Search

Existing scholarship has demonstrated that theorising about security is Eurocentric. This leaves us with a partial account of the concept of security, which is presented as universal. This in turn generates explanatory problems because we are only seeing part of the picture. Yet there have been few attempts to move beyond critiques of Eurocentrism to examine the concept of security 'elsewhere'. This paper takes China as its starting point, asking: what can looking at China tell us about security? In answering this question, the paper makes two contributions. First, it presents new empirical findings, building a conceptual history of security in China. Drawing on 140 key texts dating 1926–2022, the paper traces the emergence of the concept of security in China and its evolution through three explicit security concepts. Drawing on postcolonial insights it demonstrates that these concepts are hybrid, evolving out of multiple domestic and international influences. They have similarities as well as differences with the Eurocentric concept that dominates International Security Studies (ISS) and produce a discrete approach towards security that has been overlooked in a discipline that uses 'Europe to explain Asia'. Second, considering these insights, the paper demonstrates that the universal concept of security that underpins theorising in ISS is partial and misleading. Differences in security concepts matter for theorising security and for understanding security policy. Consequently, I argue that we need to provincialize the concept of security: a truly global security studies is of necessity a provincial one attuned to difference and similarity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Faced with ongoing large-scale cyber espionage and the rising prominence of information operations targeting social media, the cyber conflict scholarship has entered into a renewed debate over how to characterise the role and place of cyberspace conflict in broader patterns of international security. In response to these empirical challenges, this paper argues that the current scholarship is limited because it uses the 'cyberspace domain' – a doctrinal concept originating in the U.S. military – as a conceptual foundation. This paper argues that the cyberspace domain should be replaced with a holistic conception of "information competition" of which there are three paradigms: cyberspace domain, mixed, and information. All states seek to intervene in the flow and storage of information across domestic and international contexts; information competition is better able to capture information-related interactions between states and observed empirical variation in how states approach information technology and conflict. For example, China and Russia centre 'information' as the core organising framework for their approach to information technology and conflict. This paper also demonstrates how an information competition framework better clarifies the role that the U.S. has played in shaping Russian and Chinese approaches to information competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research in security studies contends that information warfare (IW) is becoming a critical element in states' overall security strategies. Additionally, many researchers posit that artificial intelligence (AI) is quickly emerging as an important component of digital communications and states' military applications worldwide. However, less is known regarding how states are incorporating AI in their information warfare and influence operations (IWIO). Thus, given the growing importance of AI and IW in global security, this paper examines how the United States, China, and Russia are incorporating AI in their IWIO strategies and tactics. We find that the US, China, and Russia are utilizing AI in their IWIO approaches in significant ways depending on each state's overall IW strategy, with important implications for international security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The qualitative and quantitative balance in strategic nuclear capabilities between major global nuclear-armed states had been the subject of a longstanding international bilateral and multilateral treaty regime, which since the onset of the 21st century has undergone a process of continual degradation. With the gradual establishment of a more confrontational multipolar world order, the treaty regime as well as the guarantees it provided for international security have come into further peril. The present paper will examine the defining characteristics of the nuclear treaty regime, the factors leading to a point of balance in preceding decades between the nuclear superpowers of the United States of America and the Russian Federation, and the transformational factors, which have destabilised the balance in contemporary times. Furthermore, the paper will extend the discussion on the future of nuclear arms control to the changing geopolitical landscape and the rise of new major global powers such as the People's Republic of China. Ultimately the paper, attempts to establish the framework of the future evolution of the nuclear arms debate and the possibilities of reaching a new point of stability and deterrence between the mentioned state actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the wake of significant international events like the Russian invasion of Ukraine and China’s assertive diplomacy, the recently developed concept of strategic corruption has been increasingly employed to discuss how corruption infiltrates international affairs. Unlike traditional corruption, strategic corruption is commonly understood to be a sophisticated mechanism that states use to achieve geopolitical objectives, intertwining economic and security concerns. This paper explores this concept, analyzes its relationship with related phenomena, and proposes a theoretical framework to contextualize strategic corruption within national and international arenas. The framework depicts strategic corruption as a multifaceted process spanning three spheres: domestic (source), international, and domestic (target). Each sphere involves unique pathways aimed at corrupting institutions in the target domain. This approach contributes to our understanding of the complex dynamics between corruption, national security, and foreign affairs, offering a coherent tool to address these challenges within the fields of international relations and anti-corruption studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China is the only nuclear-armed country in the world that has an unconditional No First Use (NFU) of nuclear weapons policy. China's practice of this policy and its impact on international security have important implications for the international debate around NFU and inform other countries' potential consideration of NFU. Whether NFU policy could deliver the expected benefits of reducing the role of nuclear weapons, containing nuclear arms competition, and mitigating the risk of nuclear proliferation depends on the perceived credibility by other countries of such policy. This paper examines a number of internal challenges that may affect the perceived credibility of China's NFU policy. One of them is Chinese military strategists' expressed interest in threatening nuclear use in a conventional conflict under certain conditions through the so-called "lower the nuclear coercion threshold" operation. The others include the lack of institutional constraint in the Chinese system to ensure implementation of NFU and the growing ambiguities about the NFU policy's applicability in specific scenarios as a result of new technological development. The paper offers recommendations on how China can address these challenges and work with other countries to create the conditions for the international adoption of NFU, including how to address the concerns of nonnuclear weapons states about the conventional-level security consequences. It concludes by discussing how China and the other nuclear-armed states can better fulfill their disarmament obligations by strengthening the existing NFU policy and promoting credible NFU policy more broadly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Ordnance Industry Automation is the property of Editorial Board for Ordnance Industry Automation and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Tensions in the EU-China relationship have hampered cooperation in various sectors, including a set of transnational security issues where engagement with China is unavoidable but nevertheless profoundly challenging. The EU maintains a "tripartite" strategy, originally outlined in its 2019 Strategic Outlook, seeing China as a "partner", but also as an economic "competitor" and a "systemic rival". China's former State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi has described the European approach as suffering from "cognitive dissonance". As a result, and as demonstrated by the failure of the 2022 EU-China Summit, the two parties are now operating within two different frameworks, and constructive cooperation has become increasingly difficult. By working with Qin Yaqing's concept of "relationality", this article aims to contribute to a better conceptualisation of the ways in which the EU and China can work with each other to tackle global issues. Challenging the literature that tries to explain the shift in EU-China relations by focusing on individual actors, this research's approach focuses on the relations between actors. Adopting this ontology of relations, this research paper analyses how, in the EU-China relationship, relations between the two parties contribute to creating their own identities and motivate their actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article evaluates whether the threat posed to international security by a rising China has been overstated. The literature analyzed during the research reveals that China's rise does most definitely pose a threat to international security, a threat widely interpreted as being of an economic, military, and ideological nature. The article argues that claims of a China threat have not been overstated, but they have been misguided. There has been an overfocus upon China's military build-up, as well as focusing upon the events of the economic development of China, as opposed to concentrating on the consequences of this economic development. It is fundamental that the appropriate factors of the threat are focused upon and considered, in order for the international community to adapt and respond in a manner that minimizes the impact upon international security, as the threat is likely to grow in significance over future decades, as China's phenomenal rise continues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's rise is a significant concern for international security. It is essential to understand the trajectory of China's rise in order to determine world safety and prosperity measures in a period of great uncertainty. This study provides an overview of the two main possible security consequences of China's rise, that is, a peaceful rise and a warlike rise, by surveying arguments found in literature regarding both aspects. The research extends beyond the often-made binary argument of "peaceful rise versus non-peaceful rise" since aspects of both arguments can explain the country's rise. This research offers a nuanced assessment of China's rise by positing a partial peaceful rise explanation whereby China seeks a non-confrontational way of asserting itself globally vis-a-vis the United States, while at the same time, modernizing and expanding its military capabilities in preparation for any eventualities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The China-Iran comprehensive strategic partnership (CSP) has been described as a potentially disruptive alignment. This article analyses the impact of the CSP in two regional security complexes (RSCs): the Persian Gulf and South Asia. It finds that of the two RSCs, the China-Iran CSP has a greater likelihood of affecting the strategic landscape of the South Asian RSC as China seeks to contain India's power and influence. In the Persian Gulf, China's economically-motivated regional presence is supported by the maintenance of the status quo, and as a result the CSP is not likely to adversely affect that RSC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China is a leader in the global transportation industry, with an especially significant position in ocean ports. A mapping of every ocean port outside of China reveals that Chinese firms own or operate terminal assets in ninety-six ports in fifty-three countries. An original dataset of Chinese firms' overseas port holdings documents the geographic distribution, ownership, and operational characteristics of these ports. What are the international security implications of China's global port expansion? An investigation of Chinese firms' ties to the Party-state reveals multiple mechanisms by which the Chinese leadership may direct the use of commercial port assets for strategic purposes. International port terminals that Chinese firms own and operate already provide dual-use capabilities to the People's Liberation Army during peacetime, establishing logistics and intelligence networks that materially enable China to project power into critical regions worldwide. But this form of networked state power is limited in wartime because it depends on commercial facilities in non-allied states. By providing evidence that overseas bases are not the sole index of global power projection capabilities, findings advance research on the identification and measurement of sources of national power. China's leveraging of PRC firms' transnational commercial port network constitutes an underappreciated but consequential form of state power projection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In spite of a turbulent past of mistrust and rivalry, the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China are not adversaries, they are political, economic and security partners, and in the context of their common opposition to the USA and western liberalism they could even become allies in the future. Russia's war against Ukraine put China in a difficult situation, since it is a supporter of peaceful ways for solving interstate conflicts and it invested a lot in the Ukrainian economy, but cannot side with the West against Moscow. Chinese lack of criticism towards Moscow was widely seen as an indicator of the convergence of the two nations's positions on the evolution of the international security architecture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Adab Al-Basrah is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Over the past several years, there has been a renewed scholarly interest in the origins, waging, and consequences of the First World War. This interest has resulted partly from a quirk of timing given that between 2014 and 2019, a series of centennial commemorations kept minds focused on a conflict that many take as the most consequential war the world ever experienced. On the other hand, interest has been stimulated not so much by the past as by the future of international security, with the "return" of the prospect of Great Power war beginning to concentrate minds in ways not experienced for a generation. Since much – but not all – of this renewed interest in Great Power war relates to China's "rise" assessed through the prism of "power-transition theory", it is natural to analogise from the events that led to 1914. In this, at least one interesting question remains relatively unexplored: are decisions to join a war already in progress prompted by a different calculus from decisions to go to war at the outset? In particular, does "status anxiety" warrant more attention as a determinant of policy-making than it has heretofore received on the part of late entrants? This analysis argues that it does and makes the case by analysing the decision of one latecomer, Italy, to join the First World War in April 1915. Although the chief focus is on Italy, the conclusion raises the possibility that status anxiety may also have been of importance in the American decision to go to war two Aprils later. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]