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On July 31, 2022, the Biden Administration successfully eliminated al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul, Afghanistan via drone strike. This killing represented a continued implementation of U.S. policy forged after the September 11th attacks to eliminate al-Qaeda members wherever they seek shelter. Nevertheless, the United States has refrained from filing an Article 51 notification of self-defense to justify its use of force against Afghanistan. With the United States asserting that the Taliban was "unwilling or unable" to neutralize Zawahiri's threat, existing international law fails to provide clear guidelines on addressing this determination. The following Note attempts to examine the legality of the strike through implementation of the Deeks Factors Test of "unable or unwilling." Further, this Note advocates for a U.N. Resolution to establish a robust "unable or unwilling" framework, to provide states with a standard to consider when assessing the use of force against non-state actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article assesses the strengths, weaknesses, and gaps in the discipline of counterterrorism studies since al-Qaeda's catastrophic attacks against the United States on 9/11 along 10 dimensions: defining terrorism, group and lone actor typologies, causes of terrorism, terrorist psychologies, radicalization and recruitment, organizational dynamics, modus operandi, incident chronology databases, forecasting and predicting terrorism, and countering terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article models the geography of the 9/11 network members' many travels from the moment the hijackers first boarded a plane to the United States until they killed 2,977 people on 11 September 2001. Building on publicly available sources, and for the first time in the literature, we address the spatiality of the terrorist network through two related concepts. First, we focus on colocation and show that the scale and sophistication of the 9/11 attacks did not require copresence to be successful. Individuals from a cell did not spend most of their time together. We then focus on co-destination and find that the need for coordination required that the 9/11 hijackers followed the same itineraries between cities. In other words, the travel geography of the four Al Qaeda cells responsible for the attacks closely mirrors the network's cell-based social structure. Then as now, the case of the 9/11 attacks suggests that spatializing social networks is an important window to understanding the emergence of terrorist networks and disrupting their patterns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On October 7, 2001, 3 weeks after 9/11, U.S. forces attacked Afghanistan; bombers struck Taliban headquarters and Al Qaeda training sites. By early December, the Taliban and Al Qaeda have been defeated and had fled. However, a war that began so successfully in 2001, eventually ended ignominiously on August 30, 2021, almost exactly 20 years later, with a U.S. withdrawal and a total Taliban victory. The speed of the Taliban's triumph shocked everyone. The entire campaign, costing US$2.3 trillion and 2,488 U.S. lives, had failed—utterly. The United States had lost its longest-ever war. How is it possible to explain a defeat of that magnitude? This article seeks to address this question. Although numerous factors played a role, this article identifies three principal factors: the environment, the local politics, and the Taliban. Afghanistan is a very difficult place to conduct large-scale military operations. The West never came to terms with the local politics and consequently undermined their own efforts. Finally, although they were not militarily sophisticated, the Taliban were politically astute and very resilient. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The war between the US and the Taliban began after the 9/11 attacks in 2001. President Bush immediately sent US military troops to Afghanistan to capture the leader of the Al-Qaeda terrorist group, Osama bin Laden. It is known that President Obama was sheltered by the Taliban in Afghanistan. During the Obama's administration, bin Laden was successfully killed in 2011. The war between the US and the Taliban will continue until President Trump's leadership. He considers that the goals of this war have been realized, targeting Al-Qaida leaders and that nothing is profitable for the US in continuing the war. According to Trump's thinking, in 2020 there will be a peace agreement between the US and the Taliban. To answer this fact, this article will use constructivist theory to explain the construction of Bush's thoughts, the result of which is the United States' political policy towards the war in Afghanistan. Therefore, this journal will discuss the construction of Trump's thoughts on ending the long war between the US and the Taliban. So that this paper can see how Trump's thought construction can end the war and what the real impact is for the US. From this, it can be concluded that the result of Trump's thought construction is to protect US citizens and interests in the economic and military fields. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the end of the Cold War and through the start of the 21st century, conventional IR theories were anticipating an eventual balancing against the United States. Puzzled when this phenomenon did not occur, balancing theorists engaged in a lively discussion, bringing with it the development of proposed alternative forms of balancing and a debate over whether the concept itself had perhaps outlived its relevance. This article reengages with this discussion, suggesting that many of the involved theorists were hampered by theoretical blinders based on statism, and that in fact balancing did occur, but in an unconventional manner and at the hands of an unexpected suspect: al Qaeda, a violent non-state actor, acting in a transnational manner. In this context, this article treats the 9/11 attacks of the violent Jihadist anti-Western movement as an instance of balancing against the hegemon, a successful one in that the Jihadists arguably aimed not at "winning," but at revealing the superpower's weaknesses so that others would subsequently join the balancing effort. By failing to view the Jihadists' efforts as an ideological balancing effort, the United States responded with force rather than ideational counter-balancing. They waged a war instead of emphasizing efforts to separate the radical violent Jihadist perpetrators from the idea they were championing—a struggle in the name of Muslims/the downtrodden East against the United States—and thus allowing the challenger to rise into a position of "dissident" in the Muslim world, and, arguably, paving the path for today's state revisionist behaviors. The article proposes a framework based on traditionally state-based concepts of intent and impact/capacity to show how non-state actors can in fact balance superpowers and therefore should be incorporated into balancing theories, and presents the actions of the violent Jihadists as an example of transnational, ideational balancing—a phenomenon as real and consequential as state-balancing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a lecture on the events happened at the time of the September 11, 2021 terrorist attacks by militant of Islamic extremist network al-Qaeda against the United States. Topics discussed included hijack of commercial airliners packed with civilian passengers and attack on New York's commercial center; a brief about victim of the attack "Barbara K. Olson" and isolating and punishing the Taliban.

Apart from bringing terrorism to the top of the international agenda, the September 11 terrorist attacks in the US also increased the current interest in terrorism studies. Numerous studies on Salafi-jihadi organizations such as Al Qaeda, which carried out the attacks, rapidly mushroomed. The literature on Salafi-jihadi organizations offers two mainstream approaches; one generalizing stream and one reductionist stream. While generalizing studies define these organizations as identical structures based on their superficial common features, reductionist studies produce classification types by focusing on their different characteristics. Although both approaches have their own advantages in explaining Salafi-jihadi organizations, the generalizing approaches ignore the differences of these actors stemming from their different political, social, economic, and historical conditions, while reductionist approaches always leave out some important characteristics of these actors which do not suit the classification criteria they created. To assess the reality of Salafi-jihadi organizations more clearly, without being bound by the limitations of generalizing and reductionist approaches, this article tries to demonstrate the similarities and differences between Al-Qaeda and ISIS as prominent jihadi terrorist organizations. The article argues that despite their strong similarities, the jihadist organizations are not as identical as generalizing approaches suggest, and their differences are not as sharp as reductionist studies offer. In this study, the similarities and differences of the actors are analyzed in the categories of ideology, goal, and strategy, mainly through the primary sources on the actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 9/11 attacks triggered a paradigm shift in the United States security policy, prioritizing to ensure homeland security and to fight against the terrorism in the new American strategy. The United States invasion of Afghanistan further ravaged the existing fragile state damaging the already crumbling socio-economic and human infrastructure. In addition, the spillover of war into Pakistan started a new era of instability and misery further complicating the socio-economic fabric of the country making it the most vulnerable to terrorism related incidents. The two decades prolonged conflict not only destroyed the economic, social, and political infrastructure in both states, meanwhile mass human rights violations have been committed by the coalition forces under the leadership of the United States. In this context, the present paper investigates human rights abuses through the prism of international human rights law. The study addresses the following questions. (a) To what extent the United States war against terror violates the international law of human rights, and how it helps Washington to reconsolidate the regional hegemony. (b) Whether the war on terror improve the situation of human rights or further aggravate the conditions of civilians in targeted states. The study underlines that the war on terror failed to meet the merit of the right to intervene for self-defense, yet the coalition forces deliberately assimilate the innocent civilians under the vagueanti-terror war rhetoric. In addition, the war serves the United States hegemonic interests in South Asia, as the American presence in Afghanistan and the Indo-United States strategic partnership brought serious geopolitical implications for China and Pakistan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses main evolutionary trends in terrorism after 9/11. Analysing the phenomenon globally and with reference to the concept of so called "new terrorism", the articles points out the continuation of majority of trends in terrorism' evolution from the past, particularly on motivational and organizational level. The study stresses, however, significant quantitative growth in terrorist acts and changes in their geographical distributions. In addition, the article analyses reasons why the risks of super- and cyberterrorism did not materialized fully in last decades. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Twenty years after the most devastating terrorist attacks, the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the immediate takeover of the country by the Taliban represent the greatest strategic success for Al-Qaeda and the global jihadist movement since 9/11. Understanding how to implement a military strategy in Afghanistan has a number of key features. First, the nature of irregular warfare makes it extremely diffi cult to assess the eff ectiveness of a strategy, leading coalition forces to rely on partial, incomplete, or misleading tactical and operational data to measure strategic progress. Without obvious strategic values, neither civilians nor military leaders can gain a clear understanding of strategic progress in an operational environment characterized by obscurity and societal fragmentation. Second, the military’s attempts to provide decision-makers with the justifi cation for tactical actions taken and the strategic value of operational control of territories, constantly providing positive assessments of tactical and operational progress, led to a picture of the surreal operational environment, which strengthened the approach. strictly military of the second phase of the joint mission in the theater of operations Afghanistan [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the counterterrorism efforts that aim to stop jihadist foreign fighters. Topics discussed include the key role of foreign fighters in such major jihadist terrorist plots in the West as the al Qaeda attacks on U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998 and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, counterterrorism strategies that influence the production cycle of foreign fighters, namely, preventing recruitment, disrupting travel and tracking fighters, and the need for political leaders to ensure community support to pursue terrorists after a terrorist attack.

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States called on Muslims to join it in its struggle against the attacks' perpetrator, Al Qaeda (AQ). U.S. officials argued that Muslim states' participation in these efforts could help the United States defeat AQ, but it could also benefit the states themselves by undermining the threat they faced from terrorism. As we are now over ten years out from the beginning of this global war on terrorism, it is possible to both ask and answer the question posed by U.S. demands: did it work? That is, did majority-Muslim states who implemented counterterrorism policies in line with America's counterterrorism priorities benefit from this, through a reduction in the threat of terrorism? In this article, I argue that Muslim states that adopted policies in line with US priorities would accomplish their primary goal: disrupting Al Qaeda's ability to carry out attacks. I use a quantitative analysis to demonstrate that states implementing the counterterrorism policies preferred by the United States experienced significantly fewer deaths from terrorist attacks than those that did not. These findings can contribute to debates over the global war on terrorism, as well as broad debates on effective counterterrorism and counterinsurgency tactics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The terrorist organisation al-Qaida (AQ) became infamous for their attack on the US on 9/11. In the resulting war on terror the United States pressed hard on the organization and pushed it back underground. Following these events, other factions of jihadist movements began competing with AQ for hegemony, challenging the organizations position as leader in jihad. This article follows the three phases of AQ after 9/11 in which it had to first go back into a clandestine retreat in order to survive, secondly how it fought for legitimacy among other jihadist groups (like the Islamic State), trying to maintain its standing after the death of Osama bin Laden; and thirdly, how its franchising system guaranteed its survival, making it a relevant threat on a global scale. This article finds that, building on its self-sufficiency in various regions, the franchising system as well as its strong hierarchy, AQ established a strong foundation for the persistence of the organisation, with a new structure that will make breakaways like that of the IS less likely. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Seit 9/11 hat sich unser Verständnis von Sicherheit verändert. Lediglich auf terroristische Vorfälle zu reagieren, ist nicht mehr ausreichend. Stattdessen müssen terroristische Bedrohungen antizipiert, präventiv eingedämmt und um jeden Preis verhindert werden. Dies ist mit dem Aufkommen sozialer Mediennetzwerke, die die Angst vor Online-Radikalisierung geschürt haben, zunehmend schwieriger geworden. Im Bestreben, Extremismus und Terrorismus präventiv zu verhindern, haben westliche Gesellschaften die Verantwortung für die Bekämpfung extremistischer und terroristischer Aufstachelung in sozialen Medien in die Hände privater Plattformen gelegt. Dies hat zu einem Mangel an Rechenschaftspflicht und Transparenz geführt, da Entscheidungen zur Entfernung von Inhalten abseits von Gerichten und ohne freiheitlich-demokratischen Kontrollrahmen erfolgen. Dieser Artikel befasst sich mit den Implikationen, die sich nach dem 11. September 2001 aus der Anwendung einer Sicherheitslogik auf die Bekämpfung von Extremismus und Terrorismus in den sozialen Medien ergeben. Er bewertet die Art und Weise, wie Extremisten und Terroristen Online-Propaganda verbreiten, problematisiert menschliche und algorithmische Praktiken der Inhaltsmoderation, die Social-Media-Unternehmen einsetzen, und zeigt auf, wo der derzeitige „One-size-fits-all"-Ansatz bei der effektiven Bekämpfung neuer Formen der rechtsextremistischen und dschihadistischen Propaganda versagt. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Angesichts von so viel Literatur über die Anschläge vom 11. September 2001: Was können wir am 20. Jahrestag noch in Betracht ziehen? Dieser Artikel gibt einen Überblick über die Menschen, Entscheidungen und Ereignisse, die an diesem Tag endeten: von der Präsidentschaft Bill Clintons, die sich mit der aufkommenden Bedrohung durch Osama bin Laden und anderen dringenden Herausforderungen der nationalen Sicherheit auseinandersetzen musste, bis zum ersten Jahr der Präsidentschaft George W. Bushs. 2001 wusste Bushs nationales Sicherheitsteam, dass ein Al-Qaida-Angriff auf amerikanischem Boden sehr wahrscheinlich war, aber es fehlten Einzelheiten. Daher beschloss man, das Land nicht auf einen Krieg einzustellen. Der Autor betrachtet die amerikanische Reaktion auf 9/11 und die unbeabsichtigten Folgen der Anwendung militärischer Macht ohne ein vollständiges Verständnis der Bedrohung und des kulturellen Kontexts, in dem sie agierte. Die Ziele sowohl des Westens als auch al-Qaidas werden ebenso verglichen wie die Kosten der Kriege in Afghanistan und im Irak. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dieser Artikel argumentiert, dass Terrorismus auf zwei parallele Weisen verstanden werden muss: Er ist sowohl schockierend als auch gewöhnlich. Verankert in der Entwicklung von Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologien verstärken sich zwei Narrative gegenseitig. Das erste betrachtet Terrorismus als einen Akt oder Akte schockierender politischer Gewalt. Der Artikel untersucht die Entwicklung von Terrorismus, um zu zeigen, dass terroristische Handlungen die Aufmerksamkeit auf ein größeres politisches Ziel und in der Regel auf irgendeinen strategischen Endzustand richten und durch ihre Fähigkeit zu schockieren das öffentliche Bewusstsein zu beeinflussen versuchen. Das zweite Narrativ betrachtet diese Akte politischer Gewalt als gewöhnliche Bestandteile von Propaganda. Die Autoren zeigen, dass jene Terrorgruppen beim Erreichen ihrer Ziele erfolgreicher waren, die zur Rechtfertigung ihrer Aktionen aufkommende und populäre Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologien nutzten und diese Geschichten an ein weites Zielpublikum verbreiten konnten. Der Artikel beginnt mit den Ereignissen von 9/11 und untersucht die Beziehung zwischen terroristischem Schock und der Regelmäßigkeit von Propaganda. Schließlich wird aufgezeigt, wie eine solche Analyse helfen kann, den Aufstieg des Islamischen Staats und dessen Nutzung der sozialen Medien zu verstehen. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Al-Kaidas Terroranschlag vom 11. September 2001 auf das amerikanische Festland war ein tragisches Ereignis, unvergleichlich in der US-Geschichte seit der japanischen Bombardierung Pearl Harbors am 7. Dezember 1941. Die schnelle Antwort der USA führte zur Zersplitterung von Al-Kaida und zum Sturz des Taliban-Regimes in Afghanistan. Die Bush-Administration entwickelte zudem den Drohneneinsatz, um die globale Terrorbekämpfung voranzutreiben. Einige dieser ferngesteuerten Fluggeräte wurden vom Verteidigungsministerium dirigiert, andere von der Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Kriegsführung mittels Drohnen wurde bald zur tödlichsten Form verdeckter Operationen. Bald forderten Reformer in den USA verbesserte Richtlinien, um die Vorteile von Drohnenangriffen zu evaluieren. Drei CIA-Direktoren formulierten wohlüberlegte Verhaltensregeln wie den New-York-Times-Test: Die Entscheidungsträger sollten sich vorstellen, wie die amerikanische Öffentlichkeit einen Drohnenangriff beurteilen würde, sollte er öffentlich bekannt werden. Andere Kritiker verwiesen auf die Bedeutung der US-Verfassung und bestehender Geheimdienstgesetze zur Kontrolle von Drohnenoperationen, insbesondere die Pflicht, dem Kongress Rechenschaft über verdeckte Operationen abzulegen. Während die USA weiterhin versuchen, die Effektivität und die Moralität der Drohnen im Kampf gegen den globalen Terrorismus zu beurteilen, sind die Ambivalenzen in diesem Politikbereich nach wie vor zahlreich. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Der Terroranschlag von 9/11 war das Resultat einer langen Verkettung von Ereignissen und Entwicklungen, die sich bis zum Kampf der Mujaheddin gegen die Sowjetunion in Afghanistan zurückverfolgen lassen. Dieser Artikel gibt einen Überblick über diese Zusammenhänge und die anschließenden Untersuchungen der amerikanischen Regierung. Während zunächst kurz auf die Akteure in Afghanistan und die Kooperation der Taliban mit Al Qaeda eingegangen wird bzw. darauf, wie Osama bin Laden die Umstände im Land für sich nutzen konnte, zeigt der Artikel in weiterer Folge, wie sich die Terrororganisation durch Anschläge im Jemen, in Tansania und Nairobi zunehmend etablierte. Danach werden die Ergebnisse des 9/11 Commission Report beleuchtet und wie dieser die Konkurrenz der Nachrichtendienste, institutionelle Hindernisse und die Jagd auf die Masterminds der Anschläge vom 11. September aufbereitete. Der Artikel schließt mit den Resultaten und lessons learned der Ermittlungen und einem Ausblick auf die aktuelle Lage in Afghanistan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article moves around the security of Pakistan and examined the incident of 9/11 and counter-terrorism strategies of civil-military during the war on terror. This study tells us that big attacks increase terrorism. After 9/11 some countries actively supported America in the war against terrorism and faced its negative consequences. Terrorism is a serious issue in the world. Many countries have taken serious actions against this evil. Pakistan faces many security challenges in the war against terrorism. This article is based on qualitative research techniques and secondary data. The massive lesson here is that the decision-making process should not be one-sided otherwise it leads to serious consequences. Pakistan experienced the worst issues in the portfolio of security. This requires a serious action plan on border security. Establish the writ of the state and secure the people from all internal and external threats. Resolve the conflicts between hostile factors peacefully without compromising on rule of law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author reflects on the symbolism of the date of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the U.S. led by Al Qaeda. Topics discussed include speculations on the meanings of the date of the terrorist attacks, the political and historical symbols in terrorism, the timing of the attacks based on operational needs, and the terror timelines published by Al Qaeda's magazine "Inspire" on the 10 year-anniversary of the attacks.

September 11, 2001, when Islamists affiliated with the terrorist organization Al Qaeda attacked iconic buildings in the United States, marked a turning point in recent human history. The impact of these attacks goes far beyond other contemporary events, which triggered major geopolitical processes, such as the 1956 Suez Crisis or the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. If initially humanity was in a state of shock, seeing how the superpower of the moment seems paralyzed by the aggression of a little-known enemy, later, security measures and geopolitical dynamics overturned not only the life of the Earth's population until then, but also paradigms, strategic concepts, political behaviors. This article aims to analyze how the attack orchestrated by Salafist fanatics in Al Qaeda has transformed and continues to transform society and global geopolitical dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is the Islamic State Khorasan, the newer Islamic State Pakistan, the remnants of the old "core" Al-Qaeda and the more recent Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent; all of which have global terrorist aspirations. Pakistan stands on the brink of another crisis, and one almost entirely of its own making. [Extracted from the article]