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In the increasingly volatile global political order, national economic structures and international relations, integrated as they are, are showing concerning signs of strain. Taiwan, whose world-leading semiconductor industry is indispensable in Global Supply Chains and whose economic prosperity and security are critical to a stable global economic system, has received much research interest since the late 1980s. Against the background of a slowing Taiwanese economy, starting in the 2000s, this paper seeks to investigate the causes of Taiwan's challenges and the linkages to the global economy vis-à-vis China. Based on previous research from different social science disciplines, this paper shows that Taiwan's economic performance has been undermined by the declining effectiveness of its industrial policy and the general state intervention in the country, which is in turn caused by deep socio-political divisions on issues of national identity and Taiwan-China relations. The paper reveals the dilemma, which results from this. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) (Taiwan) have taken divergent paths in the area of human rights. Since the two leaders Xi Jinping and Tsai Ing-wen came to power, the differences in the area of human rights have further increased. The paper analyses and compares their external human rights strategies based on realist assumptions and the soft and hard power resources of the PRC and the ROC. The PRC's objectives are to deflect international criticism of its human rights situation and to weaken the global human rights system and its underlying human rights norms. Taiwan's objective is to use its record as a human rights leader in Asia to expand its limited international space and to strengthen its ties with other consolidated democracies and the global civil society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a growing risk of a military attack on Taiwan by mainland China (otherwise known as the People's Republic of China, or PRC) to achieve what the latter terms "reunification." Taiwan, the US, and Japan must urgently and interactively prepare for this contingency—which is also the best way of deterring it. Taiwan must increase military spending (as it has begun to do), with an emphasis on a "porcupine strategy" of lots of distributed, mobile, survivable, affordable, and lethal weapons. The US must increase its military deployments and joint exercises in the region, again emphasizing the types of weapons that can survive a preemptive PRC attack and counter a Chinese blockade or amphibious invading force. Japan will double defense spending over the next five years in a welcome and transformative move, but effective deterrence requires that it also signal that the collective defense of Taiwan against a military attack is existential for its own security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan's opposition to PRC demands such as acceptance of the '92 Consensus' and 'One Country, Two Systems' formula since 2016 has invited a series of retaliatory measures from Beijing, designed to coerce Taiwan into compliance. Given the stark asymmetry in economic size, military capability, and diplomatic status, Taiwan provides a case for studying coercive diplomacy that takes the form of threats to punish. Material differences suggest that Taiwan should capitulate, and 'cheap talk' theses expect PRC threats to have no discernible effect, while balance of threat arguments expect resolve. In this article, we use the survey data collected in the 2016, 2019, and 2020 rounds of the Taiwan National Security Study to examine how Taiwanese respond to China's intensifying and expanding threats. Our paper identifies four strategies that the public sees as responses to PRC coercion: isolation, bandwagon with China, balance against China by allying with the USA and Japan, and hedge by deepening economic ties with China while aligning with the USA and Japan against China. We show that the popular support for balancing against China rises as PRC coercion grows and Taiwanese citizens increasingly perceive China to be a threat. Our findings imply that citizens in a liberal democracy can develop the will to pushback against pressure from an authoritarian regime despite sharp asymmetries in capabilities and material limitations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper describes the growing human rights gap between China on one side and the US and Taiwan on the other side and analyses its impact on cross-strait relations. Since Xi Jinping's ascent to power in the People's Republic of China in 2012/2013 and the elections of Donald Trump in the US and Tsai Ing-wen in Taiwan in 2016, the relationship between China and the other two countries has worsened. The US and Taiwan have a similar view on human rights in the PRC. The increasing repression and authoritarianism of the PRC leads to a human rights gap in the Taiwan Strait that increases the divide and the tensions between both sides. The failure of the PRC to address in its proposal for a peaceful unification the concerns of the Taiwanese for their democracy and human rights pushes Taiwan further away. The similar assessment of the PRC's authoritarian threat by the US and Taiwan strengthens the bond between both, based on the shared values of democracy and human rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explores the recent features of China's economic coercion against Taiwan by offering an up‐to‐date and in‐depth analysis of China's targeted sanctions on Taishang in Tsai Ing‐wen's first term. The paper elaborates on China's specific reasons and means for imposing informal targeted sanctions, as well as their newly observed features in comparison with the past. Heavy dependence on the Chinese economy by certain enterprises of the island has made them vulnerable to sanction targeting. Compared to the past, nationalist boycotts by Chinese consumers and online activities have had a greater influence as part of China's informal targeted sanctions. Beijing's demands for supporting the "one China" policy and the "1992 Consensus" have also become more obvious. These findings suggest that the impetus for developing the cross‐Strait economic exchanges has become more susceptible to the effects of non‐economic factors. Although Beijing's sanctions on Taishang have not yet changed Taipei's policy, they cannot be said to be ineffective. Through the tactics, Beijing definitely sends clear signals of what it wants as it advances their strategy on cross‐Strait relations to the outside world. The case studies on Taiwan provide important implications for other economies as a barometer of China's increasing economic sanction practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party won the 2016 election in Taiwan, Beijing's Taiwan policies have witnessed some strategic and tactical adjustments. This article attempts to clarify the underlying changes and continuity in Beijing's Taiwan policy by addressing three vital questions. First, for Beijing, what is the prominent concern for its Taiwan policy making? Second, what is the top priority for its 'great rejuvenation' ambition? And third, what is Beijing's guideline for dealing with Taipei's reluctance to accept reunification? This paper argues that, firstly, how to prevent Taiwan's de facto independence from perpetuating has become the primary challenge for Beijing, given Taiwan's inclination to indefinitely maintain de facto independence. Second, Beijing still prioritizes the achievement of comprehensive modernization before the fulfillment of reunification within its overarching 'national rejuvenation' timetable. Third, discouraged by Taiwan's anti-China dynamics, Beijing has switched its guideline for promoting unification from 'placing hope on the Taiwanese' to 'placing more hope on the mainland itself'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The war in Ukraine and reactions to it have affected, and mostly worsened, already-formidable and growing challenges for US policy toward China-Taiwan conflict situations. These challenges include deterring a more powerful and assertive China in a more complex set of scenarios (including gray zone conflicts), assuring China that behavior that conforms to US preferences will mean more cooperative US behavior, and managing the abandonment / entrapment dynamic in US relations with Taiwan. The implication of the Ukraine war for the US and cross-Strait issues is mixed, complicated, and stillevolving. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies of public support for war among non-Western and non-major powers (NWNM) states are distinctive from United States foreign military operations. First, these wars often intrude on subjects' direct livelihood. Second, great powers' intervention can drastically alter the outcome of these wars. These factors have not been examined extensively in the war support literature. We fill this gap by spearheading several hypotheses of war support unique to NWNM countries. Through an original and representative survey experiment on a hypothetical military conflict between China and Taiwan, our analysis yields that the information about the United States coming to Taiwan's defense in an armed conflict with China drives up war support by around 7% among the citizenry, although such information does not make the Taiwanese population more tolerant of combat casualties. In addition, perception of military training increases public support for war significantly. The findings suggest that the study of NWNM states could contribute to the war support literature from different perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does the quality of international relations between countries affect regional economics? The question of how much economic change can be attributed to the trajectories of international politics is difficult to answer, because different factors over time can influence economic development. This research uses synthetic control and difference-in-differences methods to evaluate the impact of the normalisation of cross-strait relations in 2008 on regional economic growth in Jiangsu province. Based on data from the Regional and China Year Books from 1990 to 2015, Jiangsu province, a region with prominently close economic ties with Taiwan, witnessed a CNY 20,726.52 (around GBP 2328.35) increase in per capita GDP from 2008 to 2015, compared with the counterfactual in the absence of normalised cross-strait relations. There was an annual increase of approximately CNY 2961 Yuan (around GBP 333). This research has important implications for acknowledging the relationship between the quality of political relations and their economic impact on confrontational countries and regions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of China Quarterly is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of China Quarterly is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This study focuses on the characteristics and institutions of the Xi Jinping regime's policy-making on Taiwan affairs and compares them to those of the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao regimes. The study examines how factors such as changes in leadership, the domestic and international environment, and Cross-Strait relations have affected the policy-making processes and their mutual relations. The following three points are made. First, the operation of the People Republic of China's (PRC) policy-making on Taiwan affairs strongly reflects the leader's personality and domestic political situation at the time. Second, on the other hand, the process of the PRC's policy-making on Taiwan affairs is not only influenced by internal factors such as the personality of the leader and the internal political situation but also by the current status of the Cross-Strait relations and internal politics in Taiwan at the time. Third, since the Hu Jintao regime, the role of local governments in the PRC's policy toward Taiwan has increased, and the role of the local Taiwan affairs policy-making system has been polarized under Xi Jinping's rule. Considering these trends, the situation emerges that Xi Jinping's authority over the CCP's policy-making on Taiwan affairs is becoming more vital than ever. With the official channels of negotiation with Taiwan closed and the means available for "promoting reunification" limited, Xi Jinping is using the centralized policy-making system to develop policies that require a higher level of leadership than Hu Jintao's policies toward Taiwan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Biden administration is attempting to transform traditional US–Taiwan relations into a multilateralism‐based "US + alliance–Taiwan" interactional model, which can be conceptualized as alliance coordination. This article unpacks the logic of Biden's strategic thinking in the US Taiwan policy. Adopting an asymmetric alliance perspective, it argues that US allies' reactions to Biden's foreign policy and their ideological attitude toward China have interacted with the US placement of the Taiwan question on the agenda in the alliance system to produce different degrees of alliance coordination, which can be measured by the new typology constituted by seven approaches: all‐fields approach, pure high politics approach, high politics driven approach, half‐measures, low politics driven approach, pure low politics approach, and strategic inaction. Three cases, including the different reactions of Japan, European countries, and South Korea, are analyzed to demonstrate how the alliance coordination operates in realpolitik. Additionally, the assessment of this article reveals that Biden's alliance coordination would place growing strategic pressure on mainland China and introduces greater volatility into cross‐strait relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tensions between Beijing and Taipei in 2022 reached their heights since the 1995- 1996 Third Strait Crisis. The decision by the outgoing Speaker of the US House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi to visit Taiwan in August, few months prior to the momentous 20th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, was immediately followed by an unprecedented display of military capabilities by the People’s Liberation Army in the waters and airspace surrounding Taiwan. Forceful assertions of sovereignty over the island by Beijing, and explicit declarations of support in case of a Chinese attempt at a military takeover by President Biden preceded and followed the events that occurred in August, only to partially wane by the end of the year following the XiBiden G20 meeting in Bali. With no open route to improve cross-Strait relations, the Tsai administration further deepened relations with the US and expanded unofficial engagement with Washington’s East Asian allies and the European Union and its member states. Shared support for Ukraine against Russia’s aggression and growing synergies in industrial policy related to the semiconductor sector drove this engagement, without however producing meaningful results in trade policy. In November, the Kuomintang obtained a sweeping victory in the local «nine-in-one» elections. The result showed the party’s continuing competitiveness in local elections, but the slowdown of the Taiwanese economy, rising inflationary trends, and declining popular support for the Tsai administration complicated the ruling Democratic Progressive Party’s prospects for the 2024 general elections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]