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This paper intervenes in debates on Chinese higher education and social (re)production strategies in the contemporary African diaspora, developing the link between 'Chinese' capitals, social status and spatial mobility. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with both disadvantaged and middle-class African international students, I unpack how migration to China will enable them to accumulate prized forms of capital and position advantageously in different spheres of African society. The paper focuses on two 'Chinese' capitals--specifically high proficiency in the Chinese language, and exposure to and internalisation of Chinese lifestyles and practices--which are convertible to profit, distinction and secure coveted jobs in their respective home countries. By exploring how China's 'in the middle' position within the global political economy and exercising its soft power over peripheries are reflected in the ways these African students and their families play the 'class game' and make higher education choice, this paper moves beyond the 'West' vs. 'the Rest' gaze and nuances an emergent mobility pattern within the Global South. I conclude by presenting an argument that in seeking these 'Chinese' capitals, the students and their families may enhance China's geopolitical standing and facilitate its movement towards the 'core' within the arena of the world (knowledge) system.

The growth of the Chinese language in African countries and African students' consequent flocking into Chinese higher education are both emergent phenomena. This partly explains the lack of empirical research on this body of student migrants and their Chinese language learning. This paper applies Watkins' theorisation on pedagogic affect to explore pedagogic practices and students' learning experiences in a vocational college in Southeast China. Through a participant observation stance, journal entry and interview data reveal that the teacher's pedagogy generated and heightened affects, which skilfully aroused students' desire to learn but also the capacity to do so. By engaging with the 'affective turn' in second language acquisition studies, I argue that the affective link developed through pedagogic relationships and the bonds fostered in language learning have powerful potential to contribute to the delivery of language skills and resolve cultural adaptation issues in a positive atmosphere.

On the one hand, studies of African international students in China document their instrumental role in "telling China's story and spreading China's voice" while, on the other hand, this research indicates how their lived experiences are shaped by racialisation and exclusionary practices in social life. However, there remains surprisingly little scholarship exploring ways of reducing inter-group stereotypes and racial divides so as to further Sino-African diplomatic relations over the long term. Drawing primarily upon an in-depth interview with Alex - a 23-year-old Burundian international student in China, this paper employs Freire's central concepts of dialogic practices and critical consciousness to examine how he established dialogues with villagers in rural areas in an effort to alter relations between two ethnic groups. The case study of Alex and his daily racial encounters highlights how African students are agentic in disrupting racial discourses. We further argue that dialogue, as a method to read the world in a Freirean sense, can contribute to increased tolerance and understanding.

The Strategic Consequences of Chinese Racism is a book-length academic research article commissioned by Andrew Marshal, director of the Department of Defense Office of Net Assessment (ONA). Owing to the significant policymaking power of ONA, Strategic Consequences indicates potential soft-power tactics in use by the Pentagon in countering Chinese influence in Africa. This paper examines Strategic Consequences' three key arguments. This paper examines the argument that Chinese society is more racist than U.S. society and finds this argument is likely correct. This paper examines the argument that Chinese racism is a stabilizing force for the Chinese government and finds this argument is likely correct. Finally, this paper examines the argument that U.S. anti-racist culture acts as a useful tool of soft-power influence in Africa, and finds this argument is likely incorrect. This paper concludes that ONA has accurately gauged the strategic value of Chinese racism for the Chinese government but overestimates the U.S. capacity to counter China in the field of soft power competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The proportion of international students in Chinese higher education is increasing, however, there remains little research that explores their motivations and how their learning of Chinese influences their identities and imagined futures. In this paper, we address the need for research on South-South migration--specifically Sino-African relations--and draw on the concept of linguistic capital to explore what it means for 15 self-funded international students from six different African countries. The findings highlight African youths' negotiation of power matrices in different fields and their desire for Chinese linguistic capital. The acquisition of such capital would position themselves advantageously in terms of employability and social prestige within the geopolitical and geo-economic context of China-Africa relations. In documenting their investment in Chinese language learning, the study compels us to reflect on the intersection of identity, ideology and capital within the language acquisition process and what Chinese language learning has come to mean for those from the peripheral nation-states.

An emerging discourse contends that China has become a willing collaborator for digital technology abuse through substantial investments in Africa’s digital infrastructure, thus leaving digital power at the discretion of unstable African governments. However, it is unclear whether Chinese companies are willing collaborators with autocratic regimes in advancing China’s model of digital authoritarianism in the African continent. Despite the need to better understand the changing dynamics of China’s role in aiding authoritarian regimes through digital technologies, research that responds to these concerns remains empirically understudied and under-conceptualised. The central question this paper addresses is: How does China’s model of digital authoritarianism affect autocratic politics and the trajectory of authoritarian regimes in Africa? The article’s primary objective is to investigate allegations that China is promoting its internet model, which includes censorship and restrictions, through digital investments in African countries. A related aim is to examine how African governments have abused their digital infrastructure to undermine their electoral processes and roll back democratic gains made since the early 1990s. In grappling with these concerns, part of this paper’s contribution is to explore critical practices and meanings of power that appear to have produced trajectories towards digital authoritarianism in Africa. The paper’s main departure point is the proposition that democratic rollbacks can be only partially understood by tracing China’s digital footprints on the continent. The article finds proliferating discourses that China is exporting an authoritarian digital authoritarianism model to Africa misleading. Instead, the evidence suggests that African autocracies are exploiting the adoption of China’s model of the internet to roll back democratic gains through surveillance and censorship of civil liberties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper examines China’s increasing security interests in Africa. It seeks to understand the nature and scope of Chinese engagement in peace and security issues on the continent based on its engagement in international and domestic (African) politics. Through literature analysis and logical reasoning, the author intends to define the implications of China’s new role as a security provider. The paper is based on desk research using primary and secondary data and statistical and comparative analysis of official documents, academic research, and media sources. The methods include literature analysis, logical reasoning, statistical research, comparative analysis, and the inductive method to build general theorems. The paper analyses aspects of China’s security engagement on the African continent: its participation in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, small arms exports, and Beijing’s sharing of technology with African partners. China’s engagement in Africa’s security helps to advance its vital economic and political interests, with limited impact on African security. Key lessons for African partners are offered. The last decades have seen an extraordinary increase in China’s economic and political ties with Africa. Security cooperation followed massive Chinese investments and thousands of Chinese nationals working on the continent. China’s security engagement in Africa protects Beijing’s interests regarding access to resources, markets, political influence, and social credibility. It has little to do with a benevolent will to help Africa deal with instability or economic underdevelopment. African partners must make necessary efforts to avoid further dependence on China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The role of China in the liberation of Africa from colonial rule cannot be down played as I laid a foundation to Africa today. Most African countries were aided by China militarily and ideologically in the fight against Western colonial rule. Though some scholars would suggest that China's contribution was as a result of the hostility that was there in the times of the cold war between the self-acclaimed democrats of the Western bloc and the Communist Eastern bloc. Philosophers like Marx Engel, Karl Marx, Lenin and Mao Zedong had a major influence on the liberation of Africa. The purpose of this paper is to show how the relationship that started as sincere has become a curse for the poor and unconnected Africans. In recent years the Chinese has overtaken the Briton hood Institutes of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank as the major lenders of loans to African States. Kwame Nkrumah warned us of the danger of Africa being recolonised in what he termed neo colonialism where the colonisers will come as investors. Neo colonialism is no longer a theory but has become a reality as will be exposed in this article using empirical, qualitative and quantitative research methods to show how a friendship with China has benefited the elite politicians at the cost of citizens affairs. Africa is endowed with natural resources yet it has the poorest population per Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. The paper will show how it is easy for a Chinese to own a business in Africa compared to the native Africans using the case of Shurugwi in Zimbabwe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper applies Marcel Mauss' Gift Theory in conjunction with Qin Yaqing's Relational Theory to Chinese foreign aid. It proposed that this approach allows to conceptualise Chinese aid to Africa as a continuous gift cycle initiated in Bandung and has been going uninterrupted till today. The paper argues through the language of reciprocity and relationality, China symbolically affords the recipient status in a way that Northern aid does not. The real existing power asymmetries between China and Africa do not per se translate into unlimited influence as China can never be sure of reciprocity and is obliged to keep giving continuously. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent decades, Chinese FDI has become an integral investment source for African countries and has, therefore, engendered studies seeking to understand the determinants of these flows. In a quest to identify the factors that stimulate these flows, this paper assesses whether the ease of starting a business induces Chinese FDI flow to Africa. The analysis is based on panel data for 46 African countries between 2004 and 2018. The results from fixed-effects estimations suggest that Chinese FDI is attracted by the ease of starting a business in African economies. This finding also holds for sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and is robust across all estimations. The results also provide corroborating evidence that identifies Chinese FDI as market and resource-seeking, attracted to large markets and economies with abundant natural resources. The findings suggest that improving business regulations could be a stimulant for Chinese FDI flow to Africa. In evaluating the nexus between Chinese FDI and business start-ups, this paper provides new evidence to complement the dated studies on this theme. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to examine the political economy of China in Africa to unpack whether this foreign presence represents a miracle or a mirage for the continent. Data was gleaned from books, articles, official documents and the 2021 Afrobarometer Dispatch 489 survey (AD489). The paper argues that China is a rational actor that engages with Africa to advance its national interests. The Chinese presence in Africa has elicited divergent reactions from Africans of different social groups. The non-interference principle of the Beijing Consensus has led African power elites to embrace China as a reliable partner. Yet, the reactions of local Africans are mixed. While some applaud China’s contributions to infrastructure development, others criticise it for employing debt-trap diplomacy to assert hegemonic dominance on the continent, exploit African labour and extract resources. The criticism from Africans has led China to attempt to formulate corporate social responsibility policies, establish environmentally sustainable industries and ensure favourable working conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past few decades, China emerged as Africa's main partner in digital development. Sino-African cooperation in the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) sector meets African demand for advanced technologies and know-how while helping China to position itself in the global ICT sector. Albeit crucial for Africa's digital development in the short term, this paper argues that the breadth of Sino-African cooperation carries important long-term consequences that could afford China latent control over Africa's digital development. Drawing on Susan Strange's pillars of structural power, this paper considers how the rollout of fiber-optic network cables underpins Chinese control over production, how the construction of data centers might impinge on security, and how research partnerships enhance norms and standards in future innovation—the knowledge pillar. The paper argues that the enabling force of Sino-African cooperation in these three realms is Chinese finance. To test this claim, I conduct a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) of 42 states in Sub-Saharan Africa, showing that Chinese aid and, to a lesser extent, Chinese loans are the main drivers of Sino-African ties in the ICT sector. The paper concludes that Chinese financial support not only promotes Africa's digital development but also paves the way to Chinese structural power in the ICT sector. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Jurnal Hubungan Internasional is the property of Universitas Airlangga and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Purpose: This paper reports on the impact of China's Community of Shared Destiny Policy (CCSDP) on ethnicity, and the development and trade benefits in Africa, whilst proposing suggestions for improvements. Design/methodology/approach: A mixed-research (desktop-based and online survey-based) approach was employed. Findings: Trade and foreign direct investment alone can account for 11.8% of changes in the peaceful coexistence of China and some selected African countries, and cause changes to the mutual prosperity of China and African nations, to the tune of 6.3%. Therefore, the activation of mutual prosperity among these nations is not necessarily trade and foreign direct investment. The CCSDP is effective and has increased economic development for ethnic groups (50%), although with some negative concerns. Research limitations/implications: Inadequate/small sample size for the study. Originality/value: Chinese investment in Africa has had a transformative impact, driving economic growth, improving infrastructure, and fostering regional integration. The share of trade between China and Africa in the continent's overall external trade has increased dramatically. Overall, the CCSDP should be kept in place, but with some modifications to improve its effectiveness and mitigate its negative effects. Finally, as China's engagement with Africa evolves, it is vital that partnerships are founded on mutual understanding, respect, and benefit, and that policies reflect the different needs and ambitions of African communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several studies have pointed out that manufacturing wages are relatively higher in African countries than in other countries at similar levels of development, and that this contributes to the continent's lower levels of manufacturing competitiveness. This paper derives unit labor costs (ULCs)—average wages relative to productivity—for two‐digit manufacturing sectors across a sample of 79 developed and developing countries, including 13 African countries, over the 1990–2015 period. We benchmark the ULCs to China and estimate the relationship between relative ULCs and manufacturing sector investment rates and export performance. We find that relative ULCs have a smaller association with exports in Africa relative to other developing regions. There is some evidence that investment responds to changes in relative ULCs in Africa; however, the estimated effects are smaller than in the full sample. Further, we find that for Africa, the level of labor productivity has a quantitatively stronger and more robust association with manufacturing performance than the level of real wages. The results have important implications for industrial policy in African countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: This paper aims to examine the impact of host country corruption on foreign direct investment (FDI) from China to developing countries in Africa. With the opposing arguments that corruption is detrimental to or instrumental in FDI and mixed empirical evidence, this paper contributes to the literature by providing new evidence on the issue. Additionally, little research has been done on the impact of corruption on FDI made by developing country multinationals to developing countries. This paper fills a void in this area. Design/methodology/approach: Based on the published literature, as well as China and Africa contexts, the authors develop hypotheses that host countries with low corruption receive more FDI and resource-seeking investments weaken the relationship. The annual stock of Chinese FDI in 35 African countries, host country corruption data and other control variables from 2007 to 2015 are collected. Feasible generalized least squares models are used to test the hypotheses. Additional robustness tests are also conducted. Findings: The findings support the hypotheses. Specifically, Chinese investors make more investments in host countries with low corruption except for resource-seeking investments in resource-rich host counties. The results are statistically significant accounting for various control variables. The results of the robustness tests show that the main findings are robust. Originality/value: First, this study provides new evidence on the impact of corruption on FDI. Second, this study also fills a void by examining FDI from a developing country, China to other developing countries in Africa. Finally, this study also has a practical implication for Chinese multinationals investing in Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With reference to frames as socially determined definitions of reality, this paper examines the discrepancies between the prominence of 'South‐South cooperation' terminology in globally dominant discourses and its limited usage by African stakeholders. Based on insights from the United Nations, (cross‐)regional collaboration formats and bilateral cooperation, we find that African officials employ 'South‐South' terminology mainly when 'Northern' partners are present but use other frames when engaging with developing countries. This limited resonance poses a challenge to multilateral organisations and traditional donors in their attempts to expand engagement with 'South‐South' relations. A focus on the usage and effects of frames, we argue, can clarify the assumptions based on which international cooperation unfolds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Between 2017 and 2018, US President Donald Trump introduced a Section 301 investigation into China’s trade practices following allegations of unfair trade practices against China (Bown & Kolb, 2018). The battlelines first emerged when China surpassed the US in 2009 to become Africa’s largest trading partner, having signed bilateral trade agreements with over 40 countries in the African continent. By the second decade of the 2000s, the rise of the digital economy, estimated to grow at between 15% and 25% annually in emerging countries (WEF, 2017), drew Africa into the crosshairs of the US-China trade war. Between 2018 and 2023, over 36 Chinese high-tech companies were blacklisted by the US, citing concerns over national security (Sevastopulo et al., 2022). Against this background, the article places the US-China standoff over digital supremacy in Africa in a media context, bringing novel dimensions into consideration that illuminate a media war focused on competing hegemonic agendas. The article springboards off Bastiansen et al. (2019, pp. 5-8) to argue that the trade war between the two countries presents an ideal setting to study partisan and elite perspectives reflected in news reporting on the international conflict. By expanding the scope of analysis to the media as a mode of information, the article’s main departure point is that the trade war between the two countries that began in 2009, when China surpassed the US to become Africa’s largest trading partner, is being interlocuted through the agency of soft power, with media outlets playing a pivotal role in shaping public biases. A central theme emerging from the research is that media publications have clear biases. Generally, the US news media outlets analysed are heavily critical of the Chinese government and its cutting-edge technologies in Africa. In contrast, the popular Chinese media outlets analysed adopt a defensive stance in their responses to the US. Revealing this through thematic analysis can contribute valuable insights into the dynamics of the tech war between China and the US. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study how the allocation of resources impacts localised crime rates. Recent studies on the effects of Chinese aid in Africa have increased rapidly, and this paper contributes by showing the mechanism by which aid increases crime. Using a geo‐referenced dataset of subnational allocation of Chinese projects, geographically matched with 145 701 respondents of four rounds of Afrobarometer surveys from 36 African countries, we use a difference‐in‐difference‐in‐difference (DDD) approach and an instrumental variable (IV) identification strategy to account for endogeneity and capture the effect of living near projects under implementation before or after a survey against those with no projects. We find that Chinese aid projects significantly increased crime rates in the immediate locations where the projects were implemented. The main channel of effect is the increased local economic activities leading to the availability of employable opportunities. There is a similar but smaller magnitude of the effect regarding projects funded by other donor agencies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: The belt and road initiative (BRI) emanates from China and seeks to connect Europe, Asia and Africa through transport and telecommunications infrastructure. Despite the importance of Africa in the BRI network, very little research has been done on the BRI in Africa, and even less of this emanates from Africa itself. In particular, considering that the BRI investments in Africa are largely transport related, there is almost no research covering the area of logistics, which should be greatly affected by the infrastructure investments. This paper sought to establish the current state of logistics research related to the BRI in Africa. Design/methodology/approach: A bibliometric analysis was conducted on documents extracted from the SCOPUS database. Findings: The findings indicate that there is a lack of research in critical areas such as environmental, social and economic impact of BRI transport investments, governance, logistics performance and international cooperation. In particular, there is a massive gap in local knowledge regarding the BRI. Research limitations/implications: The study is limited to published research indexed in the SCOPUS database. Future research directions include empirical studies into BRI project initiation investigation, economic and environmental impacts, governance structures and policy intervention requirements and macro-level logistics impacts. Practical implications: The study emphasises the importance publishing all the relevant information regarding BRI related projects in Africa to create transparency. Originality/value: The study investigates the current research on the effect of China's BRI on transport and logistics in Africa through a bibliometric analysis. The investigation reveals that while there are huge investments in infrastructure, the actual effect on logistics of participating countries in Africa has not been interrogated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to position socialist China in the mobility of global socialism in the context of Cold‐War politics. It examines how the techno‐politics of China and the Soviet‐bloc's socialist tropical architecture differently reconfigured thermal exchanges between the environment, human body and a series of other multi‐scalar things in Africa during the 1960s−1980s. Drawing on the theories of thermal material culture, techno‐politics and science and technology studies (STS), it constructs a cross‐cultural comparison between China and Soviet‐bloc, aiming to achieve a more nuanced techno‐political understanding of mid‐late twentieth century socialist architecture in the Global South. It also hopes to contribute to recent scholarship about thermal comfort and governance in the context of climate change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The China–Africa relationship has received increased interest over the past few decades as scholars critically examine the challenge that China, in its quest for a closer strategic partnership with Africa, poses to the norms governing the neoliberal world order (NLWO). One crucial aspect of this is international aid, and how Chinese aid to Africa differs from Western aid. This paper argues that Chinese aid reduces the power of traditional aid donors to shape the development route of African countries. This new development finance ultimately breaks the monopoly of Western aid to decide how poor countries in the global 'South' develop. In doing so, the Sino–African aid relationship is challenging the current world order as it offers African states the possibility to decouple (or delink) themselves from the global economy. By challenging assumed neoliberal economic development fundamentals, this relationship, if harnessed correctly by African leaders, can pose longer-term ideological questions around the very set of ideas that underpin development itself, while enabling African states the policy space needed to pursue more sustainable development from an Afro-centric perspective. It is this possibility to delink, due to changing ideological fundamentals concerning economic development, that is the challenge China and Africa pose to the NLWO. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China’s increased engagements in Africa over the past two decades have been as notable as they have been controversial. While some have predicted China’s economic stagnation as a result of issues such as debt, supply chain shortening as a result of the impacts of COVID and the impact of strict lockdowns in that country, others see its economy dramatically rebounding. However, it appears that Chinese lending to Africa has now peaked and is in precipitous decline. Other indicators of economic engagement have also decreased and other powers are also now vigorously contesting for space on the continent. This paper examines whether or not we are now in a period “post-peak China in Africa” and the reconfiguration of strategies of influence. The original Ian Taylor Memorial Lecture under the same title held on April 27, 2023 at the University of Pécs has been edited and headings added for clarity, and references included/provided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Selcuk University Journal of Social & Technical Researches is the property of Selcuk University Journal of Social & Technical Researches and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a massive Chinese state/capitalist programme of transnational infrastructure construction initiated in 2013. Between 2013 and 2016, Chinese banks extended hundreds of billions of dollars –principally across Asia, but also Europe and Africa – for transportation and energy networks. Recently released statistics, however, suggest that project lending for the BRI collapsed from 2016 onwards. Our paper examines the reasons for this contraction through a case-study of the BRI in Africa. We contend that the lending contraction resulted from political and economic contradictions generated by this form of international interconnection, including the types of debt traps it helped create. This outcome is explained partly by the fact that the BRI is simultaneously a geopolitical and geoeconomic project. Whereas the balance of economic risks is arguably skewed against borrowers (in some cases leading to debt traps), from a geopolitical perspective, the Chinese state also seeks to expand influence in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world. This creates counter-pressure on further expansion of such financing, which, complemented by domestic economic implications of loan failure, helps to explain the contraction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the institutional structures and other predictors that determine bilateral trade between Africa and China from 1995 to 2017. Design/methodology/approach: In line with the gravity model of trade, institutional, geographical and socio-economic determinants of China's bilateral trade with 18 African oil/minerals exporting countries are examined by deploying Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood and dynamic bias-corrected least squares dummy variable econometric techniques. Findings: The results indicate that China's oil/minerals imports from Africa are higher than imports of manufacturing and agricultural goods, and institutional structures indicate that a weak politically stable region with less control of corruption has a discernible effect on trade. Research limitations/implications: Further insight can be gained if the type of manufactured goods being exported to China is examined; this is necessary given that China crowds out Africa's manufactured goods. Therefore, this study recommends the need for Africa to continually strengthen its institutional structures to stimulate trade from other regions. Originality/value: This study examines the quality of the institutional structures (political stability and corruption) in African oil/minerals exporting countries, considering that China has been alleged for capitalising on Africa's weak institutional structures to trade with the resource-endowed region. For the first time, the UN COMTRADE HS product-country-partner-year trade data is used to examine on bilateral sector trade China–Africa links rather than proxies used in the studies of Biggeri and Sanfilippo (2009), De Grauwe et al. (2012) and Foad (2011) that did not capture the real trade value. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines China's geo-economic interest in Africa. China intends to exercise its leverage over both coastal frontiers for trade and defense and its hinterland for rich mineral, metal, and fossil deposits. Furthermore, the debt trap seems to be one of the methods through which China intended to bargain with Africa to bag as much advantage as it could gain. The question that emerges from this critical engagement with China-Africa relations is to look into how the reality of Africa's narrative of development is projected both from outside and within and the contradiction embodied in that projection. China used the narrative of development to set its feet on African soil. This paper discusses China's penetration into Africa by offering interest-free loans and its gradual emergence as a neocolonial power through expanding its network. The method used in the study to establish China's monopoly and interfering streak in African affairs through BRI is the analysis of available data based on which the objectives and the conclusions are drawn. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through document analysis and interviews, this paper examines the patent narratives of Transsion, a Chinese company dominating Africa's smartphone market and a leading innovator in facial recognition technologies (FRTs) optimized for darker skin tones. We identify two major narratives concerning Transsion's FRT patenting practice. First is 'empowerment', through which Transsion argues that there are 'blind spots' in conventional AI technologies and presents its AI camera as a remedy and an empowerment tool for dark-skinned users by 'seeing' their beauty. Second is the 'warfare' narrative, which is shaped by the heightening market competition and accelerating patent races among Chinese phone makers. As the battle for tech supremacy intensifies in Africa, Transsion expresses a strong sense of crisis and considers its FRT patents as 'weapons of competition' in preparation for a future smartphone warfare in Africa. This study makes two contributions. Empirically, through analyzing patents, we examine a relatively less-known Chinese tech company that has tremendous impact in the Global South. Theoretically, we interrogate the possibility of algorithmic empowerment against racist AI and technological independence through patents, although developing AI as weaponry, in the China-Africa context, also hampers the politics of decolonization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After nearly three decades of "ICT for development", the rollout of ICT backbone infrastructure remains challenging throughout Africa. African states do not only depend on the technology of foreign companies but must also seek external finance to pay for it. This dual dependency puts African governments in a vulnerable position, leading us to inquire: to what extent does the dual dependency on foreign finance and technology affect African agency in ICT infrastructure provider choice? The paper proposes a model that distinguishes between the agency of higher and lower income countries. Elaborating on the latter, the model assumes that the source of foreign ICT-related finance (i.e., China, World Bank, both, internal) determines whether the recipient state can exercise a weak, medium, or strong degree of agency in its ICT infrastructure provider choice. The paper further argues that the link between foreign finance and degree of agency is shaped by the digital development agenda of the donor. For instance, the model predicts that countries which predominantly received Chinese ICT finance possess weak agency when choosing an ICT infrastructure provider because China's digital development agenda ties the provision of finance to hiring a Chinese contractor. By examining the ICT-related financial inflows and geographical distribution of network equipment providers in African states, the paper shows that the source of finance affects the degree of agency and, subsequently, the choice of ICT infrastructure provider. However, the analysis also suggests a divide in African agency along former colonial lines. In fact, the model holds only for countries without colonial ties to France whereas former French colonies all contracted Huawei, regardless of ICT finance flows. • Proposes a model for African agency in choice of network equipment provider. • Development finance determines African agency in ICT infrastructure provider choice. • Digital development agendas of donors affect ICT infrastructure provider choice. • Geospatial mapping of fiber-optic cables sets Francophone states apart from others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Current humanity is experiencing extraordinary levels of material and ideal connectivity. Change being constant and stability exceptional and provisional; one has to expect a significant acceleration of change in the next hundred years. The core question is therefore: What kind of future is being shaped for the next generations, our grandchildren and greatgrand children? Without going too far back in time, it is fair to say that the current world was shaped by two different, successive and antinomic global processes: imperial expansion, colonization and domination on the one hand, and resistance, struggle for liberation, and the search for a more equitable world order on the other hand. Against all the odds, European imperialism, civil war, wars of aggression, and Western ostracism, China was an influential actor in the struggle for liberation of Africa from colonialism, got its rightful place in the international world order and is now the second economy of the planet. Globalization resulted in the emergence of a de facto multipolar world, with different models of societies and organizational cultures. These are dialectic processes constantly in operation, but there is however a third crucial area of interest, generally taken granted, that of people and culture. Peaceful relations and sustainable economic development backed by greater cultural and demographic connectivity are better options for the construction of a novel future for humanity. Universities and higher education institutions can play an important role in spearheading and implementing these new orientations for the construction of a future peaceful and sustainable human world in which war will be outlawed. This paper outlines what academics can do to promote such a vision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the Chinese government, the Belt and Road Initiative is oriented towards “policy coordination, connectivity of infrastructure, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and closer people-to-people ties”. This global and multibillion initiative was launched in 2013, in a decade characterized by the renewal of the continental integration efforts in Africa through ambitious continental trade and development policies. The drafting of the African Union Agenda 2063 and the linking of Agenda 2063 to the global Agenda 2030 on Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs); the transformation of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) into an African Union Development Agency; and the signing of an African Continental Free Trade Agreement demonstrate this new trend in the continental integration policies. Interestingly, like the BRI, these policies aim at connecting African countries in terms of infrastructure, trade and people. This paper examines the congruence (and co-learning) between the BRI and Africa’s infrastructure policies by cross-tracing the ideational process in the two contexts before elaborating on some preliminary reflections on the BRI impacts in Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article we examine how the strategic investment partnership between China and African countries has come to be identified and labeled in the discourse on Sino-African relationships. The emerging narrative is that Chinese investment in Africa is fraught with issues such as labor abuses, risky loans, and imported labor, therefore contributing little to employment generation and local skills development. Nevertheless, we identify good Chinese-financed business outcomes, suggesting that Chinese investments in Africa have positively impacted technology transfer and significantly bridged Africa's infrastructure gap; our estimation points to a high workforce localization rate within Chinese firms, of above 80%. In making explicit how these competing perspectives play out in the form Sinophilia and Sinophobia, we induce an integrative framework which assimilates the two perspectives to delineate the affection/disaffection phenomena characterizing the evolving China-Africa business relationship. We also set out an agenda for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese expatriate workers in Africa remain an under-researched and poorly understood group despite their large numbers. Based on data collected through interviews and participant observations during 2013 and 2014 among Chinese expatriate construction workers employed by a large-scale Chinese state-owned construction enterprise in Zambia, this article offers an analysis of their migration experience as it relates to the context of China's growing economic involvement with Africa. This paper further argues that Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Africa function as transnational social organizations to promote Chinese expatriate workers' migration to Africa and provide them social support and care when they experience difficulties during their sojourn. In this way, the patron–client relationship was formed between Chinese SOEs and Chinese expatriate workers, paralleling the existing employment relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• In the post-financial crisis era, fiscal challenges have led countries adopt a more market-based means of development finance. • The state is not a sheer subsidizer distorting market in favor of policy objectives, but a risk-sharing, profit-seeking equity investor. • China's investment fund offers not only equity shares but also state-related resources to assist private firms' business expansion in Africa. • Stateness has prevented the investment fund from choosing the most financially promising projects or withdrawing from the failing ones. The post-2008 financial crisis era has witnessed a significant change in the global development landscape. Fiscal challenges have led countries that historically provided state-led, gift-like development assistance to adopt a more market-based means of development finance driven by self-interest. This allows us to reconsider the roles of the state and the market in development by focusing on the China-Africa Development Fund (CADFund), China's first official development-oriented investment fund and a subsidiary of the China Development Bank, the world's largest national development bank. This paper draws from interviews and participant observations involving CADFund, its partners, and project companies in Africa to examine how China's official finance mobilizes private investment to facilitate global development. The findings indicate that the state-led equity fund has catalyzed the start-up and expansion of Chinese overseas private enterprises by providing otherwise inaccessible equity support and channeling additional state-related resources to empower long-term business development. Meanwhile, stateness has created an adverse selection problem, preventing CADFund from choosing the most financially promising projects or withdrawing from the failing ones. The paper sheds light on the potential challenges facing development finance institutions in employing equity investment as a tool for reconciling long-term development objectives and short-term commercial objectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does foreign aid change local attitudes toward gender equality? Drawing on a theory of norm diffusion through intervention, we contend that when donors integrate norms into aid projects, such norms can be diffused to individuals in recipient countries. The World Bank and China are two comparable donors to examine this relationship. We matched the geocoded aid projects of the two donors from AidData and Afrobarometer surveys in Africa to test our hypotheses. Our strategy is to compare respondents' attitudes toward gender equality who were near a site where the project had been implemented at the time of the interview to those who were close to a site where the project would be started after the interview. We find that the World Bank aid increases local support for gender equality and the results differ across sectors and gender. Aid going to gender-sensitive sectors has the most significant impact on women's attitudes toward gender equality. In contrast, Chinese aid shows no similar effects. This study sheds light on the linkage between aid and social norm change and is expected to exert implications for policymakers and development practitioners adventuring in the land of aid. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Today's development and peacebuilding donor landscape is much more complex than it was just a few decades ago. In addition to traditional donors, emerging donors have come to play much more prominent roles in development and peacebuilding assistance. This article explores these shifting dynamics of the donor landscape by analyzing China's and India's engagements with African states. In particular, it investigates whether these two emerging donors' development and peacebuilding interventions are framed around the localization of aid concerns that have animated traditional donors. The article shows that nationally led and nationally owned development and peacebuilding priorities are central to the provision of aid by these emerging donors. However, neither China nor India has explicitly joined the localization of aid debate. The term "localization" does not appear in the key documents produced by the government agencies that oversee these countries' development and peacebuilding interventions. Moreover, neither China nor India has signed onto the various international agreements that place localization at the forefront of traditional donor agendas. This article argues that the local is important to both China and India. However, for these two countries, localization is reflected in the emphasis on nationally led and nationally owned development and peacebuilding priority setting; and the promotion of state capacity and strength rather than as a way of working with civil society and nongovernmental organizations. These engagements with the local by China and India in the context of Africa have shifted over time as their footprints across the continent have expanded and their global aspirations have shifted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past 20 years, China has granted a conspicuous amount of loans to African countries. New loan data show that compared to Western multilateral loans, Chinese loans have relatively high interest rates and shorter maturities, tend to be highly collateralized, and are volatile over time. Thus, Western loans are generally more likely to be in the economic interest of the borrowing country. Furthermore, Chinese loans are focused on resource-rich countries that undertake fewer anti-corruption efforts, so local policymakers have more opportunities to feather their own nest. Finally, unlike Western loans, Chinese loans are not tied to any economic policy conditions. It seems worth considering for Western lenders to reduce the number and intensity of loan conditions to respect the sovereignty of the borrowing countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung: DIW-Wochenbericht is the property of DIW Berlin and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Africa faces a new debt crisis fuelled by Chinese and Western lending. At the forefront is Zambia, which defaulted on Eurobond payments in 2020. The article sets the developing Africa‐wide crisis within a relational comparison that draws the current Zambian moment together with the financial collapse of the 1980s. By placing Chinese lending within a comparative global frame, we make three contributions. First, Zambia provides a "spatial fix" for capital, but such African borrowing is not passive and shapes hegemonic struggles between China and the US. Thus secondly, Africa's relationship with debt is co‐constituent in the remaking of the global economy, as signalled by the contested execution and interpretation of development‐as‐modernisation. Finally, a relational comparison of the two debt crises demonstrates that global capitalist hegemony is, partly, engineered by the consent and coercion of African governments, yet the human costs of borrowing are fully borne by the world's poorest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article brings to fore long-standing intricacies and dilemmas in Brazil's and China's international positioning. It reveals the complex discursive repertoires shaping the Brazilian and Chinese sense of Self in the world, in the Global South, and, more particularly, in relation to Africa. It engages with the concept of "liminality" to highlight how constructing South–South relationships and invoking Southern identities have been ambiguous, indeterminate—thus liminal—endeavors in these countries' international affairs. By dissecting their diplomatic and corporate narratives towards Africa, our analysis demonstrates, notwithstanding tensions and contradictions, how Brazilian and Chinese actors have creatively acted upon this liminality to pursue foreign policy goals and economic projects. In doing so, the article stresses the floating, ambiguous nature of powerful constructs such as "South" (and "West"), and binary oppositions between them. It concludes by discussing how a liminality perspective allows us to understand the unfixed and multifaceted nature of roles and identities in international relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Çankırı Karatekin University Journal of the Faculty of Economics & Administrative Sciences is the property of Cankiri Karatekin University, Faculty of Economics & Administrative Sciences and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This commemorative piece reviews Ian Taylor’s Stellenbosch experience and the lasting influence it has had on his own work, and that of many of his colleagues. It also considers ways in which this influence can be deepened by shifting the focus from macro to micro determinants of the persistence of inequality and deprivation in Africa – issues that deeply troubled Ian throughout his life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study applies a Chinese theoretical framework—relationality, as articulated by Qin Yaqing—to explain how Beijing creates and manipulates its relations with African partners to advance its "core interests" and leadership of the Global South. Relationality elucidates the "Community of Shared Future for Mankind"—an interlocking, multitiered network of Sinocentric relationships based on traditional Confucian conceptions of reciprocity. The pervasiveness of China's influence in Africa can be explained by its overlapping latticework of relationships involving thousands of African elites traversing all four levels—bilateral, subregional, regional and global. At each level, Chinese interlocutors use material support, inclusive rhetoric and host diplomacy to create and perpetuate so‐called "win–win" relationships with African partners. Because the "relational power" these dyads generate disproportionately strengthens the weaker side, China can elicit African compliance by reducing—or threatening to reduce—its shared economic and political resources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using a multivariate framework and the most recently available data that include numerous African countries, this investigation has produced the first extensive statistical evaluation of China's image in Africa based on China's various economic relations with Africa, including aid, trade, FDI and contracts. We find that China's economic development assistance, contracts, and to some degree, trade with African countries contribute to a positive image of China in Africa. In addition, we find that people in African countries of a smaller population, poorer livelihood, less open economy, and better governance tend to have positive views of China's political and economic influence. With the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative, Chinese economic activities in recipient countries have been increasing. The implications of this research shed light on how BRI may be received in the host countries and the likelihood of its success or failure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The increased access to smartphones in Africa and elsewhere in the global south has opened new markets and new areas for surveillance/platform capitalism/data colonialism to operate. This article attends to the socio-technical practices of Transsion, the Chinese maker of Africa's top selling smartphones, and through these showcases how essential hardware are to the global data economy. Working from a mix of data, including translocal fieldwork in Shenzhen, Accra, Addis Ababa, and a close reading of Transsion products and artifacts alongside business practices, the article shows how the company's prioritizing of Black African consumer needs sustains its competitive position and how its constellation of hardware and apps are integral to its success in routine experimentation of artificial intelligence, facial recognition, and other emerging areas of computation. Ultimately, the argument is that consumer hardware such as low-cost smartphones are critical to the datafication of the everyday in the global south via the bundling of surveillant and extractive software and should be considered sites of power within discourses on the platform era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the logics, persistence and evolution of perspectives on the Chinese labour regime in Africa. Studies find that Chinese firms' labour practices engender abuse via casualisation of labour, low remuneration, and a general lack of adherence to occupational safety. Contrarian studies however demonstrate variations among Chinese firms' labour practices as mediated by the labour dynamics of host countries, labour specificities and industrial capitalism dynamics. The article concludes by questioning the 'talent gap' dynamic in Africa in relation to Chinese firms' managerial hiring practices and calls for an engaged scholarship on how Chinese investment in Africa's human resource base is altering the 'talent gap' phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate the role of institutions in attracting Chinese FDI into Africa. Focusing on market- and resource-seeking motivations, we consider whether the impact of institutions varies by motivation for FDI. Our data relates to 43 African countries over 11 years, and we use the Generalized Method of Moments to show that Chinese MNEs are market-seeking and are attracted by weaker institutions. This negative effect of institutions is especially strong in resource-rich and higher-income countries. Our study also finds that in resource-rich African countries, better infrastructure quality attracts Chinese FDI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

African nations are trying to diversify their economies in order to induce industrialization that will help them eradicate poverty and create employment for their young workforce. One of the continent's key challenges continues to be the shortage of physical infrastructure. Therefore, finding ways to overcome this problem has become of large importance. China has identified this and has thus enhanced its involvement in Africa primarily via its swap formula. The formula enables the financing and development of infrastructure that African nations critically need by depending on their resource wealth. However, the mounting involvement of the formula has continued to stimulate questions on its impact regarding creating backward and forward linkages. As such, one of the significant aims of this article is to identify linkages that emerge from the Chinese swap formula that involve long-term concessionary loans from China's Exim Bank to finance major infrastructure projects in Africa. It examines whether the swap formula is creating backward and forward linkages in Africa, and what the infrastructure leads to concerning creating novel opportunities for the continent, by theoretically answering this question: "Can China's swap formula create backward and forward linkages?" Furthermore, the article theoretically identifies the benefits and linkages of the formula via a case study – that of Abuja-Kaduna railway. Arguably, the article discovers that the formula has multiple benefits and linkages for Africa. It is also seen by the Chinese government as a way of fulfilling its strategic goals in Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Leaders in the developing world typically value inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI), on the logic that FDI bolsters economic development and signals competence to voters. Yet the promise of new jobs and other benefits may outstrip the supply, leaving many disappointed. We present a theory of unmet expectations and political blame, which we test by connecting 223 georeferenced Chinese FDI projects to the political-economic perceptions of 179,278 respondents in Africa. We show that the announcement of Chinese FDI projects inspires economic optimism and bolsters perceptions of political leaders' competence for about one year. Once projects are operational, however, individuals living near those projects view the economy as worse than it would have been in the absence of FDI, and perceptions of political leaders similarly decline. This pattern of unmet expectations and political blame does not appear in the context of Chinese foreign aid. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]