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The evaluation of the European Moral Case Deliberation Outcomes project (Euro-MCD) has resulted in a revised evaluation instrument, knowledge about the content of MCD (moral case deliberation), and the perspectives of those involved. In this paper, we report on a perspective that has been overlooked, the facilitators'. We aim to describe facilitators' perceptions of high-quality moral case deliberation and their Euro-MCD sessions. The research took place in Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands using a survey combined with interviews with 41 facilitators. Facilitators' perceived that attaining a high-quality MCD implies fostering a safe and respectful atmosphere, creating a wondering mode, being an attentive authority, developing moral reflective skills, reaching a common understanding, and ensuring organisational prerequisites for the MCD sessions. Our central conclusion is that efforts at three levels are required to attain a high-quality MCD: trained and virtuous facilitator; committed, respectful participants; and organizational space. Furthermore, managers have a responsibility to prepare MCD participants for what it means to take part in MCD., Competing Interests: Declarations. Competing Interests: There are no competing interests to declare., (© 2024. The Author(s).)

Some of the most difficult consultations for an ethics consultant to resolve are those in which the patient is ready to leave the acute-care setting, but the patient or family refuses the plan, or the plan is impeded by deficiencies in the healthcare system. Either way, the patient is "stuck" in the hospital and the ethics consultant is called to help get the patient "unstuck." These encounters, which we call "complex discharges," are beset with tensions between the interests of the institution and the interests of the patient as well as tensions within the ethics consultant whose commitments are shaped both by the values of the organization and the values of their own profession. The clinical ethics literature on this topic is limited and provides little guidance. What is needed is guidance for consultants operating at the bedside and for those participating at a higher organizational level. To fill this gap, we offer guidance for facilitating a fair process designed to resolve the conflict without resorting to coercive legal measures. We reflect on three cases to argue that the approach of the consultant is generally one of mediation in these types of disputes. For patients who lack decision making capacity and lack a surrogate decision maker, we recommend the creation of a complex discharge committee within the organization so that ethics consultants can properly discharge their duties to assist patients who are unable to advocate for themselves through a fair and transparent process., Competing Interests: Declarations. Conflict of interest: The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest., (© 2023. The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V.)

Clinical ethics consultation services (CECS) can be particularly complex in oncology, and widespread misconceptions exist about their nature. As a result, visibility and accessibility of information regarding CECS is critical. We investigated the availability and content of information regarding CECS on websites of NCI-designated comprehensive cancer centers and cancer centers (CCs). Each website was reviewed for information on CECS and reviewed for benchmarks partially derived from the American Society of Bioethics and Humanities recommendations for CECS. Our analysis revealed that of 70 NCI-designated center websites, 38 had information on CECS, and 17 were found directly on these sites. When CECS information was available, most websites provided a mission statement (71%) and an explanation of what constitutes an ethics consult (74%). Few provided a description of the consult process (45%) or service membership (39%). Our findings reveal a significant gap in CECS visibility on the websites of NCI-designated CCs., (© The Author(s) 2024. Published by Oxford University Press.)

In the process of professionalization, the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities (ASBH) has emphasized process and knowledge as core competencies for clinical ethics consultants; however, the credentialing program launched in 2018 fails to address both pillars. The inadequacy of this program recalls earlier critiques of the professionalization effort made by Giles R. Scofield and H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr.. Both argue that ethics consultation is not a profession and the effort to professionalize is motivated by self-interest. One argument they offer against professionalization is that ethics consultants lack normative expertise. Although the question of expertise cannot be resolved completely, the accusation of self-interest can be addressed. Underlying these critiques is a concern for hubris, which can be addressed in certification and the vetting of candidates.Drawing on the virtue ethics literature of Alasdair MacIntyre and Edmund D. Pellegrino, I argue that medicine is a moral community in which ethics consultants are moral agents with a duty to foster the virtue of humility (or what Pellegrino and Thomasma call self-effacement). The implications of this argument include a requirement for self-reflection in one's role as a moral agent and reflection on one's progress toward developing or deepening virtuous engagement with the moral community of medicine. I recommend that professionalization of clinical ethics consultants include a self-reflective narrative component in the initial certification and ongoing renewal of certification where clinical ethics consultants address the emotional dimensions of their work as well as their own moral development. Adopting a teleological view of ethics consultation and incorporating narratives that work toward that purpose will mitigate the self-interest and hubris of the professionalization project., (© 2023. The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V.)

AbstractClinical ethicists are routinely consulted in cases that involve conflicts and uncertainties related to surrogate decision-making for incapacitated patients. To navigate these cases, we invoke a canonical ethical-legal hierarchy of decision-making standards: the patient's known wishes, substituted judgment, and best interest. Despite the routine application of this hierarchy, however, critical scholarly literature alleges that these standards fail to capture patients' preferences and surrogates' behaviors. Moreover, the extent to which these critiques are incorporated into consultant practices is unclear. In this article I thus explore whether, and how, existing critiques of the hierarchy affect the application of these standards during ethics consults. After discussing four critiques of the hierarchy, I examine how two prominent published ethics consultation methodologies-bioethics mediation and CASES-incorporate these critiques differently. I then argue that while both methodologies explicitly endorse the same hierarchy, the varying degrees to which these four criticisms are incorporated into the prescribed consultation process could produce different applications of the same standard. I demonstrate with a case study how an ethics consultant following either methodology might produce two substantively different recommendations despite using the same substituted judgment standard. I conclude that while this heterogeneity of application should not dismantle the hierarchy's status as field-wide canon, it complicates projects of professional ethics consultation consensus building.

Leading paradigms of clinical ethics consultation closely follow a biomedical model of care. In this paper, we present a theoretical reflection on the underlying biomedical model of disease, how it shaped clinical practices and patterns of ethical deliberation within these practices, and the repercussions it has on clinical ethics consultations for patients with chronic illness. We contend that this model, despite its important contribution to capturing the ethical issues of day-to-day clinical ethics deliberation, might not be sufficient for patients presenting with chronic illnesses and navigating as "lay experts" of their medical condition(s) through the health care system. Not fully considering the sources of personal knowledge and expertise may lead to epistemic injustice within an ethical deliberation logic narrowly relying on a biomedical model of disease. In caring "for" and collaboratively "with" this patient population, we answer the threat of epistemic injustice with epistemic modesty and humility. We will propose ideas about how clinical ethics could contribute to an expansion of the biomedical model of care, so that important aspects of chronic illness experience would flow into clinical-ethical decision-making., (© 2022. The Author(s).)

Clinical ethics consultants (CECs) work in complex environments ripe with multiple types of expectations. Significantly, some are due to the perspectives of professional colleagues and the patients and families with whom CECs consult and concern how CECs can, do, or should function, thus adding to the moral complexity faced by CECs in those particular circumstances. We outline six such common expectations: Ethics Police, Ethics Equalizer, Ethics Superhero, Ethics Expediter, Ethics Healer or Ameliorator, and, finally, Ethics Expert. Framed by examples of requests for ethics consultation that illustrate each kind, along with brief descriptions, we argue that while these expectations ought to be resisted for clear and practical reasons, they also create opportunities for CECs to articulate, educate, and ultimately be responsible to the professional demands of clinical ethics work. Recognizing, acknowledging, and at times resisting those expectations thus become key activities and responsibilities in the performance of ethics consultation., (© 2022. The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V.)