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We provide a mixed-methods, comparative analysis of the development of the urban-rural electoral cleavage in Canada, Great Britain, and the United States from the early 20th century to the present. Using aggregate election results, electoral district boundary files, and electoral district population measures, we construct a new comparable dataset of district election results and urbanity for the lower house of the legislature in each country. We use this dataset to measure the importance of the urban-rural divide for election outcomes across countries and time. We find that the cleavage has widened over time in each country, each arrived at its current urban-rural divide via a distinct developmental trajectory, which we interpret with reference to secondary literature. We conclude by discussing the significance of our findings for theories of both the causes and consequences of urban-rural divides and discuss the implications of our work for the comparative study of urban-rural cleavages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although more and more people choose to live in (large) cities, people in the Western world generally report lower levels of subjective well-being in urban areas than in rural areas. This article examines whether these urban–rural differences in subjective well-being are (partly) driven by selective migration patterns. To this end, we utilise residential mobility data from the United Kingdom based on 12 waves of the British Household Panel Survey. We explore urban–rural differences in life satisfaction as well as changes in life satisfaction of people moving from rural areas to urban areas (or vice versa), hereby paying specific attention to selection and composition effects. The results show that selective migration can, at least partly, explain the urban–rural subjective well-being differential through the selection of less satisfied people in cities and more satisfied people in the countryside. While the average life satisfaction of urban–rural migrants is higher compared to the life satisfaction of rural–urban migrants, we do not find – on average – long-lasting life satisfaction effects of migration. At the same time, there are differences between sociodemographic groups in that we find that a move from the countryside to the city is positively associated with the life satisfaction of students while it is negatively associated with the life satisfaction of people with a non-tertiary education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research studies the social and spatial inequalities of contemporary food deserts in England and Wales. Two indices of the Store Food Desert Index and Online Food Desert Index are measured to examine store access and online access to food at the Lower Layer Super Output Areas geographical level. A detailed analysis is conducted to (i) identify "priority areas" where there is relatively lower store access and online access to food, (ii) synthesize population to understand the characteristics of "at-risk communities" that are disproportionately affected by food deserts, and (iii) examine the association between self-reported health conditions and a compound of store and online access to food. Three insights are provided. First, there is a clear urban-rural divide in which urban areas generally benefit from better provision of both store and online access to food. Second, about 23% of the population (13.8 million people) live in priority areas with limited access to both physical stores and online groceries. Within this group, 0.06% (8000 individuals) do not have cars, 2.17% (300,000 individuals) are Black, and 14.5% (2 million individuals) reside in deprived neighborhoods. This is an alarming picture. Third, people residing in areas with high store and online access to food reported better health conditions, and online access is as effective as store access in improving health conditions. The findings highlight the potential of combining online and store access to bridge geographical and economic gaps, thereby providing healthier food options to those in food deserts. • 13.8 million people in the UK have limited access to store and online groceries. • There is a clear urban-rural divide in both store and online access to food. • Deprived households are disproportionately affected by access to food. • People with access to store and online groceries reported better health conditions. • Online access is as practical as store access pertaining to health conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, protest voting, voting for populist parties and, specifically for Europe, votes for parties opposed to European integration, have increased substantially. This has focused the attention of researchers and policy makers on the causes behind this trend. Most of the existing research looked at voters' characteristics, mainly values, education and age, or economic insecurity, such as rising unemployment or a declining economy more in general. This paper focuses instead on the urban-rural divide in anti-EU sentiment, and tries to explain why cities – and urban areas in general - in Europe tend to vote less for Eurosceptic parties. Using electoral data for national elections at the electoral district level for the years 2013–2018 and political parties' orientation as assessed by the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, we find robust statistical evidence of a lower anti-EU vote in cities, towns and suburbs than in rural areas. We also find that drivers of voting for anti-EU parties differ significantly between urban and rural areas in the EU and UK, despite some similarities. We show that three factors are associated to a higher anti-EU vote in all areas: growth in unemployment, a low turnout and a higher share of people born outside the EU. A sluggish economy is associated to a higher anti-EU sentiment in rural areas, but not in cities and towns and suburbs. Higher shares of university graduates, people aged 20–64, and of people born in a different EU country reduce anti-EU voting in rural areas and towns and suburbs, but have no impact in cities. • Based on voting data for 27 EU countries plus UK, we show that people in rural areas are more likely to vote for anti-EU partiesthan people in cities. • This result holds after controlling for territorial economic and for socio-demographic characteristics. • In rural areas, economic decline, a less educated workforce and higher shares of middle-aged people are linked to more votes to Eurosceptic parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]