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How do states respond to the challenge of climate governance? The Paris Agreement has led to heightened interest in domestic climate policies, but attention to underlying national climate institutional architectures has lagged behind. This literature gap deserves to be addressed, because climate change brings considerable governance challenges. Drawing on a collection of country studies, this paper outlines a framework to explain the path-dependent emergence of climate institutions, based on the interplay of national political institutions, international drivers, and bureaucratic structures. The resultant institutional forms suggest four varieties of climate governance, based on the extent of political polarisation and the narrative around climate politics in the country. The functioning of existing climate institutions indicates they have so far played a modest role in addressing climate governance challenges, but also illustrates their importance in structuring climate politics and outcomes, suggesting a substantial agenda for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper conceptualizes acquiescence as a strategy bureaucrats adopt to deal with contestation between themselves and political leaders. The literature on bureaucratic politics argues that policy outcomes result from a game of bargaining between bureaucrats and political leaders. These actors employ diverse strategies like bargaining for more authority, exploiting loopholes, challenging the political class, and, at other times, using the threat of resignation to implement their preferred priorities. However, we advance the above argument by introducing another strategy that bureaucrats use, acquiescence. We analyze African Union (AU) bureaucratic politics through speeches, press releases, and secondary materials. The paper argues that rather than opting for standard bureaucratic strategies, AU bureaucrats acquiesce because the institutional structure, material resources, and the AU solidarity norm make it difficult for them to do otherwise. Acquiescence is the reluctant acceptance of decisions in bureaucratic politics in the form of silence or an absence of protest. We show examples of AU institutional reform and the Burundi crisis debates, where acquiescence can explain decision-making outcomes in the organization. We conclude that acquiescence is a relevant conceptual tool in explaining the outcomes of bureaucratic politics in the AU and can be generalized to investigate institutional politics in other international organizations within and outside of the continent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of China Quarterly is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The government of Indonesia continues to commit to social forestry as one of its cornerstone rural development policies. Social forestry mechanisms aim to grant legal rights/ permits to groups of local communities to manage previously inaccessible state forests, with the dual aims of improving the livelihoods of rural communities and encouraging participation in forest rehabilitation. Explicit policy targets include the allocation of 12.7 million hectares of state forests for local communities through a suite of social forestry project mechanisms. While the number of social forestry licenses have increased markedly over the past few years, current social forestry initiatives still fall short of meeting the ambitious land area targets. More importantly, increasing evidence points to social forestry policy outcomes only partially serving its initial intended promises. This paper helps to explain these partial outcomes and unmet promises from the perspective of social forestry bureaucracy structures and designs. We found that despite the core social forestry bureaucracy undergoing substantial expansion, several other bureaucracies also channeled their interests into the realm of social forestry policy. These other bureaucracies do not necessarily fit within the intended goals of social forestry policy. Indeed, several bureaucracies continue to hold social forestry policy implementation hostage through other forestry mandates, which results in an institutional chokehold on key social forestry interests. These other bureaucracies even introduced models to redirect social forestry initiatives by retrofitting mandates into their own policy priorities. To address these increasing roadblocks to achieving social forestry policy designs, this paper outlines and proposes a more simplified bureaucratic structure to assist in the implementation of a social forestry policy more in line with its intended goals. Specifically, tasks and responsibilities could be transferred to a single bureaucracy that has mechanisms more closely connected to local people, such as those already envisioned and established in the form of forest management units. • The lens of bureaucratic politics is used to explain the unmet objectives of social forestry policy initiatives. • Non-social forestry bureaucracies have increasingly channeled their interests through social forestry policy. • Non-social forestry bureaucracies are holding intended goals hostage by obstructing policy through several means. • Fragmentation of the social forestry bureaucracy hinders intrinsic policy goals of social forestry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article situates Japan in the international climate security debate by analysing competing climate change discourses. In 2020, for the first time, the Japanese Ministry of the Environment included the term "climate crisis" (kikō kiki) in its annual white paper, and the Japanese parliament adopted a "climate emergency declaration" (kikō hijō jitai sengen). Does this mean that Japan's climate discourse is turning toward the securitisation of climate change? Drawing on securitisation theory, this article investigates whether we are seeing the emergence of a climate change securitisation discourse that treats climate change as a security issue rather than a conventional political issue. The analysis focuses on different stakeholders in Japan's climate policy: the Japanese Ministry of the Environment, the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the parliament, the Cabinet, and sub- and non-state actors. Through a discourse analysis of ministry white papers and publications by other stakeholders, the article identifies a burgeoning securitisation discourse that challenges, albeit moderately, the status quo of incrementalism and inaction in Japan's climate policy. This article further highlights Japan's position in the rapidly evolving global debate on the urgency of climate action and provides explanations for apparent changes and continuities in Japan's climate change discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Foreign policy scholars often assume that leaders pursue a national interest. However, states often spread their foreign policy authority thinly across bureaucracies and programs with overlapping or conflicting interests. This is especially pronounced in foreign aid, which serves a clear foreign policy purpose but is often mired in bureaucracy. Why is foreign aid often so fragmented? Focusing on the United States, I explain foreign aid fragmentation as a byproduct of domestic politics. When moderate legislators are ideologically diffuse, leadership must persuade them to support a foreign aid agenda by offering pet projects. This increases aid's fragmentation. In contrast, when moderates are relatively homogeneous, leaders can gather support through more traditional compromise, decreasing the need for fragmented pet projects. I test this theory using a mixed-methods approach, employing a novel agency-level dataset of US foreign aid appropriations and a case study of a 1992 act delivering aid to the former Soviet Union. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article situates Japan in the international climate security debate by analysing competing climate change discourses. In 2020, for the first time, the Japanese Ministry of the Environment included the term “climate crisis” (kikō kiki) in its annual white paper, and the Japanese parliament adopted a “climate emergency declaration” (kikō hijō jitai sengen). Does this mean that Japan’s climate discourse is turning toward the securitisation of climate change? Drawing on securitisation theory, this article investigates whether we are seeing the emergence of a climate change securitisation discourse that treats climate change as a security issue rather than a conventional political issue. The analysis focuses on different stakeholders in Japan’s climate policy: the Japanese Ministry of the Environment, the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the parliament, the Cabinet, and sub- and non-state actors. Through a discourse analysis of ministry white papers and publications by other stakeholders, the article identifies a burgeoning securitisation discourse that challenges, albeit moderately, the status quo of incrementalism and inaction in Japan’s climate policy. This article further highlights Japan’s position in the rapidly evolving global debate on the urgency of climate action and provides explanations for apparent changes and continuities in Japan’s climate change discourse.

In the centre of this essay is a tension that under certain circumstances may appear between various state actors involved in economic diplomacy. In the case of the Slovak economic diplomacy both the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs and the Ministry of Economy are the main actors in external economic relations. The paper brief ly describes the origins of the tension between them and the reconciliation process that took place in the 10 years since the last reform of Slovakia's economic diplomacy. The crucial reconciling role of the Government's advisory body, the Council on Export and Investment Promotion, co-chaired by the ministers of foreign affairs and economy, is explained within the presented descriptive case study in bureaucratic politics. The article contributes to the conceptual discourse on economic diplomacy, while extending the theoretical and empirical knowledge of the subject with regard to the behavior of its main power actors and the tensions between them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do executive agencies form coalitions? Legislative coalitions are widely theorized and studied, but less attention has been paid to executive coalitions. Executive agencies’ dependence on the political branches calls for a distinctive theory of coalition building. This article presents such a theory, arguing that agencies form coalitions to optimize their autonomy given their subordinate position in a separation of powers system by signaling to overseers that their policies are efficient and should be maintained. Bureaucrats form coalitions actively to advance their policy goals in the face of political opposition. Using data on dozens of agencies over seventeen years, I find that agencies are most likely to form coalitions when their preferences are misaligned with the president but aligned with each other. I also find evidence that coalitions send credible signals that bureaucratic policies are efficient since Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs is less likely to request regulatory revisions of policies produced by coalitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of China Quarterly is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Public comments on proposed federal regulations are thought to influence bureaucratic policy choices, but why? While reelection incentives give politicians straightforward reasons for catering to public preferences, regulators lack similarly direct incentives to accede to demands from stake-holders. We argue commenters may adopt several different tactics to try and persuade regulators. Broadly, they may either describe policy consequences or threaten the regulator with sanctions, especially by the Courts or Congress. But which tactics do members of the public – especially firms and interest groups – use during commenting, and why? We explore this question by extensive manual coding of comments submitted by strategic actors during high-stakes financial rulemaking. We find that the vast majority of comments have purely informational content, with very limited threats to involve political principals. These findings should be surprising to a literature that often presumes a model where interest group commenting is a form of bargaining in the shadow of the Courts or Congress. To assess whether this behavior is driven by the benefits of information versus the costs of threatening, we explore how the strategy of outside interests changes across the resource distribution, and analyze the litigation records of firms against these agencies. We conclude with a case study of a high-stakes policy where different kinds of interests used different strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do governments respond to bilateral relationships characterised by growing economic cooperation on one side and concerns about national security on the other? The existing literature has mainly employed systemic, domestic and individual levels of analysis, but has failed to scrutinise the important bureaucratic aspect of policy-making. By focusing on Indonesia's policy towards the People's Republic of China's (PRC) assertiveness in the South China Sea (SCS), we examine the role of the 'curator', an official tasked with ensuring successful policy outcomes by often bypassing formal institutions in the policy-making process. Arguably, the main reason Indonesia maintained a relatively coherent policy can be attributed to the role of the curator, who worked within an informal space to coordinate maritime policies enacted by a bureaucratic apparatus that was deemed to be hindering the president's approach. By incorporating informality as a mode of coordination, this analysis of Indonesia-China relations advances the bureaucratic politics model in FPA. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Summary: Motivation: There has been growing interest in recent years in a better understanding of knowledge/science and policy co‐production in environmental governance. Purpose: We aim to shed more light on the politics among the numerous actors shaping ideas that drive environmental policy in Indonesia. We focus our theoretical engagement on a framing of bureaucratic politics, which is a research tradition that has made various strides in explaining the formal and non‐formal processes that influence environmental governance outcomes. Methods and approach: Building from a wide range of case studies drawn from deep engagement of participatory research in policy‐making in Indonesia, we established a simple typology that helps explain eight categories that emerge when bureaucracies, knowledge institutions, and publics come together to shape environmental governance outcomes. Findings: The bureaucratic politics specifically clarified the features of cases that have clear fragmentation of bureaucracy but clear explanation variables from the formal and informal interest of bureaucracy. Potential uncovered by bureaucratic politics framing means that, if the metapolitical works alter, the bureaucracy works smoothly or makes it impossible for bureaucracy to operationalize their formal and informal interest in capturing the dynamics of macro and micro politics. In terms of form of knowledge, knowledge produced "from below" can also be used in policy co‐production. It can be produced by non‐expert actors, or from dialogue among them and sympathetic experts that occur below the bureaucracy's radar (people‐driven). Policy implications: Our ideal policy co‐production implication is where the three actors have a strong foundation of "common consciousness" and interact equally to address a particular environmental policy agenda, with enough working space to jointly commit to creating the knowledge base to shape policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Review of Policy Research is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Effective foreign policy necessitates a well-functioning bureaucracy. However, many states fragment foreign policy authority to bureaucratic actors with little interest or expertise in foreign affairs, such as labor, agricultural, and commerce ministries. This is especially common in foreign aid, where research suggests that fragmentation can be deleterious. Why do some states allow their foreign aid bureaucracy to become fragmented? I suggest that the fragmentation of the foreign aid bureaucracy results from domestic distributive politics. Leaders building electoral coalitions can fragment aid to many projects, programs, and bureaucracies to satisfy special interests. Using a novel coding of a bureaucracy-level foreign aid data set, I find that institutions incentivizing distributive politics increase aid fragmentation and that nontraditional aid bureaucracies are more open to distributive politics. I also qualitatively trace the theoretical mechanisms using a case of UK foreign aid. I find that special interests benefit from the existence and empowerment of nontraditional aid bureaucracies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the centre of this essay is a tension that under certain circumstances may appear between various state actors involved in economic diplomacy. In the case of the Slovak economic diplomacy both the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs and the Ministry of Economy are the main actors in external economic relations. The paper briefly describes the origins of the tension between them and the reconciliation process that took place in the 10 years since the last reform of Slovakia’s economic diplomacy. The crucial reconciling role of the Government’s advisory body, the Council on Export and Investment Promotion, co-chaired by the ministers of foreign affairs and economy, is explained within the presented descriptive case study in bureaucratic politics. The article contributes to the conceptual discourse on economic diplomacy, while extending the theoretical and empirical knowledge of the subject with regard to the behavior of its main power actors econand the tensions between them.

There exist a host of separate federal statutes governing conflicts of interest for employees in the federal executive branch. These are supplemented by additional administrative rules promulgated by the Office of Government Ethics. Most provisions regulate financial self‐dealing via the imposition of criminal sanctions. In this article, I analyze the enforcement of public ethics law in the executive branch in three ways: first, by examining the textual substance of the statutory and administrative provisions regulating financial conflicts; second, through the presentation of descriptive statistics on enforcement of federal prohibitions on self‐dealing; and third, through exploratory analyses to investigate whether enforcement of federal public ethics law is driven by partisan dynamics or ideological preferences. My results indicate that the Department of Justice is at least somewhat more likely to successfully prosecute employees of agencies whose ideological preferences are misaligned with the incumbent president. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bureaucratic influence in policymaking is often described as occurring subsequent to the legislative process and scholars argue that the legislative branch strategically constrains the bureaucracy via statutory language. A reality which complicates these claims and separation of powers research is that bureaucrats frequently play a role in creating the laws which ultimately govern their behavior. This project examines the extent to which bureaucrats attempt to and succeed in securing their preferred statutory language. I track bills introduced at bureaucrats' request across 11 state legislatures. Legislatures extensively draw from agencies' expertise in forming the agenda and crafting session law, with 9% of introduced bills and 21% of law coming from bureaucrats. A difference‐in‐differences analysis shows that committee chairs and legislators in the majority introduce more administration‐initiated bills. Bureaucrats' extensive involvement in crafting statutory law and increased use in less professional legislatures imply that extant statutory control studies miss an important interaction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article aims at investigating how do mechanisms of bureaucratic politics contribute to the decision of deploying troops and in so doing to mold the national motivations underscoring the deployment. The text takes Brazil as a case and researches the decision-making process in the country, using past cases of deployments that actually happened. The bulk of the analysis, however, is dedicated to the negative case where Brazil decided not to contribute to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). The analysis provides a breakdown of the 2017–2018 domestic political and bureaucratic decision-making process in Brazil as regards the possibility of deploying troops to MINUSCA and traces the mechanisms in action that resulted in the negative decision by the government. Based on the case of Brazil, considerations are made on the importance of investigating negative scenarios to better understanding how developing countries, such as the BRICS, value the motivations and ultimately decide to contribute to a UN mission. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]