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This paper focuses on the dynamics of education in the interplay of power and seduction as creatively displayed in Takarazuka Revue's performances re-enacting the major players of the Cold War: USA and Russia (rather than former Soviet Union). "Oceans 11" (cosmos troupe, 2019) and "Once Upon a Time in America" (snow troupe, 2020), on the one hand, and "Land of Gods" (cosmos troupe, 2017) and "Anastasia" (cosmos troupe, 2020), on the other hand, lavishly display subtle interactions of longing and belonging, ecstasy and rage, love and betrayal, envy, hatred and passion, while painstakingly building up irresistible tensions between the instances involved in the performative process: actresses, administrators, audiences. The theoretical support is delivered by Robert Greene's pragmatic elaborations in his seminal works "The 48 Laws of Power" (1998) and "The Art of Seduction" (2001): education is never a linear process between a 'master' and a 'disciple', but an interactive game, governed by the pursuit of joy in overcoming challenges and finding ingenious solutions.

Purpose: This paper aims to investigate how the Japanese media conveyed the country's foreign aid policy and analyse how framing biases in the news differ depending on which language (either Japanese or English) was used in the broadcasts. Design/methodology/approach: This study uses a qualitative single case-study design and conducts a content analysis. The study uses news videos about the fifth Tokyo International Conference on African Development aired on YouTube by the Japanese media using Japanese and English. Findings: The findings reveal subtle but notable differences in the patterns of the framing biases in the Japanese media's news aired in Japanese intended for the domestic audience, and in the news on the same topic broadcast in English to the international audience. Research limitations/implications: The limitation of the study is the rather small data set used for the single case study of one event. Social implications: Framing biases could lead the general public in a monolingual society to a more skewed view of their government's policy and its activities abroad. This could be an obstacle to developing a common ground for global issues and cross-border policy agendas. Originality/value: The study explores an under-researched function of language in international affairs. It highlights how the mass media in a non-English-speaking country uses a dual approach to framing news while addressing different audiences. To the best of the author's knowledge, the context that this paper deals with is novel because there are limited studies on the nexus between the influence of language choices and media logic in the field of international business. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2019, the prime ministers of the Nordic countries announced their joint vision of leading the most sustainable and integrated region in the world by 2030. While public opinion on EU integration has been divided in the Nordic countries, there is broad support for closer intra-Nordic collaboration. The paper asks whether this new vision is likely to lead to closer collaboration on the foreign policy front. To answer, trends in Nordic policies and strategies towards the wider world are studied and three joint initiatives centred on Japan are analysed to see how some of these policies have played out in practice. On the one hand, the cases demonstrate a variety of processes and formats for Nordic collaboration. On the other hand, they demonstrate how well Nordic collaboration can work in a remote, yet strategic market like Japan, not only as an abstract idea, but also in practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After World War II, Japan became a major recipient of foreign aid from the USA. As Japan's economy improved in the 1960s, it played a significant role as a global aid donor in world politics through its Official Development Assistance (ODA). This commitment continued into the 1990s when Japan, as one of the leading proponents of the concept of human security, began providing humanitarian aid to more countries across the globe. To better understand the notion of human security in international politics, this paper examines Japan's endorsement of the concept in its foreign policy strategy. This paper provides an overview and critical assessment of Japan's Grant Assistance for Grass-Roots Human Security Projects (GGP) in the state of Sabah in East Malaysia from 2000 to 2021. This paper argues that different contexts and circumstances in the state of Sabah require further study, especially for understanding Japan's focus and concern in the area of basic human security needs, as enshrined in the GGP philosophy. Despite Japan's GGP objective as part of its foreign policy to promote human development, the execution of its foreign aid in Sabah does have issues. This paper concludes that the implementation of Japan's GGP necessitates greater inclusion, particularly for other vulnerable groups and underdeveloped areas in Sabah. Despite Japan's GGP objective as part of its foreign policy to promote human development, the execution of its foreign aid in Sabah does have issues. This paper concludes that the implementation of Japan's GGP necessitates greater inclusion, particularly for other vulnerable groups and underdeveloped areas in Sabah. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Korea's Japan policy has increasingly become inconsistent and even volatile across time. At the centre of the inconsistency is the Moon Jae-In government's GSOMIA policy. While starting his tenure by deciding to remain in the GSOMIA, the government made 180-degree turn and notified its intention not to renew the agreement when Japan announced export controls. But the decision was completely reversed within months when the government held off ending the agreement. What explains such inconsistency in Korea's Japan policy? To answer this question, the paper proposes a generic model of foreign policy inconsistency, which might be called "two-level constraint model" and applies it to the case of Korea's GSOMIA policy. The central argument of the model is that the inconsistency in the countries' foreign policy is the result of shifts in foreign policy leaders' incentives, which are affected by the changes in the level of external-and internal political constraints they face. A crucial case study of the Moon Jae-In government's GSOMIA policy finds strong evidence that lends a support for the argument. The paper concludes by offering both a short summary and policy implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan's war reparations began to be paid to Burma and the Philippines in 1956 and ended in 1976. Approximately 65 years have passed since the reparation payment began. The nature of Japan's Official Development Assistance, which has been based on economic infrastructure and prioritises Asia, began with war reparations. Although post-war reparations are relevant to Japan's economic statecraft, previous studies have analysed only the negotiation process for individual countries. No comprehensive historical analysis of war reparations has been conducted so far. This paper fills this gap by analysing the declassified materials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the state-of-the-art Japanese literature based on those materials. It also clarifies the characteristics of war reparations as part of Japan's Official Development Assistance by looking at the projects and goods paid by the reparations in each country. Furthermore, this paper challenges the conventional understanding of previous research on Japan's economic re-entry into Southeast Asia through reparations. The study concludes that reparations were unimportant in increasing Japan's exports to Asian countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To what degree are historical animosities regarding another country relevant for foreign policy in the face of changes in the security environment? This paper seeks to answer this question in the context of Korea–Japan relations. While pundits have pointed to the Korean public's negative views of Japan—rooted in the colonial experience—as the explanation for the lack of cooperation between Japan and Korea in the security field, this paper argues changes in the level of common external threat can shift the public's priorities from perceived historical injustices toward the needs of security. Surveys from the period when the security environment was shifting markedly—the final years of the Cold War (1986–1990)—reveal that public opinion regarding Japan relative to other powers in the region began to deteriorate only after the security environment improved, pointing to a limit to the extent that "history" trumps security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The bio-medical model of 'mental health' and 'mental illness' that relates to the relationship between wellbeing and distress informs psychopathology and dominates conceptualisation in many Western Educated Industrialised Rich Democratic (WEIRD) populations. This paper aims to critique the model, questioning the appropriateness of psychopathology as a conceptual framework when working as a Western trained clinician with populations such as in China, Japan, Asia, the Middle-East and Africa. The paper also considers the cultural appropriateness of western notions of psychopathology when working inter-culturally in relation to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Guidelines on Mental Health and Psychosocial Support in Emergency Settings, and the Review of the Implementation of the IASC Guidelines on Mental Health and Psychosocial Support in Emergency Settings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy & Peace is the property of Ihsan Dogramaci Peace Foundation, Center for Foreign Policy & Peace Research and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Quad or Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, a group of four democracies, the US, India, Japan, and Australia, was first proposed in 2007 by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in his 'confluence of two seas' speech that subsequently embarked on the path to the foundation of the group. Quad perceives China's economic growth, which enables her to transform the world order as a threat and aims at containing the growing Chinese assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region. The Malabar naval exercises in the Indian Ocean by the Quad members were one such exercise. This paper, aims to analyze the formation of Quad and will contemplate whether the group is causing confrontation or stability in the Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific regions. The paper will also assess that the Quad is designed to counter China's growing influence in the Asia-pacific and Indo-pacific regions. Containing China is likely to create a confrontation in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Escalation of great power rivalry resulting from China's rise and Russia's invasion of Ukraine has prompted Japan to align its foreign and security policies more closely. This paper analyzes how ODA policy, which the Japanese government regards as a crucial diplomatic instrument, has been modified in the face of these changes. The most significant transformation is the securitization of ODA, or the deployment of ODA to advance Japan's national security interests. This trend is evident in the emergence of a new type of ODA that aims to contribute to Japan's security interests by strengthening the deterrence capabilities of developing countries involved in territorial disputes with China. Notably, Japan is justifying this new ODA trend in the name of upholding the universal value of the international rule of law. In other words, Japan is shifting the focus of assistance away from domestic issues of democracy and human rights in each recipient country toward the rule of law in international relations. This is a manifestation of Japan's effort to strike a careful balance between upholding universal values and avoiding the risk of offending incumbent governments in recipient countries with questionable domestic governance records. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Sino – Japanese Peace Treaty signed in April 1952 not only set the basic framework for diplomatic relations between China, Japan, and Taiwan until 1972, but was also significant in substantially determining the legal status of Chinese residents in Japan during the same period. Subsequently, this paper analyzes both the legislative process in Japan leading up to the Sino – Japanese Peace Treaty and the process of diplomatic negotiations between Japan and China and identifies the following points. In the process of legislating the Immigration Control Ordinance, the Japanese government, while recognizing that Chinese mainlanders in Japan were Chinese nationals, considered them to be outside the legal jurisdiction of the Republic of China (R.O.C.) government, and while recognizing the jurisdiction of the R.O.C. government over Formosans in Japan to a certain extent, interpreted "the ultimate nationality of Taiwanese people has not been determined" from the standpoint that the legal status of Taiwan was undetermined. The R.O.C. government was forced to accept the Japanese government's treatment regarding the legal status of Chinese residents in Japan because it was unable to have its sovereignty over Taiwan and the Penghu Islands clearly stated in the articles of the Sino – Japanese Peace Treaty out of consideration for the United States, which acted as an intermediary in the negotiations of the treaty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Records Management: Journal of the Records Management Society of Japan is the property of Records Management Society of Japan and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Japan has emerged as a critical strategic actor in East Asia amidst intensifying US-China structural competition since 2010. Southeast Asia/ASEAN is an important dimension of Japan's foreign policy expansion. This paper argues that Japan's foreign policy is driven by the aim of becoming an alternative source of strategic stability in Southeast Asia/ASEAN as opposed to the United States and China. This is explained by analysing Japan's foreign policy in regional balance of power and ASEAN-led multilateralism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For Japan's former prime minister Abe Shinzō, security cooperation with Southeast Asia was central to preventing the South China Sea from turning into a "Lake Beijing" - completely under Chinese control. This paper explains why Abe's security engagement in the region focused mainly on providing Capacity Building Assistance (CBA) to Southeast Asian coast guards agencies to counter China's maritime assertiveness. Answers are provided by looking at not only international but also domestic factors. Based on key variables of post-Cold War Japan's foreign policy, namely the US-Japan alliance, the dominance of economic tools, and normative and institutional constraints on the use of force, the analysis concludes that CBA was an ideal response to the complex demands and restrictions of Japan's security policy. In particular, the economic benefits of providing CBA are an important finding of the analysis and one that has not yet received much scholarly focus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Strategic links between Japan and Europe during the Cold War were limited. During this period the IISS helped bridge the gap between the two, exposing its membership base to the international affairs of Asia and Japan and providing Japanses scholars, strategists and diplomats with a platform from which to amplify their voices in the West. Analyses by these experts often appeared in IISS publications, but the Institute also gained key insights through its well-established conferences and lecture series. These initiatives illuminated Japanese strategic thinking and perspectives on contemporary critical issues in Japan's and Asia's foreign, security and defence policy. This Adelphi book, through its collection of earlier analysis, helps the reader to understand the evolution of Japanese strategic thought from the 1960s until today, and shines a light on the continuities and changes in this thinking. New, original analysis of the material seeks to identify areas where such thinking was prescient and remains relevant to the contemporary strategic environment, and other areas where predictions failed or assumptions were proved wrong. These new essays were also informed by interviews of Japanese senior scholars and diplomats who spent time with the IISS. This book seeks to frame, educate and guide strategic thinking on the most pressing issues of today, both in and outside Japan and Asia, and will be of great interest to analysts, practitioners and students of international affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper examines Japan's foreign policy towards the South Caucasus through the case study of Japanese engagement in Georgia. The goal of the study is to explore the formulation of Japan's official foreign policy towards Georgia and to highlight the ideational factors influencing the process. As for the timeframe, the thesis is focused on the period from 1992 to 2016. Following the constructivist theory of International Relations, claiming the reality to be shaped by the perceptions of the actors, the study engages in documentary analysis and tries to provide a comprehensive understanding of Japan's policymaking regarding the South Caucasus. The study contradicts the dominant positivist claims and argues that Japan's official foreign policy discourse regarding the South Caucasus is constructed according to Japanese perceptions of world affairs, its domestic environment, the situation in the South Caucasus itself, the imagined role for Japan (identity), and the norms and values that were believed to have universal importance. As for the development of Japanese foreign policy towards Georgia, the author differentiates three stages in the construction of Japan's approach: (1) No strategy (1992–1996); (2) "Eurasian Diplomacy" (1997–2005); and (3) "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity" (2006–2016), while the factors claimed to be influencing these dynamics are the ideas, beliefs, and values of Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan is one of the richest democracies of Asia, a pillar of the international liberal order in the region, and a strongly pacifist nation with the only anti-war constitution in the world. It is also one of three major countries which have elected to incorporate human security principles as intrinsic components of foreign policy. However, its implementation of human security principles in some areas, especially refugee policy, belies its rhetorical commitments; it boasts the lowest number of refugees among all industrialised nations. What explains this discrepancy? Through a comparative study of the Indochinese and the Rohingya refugee crises, this study aims to offer a corrective and a supplement to Sarah Tanke's work (2021) by arguing that despite Japanese officials' championing of a human security narrative in the international arena, the gap between declaration and implementation, especially regarding the human security of displaced persons in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond, points to their instrumental use of such a narrative to avoid international censure and free ride on the international asylum regime. It further investigates the domestic political, social and psychological factors modulating this behaviour, and argues for a broader role for international pressure in order to bring about policy change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study takes the argument that nontraditional security (NTS) diplomacy can provide the essential window of opportunity for China and Japan to move beyond traditional diplomatic history. However, NTS issues have become dominant in reforming bilateral relations between China and Japan, though there is no fixed edge in nontraditional security. To reveal, it explores the NTS diplomacy with the importance of nontraditional security issues as substance for the expansion and development of two leading economies. The non-military and transboundary character of NTS threats have constrained courtiers to pursue more substantial levels of security integration. This study argues that the significance of NTS diplomacy is twofold; first, it avoids sensitive historical hostilities and finds common ground for cooperation on NTS threats that traditional approach of diplomacy apparently is unable to envisage. Second, security interdependence approach can turn traditional diplomatic relations of China and Japan into a more conciliatory and prominent path. While NTS threats like natural disasters, environment degradation, and economy crisis have been taken as case studies to provide empirical evidence and significant opportunities for both rival states. This article, to some extent, describes the dynamic between traditional, nontraditional, and nontraditional security diplomacy through China-Japan relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The late 19th century marked a significant period in Korea's history, when it established formal diplomatic relations with the outside world. Goryeo celadon began appearing in the context of diplomatic and other exchanges in the 19th century. These celadon pieces were exquisite and often of the highest quality. There are also cases of foreign diplomats collecting Goryeo celadon. British consul William Carles, French consul Victor Collin de Plancy, and American consul Horace Allen played prominent roles in collecting, selling, and donating Goryeo celadon. In the complex landscape of East Asian diplomacy, ceramics occasionally played a role in exchanges between China, Japan, and Southeast Asian regions. Overall, this phenomenon can be attributed to the changing economic and cultural value of Goryeo celadon, particularly during the late 19th century. However, the inclusion of Goryeo celadon in diplomatic contexts or as prominent diplomatic gifts was also closely related to the changing perception of Goryeo celadon within Korea, as it began to be viewed from a more externalized perspective. Moreover, as foreign interest in Korean (Joseon) culture expanded into a range of ethnographic studies, Goryeo celadon came to be recognized as an artistic product that demonstrated the cultural competence of the nation. Simultaneously, Goryeo celadon took on the role of a diplomatic medium, symbolically representing Korea's heritage on a national level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the late 2010s, Japan has said publicly that it will provide foreign assistance to protect its national interest. A systematic text analysis reveals, however, that Japan had announced this objective as far back as 1969. From the 1970s through the 1990s, the connection of aid to the national interest was indirect and long-term, with the belief that global stability would lead to prosperity. In the 2000s, the suspension of aid to China and the reconstruction of Iraq became major topics of discussion. In recent years, securing the national interest through aid has diverged from the mercantilist approach of the past, which revitalized the Japanese economy. The presence of China as a competitor for infrastructure aid in Asia is the primary reason Japan has emphasized the national interest in its aid policy. The data demonstrate that Japan's actual aid allocation behavior has been significantly influenced by its emphasis on the national interest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Strategic links between Japan and Europe during the Cold War were limited. During this period the IISS helped bridge the gap between the two, exposing its membership base to the international affairs of Asia and Japan and providing Japanses scholars, strategists and diplomats with a platform from which to amplify their voices in the West. Analyses by these experts often appeared in IISS publications, but the Institute also gained key insights through its well-established conferences and lecture series. These initiatives illuminated Japanese strategic thinking and perspectives on contemporary critical issues in Japan's and Asia's foreign, security and defence policy. This Adelphi book, through its collection of earlier analysis, helps the reader to understand the evolution of Japanese strategic thought from the 1960s until today, and shines a light on the continuities and changes in this thinking. New, original analysis of the material seeks to identify areas where such thinking was prescient and remains relevant to the contemporary strategic environment, and other areas where predictions failed or assumptions were proved wrong. These new essays were also informed by interviews of Japanese senior scholars and diplomats who spent time with the IISS. This book seeks to frame, educate and guide strategic thinking on the most pressing issues of today, both in and outside Japan and Asia, and will be of great interest to analysts, practitioners and students of international affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I look into the lesser-known history of "comfort women" in the Philippines. I engage with the following questions: how did the trafficking and sexual exploitation of Filipino women emerge as part of state policy in the Japanese Empire? How was it dealt with in the aftermath of the war, especially in the face of shifting post-war alliances and the changing place of Japan in the geo-politics of the Cold War? How did events in the international arena, in turn, affect diplomatic relations between the Philippines and Japan, specifically with respect to aid and trade? Finally, how did the market forces at play affect state policy in the Philippines? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan was among the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with Malaya (then Malaysia). On 9 September 1957, nine days after Malaya achieved independence, Japan opened its embassy in Kuala Lumpur. The introduction of the Look East Policy (LEP) in 1982 strengthened the existing Malaysia-Japan bilateral relations. The main objective of this study is to examine the nature of the bilateral relationship between Malaysia and Japan during the implementation of the Look East Policy (LEP) and to identify the mutual benefits obtained by both countries in the implementation of LEP 2.0. This study adopted a qualitative analysis method by conducting intensive interviews and focus group discussion involving 13 informants who were directly involved with the implementation of LEP. The study found that, among other things, while LEP made the good practice of the Japanese people as the main driving factor, it also included the Japanese work culture, discipline, ethics, integrity, accountability, management and strategic partners. Three decades after the implementation of LEP in Malaysia, LEP took up a notch with the introduction of the Second Wave of LEP in 2012. Otherwise known as LEP 2.0, it prioritised new areas in line with technological developments in the millennial era. In line with that, LEP 2.0 also focused on the context of mutual benefit (common interest) for both countries especially in Halal hub industry and tourism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: The division of the Korean peninsula involved many neighbouring countries in the Korean War. The relations with those countries have since been reorganised due to active exchange. This study examined how the quantity and quality of contact with traditional alliance (US and Japan) and strategic partner (China and Russia) countries affected their national images. Methods: To this end, this study analyzed the relation with the national image by measuring the quantity and quality of contact of an individual with each country. The quantity of contact included an evaluation of the individual's subjective amount of contact, contact path, and contact status, and the quality of contact was measured as an evaluation for the pleasure, competitiveness, intimacy, spontaneity, and necessity when contacting each country's culture. A total of 387 participants were divided into two groups based on the presence of direct contact and the quantity and quality of their contact and national images were examined. The participants were followed by a completion of the self-questionnaires including the Culture Experience Questionnaire, National Image Questionnaire, and demographic information questionnaire. Results: The results of this study are as follow: first, regardless of the type of country, the national image was highly correlated with the degree of subjective contact evaluated by individuals, but there was a weak tendency with contact quality. Second, there was no significant interaction between the country type and contact status for national image, however, different national images for each country were detected. In other word, for contact quantity, contact groups showed more positive national images compared to non-contact groups in Russia, but not Japan, China, and the US. For contact quality, the positive contact experience group showed more positive national images compared to the negative contact experience group, but only in traditional alliance countries. Conclusion: This study highlights the importance of implementing different strategies for countries to maintain peaceful international relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses the complex landscape of Japan's diplomatic engagement in Southeast Asia, spanning from the late 1990s to the present day, and explores the transformative role that Japan has played in post-conflict peacebuilding and regional security. Japan has reinforced diplomatic relations with conflict-affected Southeast Asian countries in the post-Cold War era, contributing to security cooperation in the region under the recent Japan's diplomatic direction of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Jahrbuch der Vereinigung für Sozialwissenschaftliche Japanforschung is the property of Iudicium Verlag GmbH and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The aim of this article is to trace the origins of Russophobic stereotypes and myths in Japan and to analyze their features and traits. In the article the authors scrutinize writings by Japanese politician and public figure Uchida Ryohei (1874--1937) which are dedicated to the Russian Empire and the "Manchurian question." Uchida's writings were found in the collections of the Russian State Military Historical Archive and the National Diet Library of Japan. The hypothesis of the article is that Uchida Ryohei was one of the main ideologists and creators of Russophobic stereotypes and myths in the Japanese Empire. It was around Uchida Ryohei that proponents of anti-Russian views and people who were impatient to start the war against the Russian Empire united. The article goes on to demonstrate that Uchida Ryohei's writings and political activities played a key role in the initiation of the Russo-Japanese war (1904--1905) and in shaping a negative image of Russia in Japanese public opinion at the beginning of the 20th century. What's more, Uchida's cultural heritage is still in demand in modern Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines Japan's security and foreign policy as an example of how a major power engages in the liberal international order (LIO) and what this implies for the future of that order. Facing China's increased power and influence in the past two decades, Japan has made strategic adjustments in response to regional and global power transitions while developing an idea of a wider geopolitical landscape on Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's initiative. However, this article argues that Japan's idea of an expanded regional scope and its vision of order were addressed decades earlier through 'comprehensive security' (sogo anzen hosho). While the country is an ally of the United States and clearly accepts the alliance as a key part of international order, Japan has its own ideas about international order; these accept much of the LIO but go beyond it, particularly in the articulation and operationalization of comprehensive security. By adopting the concept of norm localization, this article argues that Japan does not have the power to coerce others to take any actions to defend the current international order, but it can adapt and tweak the dominant LIO norms, principles and practices to build congruence with local norms of sovereignty and territorial integrity embedded in its own region. To create a broader consensus in favour of sustaining the LIO, major powers like Japan can approach the sceptics by presenting an alternative to either total rejection or total acceptance of the LIO norms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article revisits the conceptualisation of (regional) order in International Relations (IR) theory to illuminate key aspects of Japan's order-building role in the Indo-Pacific. The framework is based upon a multi-dimensional understanding of regional order-building allowing for an examination of Japan's vision for a 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific' (FOIP) policy 'vision', the challenges it faces as a secondary power, and its conduct as an emerging entrepreneurial power in the Indo-Pacific. The article's central argument is that Japan's order-building should be understood in the context of the country's deeper strategic situation and, in particular, its position as a secondary, but still highly influential, power. This has implications for understanding Japan's approach to international order and how it might deploy norm entrepreneurship in shaping the new Indo-Pacific order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article seeks to explore the relevance of the concept of international friendship for the study of EU foreign policy. Drawing on a nascent friendship literature developing in the field of IR, this article argues that the EU's friendships – relations with significant others based on shared narratives and projects – play an important part in the EU's construction of its international identity. To illustrate this argument, the article provides an analysis of the EU's relations with Japan. The analysis suggests that EU‐Japan relations can usefully be described as an emergent international friendship which – revolving around the narrative of a Free and Open Indo‐Pacific and shared projects such as the EU‐Japan Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure – shapes and solidifies the EU's self‐image as an actor in international affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In an effort to counteract China's maritime expansionism, Japan has endeavoured to be a prominent player in the South China Sea dispute over the past decade. While previous studies have emphasized the limitations of Japan's South China Sea policy, one question still remains: to what extent has Japan's policy been successful? By utilizing Baldwin's analytical framework for foreign policy evaluation--which takes into account factors such as stakes, effectiveness and costs--this article argues that Japan's policy has achieved moderate success. Despite its limitations, Japan's policy has been relatively successful as it helps to maintain America's military presence in the region, and creates normative and diplomatic obstacles for China's activities in the South China Sea without damaging Sino-Japanese relations. Additionally, Japan's policy helps uphold the rules-based order by strengthening the maritime law enforcement capabilities of selected Southeast Asian states. The costs of the policy to Japan are acceptable, particularly given that it has little impact on the waters surrounding the country. Conversely, the policy imposes increased material, normative and time costs on China. Given China's uncompromising historical and security position in the South China Sea, the qualified success of Japan's policy should be acknowledged. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why study Japan? Research on contemporary Japanese politics and foreign policy faces headwinds from the relative geopolitical decline of Japan and scholars skeptical about single-country studies. An overview of Japanese politics publications in English-language journals over the past four decades suggests the subfield remains active and robust. However, there is still room to grow. I argue that Japan is a harbinger state, which experiences many challenges before others in the international system. As such, studying Japan can inform both scholars and policymakers about the political challenges other countries are likely to confront in the future. In turn, scholarship on Japan offers a critical opportunity to develop theoretical insights, assess early empirical evidence, and offer policy lessons about emerging challenges and the political contestation surrounding them. I consider the reasons why Japan so often emerges as a harbinger across issue areas and suggest areas for ongoing scholarly attention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last two decades, against the backdrop of multiple anti-Japanese protests in China, the rise of Chinese nationalism has been much debated. By taking the 2010 and 2012 Sino–Japanese crises over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands as a case study, the article applies discourse analysis to media articles and interviews to ascertain the Chinese government's propaganda toolbox in shaping the nationalist discourse, as well as to substantiate the defining features of anti-Japanese nationalism. The findings reveal a combination of strategies and techniques that the propaganda apparatus uses, such as the creation of an 'us-versus-them' dichotomy, galvanised inclusiveness, censorship, and 'card-stacking' to mould nationalism. The article substantiates empirically both top-down and bottom-up strains of nationalism, and their interaction through the four key themes of sovereignty, history, mistrust and reactivity. It finds that Japan bridges these strands of Chinese nationalism, but in its absence alternative views of nationalism are articulated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although Japan is commonly regarded as a strong proponent of the existing liberal international order championed by the US in the Indo-Pacific, sometimes it has been half-hearted in opposing a Sino-centric order and been rather supportive of Chinese diplomacy. In particular, it has to some degree supported the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) implemented by Beijing, effectively offered its endorsement to the international legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) without problematizing human rights issues, and severely restricted the enhancement of its own defense capabilities. These policies have been shaped by pro-China individuals and groups who hold privileged positions inside the government, and their privileged positions have been determined by haphazard domestic political factors which have little to do with Sino-Japanese relations. This means that, although on the surface Japan may seem to have rationally calculated its international strategic interests and implemented hedging as a coherent strategy amid Sino-US rivalries, its implementation of what seems to be a hedging strategy has actually been incidental. Its policy has turned out to resemble what has been regarded by International Relations (IR) theorists as a hedging strategy, due to haphazard domestic political factors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Deeping superpower rivalry between the United States and China has created acute strategic dilemmas for secondary powers in the Indo-Pacific such as Australia and Japan. This predicament is exacerbated by their divergent security and economic interests which cut across the superpower divide; a condition dubbed a 'security/economic disconnect'. These two intimately related dynamics preclude clear-cut implementation of conventional balancing/bandwagoning alignment choices and have led to mixed hedging strategies to cope with this situation. To address these issues, the article presents a refinement of the hedging concept in International Relations (IR) that emphasizes its multi-dimensional nature, within a broader interpretation of alignment itself. It applies this to the case of the Australia and Japan with reference to their Strategic Partnership, which is both emblematic of hedging responses to systemic uncertainty, and an institutional mechanism through which to operationalize joint hedging policies. This provides insights into how middle power strategic partnerships are managing strategic risks across the security, economic, and other, domains. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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After the Cold War, one of the biggest security challenges in Europe was the war in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). This article analyses Japanese foreign policy towards the Republic of Croatia, considering it the focal point of the Yugoslav crisis from the end of the Cold War in 1989, through the disintegration of the SFRY in 1991, until the establishment of diplomatic relations with Japan in 1993. Although the general opinion was that Japan did not have strong interests in this region, this article shows that Japan used the trilateral US–Europe–Japan framework to approach the Yugoslav crisis. It is argued that Japan acted indirectly through international institutions. Japan acted bilaterally to condition international recognition and sanctions using diplomacy and aid as its tools and multilaterally through the EBRD, G7, G24, UN, and the CSCE/OSCE by providing Japanese nationals as election monitoring staff. Japan's diplomatic efforts and humanitarian and reconstruction aid in the former SFRY were considerable. The larger implications of this article concern Japan–EU relations. By aiding the former SFRY republics to achieve democracy and market economy, Japan facilitated future NATO and EU expansion to protect its economic interests in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The literature suggests that voters have a self-centered incentive to call for the de-escalation of conflicts that inflict economic costs on them, which explains why economic sanctions and trade wars often lose popular support when the resulting cost for the domestic economy rises. It is thus puzzling why some costly disputes between two advanced democracies are prolonged. Taking a psychological approach, we argue that nonviolent yet costly disputes between international rivals can fail to de-escalate because the perception of loss invokes anger and risk-taking attitudes. We test our argument using a paired conjoint experiment involving Japan and South Korea. We find that, in both countries, the public becomes more defiant and less supportive of de-escalating an ongoing dispute when informed about (1) the high cost of the trade restrictions on domestic firms, (2) international (i.e. World Trade Organization) support for the rival country, and (3) the rival public's hardline stance on the dispute. These findings lend support to our psychological explanation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) Central Committee's Measure and Plans for Policy Activities concerning Japan, formulated in March 1955, was China's first Japan Policy Platform after the founding of the People's Republic of China. It specified policy principles and measures. Its policy directed toward Japan could be called a "Japan neutralization" policy. There were three factors that contributed to the formulation of the Japan Policy Platform. The first factor was the start of full-fledged Japan-China private-sector exchanges and the CCP's aim to break away from a people's diplomacy toward Japan that centered on support for the Japanese Communist Party. The second factor was the major change in postwar Japanese politics with the resignation of the Yoshida Cabinet and the start of the Hatoyama Cabinet. The third factor was the change in foreign policy, with the reintroduction of the "Theory of Intermediate Zones" and the international environment, with the advent of the Sino-Soviet honeymoon period and the intensification of the US-China confrontation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The UK's relationship with Japan is the cornerstone of the Indo-Pacific 'tilt' and provides unique insights into its motivating logic and the UK's role in world politics, Philip Shetler-Jones argues. First, it exhibits the importance the UK gives to universal principles unrestricted by cultural or geographic markers in its choice of 'like-minded' partners – an aspect of Global Britain that is reciprocated in Japanese policy, informing how the 'tilt' is received in the region. Second, it represents the prime example of how the tilt maintains the equilibrium of UK foreign policy in the midst of a shifting global power balance, by means of a more diversified, flatter framework of 'quasi alliance' relations built on the foundation of the transatlantic alliance. Third, the foremost commitment in the Integrated Review that the UK remain a leading technology power is reflected in the defence technology and industry partnership that is becoming central to the UK–Japan relationship.◼ [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article takes a comparative approach that looks at the rise of Japan and China during their ascendency and challenge to the hegemonic state within the international system, and the subsequent racial threat perception that both countries experienced. Engaging the English School of International Relations, it focuses particularly on the legacies of differentiation within international society. It contends that, given the English School's emphasis on the concept of international society that likens that relationship among states to a social one, it is fruitful to examine how social differentiation occurs within a domestic setting and to use that finding as analogous to international society. The article argues that racialised threat perception towards Japan and China heightened in tandem with their successive rises due to the challenges the two countries posed to the status and privileges of the dominant country—the USA—and which coincided with a US economic downturn and domestic crisis. This racially sensitive approach can provide at least one lens through which to understand the racial threat perception and contemporary relational dynamics between the two great powers: the USA versus the People's Republic of China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the policies of development cooperation promoted by Japan and Korea in Central Asia, focussing on the roles of discourses treating Japan and Korea as potential non-Western models for the region's development and modernisation in their relations with Central Asian states. We trace the evolution of relevant developmental approaches made by Japan and Korea, analysing discourses and practices of sharing experiences, as well as the key drivers behind those shifts, and we seek to locate these changes in the larger context of regional political economy and international relations. Furthermore, the article seeks to address the ideational and normative aspects of Japanese and Korean development cooperation in Central Asia. We conclude with a recap comparison of Japan's and Korea's sharing of development experiences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on the varying intensity of political clash that South Korea has got involved in with Japan regarding the territorial dispute, Dokdo/Takeshima. Existing works are limited to acknowledging the role of nationalism as a key obstacle to the negotiation or settlement of the territorial dispute. However, democratically elected Korean leaders at times remained low key in the territorial problem and even sought collaboration with Japan despite the existence of nationalism. Specifically, South Korea employed both calm and hardline diplomatic choices in the territorial dispute. Why did South Korea choose disparate territorial policies despite the population's anti-Japanese sentiments? Under what circumstances did leaders in Korea employ dovish diplomacy that might cause a strong backlash from the public? Introducing the vulnerability-restraint theory, I argue that top decision makers' political vulnerability in domestic politics and the restraining pressure from the United States have impact on the final choice of foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nearly 30 years have passed since the government of Japan unveiled its first Official Development Assistance Charter. Although it sets forth fundamental guidelines for the government's foreign aid policy, previous studies have downplayed the influence of the ODA Charter. By contrast, this study argues that the ODA Charter changed Japan's aid allocation behavior in relation to a number of issues. First, regarding military matters: since the introduction of the 1992 ODA Charter, testing of weapons of mass destruction by developing nations, as well as military expenditures for conventional weaponry by developing nations outside of Asia, have had a negative effect on aid from Japan. Non-military cooperation with military personnel was newly introduced as a principle in the 2015 Development Cooperation Charter, and that type of cooperation increased from 2015 on, a clear indication of the influence of the Charter. Foreign aid designed to serve Japan's own interests was first discussed in the 2003 Charter, and the proportion of that type of aid has since increased. The aims of avoiding military force and returning economic benefits to Japan, which have long had strong domestic support in postwar Japan, were seamlessly incorporated into the ODA Charter. By contrast, the aims of promoting democratization and protecting the vulnerable—international norms for foreign aid, imported from abroad—are duly set forth in the ODA Charter, which ostensibly guides Japan's foreign aid policy, but they have had no impact on its actual aid allocation behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely thought that Japan's involvement in multilateral conflict-resolution diplomacy began at the 1989 Paris international peace conference aimed at ending hostilities in Cambodia. However, in 1970, Japan was engaged in the Jakarta conference, a gathering of Asian and Pacific countries attempting to resolve a Cambodian conflict that erupted in that year and in the follow-up initiatives. This analysis draws on declassified diplomatic documents to show that although those efforts failed, Tokyo gained much from its debut in an international effort to resolve a conflict in Asia: expansion of its regional role, co-operation with Southeast Asian countries, and valuable peacemaking experience. This examination of that history elucidates the features and limitations of Japanese peacemaking diplomacy and examines international reactions to those efforts and the manner in which that experience shaped Japan's role in Southeast Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political relations between countries can potentially affect and be affected by bilateral visitor flows. Applying various modified Granger causality tests, this article uses Japan and China as a case study of the possible bi‐directional linkages between tourism demand and political relations. Findings suggest that country relations do influence visitor flows, but not vice versa. The influence is statistically strong regarding visitor flows from China to Japan, but is weak and insignificant in the opposite direction, although this relationship appears to be time‐varying and strengthening recently. This article concludes with a discussion of policy implications and some suggestions for further research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Explaining the transformation of the state and the dynamics of democratic governance is a focal topic of scholarship. A key component is depoliticization research, which considers depoliticization to be the key element in the logic of delegation among many polities, and uses it as an analytical tool to examine the nature of 'anti-politics,' particularly within liberal democracies. Despite this, it has not been used to explain political change in Japan, an enormous industrial power and liberal democracy. This article redresses the issue by incorporating the country's international relations into the analysis. By employing a multi-level analysis of depoliticization in Japan, the article builds abridge between both research fields, depoliticization research and international relations theory, and contributes an innovate approach to depoliticization which provides a means to implement a deeper policy analysis and interpretation of the changes in Japanese governance and beyond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]