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Problem definition: Vehicle-to-grid increases the low utilization rate of privately owned electric vehicles by making their batteries available to electricity grids. We formulate a robust optimization problem that maximizes a vehicle owner's expected profit from selling primary frequency regulation to the grid and guarantees that market commitments are met at all times for all frequency deviation trajectories in a functional uncertainty set that encodes applicable legislation. Faithfully modeling the energy conversion losses during battery charging and discharging renders this optimization problem nonconvex. Methodology/results: By exploiting a total unimodularity property of the uncertainty set and an exact linear decision rule reformulation, we prove that this nonconvex robust optimization problem with functional uncertainties is equivalent to a tractable linear program. Through extensive numerical experiments using real-world data, we quantify the economic value of vehicle-to-grid and elucidate the financial incentives of vehicle owners, aggregators, equipment manufacturers, and regulators. Managerial implications: We find that the prevailing penalties for nondelivery of promised regulation power are too low to incentivize vehicle owners to honor the delivery guarantees given to grid operators. Funding: This work was supported by the Institut Vedecom. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2022.0154. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the era of modern business analytics, data-driven optimization has emerged as a popular modeling paradigm to transform data into decisions. By constructing an ambiguity set of the potential data-generating distributions and subsequently hedging against all member distributions within this ambiguity set, data-driven optimization effectively combats the ambiguity with which real-life data sets are plagued. Chen et al. (2022) study data-driven, chance-constrained programs in which a decision has to be feasible with high probability under every distribution within a Wasserstein ball centered at the empirical distribution. The authors show that the problem admits an exact deterministic reformulation as a mixed-integer conic program and demonstrate (in numerical experiments) that the reformulation compares favorably to several state-of-the-art data-driven optimization schemes. We provide an exact deterministic reformulation for data-driven, chance-constrained programs over Wasserstein balls. For individual chance constraints as well as joint chance constraints with right-hand-side uncertainty, our reformulation amounts to a mixed-integer conic program. In the special case of a Wasserstein ball with the 1-norm or the ∞ -norm, the cone is the nonnegative orthant, and the chance-constrained program can be reformulated as a mixed-integer linear program. Our reformulation compares favorably to several state-of-the-art data-driven optimization schemes in our numerical experiments. Funding: The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Hong Kong Research Grants Council [Early Career Scheme CityU 21502820], the Swiss National Science Foundation [Grant BSCGI0_157733] as well as the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council [Grant EP/N020030/1]. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study a robust monopoly pricing problem with a minimax regret objective, where a seller endeavors to sell multiple goods to a single buyer, only knowing that the buyer's values for the goods range over a rectangular uncertainty set. We interpret this pricing problem as a zero-sum game between the seller, who chooses a selling mechanism, and a fictitious adversary or 'nature', who chooses the buyer's values from within the uncertainty set. Using duality techniques rooted in robust optimization, we prove that this game admits a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies that can be computed in closed form. The Nash strategy of the seller is a randomized posted price mechanism under which the goods are sold separately, while the Nash strategy of nature is a distribution on the uncertainty set under which the buyer's values are comonotonic. We further show that the restriction of the pricing problem to deterministic mechanisms is solved by a deteministic posted price mechanism under which the goods are sold separately. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Wasserstein balls, which contain all probability measures within a pre-specified Wasserstein distance to a reference measure, have recently enjoyed wide popularity in the distributionally robust optimization and machine learning communities to formulate and solve data-driven optimization problems with rigorous statistical guarantees. In this technical note we prove that the Wasserstein ball is weakly compact under mild conditions, and we offer necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of optimal solutions. We also characterize the sparsity of solutions if the Wasserstein ball is centred at a discrete reference measure. In comparison with the existing literature, which has proved similar results under different conditions, our proofs are self-contained and shorter, yet mathematically rigorous, and our necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of optimal solutions are easily verifiable in practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]