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It is often said that science is self-correcting, but the replication crisis suggests that self-correction mechanisms have fallen short. How can we know whether a particular scientific field has effective self-correction mechanisms, that is, whether its findings are credible? The usual processes that supposedly provide mechanisms for scientific self-correction, such as journal-based peer review and institutional committees, have been inadequate. We describe more verifiable indicators of a field's commitment to self-correction. These fall under the broad headings of 1) transparency, which is already the subject of many reform efforts and 2) critical appraisal, which has received less attention and which we focus on here. Only by obtaining Observable Self-Correction Indicators (OSCIs) can we begin to evaluate the claim that "science is self-correcting." We expect that the veracity of this claim varies across fields and subfields, and suggest that some fields, such as psychology and biomedicine, fall far short of an appropriate level of transparency and, especially, critical appraisal. Fields without robust, verifiable mechanisms for transparency and critical appraisal cannot reasonably be said to be self-correcting, and thus do not warrant the credibility often imputed to science as a whole. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Truth" and "cause" are essential issues in theology. Truths of faith are meant to remain solid and fundamental and can be traced back to the unique truth of God. The same God is conceived of as the Creator who brought everything into existence before every other cause. Recent discussions about scientific rationality and causality have engaged with the same ideas of "truth" and "cause", even though they have done so according to different methodologies and from different points of view. Can those discussions stimulate theology, and if so, in what manner? In this paper, we begin by considering the subject of scientific change and rationality, arguing that scientific change leads to the recognition of the connection between any scientific theory and what remains intelligible in nature. Next, we show some of the outcomes from new mechanistic philosophy, focusing on the idea of cause, which unveils a strong correspondence between epistemology and ontology and provides a unique way of speaking about causality. Finally, we conclude that science can support theology through new approaches to nature and that a theology of science is required today as an intertwined perspective between science and theology. The main virtue that guides this approach is humility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This critical essay evaluates the potential integration of distinct kinds of expertise in policymaking, especially during situations of critical emergencies, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. This article relies on two case studies: (i) herd immunity (UK) and (ii) restricted access to ventilators for disabled people (USA). These case studies are discussed as examples of experts' recommendations that have not been widely accepted, though they were made within the boundaries of expert epistemic authority. While the fundamental contribution of biomedical experts in devising public health policies during the COVID-19 pandemic is fully recognized, this paper intends to discuss potential issues and limitations that may arise when adopting a strict expert-based approach. By drawing attention to the interests of minorities (disenfranchized and underrepresented groups), the paper also claims a broader notion of "relevant expertise." This critical essay thus calls for the necessity of wider inclusiveness and representativeness in the process underlying public health policymaking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: YouTube is widely used for learning about scientific issues in and out of school. However, much of the scientific information on YouTube is inaccurate. Prior studies have mostly focused on how students evaluate textual online information sources and have not yet systematically examined how they evaluate authentic scientific YouTube videos. Objectives: The purpose of this study was to examine how students evaluate authentic scientific YouTube videos in comparison to scientific webpages. Methods: Eighth grade students ranked six YouTube videos on the topic of climate change, justified their rankings, and responded to metacognitive prompts designed to elicit their evaluation criteria and strategies. Students also responded to a parallel webpage evaluation measure. We analysed and compared students' evaluation strategies and criteria. We also examined which evaluation criteria predict students' judgments of YouTube video quality. Results and Conclusions: Students predominantly relied on evaluation of video content, focusing mainly on criteria of communicative quality and explanation quality. Students tended to neglect source expertise and information validity criteria. Students evaluated videos mostly similarly to how they evaluated webpages. However, affective experiences played a greater role in video evaluation; whereas task relevance and verbal quality played a smaller role. Students' evaluation criteria predicted their judgments of video quality. Implications: The findings suggest that students are unprepared for critically evaluating scientific YouTube videos and that digital information literacy instruction should address this gap. The study also identifies some unique challenges of video evaluation that educators should attend to. Lay Description: What is already known about this topic: Students often use YouTube for learning about scientific issues.However, much of the scientific information on YouTube is inaccurate.Prior studies have found that students can find it difficult to evaluate scientific websites.Little is known about how students evaluate scientific YouTube videos. What this paper adds: Students mostly focused whether the videos include good explanations and if they are well‐designed.Students tended to ignore the sources of the videos and the accuracy of the information.Students evaluated videos mostly similarly to how they evaluated webpages.However, emotional experiences played a greater role in video evaluation compared to webpage evaluation; whereas the content played a smaller role. Implications for practice and/or policy: The findings suggest that students are unprepared for critically evaluating scientific YouTube videos.Digital information literacy instruction should also focus on teaching video evaluation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Logos: Anales del Seminario de Metafísica (1575-6866) is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Alpha: Revista de Artes, Letras y Filosofía is the property of Universidad de Los Lagos and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article considers Australian receptions of C. P. Snow's The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution (1959), and of the controversy over the literary critic F. R. Leavis's combative 1962 response to it. Taking a lead from conceptual insights in global histories of science and the history of knowledge, the paper considers the ways knowledge claims iterate differently in different geographic and cultural contexts. Elements of the Snow–Leavis dispute resonated among Australian scientists, cultural critics, journalists and poets, while others did not. Snow's diagnosis of a disciplinary antagonism between the humanities and the sciences was central to Australian receptions of the controversy, but wider political issues, emphasised in much of the more sophisticated historiography of the 'two cultures' as a British-American controversy, were largely ignored. This reception reflected the post-war expansion of Australian higher education, and the shifting relations within it between the humanities and the sciences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, the author subjects the narrative of "interculturality" to a critique from an intercultural perspective, invoking the critical potential of intercultural philosophy in contrast to a culturalist "interculturality" light. The background of this analysis is the epistemic violence exercised by the West in the fields of knowledge, science, and education. This violence is particularly noticeable in the case of philosophy, leading to a sort of "philosophical homicide" (philosophicide) with respect to indigenous philosophies such as the Andean one in the case of Abya Yala. The paper concludes with some guidelines for the challenges that a critical intercultural philosophy must face in the XXI century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Discusiones Filosóficas is the property of Universidad de Caldas and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The objective of this those is to postulate Theistic panpsychism as a version of naturalized epistemology it is a cognitive science of essences, substances and modes of physical world (phenomenon) and the a priori world (nuomena). The traditional epistemology is that with experiences in the form of impressions or sense data, we justify our claims to know objects such tables, or molecules etc. Theistic Panpsychic naturalized epistemology is concerned with external physical and metaphysical worlds of objective and subjective realities. Consistent with modernity and post-modernity, it is neither against the canon of reason nor intuition, nor experience but asserts that there are truths of non-empirical modalities. As an objective idealist, realist and panpsychist, the African Bantu sees God in every being and object manifesting as gods, spirits and forces. These forces, he understands and grapples with designators and predicates in explaining nature and medical and scientific puzzles. Similarly, considering the theory of relativity from epistemological standpoint, this paper establishes that Albert Einstein grappled with theistic panpsychism, and then to special theory of relativity and finally general theory of relativity. He explained the randomness and uncertainty of nature with notion of God and forces thereby confirming his theistic panpsychic disposition before his great scientific discovery's namely E=mc². The realm of theistic panpsychic naturalized epistemology is nature, absolutes, thinking, cognition and deductive reasoning. It is a transcending totality encompassing the a priori and a posteriori and provides answers to moral, epistemological and metaphysical questions. It is the epistemologist of Africanity (African or Bantu cognitive world view) and Einsteinism (Ensteins world view that influenced his theory of relativity). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The erudite James Burnet, Lord Monboddo (1714–1799), member of the Select Society and judge of the Court of Session in Edinburgh, wrote many pages about the existence of 'men with tails' and orang-utans' humanity. For this reason, he has been labelled as 'credulous', 'bizarre' and 'eccentric' both by his contemporaries and by modern scholars. In this paper, I shall try to take his argument seriously and to show that throughout his work Monboddo searched for evidence. If his belief in mermaids, giants, blemmyes, daemons and oracles was far from reflecting the general attitude of the age of Enlightenment and empiricism, Monboddo contributed to place the 'science of man' at the centre of the map of knowledge, where Nicholas Phillipson had also located it. He did this by emphasising the variety and historicity of humankind and stressing how mind and body changed over time and space. This article is also an attempt to connect Monboddo's erudite production with his position as a lawyer and a judge. I shall argue that Monboddo founded his 'science of man' on an epistemology of legal evidence, employing the same inquisitive approach that he practiced at the bar and in the court. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Ciencia Política is the property of Universidad Nacional de Colombia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Estudios Filosóficos is the property of Estudios Filosoficos and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper explores the fundamental axes that currently converge for the needs of nature and humanity. The philosophical statements contained in this reflection become valid when it comes to articulating ethical codes with the advancement of science and, at the same time, educating through an axiological system that leads to sustainable human development. In this order of ideas, it is pointed out how Western progress has led to catastrophic events for life on the planet, coupled with the excessive use of science, without any ethical criteria to regulate their actions. However, as a result of the moral reflection of recent times, of the voices of various social groups, scientific improvements have been questioned and directed towards the production of knowledge that allows human activity to be deployed positively on nature and on society, taking into account that, to make this possible, it is necessary to combine ethics, science and education, to walk towards progress in terms of sustainability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the sixty years of his career, Robert Bellah has occupied an enigmatic position in the field of American sociology. Despite his triumphant academic career and his standing as a prominent advocate of sociology in the public sphere, he felt increasingly dissatisfied with the direction of sociology and believed he was underrecognized and misinterpreted by many of his peers. Drawing on Matteo Bortolini's A Joyfully Serious Man, this article reviews various biographical circumstances that may account for Bellah's ambiguous status as a sociologist. It then argues that the most significant source of tension with the sociological profession was Bellah's aversion to science as manifested in many of his writings, where he engaged in a relentless critique of positivism and scientism. This negative side of Bellah's epistemology, i.e. what he defined as bad or dangerous knowledge, is often overlooked both by Bortolini in his book and by commentators who try to derive a usable epistemology from Bellah's oeuvre. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Intense public interest in scientific claims about COVID-19, concerning its origins, modes of spread, evolution, and preventive and therapeutic strategies, has focused attention on the values to which scientists are assumed to be committed and the relationship between science and other public discourses. A much discussed claim, which has stimulated several inquiries and generated far-reaching political and economic consequences, has been that SARS-CoV-2 was deliberately engineered at the Wuhan Institute of Virology and then, either inadvertently or otherwise, released to the public by a laboratory worker. This has been pursued despite a clear refutation, through comprehensive genomic analysis, of the hypothesis that the virus was deliberately engineered and the failure of detailed investigations to identify any evidence in support of a laboratory leak. At the same time a substantial, established body of knowledge about the many factors underlying the emergence of novel zoonotic diseases has been largely ignored—including climate change and other mechanisms of environmental destruction, tourism, patterns of trade, and cultural influences. The existence and conduct of these debates have raised questions about the vulnerability of science to manipulation for political purposes. Scientific discourses are vulnerable because: (i) claims can be made with no more than probabilistic force; (ii) alleged "facts" are always subject to interpretation, which depends on social, ethical, and epistemological assumptions; and (iii) science and scientists are not inherently committed to any single set of values and historically have served diverse, and sometimes perverse, social and political interests. In the face of this complexity, the COVID-19 experience highlights the need for processes of ethical scrutiny of the scientific enterprise and its strategic deployment. To ensure reliability of truth claims and protection from corrupting influences robust ethical discourses are required that are independent of, and at times even contrary to, those of science itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With rapid advancements inmachine learning, we consider the epistemological opportunities presented by thisnovel tool for promoting organizational theory. Our paperun folds in three sections. We begin with an overview of the three forms of machine learning(supervised, reinforcement, and unsupervised), translating these onto our common modes of research (deductive, abductive, inductive, respectively). Next, we present frank critiques of machine learning applications for science, aswell as of the state of organizational scholarship writ large, high lighting contemporary challenges in both domains. We do so to make the case that machine learning and theory are not in competition but have the potential to play complementary roles inmovingour field beyondsiloeddo mainsand incremental theory. Our final sectionspeaks to this synergy. We propose that machine learning canact as a tool to test and prunemidrange theory, and as a catalyst to expand the explanatory spectrumthat theory can inhabit. Specifically, we outline how machine learning can support local but perishable theory targeting pragmatic problems in the here and now, and grand theory that is sufficiently bold and generalizable across contexts and time to serve the social-functional purposes of inspiring and facilitating long-termep is temological progress across domains. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What can I know? What must I do? What may I hope? For Kant, these existential concerns ultimately come down to the question: What is the human being? Anthropology as the science of human beings remains hopelessly overburdened by the order to respond meaningfully to these questions. For Hubert Fichte, literary writer and self-taught ethnologist, this burden proved a productive challenge to test the epistemological limits of ethnography. His essay “Heretical Remarks for a New Science of Man” raises broad charges against the academic and literary institutions of knowledge production that will be unfolded in the present article alongside other episte)mological remarks of Fichte. Behind his sharp polemics (e.g., against Claude Lévi-Strauss), his passionate identifications (e.g., with Herodotus), and the fuzzy counter-model of “poetic anthropology” looms a fundamental critique of what humans can and cannot know. Fichte derived this critique from his engagement with Afro-diasporic syncretism. This essay investigates how this engagement generated a form of anthropological knowledge as poetic practice, which, though utopian in essence, has epistemological implications beyond Fichte’s work and the specific cultures he studied. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista de Enfermagem Referência is the property of Escola Superior de Enfermagem de Coimbra and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Is it possible to draw a border line between ontology and epistemology? A positive answer to this question looks attractive, mainly because it reflects convictions deeply entrenched in our common sense view of the world. However, anyone wishing to clarify the distinction between the ontological and the epistemological dimensions meets problems. This is due to the fact that the separation between factual and conceptual is not clean, but rather fuzzy. It is certainly correct to state that science means to offer correct information about the world, but the extent to which it succeeds in accomplishing this task is always questionable. We cannot claim that the picture provided by today science - our current scientific image of the world - is absolutely correct, because the history of science itself shows us that any such statement is likely to be rejected by future generations. While it may be recognized that science purports to offer a correct description of the real world, the past experience should also prompt us to accept its claims sub condicione, and to view them as merely provisional. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The challenge of improving the functioning of child protection systems is a complex one shared by many governments internationally. In Australia alone, there have been dozens of public inquiries and reform efforts in this vitally important domain over the past four decades. The English system has also undergone numerous reforms, including that led by Munro a decade ago. Despite these efforts, systemic pathologies persist. This article views the challenges of child protection reform through the lens of the long-established transdisciplinary systems science of cybernetics. This article argues that reform efforts are often founded on an epistemological and ontological error. Despite pervasive recourse to use of the term 'child protection system', and reference to the need for 'systemic' change, reform efforts, to varying degrees, fail to operate from a basis in the established tenets of systems science. A critique is offered and some fundamental 'rules' that should inform such reform efforts are distilled. It is argued that to achieve positive and enduring change, these systems must be 'built' from the front line. It is also argued that the political context in which reform efforts take place is perhaps more of a hindering factor than is the complexity of the systems themselves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current dismay within the mainstream of nomological psychology may result from the fact that the anomaly of non-replicability has a direct bearing on its very own methodological requirements and quality criteria of empirical research. The call for more scientific rigour on the customary avenue in order to secure unambiguous empirical findings gives, however, rise to suspect that the deeper reason for this anomaly is not yet recognised: namely, the misguided regulation of a strictly objective inquiry, distorting what is present and relevant in everyday life and treating the 'subjective' of the subject matter as the central root of interfering factors which have to be eliminated or neutralised in the pursuit of experimental hypothesis testing. The problems of replicability would thus be a proof once again that the notorious inversion between matter and method does not really work, due to the uncircumventable characteristics of human inter-/subjectivity. In this sense, the replication crisis replicates the perennial topic of all historical discussions about a crisis in psychology – the failure of a 'psychology without subject'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A theory of reasoned knowledge is presented by developing and demonstrating the methodology of a novel skeptical critique designed to extend the epistemological practice of belief justification to an epistemological practice of reason justification. Analyses of the reasoning found in the theorizations of certain seminal philosophers and leading scientists will reveal how the absence of the epistemic justification of reason defaults to the use of an unjustified form of reason that runs the play of an unrecognized and unchecked dialectic between epistemology and science. An alternative form of reason will be logically outlined and tested against the formalized skeptical critique in order for the newly recognized dialectic to be checked over reason with provisional epistemic justification. Zeno's paradox and Green's and Sellars' critique of givenness are employed as argument functionaries of the reasoned knowledge theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although ophthalmology has made significant progress and awareness about eye care and the accessibility of health technology has increased, there are still aspects that might be improved. One of the ways to achieve improvement is philosophical investigation of some reasoning and behavior styles in ophthalmology. Philosophy means love of wisdom, and the philosophical approach can contribute to increasing the wisdom of ophthalmologists. Logical fallacies currently affecting the decisions of ophthalmologists can be reduced. "ontology" can contribute to a better understanding of "the nature of reality". A detailed inquiry about the basic concepts concerning ophthalmology may support better reasoning styles. Reflecting on epistemological questions such as "What is true knowledge?", justifying information, and having a skeptical attitude may help to make decisions with more accurate information. The philosophy of science is concerned with the detailed investigation, questioning, and understanding of ophthalmologists' scientific activities and may form the missing link between ophthalmology and philosophy. Moreover, the claim that philosophy's contribution to science is of no interest to scientists warrants consideration. The philosophers of science Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn have made significant contributions to the perception of science that are still valid today. Karl Popper proposed that a demarcation between science and pseudo-science might be made through the concept of "falsification". According to this concept, a statement is scientific if it can be tested and falsified using valid methods. Thomas Kuhn stated that major scientific changes (i.e., revolutions) occur through paradigm shifts. Although the areas of moral philosophy/ethics/bioethics have generated useful ideas and practices for the improvement of the art of medicine, bioethics in particular deserves to be questioned philosophically by physicians living in real life. Ophthalmologists can develop more beneficial and realistic ophthalmology education, research, diagnosis, treatment, and rehabilitation practices by utilizing the basic methods of philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers a framework to model the epistemological terrain of the circulation and regulation of knowledge in late-period Soviet society. It proposes that secrecy and openness operated in a mutually constitutive "social map of knowledge" that was constantly shifting due to the inability to maintain secrecy as a stable category. Investigating the domain of Soviet science, this article sheds light on the work of institutions such as Glavlit, the state censorship authority, which supported the state's goal to maintain the contours of secrecy as a static category by repeatedly issuing edicts and restructuring the apparatus of secrecy in the face of constant and destabilizing social, cultural, and technological pressures. This stable but volatile condition encouraged a common language of "speaking in secret" that cut across the Soviet social order. The "social map of knowledge" was one with high peaks, where valuable knowledge was placed in the hands of those with power, even as these peaks were under intense pressure to collapse from a parallel market of speculation marked by rumor, suspicion, and conspiracy theories. This form of "stable volatility" became impossible to maintain in the 1980s, when a deluge of information flooded Soviet society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Show, don't tell" is a maxim basic to literary craft. It enjoins avoidance of abstract, cliché‐ridden summaries and use of rich, vividly rendered details. Anyone who has attended an introductory creative writing course will have encountered it. Practised literary writers know it is true. Why is showing so fundamental to good literature? Why is it more effective than telling? Showing constellates details, placing facets of a larger shape before the reader's mind, a shape that cannot be adequately encompassed by a summary, whose power lies in the simultaneous integration of multiple, superficially discontinuous aspects. This sounds like the eureka effect, the "Aha!" of sudden discovery in mathematics and the sciences. I argue that grasping what is being shown in a literary context is indeed related to insight in theoretical fields. Telling the reader "what happened" makes the mind's eye glaze over in just the way that it glazes over when it is forced to memorize formulae that it does not understand. Showing is like offering an elegant proof; the mind reaches to understand what is going on. When it succeeds, it feels the satisfaction of having grasped meaning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]