompetent or lack of motivation to combat crimes, which harm other jurisdictions. Findings: The developmental trajectory and contemporary connotation of major jurisdiction principles suggests that the legitimacy of the mainland's exercise of passive personality jurisdiction over Taiwan criminal suspects lies in the urgent need to recover mainland victims' significant property loss, the incompetence of Taiwan in detecting and prosecuting telecom fraud crimes committed by Taiwanese residents and targeting mainland victims and that the mainland has guaranteed the Taiwan side's right to be timely informed and fully participate in its exercise of criminal jurisdiction over crimes involving Taiwan suspects. Originality/value: Current literature on jurisdiction doctrines mainly uses a historical or descriptive approach to reveal the attitudes of different countries toward jurisdiction principles, which helps little in resolving the issue of concurrent jurisdiction over cross-border crimes in an era of globalization. This paper uses an interpretative approach, reinterprets the contemporary connotation of different jurisdiction principles and redefines the criteria for determining their prioritization in the context of the specificities of a case. It is expected to update the academic literature for resolving concurrent jurisdiction, fill the legal vacuum for combating cross-border crimes created by rigid compliance with territorial jurisdiction, and meanwhile relieve concerns about abuse of extraterritorial jurisdiction as it provides concrete standards for weighting the applicability of jurisdiction principles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of China Quarterly is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The Biden administration has in general been operating both “strategic ambiguity” and “strategic clarity,” prompting the question: Is the United States being strategically ambiguous or strategically clear towards Taiwan? This paper believes the discussion should start with the clarification of “U.S. policy regarding Taiwan.” However, U.S. policy towards Taiwan involves the highly sensitive One–China policy. Thus, the United States will evaluate its “core interest” in relation to China when dealing with the One–China policy, as mishandling it may trigger a war between the United States and China or the rest of the world. This is the reason why the United States must devise its Taiwan policy at a macro-level and cautious manner. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper describes the growing human rights gap between China on one side and the US and Taiwan on the other side and analyses its impact on cross-strait relations. Since Xi Jinping's ascent to power in the People's Republic of China in 2012/2013 and the elections of Donald Trump in the US and Tsai Ing-wen in Taiwan in 2016, the relationship between China and the other two countries has worsened. The US and Taiwan have a similar view on human rights in the PRC. The increasing repression and authoritarianism of the PRC leads to a human rights gap in the Taiwan Strait that increases the divide and the tensions between both sides. The failure of the PRC to address in its proposal for a peaceful unification the concerns of the Taiwanese for their democracy and human rights pushes Taiwan further away. The similar assessment of the PRC's authoritarian threat by the US and Taiwan strengthens the bond between both, based on the shared values of democracy and human rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• The literatures on subterranean geopolitics have paid insufficient attention to issues of peace. • The concept of affective atmosphere helps to flesh out the elemental and embodied dimensions of subterranean geopolitics. • The paper uses the case study of the Zhaishan Tunnel to show how it serves as a rapprochement tourism site. • Visitors of Zhaishan Tunnel (re)negotiate peaceful China-Taiwan relations in this subterranean space. Geopolitical studies on the subterranean have tended to portray underground spaces (including tunnels and caves) as closely imbricated with warfare, violence and militarism. This paper departs from existing literatures insofar as it explores how peaceful ideas and relationships can similarly be fostered through the subterranean realm. Using the case of the Zhaishan Tunnel located on the Taiwanese island of Kinmen, we demonstrate how this site has converted from a defensive structure against the military antagonisms from mainland China to one that is largely associated with rapprochement tourism for the cultivation of benign China-Taiwan relations. Specifically, by drawing on the concept of affective atmosphere, we argue that the elemental and material aspects of the tunnel have been strategically deployed to affectively shore up Chinese and Taiwanese visitors' collective memories in order to re-orientate their dispositions towards peaceful cross-strait futures. In so doing, we demonstrate how affective atmosphere can be analytically productive in examining the elemental and embodied dimensions of subterranean geopolitics. It not only enables critical appreciation of the ways in which different elemental materialities impact upon subjective feelings in/of subterranean spaces. More crucially, it also encourages incisive reflections into the agency and politics behind the conjoining of the elemental and bodily for the (re)making of subterranean geopolitics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explores the recent features of China's economic coercion against Taiwan by offering an up‐to‐date and in‐depth analysis of China's targeted sanctions on Taishang in Tsai Ing‐wen's first term. The paper elaborates on China's specific reasons and means for imposing informal targeted sanctions, as well as their newly observed features in comparison with the past. Heavy dependence on the Chinese economy by certain enterprises of the island has made them vulnerable to sanction targeting. Compared to the past, nationalist boycotts by Chinese consumers and online activities have had a greater influence as part of China's informal targeted sanctions. Beijing's demands for supporting the "one China" policy and the "1992 Consensus" have also become more obvious. These findings suggest that the impetus for developing the cross‐Strait economic exchanges has become more susceptible to the effects of non‐economic factors. Although Beijing's sanctions on Taishang have not yet changed Taipei's policy, they cannot be said to be ineffective. Through the tactics, Beijing definitely sends clear signals of what it wants as it advances their strategy on cross‐Strait relations to the outside world. The case studies on Taiwan provide important implications for other economies as a barometer of China's increasing economic sanction practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The war in Ukraine and reactions to it have affected, and mostly worsened, already-formidable and growing challenges for US policy toward China-Taiwan conflict situations. These challenges include deterring a more powerful and assertive China in a more complex set of scenarios (including gray zone conflicts), assuring China that behavior that conforms to US preferences will mean more cooperative US behavior, and managing the abandonment / entrapment dynamic in US relations with Taiwan. The implication of the Ukraine war for the US and cross-Strait issues is mixed, complicated, and stillevolving. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is an exploratory research that seeks to investigate how ideology predicts Taiwanese perceptions of cross-strait relations, including attitudes toward Taiwan independence, perceptions of mainland China and Chinese people, Chinese invasion of Taiwan, and Chinese democracy. We took an inductive approach to left-right differences in Taiwan to offer a more systematic empirical understanding of ideology beyond the West. To do so, we conducted a nationally representative survey among adult Taiwan citizens (N = 1,350). Findings revealed that those who identified with the Left (vs. Right) tended to demonstrate more negative perceptions of cross-strait relations. Specifically, the political left is more negative about the outlook of Chinese democracy while favoring Taiwan independence, than the political right. Furthermore, the political left perceives both mainland China and the Chinese people more negatively than the political right. These findings underscore the role of ideology for a full comprehension of cross-strait relations, as they indicated a fundamental difference between the political left vs. right in terms of perceptions of cross-strait relations. The present research extends existing political psychology literature on ideology and international relations, particularly in the East Asian context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on the data from the 1991–2016 agricultural investment of China's Taiwan in China's Mainland and the agricultural GDP of the latter, through models of vector autoregressive (VAR) and vector error correction (VEC), the influences of China's Taiwan agricultural investment on the development of agriculture in the eastern, central, and western regions of China are discussed. The results show a long-term equilibrium relationship between China's Taiwan agricultural investment and agricultural development in China's eastern, central, and western regions. In the long term, China's Taiwan investment in agriculture in the eastern, central, and western regions of China have certain positive promoting effect on their agricultural development. However, there is an obvious regional diversity in investment effect: Impulse response and variance decomposition show that the positive effect from China's Taiwan agricultural investment in China's western region agricultural development is most significant, and it is significantly higher than that in the eastern region; its contribution to the central region's agricultural development is little. VEC model analysis shows that in the short term, China's Taiwan investment in agriculture has a significant positive effect on the agricultural development of China's eastern region, but not on the agricultural development of the central and western regions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies of public support for war among non-Western and non-major powers (NWNM) states are distinctive from United States foreign military operations. First, these wars often intrude on subjects' direct livelihood. Second, great powers' intervention can drastically alter the outcome of these wars. These factors have not been examined extensively in the war support literature. We fill this gap by spearheading several hypotheses of war support unique to NWNM countries. Through an original and representative survey experiment on a hypothetical military conflict between China and Taiwan, our analysis yields that the information about the United States coming to Taiwan's defense in an armed conflict with China drives up war support by around 7% among the citizenry, although such information does not make the Taiwanese population more tolerant of combat casualties. In addition, perception of military training increases public support for war significantly. The findings suggest that the study of NWNM states could contribute to the war support literature from different perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of China Quarterly is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Over the last few decades, China has become one of the most important foreign investment destinations and centers of economic development in Asia. China's growing economic clout and coercive measures lead to the following empirical puzzles: how has Taiwan perceived China's increasing military capabilities and economic influence? What are the major factors that facilitate or constrain the role of a government agency of a weaker state in addressing the economic power of a stronger one? More specifically, what has been the purpose of Taiwan's economic statecraft? Based on Taiwan's official statements, regional trade data, and newspaper coverage in Chinese and English, this study investigates both positive and negative evaluations of China-Taiwan trade from 2009 to 2021. From 2009 to 2016, President Ma Ying-jeou adopted a desecuritization strategy in normalizing bilateral trade with China, and he actively promoted greater liberalization of Taiwan's financial and service sectors for China's investment. From 2016 to 2021, President Tsai Ing-wen employed a securitization strategy in light of the risks of economic reliance on China's markets. The article proceeds as follows. First, it engages the current literature on economic statecraft, China-Taiwan relations, and Asian politics. Second, this study offers a framework of desecuritization and securitization of Taiwan's trade toward China, and it highlights how the political leaders in Taiwan attempt to find a balance between trade and security. Third, it provides in-depth case studies on how Taiwan executed desecuritization and securitization strategies. Finally, it concludes with some initial thoughts on the studies of comparative economic statecraft, and provides policy implications for countries in the Asia Pacific region and beyond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do people risk their lives fighting in wars? This article looks beyond group grievance and material benefits to add another psychological mechanism explaining why people choose to fight or not to fight – perceived collective action. An individual is much more likely to fight when they perceive that others will also fight. Contrary to the expectations of social identity theory and social pressure theory, the effect of perceived collective action is stronger among those who have a weaker national identity because they are more likely to rationally calculate the chance of winning by accounting for others' decisions. To mitigate the endogeneity in post-conflict cross-sectional surveys, we conduct a survey experiment (n = 1,001) in Taiwan manipulating perceptions of others' willingness to fight in a potential China–Taiwan military conflict. Experimental evidence supports the hypotheses that perceived collective action works only on weak Taiwanese identifiers. The result holds in robustness checks and in another nationally representative survey. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Because of the complex and special political relationship between Mainland China and Taiwan. Cross-Strait trade is influenced by many variables, there has been a view that trade relations between Mainland China and Taiwan are more influenced by political factors. However, between the Cross-Strait, the trade volume has generally shown an upward development trend, especially since 2001. Therefore, the political factors can hardly explain the facts, and economic factors, especially industrial structure factors in Mainland China play an important role in Cross-Strait trade. Based on the small sample data since 2001, this study employed Grey Relational Analysis （GRA） method to verify the evolution of Mainland China's industrial structure and Cross-Strait trade. Based on the results show that the evolution of Mainland China's industrial structure strongly impacts the development of Cross-Strait trade. The tertiary industry has the strongest correlation with Cross-Strait trade, followed by the secondary and primary industries. Furthermore, the evolution of the mainland's industrial structure will expand as well as accelerate the imbalance of Cross-Strait trade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of China Quarterly is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of China Quarterly is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

China is accused of conducting disinformation campaigns on Taiwan's social media. Existing studies on foreign interventions in democratic societies predict that such disinformation campaigns should lead to increasing partisan polarization within Taiwan. We argue that a backlash effect, making Taiwan's citizens more united against China, is equally plausible. We conduct a survey experiment exposing participants to a real-life rumour and rebuttal to test these competing hypotheses. We find, at best, mixed evidence for polarization. Although neither rumour nor rebuttal mention China, there is consistent evidence of backlash against China. Most notably, participants across the political spectrum are more inclined to support Taiwanese independence after viewing the rumour rebuttal. These findings indicate that citizens may put aside partisanship when confronted with false news that is plausibly linked to an external actor. We conclude by discussing the broader applicability of our theory and implications for cross-Strait relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]