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The East China Sea (ECS) is one of the region's most significant and oft-times under-addressed potential flashpoints. In this article we take a holistic approach and reexamine the recent actions of East Asia's two most significant powers, China and Japan, in relation to this important body of maritime space, as well as those of the United States (US), as the incumbent regional hegemon. Specifically, we examine the efficacy of each. This highlights a dynamism in Chinese actions, as well as elucidating how the US and Japan have come to adopt policies that are of dubious efficacy as a means of alleviating or nullifying the escalation of unwanted tensions across the ECS. In so doing, we draw upon two key concepts, immobilism and confirmation bias, that help us to understand why the US and Japan are failing to achieve their assumed objectives of regional stability and the maintenance of the status quo. Ultimately, we argue that a combination of immobilism and confirmation bias in American and Japanese foreign policy, in response to the greater dynamism and adaptability of regional great powers such as China, has led to latent changes in the status quo that risk undermining stability across the ECS. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Felt understanding" is a crucial determinant of positive interpersonal and intergroup relationships. However, the question of why felt understanding shapes intergroup relations has been neglected. In a pre-registered test of the process in intergroup relations with a sample from East Asia, we manipulated felt understanding (understood versus misunderstood by an outgroup) in an experimental study (N = 476). The results supported the expectation that felt understanding would lead to a more positive intergroup orientation and action intention. The results of parallel mediation analyses showed that felt understanding indirectly predicted intergroup outcomes through felt positive regard, intergroup overlap, and outgroup stereotypes. Furthermore, the results of post-hoc sequential mediation analyses indicated that felt understanding indirectly predicted intergroup outcomes sequentially through felt positive regard and intergroup overlap, followed by outgroup stereotypes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines a transnational network of advocates for Kampō (traditional) medicine in Japan, occupied China, and Manchukuo during the Sino-Japanese War (1931–1945), shedding new light on collaborationism, Asianism, and the modernization of traditional medicine in East Asia. In the 1930s, despite deteriorating Sino-Japanese relations, the Kampō revival movement in Japan joined forces with the struggle to preserve traditional medicine in China. In 1938, the Association of East Asian Medicine was founded in Japan, gathering together Chinese, Korean, and Japanese advocates under the banner of 'East Asian medicine'. This article delineates the evolution of what I call 'medical Asianism' and how it was institutionalized in different parts of the Japanese empire. Participants in this network differed in their priorities and ideological commitments, yet they tactfully utilized the Japanese imperial infrastructure and wartime circumstances to promote traditional medicine. Their work laid important intellectual and institutional foundations for the postwar development of traditional medicine across East Asia. This study also contributes to a more nuanced understandings of collaborationism. The type of collaboration examined in this article was preceded by a long history of intellectual exchange, based on a shared body of knowledge and morals, motivated by mutual empathy, and for a cause that was much valued in postwar Asia. As a result, unlike most Chinese collaborators who were prosecuted as 'traitors', protagonists in this study continued to prosper professionally and became valuable assets in the postwar rebuilding of Sino-Japanese relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International Relations (IR) scholars have taken China's presumed hegemony in pre-modern East Asia as an ideal case to 'undermine' the field's Eurocentrism. If Eurocentric IR is guilty of 'getting Asia wrong', do students of historical Asia 'get Asia right'? Analysts should avoid exotifying differences between the West and the East and 'exchanging Eurocentrism for Sinocentrism'. This article tries to 'get Asia [more] right' by 'disaggregating' and then 'reassembling' taken-for-granted concepts by time, space, and relationality. When 'Confucianism' is understood to justify both war and peace in competition with other thoughts, it does not dictate peace among East Asian states or conflicts across the Confucian–nomadic divide. When 'China' is unpacked, it does not sit on top of an Asian hierarchy. When Korea's, Vietnam's, and Japan's views of their relations with China are examined rather than presumed, cultural legitimacy is thinned out. When 'Asia' is broadened to cover webs of relations beyond East Asia to Central Asia, Confucianism recedes in centrality and pan-Asian phenomena including Buddhism and the steppe tradition come to the fore. The article concludes that a better challenge to Eurocentrism is not to search for cultural differences but to locate Eurasian similarities that erase European superiority. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much has been written on how an increasingly assertive China has sought to challenge the incumbent players in the global and regional arenas. Japan, as East Asia's regional hegemon, is said to be throwing its weight behind the US because it has much to lose in an era of China rising. Nevertheless, how much of this resembles reality? This article seeks to unpack some commonly held assumptions, focusing on the political/security as well as economic choices facing Japan. It argues that the Japanese have seemingly forged a rather strong alignment with the US in the sphere of politics/security, often with an eye to limit the influence of China. However, the situation is less clear cut when it comes to opportunities and challenges in the economic realm. Indeed, in some of Japan's most prominent industries, one observes complementarity effects and close interdependence with the Chinese economy. These findings illustrate that China-Japan competition is more complex than commonly portrayed, in addition to raising questions about the complicating effects that economic interdependence can have in a nation's "strategic" policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Considering the relations between Japan and mainland China from 1952 to 1972, it is possible to say that there were "twenty lost years" in East Asian regional politics, because of no official diplomatic relations between Japan and China, which have been the two biggest powers of East Asia. The research question of this study is how the relations between the two countries developed in this process, when the political power in Japan did not prefer recognizing the communist regime in mainland China instead of its nationalist counterpart in Taiwan due to the Cold War political conjuncture. Accordingly, in this study, the period between 1952-1972 was examined in terms of economic diplomacy. Economics was perhaps the only factor that kept the people of the two countries dependent on each other. Informal and individual initiatives and businesses established during this period, which were sometimes openly supported by politicians behind closed doors, ensured that the threads were never broken in Sino-Japanese relations. In this context, the names, Takasaki Tatsunosuke in Japan and Liao Chengzhi in China, stood out. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The attitude of France towards the Sino-Japanese War that started in 1937 has given rise to various judgments. Officially neutral, France is often presented as having taken, at least morally, a favorable attitude toward China. Yet the French government had officially prohibited the transit of war materiel en route to China across the Indochinese border. This issue became increasingly important as the Japanese blockade of China progressed and conditioned the capacity of Chiang Kai-shek's government to continue the fight. The diplomatic archives of the United States, greatly concerned by the situation in China, shed more light on France's policy in East Asia. By comparing historical accounts produced by contemporaries and historians with the diplomatic archives of the United States, this article intends to bring more evidence relating to the issue of French "neutrality" during the Sino-Japanese War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]