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"A Liberal Chronicle in Peace and War: Journals and Papers of J.A. Pease, 1st Lord Gainford, 1911-1915" is a book edited by Cameron Hazlehurst and Christine Woodland. The book explores the life and political career of J.A. Pease, a largely forgotten figure who held key positions in Liberal governments during the early 20th century. The book delves into Pease's journals and correspondence, shedding light on his views on various issues such as women's suffrage, international tensions, and the First World War. It also provides insights into the political landscape of post-Edwardian England and features notable figures like Prime Minister H.H. Asquith and Chancellor of the Exchequer David Lloyd George. The book is a valuable resource for researchers interested in this period of history. [Extracted from the article]

The paper addresses the problem of imaginative resistance in science, that is, why and under what circumstances imagination sometimes resists certain scenarios. In the first part, the paper presents and discusses two accounts concerning the problem and relevant for the main thesis of this study. The first position is that of Gendler (Journal of Philosophy 97:55–81, 2000), (Gendler, in: Nichols (ed) The Architecture of the Imagination: New essays on pretence, possibility and fiction, Oxford University Press, New York, 2006a), (Gendler & Liao, in: Gibson, Carroll (eds) The routledge companion to philosophy of literature, Routledge, New York, 2016), according to which imaginative resistance mainly concerns evaluative scenarios, presenting deviant moral attitudes. The second account examined is that of Kim et al. (in: Cova, Réhault (eds) Advances in experimental philosophy of aesthetics, Bloomsbury, London, 2018), who insisted on the link between imaginative resistance on the one hand and counterfactual and counterdescriptive scenarios on the other. In the light of both theories, this paper discusses the importance of addressing the problem of imaginative resistance in the scientific enterprise in the light of some mechanisms of embodied simulation, based on the activity of mirror neurons and investigated within the framework of the Embodied Simulation Theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following his introduction, Marcocci surveys several examples of these Renaissance era world histories over the course of five chapters. By the early seventeenth century, Marcocci maintains, blinkered nationalist histories sponsored by rulers and religious histories extolling Christianity over other beliefs replaces the cosmopolitan world histories. Marcocci believes that the last major example of a history of the world was Walter Raleigh's I History of the World i (1614), which used multiple world histories as its base and compared recent history and rulers to those of ancient empires. [Extracted from the article]

How can we make rational decisions that involve transformative experiences, that is, experiences that can radically change our core preferences? L. A. Paul ([2014]. Transformative Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.) has argued that many decisions involving transformative experiences cannot be rational. However, Paul acknowledges that some traumatic events can be transformative experiences, but are nevertheless not an obstacle to rational decision-making. For instance, being attacked by hungry sharks would be a transformative experience, and yet, deciding not to swim with hungry sharks is rational. Paul has tried to explain why decisions involving 'sharky' outcomes are an exception to the rule. However, her putative explanation has been criticized by Campbell and Mosquera ([2020]. 'Transformative Experience and the Shark Problem.' Philosophical Studies 177: 3549–3565.). In this paper, I offer a different solution to this problem. Roughly, I argue that transformative experiences give rise a problem for rational decision-making only if the decision can lead to satisfying some of our (new) core preferences, but can also frustrate other (new) core preferences. I also argue that agents can partially project what traumatic transformative experiences are like. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For Anscombe a solitary activity is intentional if the agent has self-knowledge of what she is doing. Analogously one might think that to partake in shared intentional activities is for the agents involved to have plural or collective self-knowledge of what they are doing together. I call this 'the Plural Practical Knowledge Thesis' (PPK). While some authors have advanced related theses about the nature of the knowledge involved in shared practical activities (see Laurence, B. [2011]. "An Anscombian Approach to Collective Action." In Essays on Anscombe's Intention, edited by Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby, and Frederick Stoutland. Cambridge: Harvard UP; Schmid, H.-B. [2016]. "On Knowing What We Are Doing Together." In The Epistemic Life of Groups: Essays in the Epistemology of Collectives, edited by Michael S. Brady, and Miranda Fricker. Oxford: Oxford UP; Rödl, S. [2015]. "Joint Action and Recursive Consciousness of Consciousness." Phenomenology and Cognitive Sciences 14: 769–779. doi:; Rödl, S. [2018a]. "Joint Action and Pure Self-Consciousness." Journal of Social Philosophy 49 (1): 124–136; Rödl, S. [2018b]. Self-Consciousness and Objectivity. Cambridge: Harvard UP) this alternative remains relatively underexplored in the current literature. The paper offers an account of plural practical knowledge based on the idea that shared activities of the relevant sort share a normative structure given by practical, means-end structures and proposes a paradigmatic methodology that generalizes this account to understand what different cases of collective intentional action have in common. It then discusses the differences between the proposed approach and those due to Schmid 2016. "On Knowing What We Are Doing Together." In The Epistemic Life of Groups: Essays in the Epistemology of Collectives, edited by Michael S. Brady, and Miranda Fricker. Oxford: Oxford UP and Laurence 2011. "An Anscombian Approach to Collective Action." In Essays on Anscombe's Intention, edited by Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby, and Frederick Stoutland. Cambridge: Harvard UPand the reasons why it should be preferred. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I discuss the emerging field of conceptual engineering from the perspective of the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. I explore the role the latter disciplines can and do play by specifically focusing on how different notions of what a concept is affects the general conceptual engineering framework, both positively and negatively, before considering a particular account that eschews talk of concepts altogether. I call this project 'Cappelen's challenge' as it draws from suggestive remarks in his work (Cappelen, H. 2018. Fixing Language: Conceptual Engineering and the Limits of Revision. Oxford: Oxford University Press). I argue that by appreciating the range of options that each theory of concepts brings with it, the field as a whole can come to better grips with its foundations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recent paper, Negri and Pavlović (Studia Logica 1–35, 2020) have formulated a decidable sequent calculus for the logic of agency, specifically for a deliberative see-to-it-that modality, or dstit. In that paper the adequacy of the system is demonstrated by showing the derivability of the axiomatization of dstit from Belnap et al. (Facing the future: agents and choices in our indeterminist world. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001). And while the influence of the latter book on the study of logics of agency cannot be overstated, we note that this is not the only axiomatization of that modality available. In fact, an earlier (and arguably purer) one was offered in Xu (J Philosophical Logic 27(5):505–552, 1998). In this article we fill this lacuna by proving that this alternative axiomatization is likewise readily derivable in the system of Negri and Pavlović (Studia Logica 1–35, 2020). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the normative approach, speech acts are governed by certain norms. Interestingly, the same is true for classes of speech acts. This paper considers the normative treatment of constatives, consisting of such classes as assertives, predictives, suggestives, and more. The classical approach is to treat these classes of illocutions as species of constatives. Recently, however, Simion (Shifty Speech and Independent Thought: Epistemic Normativity in Context, Oxford University Press, 2021) has proposed that all constatives (i) are species of assertion, and (ii) are governed by the knowledge norm. I defend the classical treatment of constatives and show that Simion's conclusion is untenable. No taxonomy of speech acts can accommodate such a view. More importantly, we can test whether a particular speech act is an assertion or not. I propose five tests of assertion, the passing of which is a necessary condition for being an assertion. Some constative speech acts fail these tests. Thus, contrary to Simion, not all constatives can be regarded as species of assertion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Surprisingly little attention has been paid to the nature of conscious control. As a result, experiments suggesting that we lack conscious control over our actions cannot be properly evaluated. Joshua [Shepherd, J. 2015. "Conscious Control Over Action." Mind & Language 30 (3): 320–344. https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12082; Shepherd, J. 2021. The Shape of Agency: Control, Action, Skill, Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press] aims to fill this gap. His proposal is grounded in the standard causalist account of action, according to which, simply put, bodily movements are controlled by the agent if and only if they are caused, in the right way, by the relevant psychological states. In this paper, I argue that the proposal does not succeed in distinguishing between mere causation and actual control; it does not solve the problem of deviant causation. On the basis of my criticism, Anscombean action theory promises to offer a valuable perspective. It suggests that an important function of consciousness is to integrate an action into a rational whole. If this is on the right track, it supports Shepherd's overall claim that the importance of consciousness for action control is often underestimated, because this contribution of consciousness may often go unnoticed in experimental settings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A paradigmatic experience of agency is the felt effort associated with the act of making a difficult choice. The challenge of accounting for this experience within a compatibilist framework has been called 'the agency problem of compatibilism' (Vierkant, 2022, The Tinkering Mind: Agency, Cognition and the Extended Mind, Oxford University Press, 116). In this paper, I will propose an evolutionarily plausible, actional account of deciding which explains the phenomenology. In summary: The act of making a difficult choice is triggered by a metacognitive decision to intentionally stop deliberating, despite ongoing uncertainty. This decision is the output of a metacognitive cost–benefit computation, which weighs the value of uncertainty reduction against the costs of ongoing deliberation. Strikingly, contemporary theories of effort suggest that this cost–benefit computation is also the source of the feeling of mental effort, which tracks the costs of that decision. If this account is correct, the agency problem of compatibilism has been solved. The act of making a difficult choice and the associated paradigmatic experience of agency, felt effort, both follow from the metacognitive evaluation. Implications are explored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current study used the capability approach (CA) to explore the English learning experiences of 10 economically vulnerable higher education (HE) students in Colombia in order to better conceptualise English from a capability perspective. In doing so, this paper builds on the empirical and theoretical work of capability scholars which has looked at the role of English in educational settings. It highlights the importance of viewing linguistic capabilities as inchoative since viewing them as fully formed can obscure injustices. These injustices can include poor quality English language education (ELE), an unfavourable financial situation, and a lack of opportunities for exposure to and practice of English. This last-mentioned injustice foregrounds another important dimension of linguistic capabilities: their inter-subjective, relational nature. To aid in this conceptualisation, the paper also draws on Phillipson's [1992. Linguistic Imperialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press] theory of linguistic imperialism to better illustrate how English is implicated in asymmetrical power relations which give rise to oppression and domination. However, this paper also shows how some injustices can be navigated by educationally resilient individuals. The findings of this thesis are therefore of interest not only to language policy experts and other language education stakeholders in developing contexts, but also to capability scholars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is structure a fundamental and indispensable part of the world? Is the question of ontology a question about structure? Structure is a central notion in contemporary metaphysics [Sider 2011. Writing the Book of the World. Oxford: Clarendon Press]. Realism about structure claims that the question of ontology is about the fundamental and indispensable structure of the world. In this paper, I present a criticism of the metaphysics of realism about structure based on a version of Russell's famous regress argument against nominalism [Russell 1911. "On the Relation of Universals and Particular." In Logic & Knowledge. Reprint, London: George Allen & Unwin]. First, I argue that the three general tests for the fundamentality of structure proposed by realism about structure rely on a particular empirical test for structure, namely, the so-called 'similarity test for structure.' Second, I argue that the similarity test is not well-founded because it leads to a vicious regress. Third, I argue that the regress affects the whole metaphysics of realism about structure, and that no structural notion can be said to be fundamental in connection with any of the other tests. Lastly, I argue that the question of ontology as a question about structure is not substantive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The counterfactual approach to explainable AI (XAI) seeks to provide understanding of AI systems through the provision of counterfactual explanations. In a recent systematic review, Chou et al. (Inform Fus 81:59–83, 2022) argue that the counterfactual approach does not clearly provide causal understanding. They diagnose the problem in terms of the underlying framework within which the counterfactual approach has been developed. To date, the counterfactual approach has not been developed in concert with the approach for specifying causes developed by Pearl (Causality: Models, reasoning, and inference. Cambridge University Press, 2000) and Woodward (Making things happen: A theory of causal explanation. Oxford University Press, 2003). In this paper, I build on Chou et al.'s work by applying the Pearl-Woodward approach. I argue that the standard counterfactual approach to XAI is capable of delivering causal understanding, but that there are limitations on its capacity to do so. I suggest a way to overcome these limitations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I will evaluate whether some knowledge states that are interpretatively derived from statistical mechanical probabilities could be somehow relevant in actual practices, as famously rejected by Albert (Time and chance, Harvard University Press, 2000). On one side, I follow Frigg (in: Ernst & Hüttermann (eds) Probability in Boltzmannian statistical mechanics, 2010) in rejecting the causal relevance of knowledge states as a mere byproduct of misinterpreting this theoretical field. On the other side, I will argue against Uffink (in: Beisbart & Hartmann (eds) Probabilities in physics, Oxford University Press, 2011) that probability-represented epistemic states cannot be explanatorily relevant, because (i) probabilities cannot faithfully represent significant epistemic states, and (ii) those states cannot satisfactorily account for why an agent should theoretically believe or expect something. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Semantic relativism maintains that the truth-value of some propositions is sensitive to a judge parameter, facilitating cases whereby a proposition can be true relative to one judge, but false relative to another. Most prominently, semantic relativism has been applied to predicates of personal tastes (PPTs). Recently, Lasersohn [2007. "Expressives, Perspective and Presupposition." Theoretical Linguistics 33 (2): 223–230; 2017. Subjectivity and Perspective in Truth-Theoretic Semantics. Oxford: Oxford University Press] has urged an extension of semantic relativism to terms traditionally construed as expressives including derogatory epithets (e.g. 'asshole') and, more tentatively, expressions like 'damn'. In this paper, we challenge Lasersohn's extension of relativism. Section 1 gives a background on semantic theories for expressives and on semantic relativism. In Section 2, we focus on Lasersohn's [2007. "Expressives, Perspective and Presupposition." Theoretical Linguistics 33 (2): 223–230] account where he attempts to apply relativism to a wider range of expressives. We argue that because PPTs and expressives have fundamentally different semantic functions, the prospects for a relativistic account are slim. Several problems are presented. Our focus is on the perspective sensitivity of expressive content and the phenomenon of projection failure, as both reveal a fundamental disparity between expressives and PPTs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Adverbs and Functional Heads: a Cross-Linguistic perspective (Cinque, Guglielmo. 1999. Adverbs and functional heads: A cross-linguistic perspective. New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press)—one of the founding works of "Syntactic Cartography"—combines some of the developments in Syntactic Theory from the 1980s and 1990s with insightful contributions from Linguistic Typology. This paper has two interrelated goals. First, it aims to review the fundamental theses of Cinque's monography of 1999—which are far from controversial among scholars working in Cartography—; at the same time it provides conceptual support to them. Secondly, it aims to explore some methodological tools of Syntactic Cartography presented and discussed by Cinque, Guglielmo. 1999. Adverbs and functional heads: A cross-linguistic perspective. New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, namely the so-called precedence-and-transitivity tests—after a brief discussion on methodology used to recognise the functional categories, namely the criterion by Jackendoff, Ray. 1972. Semantic interpretation in generative grammar. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press—and the use of the hierarchies as tools to detect intra and interlinguistic variation. With regard to this latter issue, the paper gathers data from Brazilian Portuguese, Canadian English and Colombian Spanish on verb raising. The discussion of the data not only favours Cinque, Guglielmo. 2017. On the status of functional categories (heads and phrases). Language and Linguistics 18(4). 521–576 recent updates of his theoretical approach to the cartography of the clause but also shows how Cartography offers a natural scenario for a methodological approach to both micro and macro-variation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The title of this paper is taken from the final sentence of the book How People Judge Policing (Waddington et al. [2017]. How People Judge Policing. Oxford: Oxford University Press.) which, though it had four authors, was really the brainchild of the late Tank Waddington. The paper picks up the book's final observation and seeks to develop it, examining the problematic core of policing, and using this as a basis for thinking more generally about issues of trust, legitimacy and reform. There now exists an increasing body of research which shows how the delivery of policing can influence perceived procedural justice, the popular legitimacy of the police, and a variety of public behaviours such as compliance with the law and co-operation with the police (Tyler, [2017] Procedural justice and policing: A rush to judgement? Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 13, 29–53.). Such work is having increased impact on debates around police conduct and legitimacy and is increasingly seen as central to police reform efforts in Anglo-American policing, and in some other jurisdictions. Though accepting the broad thrust of such research, as well as its importance, this paper suggests that there are dangers in over-reading the potential of procedural justice, not least in forgetting some crucial lessons from the history of police research. The argument here focuses on the inherent complexity of policing and the inevitability of error within it. The simple but often overlooked lesson is that controversy and dissent are the norm rather than the exception in policing, and that much dispute and disagreement rather than reflecting a failure of approach or procedure, derive from the nature of policing itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many philosophers take mental causation to be required for free will. But it has also been argued that the most popular view of the nature of mental states, i.e. non-reductive physicalism, excludes the existence of mental causation, due to what is known as the 'exclusion argument'. In this paper, I discuss the difference-making account of mental causation proposed by [List, C., and Menzies, P. 2017. "My Brain Made Me Do It: The Exclusion Argument Against Free Will, and What's Wrong with It." In H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock, & H. Price (eds.), Making a Difference: Essays on the Philosophy of Causation. Oxford Scholarship Online: Oxford University Press], who argue that their account not only solves the problem of causal exclusion but also saves free will. More precisely, they argue that it rebuts what they call 'the Neurosceptical Argument', the argument that if actions are caused by neural states and processes unavailable to us, there is no free will. I argue that their argument fails for two independent reasons. The first reason is that they fail to show that difference-makers are independent causes. The second reason is that physical realizers of mental states can be individuated in a way that makes both mental states and their realizers difference-makers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present paper is a review of the book "City Power: Urban Governance in a Global Age" by Richard Schragger, published in 2016 by Oxford University Press (ISBN 9780190246679, 322 pp.) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper introduces and develops the concept of "reflexive peacebuilding". Peacebuilding has been conceptualised using different theoretical frameworks and operationalised across various levels of governance. This paper re-conceptualises peacebuilding in the context of the growing discourse on the Anthropocene. Drawing on the work of John S. Dryzek and Jonathan Pickering (2019. The Politics of the Anthropocene. Oxford: Oxford University Press) on reflexivity in the Anthropocene, this paper locates the "pathological path dependency" of international peacebuilding and the need for reflexive peacebuilding institutions across the agency, time, and space of peace formation. It specifically examines the United Nations peacebuilding architecture to identify the path dependency and potential for reflexivity of its institutions and practices. The discussion in this paper aims to contribute to recommendations for restructuring the international peacebuilding architecture and re-affirming its relevance to the evolving peace requirements of post-conflict societies, especially in the context of the Anthropocene. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article takes its cue from David Miall's influential 2011 paper, 'Enacting the other: towards an aesthetics of feeling in literary reading', in Elisabeth Schellekens and Peter Goldie (eds) The Aesthetic Mind: Philosophy and Psychology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 285–298. There, Miall considers the workings of readerly empathy with fictional people. He draws on work from philosophy, psychology, cognitive poetics, and both empirical and textual analysis to explore the complexities of how real readerly minds interact with fictional minds and the minds of real but remote authors. In this article, I revisit these arguments with the benefit of recent insights into the cognition of fictional minds. The key mechanism underlying characterisation, empathy, hostility, and engagement, I argue, is mind-modelling. With its origins in Theory of Mind, but extrapolated far from that simple phenomenon, mind-modelling captures the aesthetic and ethical relationships between minds both fictional and natural. I consider literary reading as a broader ecosystem: the reading mind as being embodied, enacted, and extended to include the imagined authorial mind. In recognition of Miall's literary critical work, I will present a particular example from the poem 'Ode on a Grecian Urn' by John Keats – not only for the analytical demonstration but also in order to show the echoes between Romantic notions of holistic engagement with nature and recent work in cognition and literature. The analysis suggests a solution to a literary critical debate around its ending. An approach situated in mind-modelling offers a principled exploration of both fictional, poetic minds as well as authorial positioning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides an analysis of the 'frustrative' marker séna7 in St'át'imcets (Lillooet Salish), and compares it to similar elements cross-linguistically. Séna7 appears in a range of discourse contexts, including when events have an unexpected outcome, fail to continue, or fail to take place optimally. We argue that séna7 felicitously applies to a proposition p only if there is a salient true proposition q and the speaker did not expect p and q to both be true. Séna7 encodes epistemic modality, refers only to the speaker's epistemic state (ignoring the common ground), and has no effect on at-issue truth conditions (séna7(p) entails p). We show that séna7 provides a diagnostic for distinguishing between entailments and implicatures in the language, and a clear diagnostic for the distinction between futures and prospective aspects. We compare séna7 with similar elements in Tohono O'odham, Kimaragang and Tagalog. We argue that séna7 and the Kimaragang frustrative can be captured by the same analysis once independent features of their tense/aspect systems are taken into account. Following Kroeger (2017. Frustration, culmination and inertia in Kimaragang grammar. Glossa: A Journal of General Linguistics 2(1). 56. 1–29), but pace Copley and Harley (2014. Eliminating causative entailments with the force-theoretic framework: The case of the Tohono O'odham frustrative cem. In Bridget Copley & Fabienne Martin (eds.), Causation in grammatical structures (Oxford Studies in Theoretical Linguistics 52), 120–151. Oxford: Oxford University Press), we argue that frustratives should not be unified with non-culminating accomplishments, and can be analyzed without appealing to causality or efficacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Daniel J. Nicholson and John Dupré's edited collection of papers in I Everything Flows: Towards a Processual Philosophy of Biology i is an excellent example of the skillful sampling of an on-going approach in philosophy of science. Everything flows: towards a processual philosophy of biology. I especially warmly recommend it to those philosophers exposed chiefly to the standard topics and approaches in philosophy of biology and in philosophy of science more generally. [Extracted from the article]

This paper investigates how the South African government and mining corporations have appropriated anti-apartheid and anti-colonial discourses to legitimise Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) as a radically transformative policy without being transformative in conception, discourse, or action. There is a presumption in academic circles that BEE is a panacea for radically transforming historical, structural, and unequal power relations in South Africa. This article rejects this presumption by demonstrating how the conception and discourse of BEE have ignored these power relations and their underlying political economic structures of apartheid capitalism even before the policy was implemented or enforced by the government. Using [Young, Marion. 1990. Justice and the Politics of Difference. Oxford: Oxford University Press] critique of the distributive paradigm of justice, and employing [Fairclough, Norman. 1992. Discourse and Social Change. Cambridge: Polity Press] three-dimensional model of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), this article argues that the government and mining corporations present BEE as a new measure of radical transformation while simultaneously reducing this transformation to the micro concept of economic participation, focusing on numbers, representation, and targets rather than on historical, structural, and unequal power relations. As a result, the government and these corporations have reinforced and maintained these power relations while employing the discourse of BEE to masquerade as advancing their transformation. The crux is that BEE encourages Black people to operate within economically and institutionally oppressive structures which amplify the conditions they purport to be challenging. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The use of Building Information Modeling (BIM) technology has facilitated storage and reuse of information throughout the lifecycle of construction projects. Despite its benefits, construction industry has witnessed several obstacles in adopting BIM technology in terms of people management. This paper investigates how ADKAR model (an acronym for five stages of effective lasting people change: awareness, desire, knowledge, ability, and reinforcement) can contribute to successful adoption of BIM in construction sector. This study was conducted in two main stages: a rigorous literature review process followed by data collection using eight in-depth interviews with construction project managers. Data was analyzed following Bryman and Bell's [(2007). Business Research Methods. Oxford: Oxford University Press] steps for thematic analysis. The results from interviews combined with results of literature review contribute to the development of an integrated conceptual model of change management. The conceptual model identifies two main phases of determinants for successful change management process towards the adoption of BIM technology using ADKAR model. Firstly, engineers as designers with different specialist (i.e., architectural, civil, electrical, mechanical), engineers as contractors, and clients require the enhancement of all five dimensions of ADKAR for a lasting change. Secondly, government requires the enhancement of three main dimensions of ADKAR model, namely awareness, desire, and reinforcement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes a Minimalist analysis of the Adjunct Condition. It shows that extraction from adverbial adjuncts is common, and it reviews and extends (Truswell, Robert. 2011. Events, phrases, and questions. Oxford: Oxford University Press analysis), which holds that extractions are grammatical when the adjunct and matrix predicates together constitute a macro-event. Syntactically, a UI feature (representing "unintegration") on adjuncts must be active at either LF or PF; where it is active ill-formedness results. However, if a macro-event is possible, UI is inactivated at LF, allowing extraction; and though an active UI at PF normally causes ill-formedness, this is repairable by sluicing. This analysis improves on existing analyses by accounting for possible extractions, island repair by sluicing, and the basic conception of adjuncts as relatively unintegrated phrases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of explanation is central to scientific practice. However, scientists explain phenomena in very different ways. That is, there are many different kinds of explanation; e.g. causal, mechanistic, statistical, or equilibrium explanations. In light of the myriad kinds of explanation identified in the literature, most philosophers of science have adopted some kind of explanatory pluralism. While pluralism about explanation seems plausible, it faces a dilemma (Pincock in: Reutlinger A, Saatsi J (eds) Explanation beyond causation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 39–56, 2018). Either there is nothing that unifies all instances of scientific explanation that makes them count as explanations, or there is some set of unifying features, which seems incompatible with explanatory pluralism. Different philosophers have adopted different horns of this dilemma. Some argue that no unified account of explanation is possible (Morrison in Reconstructing reality, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015). Others suggest that there is a set of necessary features that can unify all explanations under a single account (Potochnik in Idealization and the aims of science, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 2017; Reutlinger in Reutlinger A, Saatsi J (eds) Explanation beyond causation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 74–95, 2018; Strevens in Depth: an account of scientific explanation, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2008). In this paper, we argue that none of the features identified by existing accounts of explanation are necessary for all explanations. However, we argue that a unified account can still be provided that accommodates pluralism. This can be accomplished, we argue, by reconceiving of scientific explanation as a cluster concept: there are multiple subsets of features that are sufficient for providing an explanation, but no single feature is necessary for all explanations. Reconceiving of explanation as a cluster concept not only accounts for the diversity of kinds of explanations, but also accounts for the widespread disagreement in the explanation literature and enables explanatory pluralism to avoid Pincock's dilemma. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the past two decades, impact evaluation and multidimensional poverty measurement have gained increasing relevance in development practice and research. The objective of this paper is to propose empirical strategies for using the multidimensional poverty measures proposed by Alkire and Foster (2011. "Counting and Multidimensional Poverty Measurement." Journal of Public Economics 95 (7–8): 476–487) in impact evaluation. The principal argument for taking this approach is that it provides a means for assessing the effects of social programmes on the simultaneous occurrence or joint frequency of deprivations, what Wolff and de-Shalit (2007. Disadvantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press) call the "clustering" of disadvantage. As the interrelation between functionings tends to bind disadvantages together, social programmes that "decluster" disadvantages could produce benefits that go beyond improvements in multiple wellbeing dimensions individually. These strategies are applied to the evaluation of the NGO TECHO's emergency housing programme in the informal settlements of Buenos Aires, Argentina. The results show that the programme produces a large reduction in the simultaneous occurrence of disadvantages. Privacy, interpersonal relations and psychological health are the dimensions that contribute the most to explaining the decline in multidimensional deprivation. Sensitivity analyses demonstrate the robustness of the results to changes in the criteria used to construct the multidimensional poverty measure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we consider a two-dimensional nonresistive magnetohydrodynamic model, taking the fluctuation of absolute temperature into account. Combining the method of weak convergence developed by Lions [Mathematical Topics in Fluid Mechanics: Volume 2: Compressible Models, Clarendon Press, Oxford, UK, 1998] and Feireisl et al. [E. Feireisl and A. Novotný, Singular Limits in Thermodynamics of Viscous Fluids, Birkhauser Verlag, Basel, 2009; E. Feireisl, A. Novotn ý, and H. Petzeltov á, J. Math. Fluid Mech., 3 (2001), pp. 358--392] from compressible Navier--Stokes(--Fourier) system and the new technique of variable reduction proposed by Vasseur, Wen, and Yu [J. Math. Pure. Appl., 125 (2019), pp. 247--282] and refined by Novotný and Pokorný [Arch. Ration. Mech. Anal., 235 (2020), pp. 355--403] from compressible two-fluid models, weak solutions are shown to exist globally in time with finite energy initial data. The result is the first one on global solvability to a full compressible, viscous, nonresistive magnetohydrodynamic system in multidimensions with large initial data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]