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Environmental decentralization is an institutional factor that influences the effect of ecological environment governance. Based on panel data of provinces in China from 2008 to 2015, this paper evaluates the indicators of environmental decentralization, and uses a fixed-effect model and a threshold model to test the influence of environmental decentralization and environmental regulation on environmental pollution. The results indicate that China's environmental decentralization can significantly curb environmental pollution in general. There is a U-shaped relationship between environmental decentralization and environmental pollution. Reasonable environmental decentralization can restrain environmental pollution, while excessive environmental decentralization aggravates environmental pollution. There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between environmental regulation and environmental pollution. If the intensity of environmental regulation is too low, it cannot inhibit environmental pollution, while if the intensity of environmental regulation is increased to a certain level, it can help to inhibit environmental pollution. The joint impact of environmental decentralization and environmental regulation cannot reduce environmental pollution. That is, with the enlargement of environmental decentralization, environmental regulation fails to reduce environmental pollution. The effect of environmental decentralization has significant regional heterogeneity in economic development level and emission intensity. The above conclusions have important reference value for optimizing the environmental decentralization system and formulating scientific environmental decentralization policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As urban agglomerations have become the main spatial organization form in China, it is of great significance to carry out environmental cooperative governance based on urban agglomerations. Research on the interaction of environmental regulation enforcement among cities can provide a new explanation for the competition and cooperation in terms of pollution control in urban agglomerations. This article selected three types of environmental regulation policy tools: market-incentive, command-and-control, and their combinations, and analyzed the interaction pattern of environmental regulations based on the theoretical mechanism derivation and the two zone spatial Durbin model by using the panel data of 103 cities in China. Then, the SLX model was used to explore the impact of the interaction of environmental regulations on the cooperative governance of pollution in five urban agglomerations. The results showed that the market-incentive environmental regulation was not fully implemented, which meant that some cities adopted a 'race to the bottom' strategy in response of the competition with their neighbors. After combining market-incentive environmental regulation with command and-control environmental regulation, the pattern of environmental regulation interaction between cities changed from ' race to the bottom' to 'race to the top'. This interactive characteristic was particularly significant in the Yangtze River Delta and the Chengdu Chongqing urban agglomerations. However, the 'racing to the top' characteristic of these two urban agglomerations had different effects on the intercity environmental cooperation: there was a synergy effect caused by strong spillover effect of environmental regulation implementation in the Yangtze River Delta urban agglomeration rather than in the Chengdu-Chongqing urban agglomeration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]